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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis interrogates the relationship between the emerging transnational field 
of nation branding practice and Polish national identity discourse. It sets the analysis 
of its findings in the contexts of the dominant neo-liberal political economy and 
promotional culture in Poland, but its examination considers the socio-historical 
conditions of the post-Soviet era accompanying nation branding as a nation building 
process. By considering specific settings, it outlines a reflexive case study, addressing 
a shift in the economy of practices at the crossovers of the Polish state’s structures, 
business groups, the mass media, and cultural intermediaries of nation branding. 
 
This study draws from Bourdieu’s theoretical oeuvre, nationalism scholarship, 
and corporate communications models. First, it demonstrates the growing impact of 
corporate communications models on the state as a democratic polity. Second, it 
sketches out the foundations for the empirical part of the study. Methodologically, it 
uses an interpretive approach to reveal collective action accompanying the nation 
branding exercise in Poland.  It draws from a range of data to reconstruct the contested 
vision of the field of nation branding and the dynamics of the relationship between 
institutional and individual actors performing nation branding in Poland.  
 
The findings of this study unfold the implications of the imposition and invasion 
of nation branding within the Polish field of power, specifically with regards to the 
marketisation of Polish national identity, its co-construction and reproduction; 
attempts to further corporatise overseas propaganda on behalf of the Polish field of 
power; and a growing impact of private sector consultants on public policy making in 
post-Soviet Poland. Primarily, this thesis argues that one of the biggest consequences 
of the invasion of nation branding in Poland is the emergence of corpo-nationalism - a 
form of economic nationalism which was a weak component, until now, of political 
economy changes in Poland, post 1989. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
SETTING THE SCENE 
 
Since 1989, the Polish state has been undergoing changes driven by neo-liberal 
political economy. Although social theorists have already explored social forces 
responsible for the introduction of neo-liberalism in Poland (Sidorenko 1998), there is 
little evidence regarding the relationship between systemic changes in the Polish 
political field, the sub-fields of institutionalised government communications and 
newcomers into this social space. Although neo-liberalism has mesmerised the Polish 
political class, ontologically it did not undermine the Polish state, but created a setting 
in which policy makers needed to consider the ‘transnational position’ of Poland by 
extending the national economy to transnational markets’ priorities. Simultaneously, 
the speed of neo-liberalisation in Poland overpowered a sense of economic 
nationalism (Szlajfer 1997), and the Polish state lacked an explicit nation building 
mechanism that would suit world-views on globalising the political economy. A group 
of newcomers into the Polish state structures, nation branders, offered consultancy that 
responded to this demand.   
 
Furthermore, neo-liberalism has reinforced the neo-Darwinian notion of 
competitiveness among enterprises in Poland, and left Polish state policy makers in an 
assumed position to consider their reputation on global markets. While the policy 
discourse on economic interdependence of the Polish state emerged in the political 
field soon after the imposition of ‘shock therapy’ (1990), the policy planning to 
integrate with Western political economy structures accelerated public affairs’ 
discourses on linking the Polish state interests and its overseas reputations (Kukliński 
and Pawłowska 1999). At that time, the Polish government launched communicative 
efforts to represent the Polish national market as foreign capital friendly. The initial 
post 1989 attempts to market Poland involved institutional participation in exhibitions, 
production and distribution of brochures and gadgets, enactment of media relations by 
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the state bureaucrats, commissioning advertorials and transnational advertising 
campaigns. One of those campaigns, ‘Poland: towards the year 2000’, represented 
political economy changes in Poland in the following way: “An historic process is 
under way; Poland is reforging her identity by seizing and creating opportunities for 
the new Europe” (Time International 1991). Over the years, the Polish state 
campaigning efforts took various bureaucratic routes and became institutionalised 
within numerous institutions of the Polish state. For the Polish political field, however, 
the accession to the European Union (EU) proved particularly challenging in terms of 
managing world public opinion (Ociepka and Ryniejska 2005). In the run-up to EU 
accession, interest groups struggled for policy solutions explicitly bridging national 
competitiveness on global markets with national identity. 
ACTORS AND THEIR PLAY 
 
 While ad hoc transnational campaigns on behalf of the Polish governments 
were commissioned soon after 1989, a codified ‘promotional policy’ making has been 
taking place since the mid-1990s within the Polish state structures and its sub-field of 
‘national images management’. Today, its enactment involves private sector actors, 
some of whom, over the years, attempted to shape the policy directions. Throughout 
this study, my analysis leads to the re-construction of initiatives of the actors engaged 
in nation branding and primarily concerns governmental, business interests groups, 
and a professional class of nation branders. Their collective actions, aligned with the 
Polish state’s bureaucracy, have been further mediated through the structuring entities 
of the mass media, businesses, academia in Poland, and market research organisations. 
These actors have contributed to the perpetuation of nation branding and were used as 
facilitators for its dissemination. Principally, nation branding is a ‘bottom-up’ 
initiative that has been enacted at the crossovers of the state and corporate interests 
among the actors involved in policy discourse on the promotion of Poland. 
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REFLEXIVITY AND COMMUNICATIVE PRACTICES 
 
Before I embark on the analysis of the developing concept of nation branding, 
there are a few initial clarifications that reading of this study requires. Scholars have 
long recognised that images of the state largely depend on its position within the 
international power structure (Boulding 1959). However, its reception is context-
dependent and gives scope to influence domestic and international public opinion in 
the pursuit of domestic (public affairs) and foreign policy (foreign affairs) goals. In 
this study, I make references to academically recognised models and studies exploring 
fields of national images management. 
 
This study understands this field as the state governed, institutional structural 
network empowered by means of legal regulations and policy commitments, to 
exercise practices, including persuasive, political or marketing communications, in a 
struggle to manifest collective identities and leading to assumed change to images of 
the state and/or the nation. The critical assessment of European and Anglo-American 
academic literature in this area reveals parallel, relatively complementary coexistence 
of professional practice and academic research exploring relationships between 
collective identities constructions and their reception as images. In fact, there are two 
lucid themes emerging from this examination. First, nation branding emerges in 
academic and professional discourses as a ‘new’ concept competing with propaganda 
and its discursive re-inventions. Second, nation branding explicitly aims to bridge a 
gap between nationalism, national identity, national images and reputations.  
 
Although scholars (Moloney, Richards, Scullion, and Daymon 2003) argue for 
the development of systematic models of ‘public’ and ‘private’ political message 
production and consumption within domestic realms of government communications, 
foreign policy making and its mediation is defined by its own dynamics that merges 
global and local dialectics. Thus far, scholars have developed models of government 
overseas communication, but I argue that this approach is limiting in terms of 
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accounting for specific state actors and new entrants into the state structures bringing 
their discourses and practices into the new spaces. This ‘static’, ‘modelling’ approach, 
I argue, poses a challenge in terms of accounting for political economy and cultural 
dynamics in which institutional or social actors perform their practices and does not 
explicitly account for social change. Sensitive to Mosco’s (2009) views on political 
economy, this study explores how nation branding has been used as a power resource 
shaping changes within the institutional agency in Poland. By drawing from the social 
theory of Pierre Bourdieu, this study adopts a reflexive epistemology in the 
exploration of the relationships between actors within state structures and reveals the 
logic and consequences of reinventing Polish national identity as a ‘brand’.  
 
As far as studies on nation branding are concerned, there is still some ambiguity 
regarding its practice, which is particularly under-researched by scholarship on the 
Polish government overseas communication and its dynamics. Among the arguments 
emerging in contemporary scholarship, there are those based on quantitative and 
qualitative reasoning. The first suggest the growing amount of actors involved in 
national images making (Chong and Valencic 2001 p. 3).1 The latter reveals the 
introduction of normative approaches into this area of academic inquiry (Manheim 
1994). This field of studies originates in the early modernist state bureaucracies’ 
propaganda practice, which either has been analysed in the settings of public affairs or 
foreign affairs. The socio-historical accounts from the United Kingdom (L’Etang 
2001) reveal that, at the institutionalisation stage, the field was limited in size and 
explicitly used ‘propaganda’ as primarily of interest to military and diplomatic 
bureaucrats. Similarly, there is evidence to suggest that propaganda was the first 
                                                          
 
1
 Chong and Valencic (2001) refer to the body of academic works that examines the importance of 
images in international relations scholarship. They include a body of literature explaining the 
significance of images and long-lasting reputations in foreign policy. Among them are: Jervis (1970), 
‘The logic of images in international relations’; Brecher (1974), ‘Decisions in Israel's foreign policy’; Jervis 
(1976), ‘Perception and misperception in international politics’; Jervis, Lebow and Stein (1985) 
‘Psychology and deterrence’; Vertzberger (1989), ‘The world in their minds: information processing, 
cognition and perception in foreign policy decision making’; and Mercer (1996), ‘Reputation and 
international politics’. 
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institutionalised communicative practice used by the Polish governments in their 
communication efforts at the outset of the modernist era (Szczepankiewicz 2005).  
 
Understanding of this thesis requires explanation of formerly institutionalised 
communicative practices by the Polish field of national images management revealed 
in professional accounts by the management of institutional field actors. Among these 
practices are: ‘public diplomacy’; ‘cultural diplomacy’; ‘investment marketing’; and 
‘destination marketing’. At this stage, it has to be emphasised that my fieldwork took 
place at the time where the aforementioned practices had been adopted institutionally 
and nation branding was considered by the Polish state actors and policy makers 
participating in my research as one of a ‘model’ in the discourse on promotional 
policy. Therefore, this study explores trajectories of actions by agents advocating 
nation branding. Throughout my fieldwork, participants involved in nation branding 
make references to formerly institutionalised communicative practices by the Polish 
state. I define them below as per pre-existing academic accounts. Scholars working 
with the propaganda model defined this form of persuasive communications as: 
  
Deliberate, systematic attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate 
cognitions, and direct behaviour to achieve a response that furthers 
the desired intent of the propagandist (Jowett and O’Donnell 1999, p. 
6).  
 
Although international relations scholars (Nye 2004) analysing soft power 
relations between the states or social theorists discussing nationalisms (Hobsbawm 
1990) use the term propaganda,  communication studies scholars began to reinvent a 
propaganda model by offering new terminologies, often advanced without any 
empirical grounding. Manheim (1994) identifies two streams of propaganda studies. 
The first focuses on the psychological effects of propaganda influence. The second 
reveals propaganda techniques which lead to interest in “public relations, advertising 
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and marketing which tends to be expressed in more anecdotal and generally normative 
terms” (p. 5). The argument that public relations and marketing models and practices 
are applicable to the government overseas communications echoes in the academic 
discourse. For example, Wilcox, Ault, and Agee (1989 p. 395), in their definition of 
international public relations, suggest that this practice is enacted by governments:  
 
Planned and organized activities of organization, institution or 
government to establish mutually beneficial relations with the 
publics of other nations.  
 
While it is not clear from the above definition what establishing mutually 
beneficial relations involves in practical terms, the further impact of the normative 
public relations model (Grunig 1992) on the academic field of national images 
management is revealed. This is particularly so in the conceptual merger with the 
‘public diplomacy’ model (Gilboa 2008). Throughout the Cold War era, this term has 
been gaining currency. Public diplomacy as a communicative practice has been 
defined as:  
 
A government process of communicating with foreign publics (Tuch 
1990, p. 3). 
 
 
Yet another area that is closely aligned with public diplomacy is ‘cultural 
diplomacy’. This practice has also been institutionalised within the Polish field of 
national images management. Cummings (2003, p. 1) defines it as practice involving: 
  
The exchange of ideas, information, art, and other aspects of culture 
among nations and their peoples in order to foster mutual 
understanding. 
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While in the commercial world propaganda has lost much of its legitimacy and 
has been dominated by a pro-business conceptual re-invention of public relations 
(Moloney 2006), public diplomacy and cultural diplomacy (Dizard 2004) - 
traditionally considered by scholars as ‘political communication’ - have been also 
subject to re-invention. In terms of production and reception of messages, they can 
also include marketising messages (Cull 2008). Marketing practice, on the other hand, 
is by definition committed to legitimizing capitalist social order and the marketisation 
of new fields (Marion 2006). In fact, two areas of marketing practice that have been 
institutionalised within the Polish state structures are ‘investment marketing’ that is 
used as one of the institutional practices aimed at attracting foreign direct investment 
(Zhang 2005) and ‘destination marketing’ (Pike 2008, p. 27), institutionalised within 
the Polish state bureaucracy as an extension of the tourism policy. Therefore, 
nowadays, differentiation between ‘political’ and ‘marketing’ communications blends 
under the political economy of practices aligned with structures of the Polish state. 
 
Although it is beyond the scope of this thesis to explore every single one of 
those models in details, I introduce them at this stage, as they emerge in the academic 
works in relationship to nation branding, and importantly, emerge throughout the 
findings of this study. The aforementioned definitions of ‘propaganda’; ‘international 
public relations’; ‘destination marketing’, and ‘investment marketing’ refer to 
frequently discussed models in the academic field of national images management. 
While there are more variations of them emerging in communication studies discourse, 
I leave them out of the main discussion in this thesis as nation branding conceptualists 
neither recognise nor engage in debate with authors of those taxonomies2. Their 
                                                          
2
 Gilboa (2000) provides categorisation of public diplomacy specialisms:”‘media diplomacy’, where 
governmental officials use the media to promote conflict resolution; ‘media-broker diplomacy’, where 
journalists temporarily assume the role of diplomats and serve as mediators in international 
negotiations”. His work on public diplomacy recognizes even more terms appearing in the literature: 
‘teleplomacy’; ‘photoplomacy’; ‘sound-bite diplomacy’; ‘instant diplomacy’; ‘real-time diplomacy’; 
‘television diplomacy’, or the ‘CNN effect’. A starting point in his categorisation is acknowledgement 
that public diplomacy has been used as a euphemism for propaganda, but he continues to use the term 
public diplomacy, as it is rooted in the US academic tradition. The ‘CNN effect’, initially introduced 
by Livingston (1997) refers to the area of foreign policy where the mass media can perform the 
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presence in the scholarship demonstrates a fragmentation of ideas, terminological 
inconsistencies, conceptual mergers, and, as I will demonstrate, competition of new 
concepts with already existing models developed in this area of academic discourse. 
THE CURTAIN GOES UP: OVERVIEW OF THE THESIS 
 
This thesis is a contribution to the post-Kleinian (2000) tradition of commercial 
branding that triggered a body of academic works exploring cultural and ideological 
notions attributed to branding practice. The next chapter unfolds taxonomy used in 
nation branding, reveals existing conceptual debates and discusses empirical research 
on nation branding. Chapter 3 and 4 develop the conceptual framework for the 
empirical part of this thesis and introduce relevant theories explaining the relationship 
between nationalisms, media and globalism. Within those chapters I also present an 
outline of Pierre Bourdieu’s concepts guiding this study. Chapter 5 indicates the 
reasoning for studying nation branding in the context of the dominant neo-liberal 
political economy in Poland. Chapter 6 lays the methodological underpinnings for the 
data collection and explains procedures of its analysis. Chapters 7, 8 and 9 report on 
emic findings whereas chapter 10 unfolds epic analysis and discussion. Concluding 
this study, chapter 11, presents the consequences of the imposition of nation branding 
within the Polish state structures, points out the invasion of nation branding into the 
Polish political field, and offers a commentary on its consequences. The conclusion 
also discusses potential for further research in the area of nation branding.  
 
Finally, I would like to make a note on the language used in this thesis. This is 
both a warning to the readers and an introduction to the palette of linguistic flavours 
accompanying reflexive sociology. Among the linguistic tokens frequently occurring 
in this thesis are signifiers such as ‘structuring structures’; ‘structured structures’ 
‘field’; ‘habitus’; ‘praxis’; and ‘praxeology’. While my narrative explains the 
                                                                                                                                                                       
following roles: a) accelerate decision making; b) obstruct foreign policy process; and c) and set the 
political agenda. Finally, Seib (1997) offers a descriptive account of ‘headline diplomacy’.  
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taxonomic nuances emerging throughout this thesis, a full list of those terms has been 
provided for the reader in a glossary on p. 331. Given that academic discourses have 
the ability to shape meanings, at the outset, I would like to disclose that throughout the 
writing up stage, I aspired to remain faithful to academic and professional discourses 
informing this thesis. Given that this study draws from different strands of scholarship, 
the taxonomic complexity at times has been challenging to overcome. In the findings 
and analysis chapters, I have attempted to use the language as close as possible to the 
one used by my participants. Outlining the conceptual framework for this study has 
been done in a similar way. Throughout the part devoted to Pierre Bourdieu’s features 
of this study, I have, however, attempted to reduce his verbosity wherever possible. 
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CHAPTER TWO: FROM TOTAL WAR TO TOTAL MARKETING 
WHAT IS BRANDING?  
 
The concept of ‘brand’ is a product of promotional culture: its contemporary 
dominant meaning originates in marketing models and practice. Initially, it referred to 
commodity signification. Lee and Carter (2005, p. 226) define brands as “the means 
customers use to differentiate products and services based on extrinsic and intrinsic 
features and are the source of organizations’ competitive advantage”. Thus, branding 
is hardly new, but contemporary scholarship recognizes a shift of branding focus and 
its expansion into new areas of social agency. Arvidsson (2005, p. 244) notes:  
 
Originally, brands had referred to producers. They had generally 
served as a trademark or a ‘marker’s mark’ that worked to guarantee 
quality or to give the potentially anonymous mass-produced 
commodity an identity by linking it to an identifiable producer or 
inventor or a particular physical place. Nowadays, the brand, or the 
‘brand image’, began to refer instead to the significance that 
commodities acquired in the minds of consumers. 
 
The above shift refers to “contexts of consumption” (Grainge 2008, p. 25). 
Branding expansionism, on the other hand, suggests that this concept ventured into 
new fields of agency, changing not only the ways marketing is thought of, but more 
importantly, it describes a social shift in the culture-economy dynamics by increasing 
the amount of marketing activities. In formal terms, branding is a soft-selling tool that 
facilitates commodity exchanges and it is a pro-market oriented practice that aims at 
increasing the perceived value of commodities. The expansion of this marketing 
technique and its emergence in different contexts stems from an assumption of its 
universality: branding of products and services (Kapferer 2005); corporate branding 
(Balmer and Greyser 2003); personal branding (Montoya and Vandehey 2003); 
political parties’ branding (Reeves, Chernatony and Carrigan 2006) and branding of 
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higher education (Chapleo 2010). Even monarchies did not escape subjecting to the 
idea of branding (Greyser, Balmer, and Urde 2006). Finally, its discourse, in the form 
of ‘nation branding’ has entered the corridors of state power in post-Soviet Poland.  
 
In the conceptualisation of marketing’s ‘disciplinary shift’ that characterizes the 
development of branding in the twentieth century, it is important to note how branding 
has merged with corporate public relations. Moloney (2006) notes that in the mid-
1990s branding expanded corporate communication management frameworks. Before 
that, corporate branding was referred to as “corporate identity” or as a “what do we 
stand for?” metaphor (ibid., p. 141). The outcome of this merger between marketing 
and public relations - corporate communications - is an attempt to integrate various 
forms of organisational communication management. Given that the public relations 
(PR) academic discourse has a made a contribution to the field of national images 
management, the following overview of the literature considers how a social construct 
of branding is re-contextualised as a self-perpetuating management fashion.  
 
Corporate branding is an exercise in corporate image and corporate identity 
management and it is one of the tools in corporate communications. Cornelissen 
(2009, p. 5) defines this area of practice as a management  
 
...framework for the effective coordination of all internal and 
external communication with the overall purpose of establishing and 
maintaining favourable reputations with stakeholder groups upon 
which the organization is dependent on.  
 
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss corporate branding in detail. 
Nevertheless, a departure point for exploring the subject of this study, nation 
branding, is an indication of its relationship to corporate branding. There are two 
explicit connections that can be made at the surface level. First, marketing writings 
assume the universality of the brand construct. Balmer and Grayser (2003, p. 975) 
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claim that “corporate-level brands can also apply to countries, regions, and cities”. 
Second, corporate branding conceptualists contribute to the development of nation 
branding (Olins 1999). As it stands, terminology existing in the area of nation 
branding is derived from corporate branding. Corporate branding is a collective 
process engaging stakeholders which indicates parallels with nation branding 
aspirations with regards to collective identity construction. Finally, claims regarding 
the importance of branding to organizational management (Schultz, Antorini, and 
Csaba 2005) echo in the academic discourse highlighting the strategic role of nation 
branding to political governance (Dinnie 2008).    
 
The above utterances demonstrate the perpetuating notion of branding: 
nowadays the idea of nation branding is welcomed by the Foreign Affairs Ministries, 
Prime Ministers, and the state agencies. Jansen (2008, p. 123) notes, “even, public 
diplomacy, a nation’s attempt to shape its image and influence public opinion in other 
nations (that is, its propaganda), has come under the purview of nation branders”. In 
part, this thesis reveals how nation branding has been introduced to the state structures 
in Poland. The pages to follow provide definitions of nation branding and its critique. 
MAKING SENSE OF NATION BRANDING 
 
Nation branding originates in the marketing discipline, specifically its sub-field 
of place marketing. The emergence of place marketing as a semi-autonomous area 
goes back to 1993 when Kotler and colleagues (Kotler, Heider, and Rein 1993) 
published ‘Marketing places: attracting investment, industry, and tourism to cities, 
states, and nations’. Development of the term ‘nation brand’ is attributed to Simon 
Anholt, a marketing practitioner, policy-advisor and one of the authors in this area. In 
1996, Anholt spelled out this idea by referring to the particular states as brands. 
Initially, he talked about nation brands in the context of country-of-origin effect and 
signified ‘America’, ‘Brazil’, or ‘Switzerland’ as brands (Anholt 1998, p. 400).  
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Definitions of ‘nation brand’ and ‘nation branding’ did not emerge until early 
2000. It is said that there is a difference between the term ‘nation brand’ and ‘nation 
branding’. Fan (2005, p. 2) argues that a nation “has a brand image with or without 
national branding”. He defines nation branding as “applying branding and marketing 
communication techniques to promote a nation’s image”3 (ibid., p. 6). Therefore, the 
pre-existence of the notion of multiple ‘national images’ or ‘national stereotypes’ 
(Kunczik 1997, p. 46) tends to be replaced with a notion of ‘brand image’ (Gertner and 
Kotler 2004) and assumes applicability of branding into yet another social space. 
 
Fan (2005, p. 6) identifies different terminologies in the area of nation 
branding and categorizes them into: ‘product related’, ‘national level’ and ‘cultural 
focus’ definitions. The ‘product related’ grouping refers to a country-of-origin effect 
and implies the impact of the image of the country4 on its products (e.g. Swiss 
chocolate, Cuban cigars) as well as its inverted version - the impact of products on the 
country’s image (e.g. stylish French women in perfume advertising). The ‘national 
related’ category refers to the state’s ‘overall’ perceptions (e.g. Ireland as ‘Celtic 
tiger’). Finally, although Fan (2005) recognises ‘cultural focus’ definitions of nation 
branding, he does not provide insights into his understanding of national cultures and 
collective identities. Elsewhere, however, Anholt (2007) argues that national culture is 
one of the elements that should be taken into consideration while developing nation 
brand strategy. The first handbook of nation branding defines nation brand as: 
 
                                                          
3 Williams (1977) argues that when taking up definitions one should start with basic ‘practices’, not 
formed concepts. Although definitions of nation branding offer a basic explanation of this concept, 
this study is concerned with understanding of nation branding by the agents who engage in its 
practice. Following Champagne (2005) and Bourdieu (1985), in a later part of this thesis, I reflect on 
my pre-understanding of this concept and aim to reveal its enactment within the political economy 
settings in Poland between 1999 and 2010. 
 
4
 In this part of the thesis, I remain faithful to marketing authors’ loose use of terminology signifying 
‘objects’, e.g. a country (as opposed to the state). Later, however, I explain my understanding of the 
relationship between branded territorial entities and professional class of nation branders. My 
understanding of the state and the professional class of nation branders is informed by Bourdieu and 
colleagues’ (Bourdieu, Wacquant and Farage, 1994) views on the state and Brubaker’s (1996) notion 
of ‘nationess’.  
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...the unique, multidimensional blend of elements that provide the 
nation with culturally grounded differentiation and relevance for all 
its target audiences (Dinnie 2008, p. 15). 
 
The ‘communication based’ approach to nation branding has been extended by 
the introduction of ‘a policy based approach’, so-called ‘competitive identity’ 
management. A key proponent of this idea argues that a departure point for nation 
branding is evocation of “a spirit of benign nationalism amongst the populace, 
notwithstanding its cultural, social, ethnic, linguistic, economic, political, territorial, 
and historical division” (Anholt 2007, p. 16). He further says:   
 
National identity and nation brand are virtually the same thing: 
nation brand is national identity made tangible, robust, 
communicable, and above all useful. Unless the overall strategy 
chimes with something fundamentally true about place and its people, 
there is little chance that it will be believed or endorsed by the 
population, let alone the rest of the world (ibid. p.75). 
 
While the above explanations make a connection between branding and national 
identity, they do not reveal a modus operandi of nation branding. By introducing 
comparative metaphors, they offer tautological explanations of the relationship 
between nation branding, national identity, and national images. Given that, allegedly, 
the ‘proper nation brand management’ involves a broad range of subject areas, such as 
policy-making aligned with foreign direct investment, tourism industry, cultural 
policy, or foreign policy, it is, at this stage, virtually impossible to comprehend the 
mechanism of its practice. In this logic, all aspects of political economy and social 
agency seem to be enacted as part of the nation branding exercise. Therefore, I argue, 
that this universalising feature of nation branding writings requires conceptual 
reflection and empirical insights. The latter might facilitate understanding of nation 
branding practice and its relationship to national identities construction. 
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ECONOMICS OF NATION BRANDING AND ITS PROCESS 
 
Initially, there were three contributors to nation branding discourse made by 
Simon Anholt, Mark Leonard, and Wally Olins. The literature reveals that the first 
author has coined the term ‘nation brand’ and written on the subject. Anholt is also an 
editor of a journal entitled ‘Place branding and public diplomacy’. By now, aspects of 
his professional practice have already been analysed and these include consultancy, 
policy advisory, and public speaking on the subject of nation branding (Aronczyk 
2008). Wally Olins, on the other hand, had previously written on corporate branding. 
In one of the first public defences of nation branding, Olins (1999, p. 1) argues for 
overlapping identities between the state and corporate enterprises: 
 
The relationship between countries and companies is changing. In 
some ways they are becoming more like each other. Nations 
increasingly emphasize nationality; global companies increasingly 
ignore it. Nations increasingly use business speak – growth targets, 
education targets, health targets; global companies increasingly 
emphasis soft issues, their value to the society and their benevolent 
influence. The relationship between companies and countries is 
getting closer. They compete, they overlap, they swap places. Perhaps 
the most significant, most misunderstood of this phenomenon emerges 
in the way nation now attempts to build a brand.  
 
The above paragraph reveals a new intertwining order in discourses on branding, 
national identity, and globalization. The early research on nation branding came from 
the United Kingdom. Awan (2007) reveals that its advocates clustered around ‘The 
Foreign Policy Centre’ think-tank and had answers with regards to ‘redesigning 
Britain as a multicultural society. The discourse on nation branding emerged in the UK 
after the government’s ‘Cool Britannia’ campaign (Leonard 1997; Roy 2007). The 
first public debate regarding nation branding exercise was met with criticism and 
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faded away as it lost government support (McNeill 2004). The media studies scholars 
recognised the British nation branding exercise in the following terms:  
 
New, more sellable ways to describe us differently with breathy 
excitement, for it was suggested if you could describe us differently, 
perhaps, hey-presto, we would be different. It was an essentially 
propagandistic and certainly ideological view of Britishness, self-
consciously shaped for selling us to ourselves and abroad (Curran and 
Seaton 2010, p. 300). 
 
Although nation branding discourse lost continuity in the UK political field, 
nation branding publishing continued. The logic of US domination in commercial 
branding accompanies Anholt and Hildreth (2004) in their discussion on ‘the brand 
America’. While in US nation branding emerged as a solution to negative perceptions 
of the US in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, there are anecdotal explanations of 
the intertwining relationship between nation branders and US politics. For example, 
Anholt and Hildreth (ibid, p. 6) argue that the US is the mother of all brands as it 
“quite consciously built and managed itself as a brand right from the very start”. By 
applying anachronism to their argument, they interpret the US history to the tune of 
branding logic. Research demonstrating the dynamics of the relationship between the 
marketing industry, the US government and nation branding analyses the ‘Shared 
Values Initiative’ campaign managed by ex-advertising executive, Charlotte Beers. 
She was appointed by George W. Bush as the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy 
and Public Affairs (Plaisance 2005; Fullerton and Kendrick 2006). 
 
The principles of competitive globalised markets are justification of the nation 
branding. Olins (1999, p. 4) provides the following rationale for nation branding: 
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competition between nations today increasingly takes place in three 
commercial areas - inward investment, tourism, and export of goods 
and services - where success or failure can accurately be charted, and 
where the questions of reputation, image, identity and hence 
marketing and branding are central to competitive edge.  
 
Later, Olins (2005) discusses the importance of public diplomacy for nation 
branding. In fact, the four dimensions of the state policies - inward investment, 
tourism, trade, and public diplomacy - are dominant sub-areas of interest for nation 
brand conceptualists. The marketing academics have responded enthusiastically to the 
idea of nation branding. Their works, however, tend to be descriptive, terminogically 
derivative, and make executive recommendations that can supposedly be applied to 
practice (Hereźniak 2010). Furthermore, the conceptual transformation of branding 
into the statehood resulted in the formation of preconceived notions.  
 
Kotler and Gertner (2002) suggest applying a strengths, weaknesses, 
opportunities and threats analysis to determine nation brand qualities. Gnoth (2002) 
speaks of product brand leveraging into nation brand. Gilmore (2002) discusses nation 
brand positioning whereas Viosca, Bergiel, and Balsmeier (2005) make 
recommendations with regards to nation brand equity management. The imperative 
overtone of nation branding discourse marries with advocacy of an executive approach 
to its enactment. This managerialism echoes in the works of Gertner and Kotler (2004) 
who argue that branding is a technique thanks to which ‘places’ can manage their 
identities and images. Among descriptive, ‘success stories’, assuming nation branding 
in various national contexts are Spain (Gilmore 2002), Australia (Olins 2002b) and 
New Zealand (Morgan, Pritchard, and Piggott 2002). While marketers attempt to 
intellectualize nation branding, its mechanics is rather simple. Olins (1999, p. 23-24) 
outlines a seven-step process that Jansen (2008, p. 130) paraphrased and abridged: 
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1. Create a working group with representatives of government,       
industry, the arts, education and the media to implement the 
initiative. 
 
2. Using qualitative and quantitative methods, find out how the 
nation is viewed both domestically and abroad. 
 
3. Consult with opinion-leaders regarding the nation’s strengths 
and weakness and compare results with findings of the internal 
and external studies. 
 
4. Identify the core strategy of the campaign, and create the central 
idea on which the strategy is based; basically this boils down to a 
slogan, around which the rest of the campaign is framed. 
 
5.  Develop a visual design and attach it to everything that 
represents the nation abroad. 
 
6.  Correlate and adjust the message to target audiences: tourism, 
internal and external investors. 
 
7. Create a public-private liaison group to launch the programme 
and keep it active in government, commerce, industry, the arts, 
and media, etc”. 
 
In summary, the above section indicates that branding has been adopted into 
many fields of agency. Conceptually, nation branding writings strive to contribute to 
the field of national images management whereby the state and non-state actors 
attempt to challenge mediated pre-understandings of national identity features. The 
section below, on the other hand, maps out the academic literature in this area with a 
particular focus on conceptual debates and existing research. In the light of this 
overview, I argue that the application of nation branding into the area of statehood is 
part of the process of corporatization of government communication. This process 
manifests itself by re-inventing propaganda by corporate communication models.  
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GENESIS OF NATIONAL IMAGES MANAGEMENT 
 
The literature review of this thesis reveals that national images management is 
the extension of political fields. It is a specialised, institutional network engaging 
communication persuasive practices aimed at changing images of nations. 
Traditionally, the modernist states were the keys player in this area. The modernist era 
(1917-1939)5 gave birth to the professionalization and furthering institutionalisation of 
government overseas propaganda. In Poland this process began as part of the state-
building at the beginning of the twentieth century. Pratkanis and Aronson (1991) call 
this feature of modernism an ‘age of propaganda’. Indeed, academic works discussing 
the early modernist government communication efforts demonstrate how propaganda 
was practiced as part of the military warfare during the First World War (Taylor 
1981). Given the role of overseas propaganda in facilitating military conflicts, 
propaganda has been associated with ‘deceit’; ‘manipulation’; ‘mind control’; 
‘brainwashing’. Later, the widespread application of propaganda within political fields 
that stood in opposition to Western liberalism or capitalist order contributed to 
negative associations of this signification of persuasive communications. Kunczik 
(1997) goes as far as to argue that propaganda, public relations and public diplomacy 
are synonymous terms underpinned by persuasion as their inherent feature. 
 
Moreover, one trend emerging within the academic discourse on the subject can 
be noted: while the term ‘public diplomacy’ was coined as a response to propaganda’s 
negative connotations (Staar 1988), ‘new public diplomacy’ (Mellissen 2005) has been 
shaped by corporate communications models and the notion of ‘relationship building’ 
in order to fit neo-liberal globalism (Held and McGrew 2002). I argue that this notion 
fits the neo-liberal sensibilities of interconnectedness and interdependency between 
                                                          
5
 Szczepankiewicz (2005) demonstrates when overseas propaganda was institutionalised in the Polish 
state back in 1917. In intellectual terms, I follow the structuralist sensibilities of modernity, but 
historiographically my thinking on modernity in the Polish context has been informed by Bauman 
(1997).  
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political fields; although ‘interconnectedness’ of the state marries with ‘the 
relationship building’ utterance favoured by nation brand conceptualists (Szondi 
2010), persuasion, inherent to ‘soft power’6 (Nye 1990), is not accounted for in those 
works. Olins (2003, p. 7) himself bluntly confesses that branding is about “persuading, 
seducing, and attempting to manipulate people into buying products and services”. In 
Poland, overseas propaganda was institutionalised as part of the state-building exercise 
after the First World War. The first text on nation brands - ‘Nation brands of the 
twenty first century’ – did not, however, emerge until end of 1990s (Anholt 1998). 
PROPAGANDA MEETS DIPLOMACY 
 
Propaganda has been identified as the first model to play a role in overseas 
government communication efforts. Its institutionalisation coincided with in the 
modernist notion of a ‘total war’ (Taylor 1981). Thus propaganda was considered as a  
coercive feature of the military warfare used in diplomacy (Ponsonby 1928), but soon 
after the First World War was thought of as applicable to relations between the states 
at the time of peace (Bernays 1928). In his study of the United States Information 
Agency (USIA), Bogart (1995, p. 195) discusses propaganda as a communicative 
practice which is “an art requiring a special talent”. Snow (1998, p. 619) takes a 
similar position of communicative practice at the USIA:  
 
USIA likes to call its particular branch of foreign affairs ‘public 
diplomacy’, a euphemism for propaganda. But USIA prefers the 
euphemism, because it doesn't want the US public to think that its 
government engages in psychological warfare activities, and because, 
among the general public, ‘propaganda’ is a pejorative catch-all for 
negative and offensive manipulation.  
 
                                                          
6
 Wang (2006) links the notions of ‘image’, ‘reputation’, with ‘soft power’. He draws from Nye’s 
scholarship to explain this concept. According to Nye (1990, p. x), soft power refers to “the ability to 
get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. It arises from the 
attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideals, and policies.” 
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Consequently, she favours the term ‘propaganda’ to describe the operations of the 
USIA as it refers to the “public relations instrument of corporate propaganda which 
‘sells’ the US story abroad by integrating business interests with cultural objectives” 
(p. 619). Although popularisation of the term of public diplomacy is accredited to 
Edmund Gullion, Cull (2008) traces its genealogy back to January 1856 when it was 
used by the London ‘Times’. In 1965 Gullion, the Dean of the Fletcher School of Law 
and Diplomacy, introduced the term ‘public diplomacy’ in the US.  
 
The USIA contributed to the US’s ideological domination in the post-Second 
World War order. Dizard (2004, p. XIV) unfolds this argument: “in this process USIA 
added a new dimension to the craft of propaganda, under a new rubric of public 
diplomacy”. This new form of propaganda was particularly important in Western-
Eastern relations. Staar (1986) provides an overview of Soviet and Western 
propaganda during the Cold War. Blitz (1986, p. 96) explains his perspective on public 
diplomacy, which he considers as public information or public communication aimed 
at shaping public opinion “by telling or displaying the truth”. While, in his view, 
persuasion is inherent to this practice, it can be also accredited with civic education 
exercised overseas. Blitz views public diplomacy as a euphemism for propaganda and 
claims that “public diplomacy is the open civic education of citizens of other countries 
using means that are not deliberately false. The point of public diplomacy is primarily 
political and there is nothing knowingly false in what it does” (ibid. p. 96).   
GOVERMENT PROPAGANDA MEETS CORPORATE ‘PR-PROPAGANDA’  
 
A separate contribution to the field of national images management has been 
made by scholars whose research has been informed by public relations models. The 
early research analysing public relations in the context of national images management 
was Manheim and Albritton’s (1984) examination of the media content of the US 
press. Their study takes an outward-inward view of the US political and media 
systems whereby its key components of media agenda, public agenda, and policy 
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agenda constitute a basis for understanding the role of external actors’ interests in 
shaping the mass media coverage. This research explores changing media agendas as 
an outcome of public relations counselling. Contemporary studies extend the notion of 
agenda setting to agenda-building (Kiousis and Wu 2008). 
 
Among conceptual works mapping out the crossovers between public diplomacy 
and public relations are normative suggestions informing its practice by corporate 
public relations models. As far as chronology is concerned, public relations’ merger 
with public diplomacy goes back to the mid-1980s. In 1992, Signitzer and Coombs 
pointed out that with an exception of Koschwitz who, in 1986, observed increasing 
‘public relations aspects’ in diplomacy, diplomacy theorists underestimated this area 
as a useful area of expertise. Signitzer and Coombs (1992, p. 145) talk of ‘conceptual 
convergence’ between diplomacy and public relations as driven by technological 
developments and political needs of the modern states. They conclude that “each area 
can benefit by learning the strengths of the other area and adopting them to the 
practice of dealing with foreign publics” (ibid. p. 145).  
 
Later, Kruckeberg and Vujnovic (2005) consider public relations as valuable in 
conceptualising public diplomacy. Drawing on Grunig and Hunt’s (1984) two-way 
symmetric model of public relations and Kruckeberg and Starck’s (1988) notion of 
community building, they suggest that both of those models prove efficient in public 
diplomacy practice in comparison to the US Cold War propaganda. By incorporating 
‘symmetry’ and ‘mutual understanding’, Kruckeberg and Vujnovic (2005) imply that 
this approach contributes to enhancement of public diplomacy practice. Similarly, 
Dutta-Bergman (2006) suggests that the international public relations literature 
provides a framework that allows a move away from the propaganda approach to 
public diplomacy. Drawing from the theory of communicative action (Habermas 
1984), Dutta-Bergman (2006) offers a cultural studies approach to public diplomacy, 
characterised by a shift from ‘imposing’ cultural values to promotion of ‘cultural 
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understanding’ and adopting a “public relations approach based on dialogue and 
respect for mutual values” (Dutta-Bergman 2006, p. 121-122). 
 
Application of public relations frameworks to diplomatic practice has triggered 
the emergence of, so-called, ‘new public diplomacy’. Melissen (2005b) has introduced 
the underpinnings of this approach by emphasising a requirement for expansion of 
social networks involved in public diplomacy, and has extended the notion of ‘soft 
power’ to more agents. Hocking (2005 p. 41), working with the ‘new public 
diplomacy’ model, points out that “public diplomacy in its state-based ‘strategic’ guise 
is a more sophisticated variant of a well-established idea - namely that ‘publics’ matter 
to government as tools of national foreign policy”. In the light of this view, and 
features adopted from corporate public relations, the ‘new public diplomacy’ raises 
questions about the relationship between agents involved in exercising soft power. 
 
Finally, Fitzpatrick (2007) talks about a ‘relationship building’ approach to 
public diplomacy. Her proposition is based on another public relations conceptual 
idea, borrowed from Ferguson (1984). This approach, largely in line with the 
Grunigian model of public relations, assumes that “if relationship building 
management were adopted as a general theory of public diplomacy, the defining 
worldview would be characterized by symmetry and mutuality and based on genuine 
dialogue” (Fitzpatrick 2007, p. 207). Yet again, this approach is consensual and 
normative: she does not address power relations between states or between public 
diplomacy agents.  
  
Critical theorists of public relations also expressed interest in this area. For 
example, L’Etang (1996) identifies similarities between public relations and public 
diplomacy. She notes that an intellectual home for diplomacy studies is a theory of 
international relations. In her view, this theory has analytical tools to explain changes 
in the international system whereas public relations scholars have not explored change 
as a feature of public relations practice. She argues that conceptual reading of the 
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impact that public relations has on diplomacy should be expanded by contextual and 
historical factors. L’Etang’s (1996) position is based on a view that there are very few 
studies exploring crossovers between public relations and diplomacy. Back then, she 
identified only three relevant papers (Traverse-Healy 1988; Signitzer and Coombs 
1992; Grunig1993). Since then new research has been published.    
 
Following the Grunigian model of ‘excellence in public relations’, Yun (2005; 
2006) demonstrates transferability of its conceptual features into ‘public diplomacy 
theory-building’. In his empirical research revealing crossovers of public relations and 
public diplomacy, Yun’s (2005) survey of foreign agents in Washington D.C. 
discusses public diplomacy management and behaviour. This comparative approach to 
public diplomacy analysis concentrates on public diplomacy behaviour and finds 
public relations management models applicable to the diplomacy practice context. 
Although this research contributes to an understanding of public diplomacy in the US, 
it neither considers features of persuasion nor the organisation of government 
communications in different realms of policy making. 
 
Revisiting academic works (L’Etang 2006a; Signitzer and Wamser 2006) shows 
more interest in this area. Signitzer and Wamser (2006) note a lack of common 
research culture between public relations and public diplomacy. Put simply, there is 
still limited evidence suggesting a shift from traditional ‘government-to-government’ 
to ‘government-to-people’ communications. In their view, it results in an intellectual 
divide that require addressing by empirical evidence. While the above academic works 
suggest that diplomatic practice can bridge domestic and foreign policy realms, there 
are models in the academic field of national images management that explicitly 
consider domestic stakeholders’ engagement in governments’ overseas 
communication. Among the models addressing the domestic-international dichotomy, 
are: ‘national projection’ (Tallents 1932), ‘mediated public diplomacy’ (Entman 
2008), and ‘strategic communications’ (Heller and Persson 2009).  
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The crossovers of state diplomacy and corporate communication are not only a 
result of their functional similarities, but also a consequence of interest by public 
relations consultancies (e.g. Hill & Knowlton) in diplomatic networks (Hiebert 2003). 
Academics, on the other hand, develop conceptual frameworks, supported by 
terminologies, taxonomies and modes of thinking that allow closer integration of the 
two areas – diplomacy and corporate communications. Needless to say, influencing 
international public opinion via media framing (Entman 2004; Entman 2008), agenda-
building (Kiousis and Wu 2008), agenda-setting (Manheim and Albritton 1984), and 
gate-keeping (Lord 1998) has played its role in foreign affairs. This is the area of 
research in which adoption of corporate public relations models, albeit debatable, 
illustrates the process of re-inventing propaganda that historically is an apparatus of 
domination used by governments and diplomatic networks (Taylor 1999). 
NATION BRANDING AND PUBLIC DIPLOMACY: EMERGING DEBATES  
 
The conceptualists of nation branding do not recognise ‘dichotomous models’: 
they neither refer to them nor engage in discussion with their authors. In fact, their 
interpretation of collective identity and its relationship with propaganda is trivialised. 
For example, Anholt (2007, p. 39) takes the following position on the relationship 
between the two models: 
 
It seems to me that what most people mean by propaganda is the 
deliberate manipulation of public opinion for the purpose of achieving 
a political end; the search for competitive identity is the consequence 
of realization that public opinion is an essential component of 
achieving a political end. It is, one might say, a necessary 
consequence of democracy and the globalization of the media. 
 
The relationship between public diplomacy and nation branding models has been 
examined by Szondi (2009a). His hermeneutic analysis of relevant scholarship leads to 
the identification of several plausible relationships between nation branding and public 
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diplomacy. He juxtaposes conceptual features of nation branding against those of 
public diplomacy. Below, I present his five conceptual positions.  
 
First, Szondi unfolds the view that public diplomacy and nation branding operate 
as separate areas of practice. He notes that after the end of the Cold War, public 
diplomacy was undergoing an ‘identity crisis’7. As a result, some states that had 
previously exploited public diplomacy have adopted nation branding and treat them as 
parallel and separate fields of practice with different objectives. For Szondi (2009a, p. 
17, original italics) “nation branding can also be characterised as the production of 
symbols, signs, territories and spaces for consumption which is manifested in 
consumers’ investing in the country, buying the countries’ products, or visiting a 
country and spending money there”. Conceptually, the economic exchange principle 
differentiates nation branding from public diplomacy and, in this approach, there is no 
assumed synergy linking communication outcomes of the two areas. 
 
The second type of relationship between public diplomacy and nation branding 
conceptualises public diplomacy as an integral part of nation branding strategy 
whereby nation branding is thought of as a master term. Szondi (2009a, p. 19) 
suggests that recent attempts by policy makers to develop nation branding-related 
policies aim at ‘commercialization of foreign policy and public diplomacy’. Given that 
there are still few contributions from academics researching public diplomacy, nation 
branding advocates make claims that their model incorporates all government-to-
foreign publics communication and this process creates a situation whereby 
  
 
                                                          
7
 It is argued that, at the time of the emergence of public diplomacy, ‘propaganda’ was going through an 
‘identity crisis’, as it carried negative historically-bounded connotations, which were considered as 
undesirable amongst the American political elites and diplomatic structures; public diplomacy was 
seen as a more acceptable euphemism for propaganda. Nowadays, public diplomacy scholars rarely 
talk about paradigm change and argue that its body of knowledge requires clarity (Gilboa 2008). 
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...public speaks to publics; when a substantial proportion of the 
population of the country – not just civil servants and paid 
figureheads – gets behind the strategy and lives it out in their 
everyday dealings with the outside world (Anholt 2003, p. 123).  
 
The third approach explaining the relationship between nation branding and 
public diplomacy assumes that nation branding fits into the strategic public diplomacy 
practice. Szondi (2009a) reveals that the state conducts public diplomacy efforts, but 
nation branding practice is not yet common. Thus far, nation branding has drawn only 
limited attention of international relations scholars. For example, Van Ham (2001) has 
explored the intersection between a broader field of place branding and international 
relations theory and locates nation branding within its constructivist paradigm. His 
work, however, has a few fundamental theoretical shortcomings. First, he uses the 
notion of branding, marketing, and public relations interchangeably and does not 
explicitly explain the relationships between them. Second, as Szondi (2009a) points 
out, international relations scholarship and marketing have different bodies of 
knowledge and Van Ham (2001; 2002; 2008) suggests that the origin of nation 
branding practice can be traced within the international relations scholarship. Put 
simply, Van Ham (2002) does not explain how constructivism, as a systemic theory of 
international relations, is linked with a micro-concept of branding. Rather, he outlines 
this conceptual relationship on the basis of terminological similarities between 
branding and international relations scholarship where ‘image’ and ‘identity’ 
constitute foundations for the relationship between their bodies of knowledge.  
 
The fourth interconnection between nation branding and public diplomacy 
considers them as distinct, but overlapping concepts, where each of them has separate 
characteristics. In this case, Szondi (2009a) subscribes to Melissen’s (2005a; 2005b) 
view who argues that public diplomacy and nation branding are separate models, but 
they share tactical practices. Nation branding, however, has much broader ambitions 
due to its ‘holistic’ approach, whereas public diplomacy strives to achieve individual 
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political objectives. Consequently, Szondi (2009a) identifies links that both models 
share. The first one is their commitment to national image management where 
reputation is a by-product of the two practices (Manheim 1994; Anholt 2003). Second, 
national identities and their manifestations are pivotal in public diplomacy and nation 
branding writings. 
 
Finally, in the last approach explaining the conceptual relationship between 
nation branding and public diplomacy, it is argued that they are synonymous. Here 
Szondi (2009a) argues that the nation branding conceptualists have paid limited 
attention to public diplomacy and frequently underestimate its intellectual oeuvre as 
well as treating it as a terminological substitute for nation branding. For example, 
Dinnie (2008, p. 251) claims that public diplomacy “at some point in the future 
supplants the term ‘nation branding’”. Szondi (2009a) concludes his evaluation with a 
statement suggesting that scholars might consider public diplomacy and nation 
branding as synonymous with propaganda or a post-modern mutation of public 
diplomacy that is on an evolutionary line that started with propaganda. His discussion 
does not consider the shortcomings of the two models. Instead, he talks about the 
‘crisis of identities’ of communicative models preceding nation branding. 
DEPOLITICISING NATION BRANDING 
 
Of particular interest to nation branding conceptualists are changing political 
governance and consequences of those changes for the state. Simultaneously, the 
nation brand conceptualists are self-declared protagonists of a globalised market 
economy. For example, Anholt (2006b, p. 2) reveals his position on the relationship 
between nation branding and global economy in the following passage:  
 
I have always held the view that the market-based view of the world, 
on which theory of place branding is largely predicted, is an 
inherently peaceful and humanistic model for the relationship between 
 29 
 
nations. It is based on competition, consumer choice and consumer 
power; and these concepts are intimately linked to the freedom and 
power of the individual. For this reason, it seems far more likely to 
result in lasting world peace than a statecraft based on territory, 
economic power, ideologies, politics or religion.  
 
This logic has reinforced a theme of, so called, ‘post-politics’ where nation branding 
marks its influence as a deus ex machina of neo-liberal identity politics (Bolin and 
Ståhlberg 2010). Van Ham (2001) signifies nation branding as the beginning of a post-
political era. He argues that nation branding marks “a shift in political paradigms, a 
move from a modern world of geopolitics and power to the postmodern world of 
images and influence” (Van Ham 2001, p. 4). This argument, in my view, continues a 
debate on national identities - the means of their reinvention and construction. 
 
The ‘ahistorical’ intellectualisation of branding-driven national identity 
construction echoes debates within the literature. It is argued primarily via alleged 
universality and long-lasting existence of nation branding. Olins (2002a) exemplifies 
this point in his polemic with Girard on the subject of nation branding in France. 
Girard (2001), one of the early critics of nation branding, argues that the idea of nation 
branding is politically and culturally grounded, and is not acceptable to some 
governments and nations. The polemical response was put forward by Olins (2002a). 
Within it, he uses an anachronic reading of history to argue that the French nation had 
undergone ‘re-branding’ each time a political regime of the French state changed. This 
revisionist interpretation, lacking socio-historical evidence, contributes to the 
formation of mythologized marketing notions.  
 
Within the emerging body of literature on nation branding, there are also 
arguments implying pragmatism and non-ideological features of nation branding. Yet 
again, Van Ham (2002, p. 263) spells them out in the following passage: 
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  ...this makes state branding different from classical ideology, 
although the comparison with Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union 
and their strong logos (swastika, hammer and sickle), slogans, 
emotive identities, and ideological manifestations is certainly 
tempting. Still, Coca-Cola does not send you to the Gulag if you refuse 
to buy their soft drinks, and Microsoft has no plans to annihilate the 
Untermensch using Linux software. This is not just a matter of 
gradation, or style; it makes all the difference. Behind the communist 
and fascist logos and ‘mission statements’ was a brutal state-machine 
that used almost random violence to intimidate people. Branding does 
also not take place in a vacuum; behind the power of the PR and 
image stands the power of practice. In general, ideology tends to 
differ from branding in that it takes itself (too) seriously and claims to 
offer the sole truthful image of the world, which sets it apart from the 
pragmatic and ideologically undogmatic thinking of PR-people and 
image makers.  
 
The above a priori assumptions about the relationship between branding and 
ideology and allegedly undogmatic mind-sets of public relations practitioners opposes 
a posteriori knowledge that has been revealed by academics studying public relations. 
While Van Ham (2002) speaks of the ‘non-dogmatic’ mindset of nation branders 
(referred to as ‘the PR-people’), his claims regarding this professional class do not 
define their identities and interests.8 He neither considers the evidence exploring issues 
                                                          
 
8
 Although Van Ham (2002) suggests that the professional background of nation branders lies in public 
relations practice, he does not offer any evidence to support his claims. However, in more recent 
research, Aronczyk (2009, p. 295) defines nation-branders as ‘consultants’: “a category of 
professionals whose primary role is to offer advisory services to national leaders in the general arenas 
of reputation, image, and identity. This includes a highly circumscribed group of individuals and firms 
devoted to the practice of nation branding specifically, but it can also extend to encompass advertising 
and marketing executives, “creativity” or “competitiveness” gurus, business and social science 
academics, and others who see their work as influencing policy prescriptions that regulate the 
intangible attributes of countries for the purposes of national development”.  
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of power in public relations (Edwards 2007), nor the body of research revealing how 
public relations is used by governments to mediate policies at home (Mickey 1997; 
L’Etang 1998; Richards 2004) and abroad (Kruckeberg and Vujnowic 2005).  
 
The area of statehood that has been characterised shifting towards this ‘post-
political’ is that of diplomacy practice. From the state perspective, “diplomacy is 
concerned with advising, shaping and implementing foreign policy” (Barston 2006 p. 
1). The emergence of nation branding, however, leads Van Ham (2001 p. 6) to suggest 
that brand management has made an impact on the practice of diplomacy: 
 
The traditional diplomacy of yesterday is disappearing. To do their 
jobs well in the future, politicians will have to train themselves in 
brand asset management. Their tasks will include finding a brand 
niche for their state, engaging in competitive marketing, assuring 
customer satisfaction, and most of all, creating brand loyalty.  
 
Van Ham does not explain what the social forces driving and mediating those changes 
are. Given that models of propaganda, public relations, and public diplomacy have 
been utilized in diplomatic practice, it is worth asking about the role and relationship 
of nation branding with the political fields set in the context of a particular state. The 
aforementioned claims of nation brand conceptualists about the changing dynamics of 
politics, nationalism, and its international outcomes are controversial and find no 
validation in a broader body of knowledge. Yet, nation branding is presented as a 
panacea and we are invited to believe that branding can resolve economic problems, 
particularly of developing nations (Gertner 2007). 
 
Summing up, at this stage a few points can be made. First, there is a trend in the 
field of national images management that illustrates expanding corporate models into 
the area of statehood. Second, this area is much under-researched and nation branding 
in particular lacks empirical focus. Third, previous research on nation branding reveals 
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an inclination of political leaders and bureaucrats (Kaneva 2007a) to adopt nation 
branding to legitimize their power. Fourth, paradoxically, nation branding is 
considered by its critics as symptomatic of collective identity crisis (Girard 2001, p. 
22). The affinity of nation branding with the political fields not only situates 
politicians or bureaucrats as ‘managers of public life’, but it affects qualities of public 
discourses regarding nationhood and, indeed, can be considered as starting point for a 
qualitative shift towards accelerating marketisation of national identities at the time 
when global and local features of national identities often intertwine. 
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CHAPTER THREE: NATIONALISM, NATION-BUILDING, GLOBALISM   
 OVERVIEW 
 
This chapter introduces the theoretical underpinnings of my thesis. To 
contextualise my research, I draw from structuralist and constructivist perspectives on 
nationalism and Pierre Bourdieu’s social theory. First, I turn attention to theories of 
nationalism as they provide a framework enabling explanation of national identity. 
Second, Bourdieu’s oeuvre allows a data-laden analysis of nation branding. The 
epistemological significance of Bourdieu’s meta-theory is not exclusively theoretical, 
but it allows exploration of practice by the field actors. The strength of Bourdieu’s 
theory of practice has also been recognised in promotional culture studies within the 
Anglo-American academic fields in the areas of media studies and nation branding. 
THE ‘STATE’ AND THE ‘NATION’ DEFINED 
 
There are many academic perspectives on state-building which have provided 
theoretical underpinnings explaining political, social, and economic forces 
contributing towards the formation of political entities.9 Regardless of the perspective 
there is, however, a common agreement that the state is ontologically a dominant, but 
not exclusive, actor responsible for national identities construction. A distinction 
between ‘the state’ and ‘the nation’ is justified, particularly when considering social 
theory explanations of the relationship between these two analytical categories.   
 
Smith (2001, p. 12) asserts that “the concept of the state relates to institutional 
activity” while “the nation denotes a type of community” and explicitly sketches out a 
distinction between the two analytical categories. On this basis, he defines the state as 
                                                          
9
 Rae (2002) has conducted a review of main theoretical explanations of state-building, which she 
suggests, have been recognised by historical sociologists and institutional economists. Those accounts 
do not however emphasize the role of culture and identity in state-building. Those are traditionally 
assigned to social theorists’ interpretations. Among the most frequently recognized approaches 
embracing culture and identity are materialist explanations of Wallerstein (1979); institutional 
accounts of North (1981); power-based explanations of Giddens (1985); and rational choice 
explanations of Hardin (1995). 
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“a set of autonomous institutions, differentiated from other institutions, possessing a 
legitimate monopoly of coercion and extraction in a given territory”. For Baylis and 
Smith (2006) , the state is a dominant, institutional representation of the community of 
people, which enjoys legal recognition by the community of other nations, and which, 
by means of ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ power and legitimised representation, governs a 
community of people. Although in this approach the relationship between the state and 
its nation is limited to the confines of a single polity, nationalism scholarship has 
considered the relationship between ‘global’ and ‘local’ realms of the state and 
national identities construction (Arnason 1990; Delanty and O’Mahony 2002).  
 
The preceding distinction between the state and the nation, albeit functional at 
this stage, requires definition of the term ‘nation’. Here, I have recourse to 
Guibernau’s (2007, p. 60) definition of a nation as “a human group conscious of 
forming a community, sharing a common culture, attached to a clearly demarcated  
territory, having a common past, a common project for the future, and claiming the 
right to rule itself ”. As far as the Polish state is concerned, its relationship with the 
Polish nation has been emphasised by Shields (2007, p. 174) in the following passage:  
 
In Poland, 'the nation' has been predominantly explained in ethnic 
terms, mainly because sovereign statehood was lacking for most of 
modern Polish history. Nation and state have historically been 
understood as distinct if not antagonistic. 
 
While historically it might have been the case, in recent years the Polish state and 
nation have been subjected to centrifugal and centripetal forces reshaping the 
dynamics of their relationship. Bearing in mind the state and the nation dichotomy, I 
move on to review the literature on nationalism in order to contextualise the analysis 
of nation branding and its capacity to shape Polish national identity. 
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NATION-BUILDING AND NATION- DESTROYING 
   
Despite similarities and differences amongst polities, the state-centred accounts 
of national identity construction share ‘nation-building’ as a process in collective 
identity formation. When the term ‘nation-building’ appeared in the 1960s, it primarily 
signified unification of post-colonial communities. Today, scholars find it useful as a 
category aimed at examination of the state’s role in constructing identity features. The 
term nation-building aimed at an epistemological break with systemic (Durkheimian) 
or developmental (Weberian) analyses of the relationship between the state and the 
nation. For example, Deutsch (1966, p. 3) claims that his conceptualisation provides a 
greater analytical scope, and suggests that nation-building is “an architectural or 
mechanical model”. While the ‘social engineering’ approach (Shah 2003) identifies 
components required to be ‘put in place’ to define the ‘nation’ (e.g. communities, 
characteristics, needs, sense of identity, communication), Deutsch’s functionalistic 
view laid the foundations for constructivism in nationalism studies.   
 
After the emergence of the nation-building concept, scholars extended the scope 
of this process by emphasising the social change that nation-building involves. 
Connors (1972) claims that nation-building leads to nation destroying. He argued that 
“since most of the less developed states contain a number of nations, and since the 
transfer of the primary allegiance from these nations to the state is gradually 
considered sine qua non of successful integration, the true goal is not nation-building, 
but nation-destroying” (p. 336). The social changes require manipulation of national 
allegiance by the state to ensure the continuation of the nation. The construction of 
national identity narratives often forces the need to challenge the existing national 
bonds. Therefore, nation-building coexists with nation destroying. Following 
Deutsch’s (1966) reasoning, it can be suggested that, because the state precedes and 
constructs the nation, by inverse logic, the nation could precede and construct the 
state. Because the genesis of the Polish nation is not at the centre of this thesis, I focus 
on academic accounts revealing reproduction of national identities. 
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PARADIGMS IN NATIONALISM STUDIES  
 
While for conceptualists, a departure point for the nation branding exercise is an 
effort to enthuse ‘benign nationalism’ (Anholt 2007), there are emerging narratives 
taking this argument a step further by claiming that nation branding can supplant 
nationalism all together (Van Ham 2001). Simultaneously, connections between nation 
brand and nation identity are also implicit. Anholt (2007, p. 75) suggests that “nation 
brand is national identity made robust, communicable and above all useful”. The 
relationship between nationalism, national identity and nation brand has not been, 
however, explicitly examined. Thus, it is important to unfold the significance of 
nationalism to collective identity construction and abilities of nationalism to merge 
with other areas of practice derived from other than the Polish state politics areas of 
practice, e.g. its capacity to merge with branding.  
 
To map out the existing schools of thoughts in the area of nationalism studies, I 
turn my attention to one of its most prominent contemporary scholars, Anthony D. 
Smith. For Smith (2001) the starting point for analysis of nationalism is an indication 
of its socio-historical underpinnings. He defines nationalism as “an ideological 
movement for attaining and maintaining autonomy, unity and identity for a population 
which some of its members deem to constitute an actual or potential nation” (ibid, p. 
9) and considers it as a belief-system characterised by: a) propositions to which most 
nationalists adhere; b) ideas present in nationalism, albeit in varying degrees; c) a 
range of concepts that give concrete meaning to the core abstraction of nationalism. 
That aside, Smith (2001) differentiates four key paradigms in nationalism studies: 
primordialist, perennialist, ethno-symbolism, and modernist. While I recognise the 
intellectual importance of them all, modernism and its constructivist offshoot have 
ontologically guided this thesis and design of my research.  
 
Modernists assert that nations originate driven by the emergence of nationalism - 
ideology, social movements, and symbolism - and were qualitatively new way of 
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organizing inner-state order. Nations, according to modernists, did not find socio-
political parallels prior to 1789. In short, nations and nation-building are the products 
of modernity (Smith 2001, p. 46). Among other processes, industrialization, division 
of labour, urbanization, and mobility are the key features of nation-building. In turn, 
these conditions required unification that was articulated in nationalist ideology. 
Gellner (1983, p. 48-49) encapsulates the modernist view on nationalism:  
 
God-given ways of classifying men, as an inherent though long-
delayed political destiny, are a myth: nationalism, which sometimes 
takes pre-existing cultures and turns them into nations, sometimes 
invents them, and often obliterates pre-existing cultures: that is 
reality, for better or worse, and in general and indispensable one.  
 
Although structuralism is considered as a dominant paradigm in nationalism, it 
is internally versatile and offers socio-economic, socio-cultural, political, ideological, 
and constructivist explanations. The modernist structuralism has been advanced by 
several scholars emphasising consequences of the state-centred nation-building. To 
Gellner (1983, p. 57), nationalism invents nations and replaces idiosyncratic social 
microstructures with national macrostructures. Hechter (1975) points out that unequal 
modernization by nationalism results in ‘inclusion’ and ‘exclusion’. He moves away 
from theorising modernization as a way of activating communities. Gellner (1983) 
also highlights the uneven effects of industrialization in nation-building. For both 
scholars, mobilization takes place in socio-economic and socio-cultural settings that 
validate capturing impressions of uniqueness (Delanty and O’Mahony 2002).  
 
Within this paradigm, the early work of Rokkan (1975) on ‘historical 
diachronics’ is pivotal to understanding the persistence of nationhood structures. For 
Rokkan (1975), the formation of nationhood involves confrontation and takes places at 
the crossovers between centres and peripheries. The political centres are the primary 
points of analysis as the power holders are involved in the boundary-spanning and 
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boundary-control in the areas relating to nationhood: commodity exchange, messages 
circulation, and codes or population control. The state-driven institutionalisation, 
ideological promulgation, religion and mass-media, the political and social centres 
perform an integrative role in the national identity formation. Rokkan’s (1975) 
structuralist position does not interpret national identity as static, but as competing 
with other forms of culturally bounded collective identities. Flora, Kuhnle and Urwin 
(1999) point out key characteristics in Rokkan’s theoretical framework as attempting 
to bridge the gap between sociological generalizations and historical contexts. 
 
While structuralism offers theoretical underpinnings for the analysis of 
nationalism, it has been criticised for its implicit determinism, preoccupation with 
industrialisation, European-centric analysis, homogenising effects, and ambiguous 
explanations of the relationship between top-down and bottom-up analytical 
approaches (Madianou 2005). Hobsbawm’s (1990, p. 11) reflection on nationalism 
highlights the fact that its ideology does not always guide “what is in the minds of 
even the most loyal citizens or supporters”. Therefore, nationalism might not be a 
dominant form of collective identity as national identification is prone to social 
change. Hobsbawm (1990) questions the deterministic top-down structuralist view and 
argues for dualism in the analysis of nationalism accounting for bottom-up agency.  
 
The modernist paradigm has been characterised by ‘class decoupling’, i.e. a 
relative independence in the distribution of power, wealth, and cultural capital from 
social structuring (Eder 1993). Over the years, the elitism in the nation-building 
process has been recognised as falling short in its analysis and scholars have identified 
a need to address the role of classes in the analysis of national identity. Whilst the 
Marxist analysis of class relations has emerged as an alternative to nationalism as a 
form of collective identity, its contemporary explanations indicate mutual, elitist and 
non-elitist, interest of class attachments to nation-building (Blum 2007). In this 
approach, state structures and the notion of ‘class’ have been factored into the analysis 
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of nationalism, structuralism, particularly constructivist orthodoxy, reveals subjective 
aspects of nationalism and national identity that comes with its discourses. 
 
Traditionally, constructivism is coupled with subjective aspects of nationhood, 
rooted in ethno-symbolic tradition. Its assumptions derive from the functionalist 
tradition (Deutsch 1966). In his early work, Hobsbawm (1983) points out that nations 
and nationalism owe much to the invention of the literary, national histories, 
mythology and symbolism. For Smith (2001, p. 79), constructivists place the emphasis 
on “social engineering, technological innovation and fashioning of a cultural artefact 
or a text, on the use of skill and imagination to create novel forms”. On the contrary, 
ethno-symbolists accentuate reinterpretation of cultural motives and reconstruction of 
earlier ethnic ties. Therefore, nations are considered as cultural artefacts where their 
imagining and reinvention is bounded by the production of nationhood narratives 
(Anderson 2006). In this approach, nations are understood as emotional communities, 
bounded by imagination and cognition. In the light of the above, constructivism 
enables the analysis of national identity narratives: it focuses on unfolding cultural 
references and representations of national features. Finally, constructivism draws the 
relationship between the past and present (Smith 2001).  
NATIONALISM AND GLOBALISM 
  
While pre-twenty century nationalism was characterised by monocentrism, this 
view has found an alternative in a polycentric analysis in nationalism studies. Given 
that neo-liberalism has contributed to the division of power centres, nationalistic 
monocentrism has been undermined by the complexity of new forces. This approach 
to nationalism recognises global cultural trends (Smith 1990) as key challenges to 
state-centric nationalism (Arnason 1990). The globalist thesis in nationalism 
scholarship is characterised by intellectual dualism. On the one hand, local 
nationalisms are seen as a reaction to globalism. One the other hand, nationalism finds 
manifestation in conflicting ideologies undermining the state monocentrism. This 
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thesis has been substantiated in the academic discourse by arguments on national 
identity fragmentation (Hopkins 2009); the demise of the state (Miyoshi 1993); 
consumer culture (Featherstone 1991); accelerating culture of commodification 
(Hassan 2008) or mediatisation of national identities (Madianou 2005). Those 
processes and accompanying practices (Ritzer 2008) lead to dissolution of 
nationalism, hybridization of identities and crystallisation of a liquid ‘imagined 
international community of nations’ (Rusciano 2004). While, arguably, these are 
characteristics of post-modernism, Smith (2001) claims that post-modern sensibility in 
nationalism studies is still too sketchy as a research programme. 
 
The academic literature draws a link between globalisation and an emerging 
post-modern approach to nationalism studies. Smith’s (1995) analysis of nationalism 
in the global era challenges post-national, post-political and ahistorical interpretations 
of national identity formation present in the globalist approaches. In his view, 
collective identity making does not have solid alternatives other then nationalism. He 
subscribes to Engels’ argument that nationalism is neither patently democratic nor 
liberal and points out that “nationalism’s central tenets are likely to impede progress to 
human rights and democracy” (ibid. p. 152). In his later, Weber- inspired work, Smith 
(2001) outlines parallels between the two belief identity systems - religious and 
national - and suggests that “...just like traditional religions have periodically 
undergone the process of change to meet new conditions, so modern national identities 
are habitually reinterpreted by successive generations” (ibid.  p. 146).  
 
In this polycentric setting, the construction of national identities has alternatives. 
Particularly in contemporary Europe, the nationalistic, state-centric elitism has found a 
strong alternative in the EU which assumes co-existence of national and European 
identities (Van Ham 2001). Therefore, recognition of neo-liberalism in Poland as a 
dominant political economy has raised questions about the relationship between 
nationalism, the dominant mode of production, and the ability of national elites to 
form allegiances corresponding with this form of governance. The link between elites, 
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nationalism and capitalism is not new. Gellner’s (1983) interpretation of nation-
building explains nationalism as a ‘top-down’ process legitimised by discourses of 
modernization and industrialization. The relationship between political economy and 
nationalism has also previously been a subject of theorising. For instance, Seers (1983) 
analyses nationalism through the lens of distinct approaches: he polarizes ‘anti-
nationalist’ and ‘egalitarian’ Marxist views against ‘anti-nationalist’ and ‘anti-
egalitarian’ forces of the neo-classical liberals. From today’s perspective, those clear-
cut juxtapositions seem limiting in analytical terms. To an extent, however, the above 
positions inform contemporary explanations of the relationship between capitalism 
and the state channels renewed versions of nationalism (Greenfeld 2003).  
 
Arguably, economic nationalism (Barber 1995) does not sit comfortably with 
neo-liberalism as contemporary markets exceed the boundaries of a single state. Some 
form of nationalism is, however, required to form collective identities. Harvey (2005) 
undertakes the task of drawing a relationship between the neo-liberal state and 
nationalism. First, the neo-liberal state institutions play a role in preparation for market 
operations. Secondly, the neo-liberal state requires a collective identity and some form 
of nationalism is necessary for the state to function effectively as a corporate and 
competitive entity. He concludes that the neo-liberal state “forced to operate as a 
competitive agent in the world market, seeking to establish the best possible business 
climate, mobilizes nationalism in its effort to succeed” (ibid. 2005, p. 85). In theory, 
neo-liberalism poses challenges which nation branding seems to have responded to.  
NATIONALISM AND BRANDING AS IDEOLOGY AND PRACTICE 
 
The indifference of nation branding conceptualists to ideological explanations of 
its practice is characteristic of the intellectual nihilism rooted in the notion of ‘endism’. 
Bell (2000) and Fukuyama (1993) have put forward their subsequent thesis on ‘the end 
of ideology’ and ‘the end of history’ arguing for the irrelevance of ideology and history 
to social change as the result of the mythologized triumph of Western democracies and 
 42 
 
capitalism. Those explanations have privileged understanding of post-industrial 
nations over their historical and analytical accuracy. While theoretically nation-
building has been characterised by “philosophical poverty” (Anderson 2006, p. 5), 
scholars argue for careful consideration of its ideological features (Smith 2001).  
 
In recent years, scholars of nationalism have extended their scope of analysis 
beyond considering it as a movement or ideology by arguing against “the dangers of 
reifying the concept of the nation” and seeing nations as “enduring collectivities” 
(Smith 2001, p. 10). In his analysis, Brubaker (1996, p. 21) differentiates the nation 
from nationalism and considers “nation as a category of practice”, “nationhood as an 
institutionalised cultural and political form” and “nationness as a contingent event of 
happening”. While scholars (Blanksten 1967, p. 5) have long recognised similarities in 
ideological manifestations in nation-building, including “an inconsistent desire for 
economic development and Westernization”, the practice of branding has not been 
analysed as a nation-building process argued by Brubaker (1996). 
  
Correspondingly to nationalism studies, marketing scholarship recognises 
multiple aspects of marketing in general and branding in particular. For example, 
Wilkie and Moore (2003) reveal how marketing can implement universalising 
frameworks, techniques, and devices reinforcing the efficiency of market economies. 
Marion (2006) extends their arguments and links marketing ideology and practice to 
beliefs and to collective representations of marketers. She points out that: 
 
...marketing ideology works as a collective action frame of marketers 
and extreme generalization of marketing vocabulary shows 
pervasiveness of marketing ideology (ibid. p. 247).  
 
In her view, linguistic markers of marketing support the legitimacy of market 
economies. The legitimizations of capitalism are also reinforced by the notion of 
universality, accompanied by professional reproduction in the field of marketing 
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(Marion 2006). Through its apparent functionality, marketing ideology and practice is 
being reinvented by different agents and expands into new frontiers.  
 
Above all, marketing relies on inventing new ideological concepts. O’Reilly 
(2006) explains this mechanism with reference to branding ideology, the practice of 
which is predominantly committed to meaning-making. She claims that “branding 
discourse relies heavily on an expansionist, linguistic acquisition-by-merger strategy” 
(p. 269). In her view, branding discourse is “accommodating signifiers in order to 
legitimate itself within the language” (p. 269) and expanding its portfolio of referents, 
i.e. ‘product branding’; ‘corporate branding’; or ‘nation branding’. This ‘acquisition-
by-merger’ discursive strategy enables marketing principles to overwrite propaganda 
as an apparatus for national identity construction (e.g. Beck 1999). 
NATIONALISM THEORY AND THE MEDIA 
 
To date, nationalism scholarship has taken limited notice of the relationship 
between the media and national identities. While this relationship has been important 
in media studies, in fact only modernists have paid attention to the mass media as 
actors in nation-building. This is not surprising if for primordialists national identity is 
fixed. Constructivists, however, take a different view. Therefore, this section outlines 
key approaches to the relationship between nationalism and the media. I introduce 
them here to contextualise my analysis of nation branding. As far as the evidence 
suggests (Kornberger 2010), in the context of corporate communications, brand 
management, largely relies on mediation. In fact, Kaneva (2007a) offers evidence that 
demonstrates how nation branding in Bulgaria involves mass mediation. 
 
Before nation branding entered research agendas, scholars emphasised different 
aspects in the role media play in mediation of nationalism. Although there are 
numerous theories explaining links between nationalism and the mass media, Smith’s 
(2000, p. 73) argument is a strong departure point for examining their dynamics:  
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The representations and images of the nation exert a profound 
influence over large numbers of people, exactly because they can be 
very widely disseminated by the media. In each of these media, 
specific images of the nation and its liberation, its heroic past, and its 
glorious future can be created and purveyed, so that the nation ceases 
to be the abstract community of all those designated as its members 
and citizens. 
 
This broad statement supports a debate on the relationship between the mass media 
and nationalism. Madianou (2005) extends the modernist paradigm into discussion of 
national identities mediation. She maps out the literature and reveals two meta-
approaches explaining links between nationalism and the media: strong media versus 
weak identities and weak media versus strong identities. Within those two approaches, 
there are several strands of research. In her view, technological determinism (Innis 
1972; McLuhan 2001), phenomenology (Martin-Barbero 1988; Scanell and Cardiff 
1991), textual determinism (Billing 1995) or market-centred (Price 1995) studies 
explaining the relationship between media and nationalism fall into the strong 
media/weak identity category. On the other hand, she suggests that media theories 
addressing global-local dynamics of national identity formation (Robins and Askoy 
2001), particularly discussing collective identities as discourses and performance (Hall 
1991), fall into the weak media/strong identities strand of research. Madiano favours 
the latter explanations. For her, this approach allows accounting for the media as an 
actor in nation-building by shifting the analysis from media-centred focus.   
 
Van Ham (2002) argues that elites always have been searching for new means of 
nation-building. The mediation of nationalisms as part of the process of re-imagining 
the nation is significant to nation-building and it is essentially a dialectical process. 
For Silverstone (2005, p. 3) mediation is: 
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...a fundamentally dialectical notion which requires us to understand 
how the  process of communication changes the social and cultural 
environments that support them as well as the relationships that 
participants, both individual and institutional, have to that 
environment and to each other. At the same time it requires 
consideration of the social as in turn a mediator: institutions and 
technologies as well as the meanings that are delivered by them are 
mediated in the social process of reception and consumption.  
 
Among the globalist explanations of the mediated national identities are those 
addressing its complexity and consequences of globalisation. The most prominent 
arguments emerging in this debate consider globalisation as a mediated process, 
underpinned by global-local dynamics and resulting in weakening of the national 
structures. Curran’s (2002, p. 194) review of academic discourses regarding 
interconnections between the mass media and globalisation indicates that  
 
During the twentieth century, globalisation of the economy was 
incomplete, uneven and discontinuous. This was even more true of 
the globalization of the media production.  
 
In a similar vein, the dominant market position ascribed to the US media has, 
according to Schiller (1996), resulted in the weakening of the national media 
structures. This process goes beyond the economic arguments and has numerous 
cultural influences (Tomlinson 2007). This post-Schillerian analysis strives to bridge 
theories concerning Westernization of the media products and their impact on 
indigenous cultures. Explanations of cultural imperialism as “the use of political and 
economic power to exalt and spread values and habits of a foreign culture at the 
expense of a native culture” (Bullock and Stallybrass 1977, p. 303) have lost academic 
credit nowadays. This approach reveals that diversity is subjected to homogenization 
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of cultures. Those allegedly unifying abilities of globalisation stem from cultures that 
“remain centred in the West and always speak English” (Hall 1991, p. 28).  
 
While the previous explanations offer insights into the relationship between 
nationalisms and the mass media, they consider culture as rigid and non-susceptible to 
changes. Therefore, in my considerations of the media and their role in nation 
building, I draw from theories revealing mediated, dialectical, non-media centric 
national identities construction. With Rusciano (1997), I consider nation-building as a 
process whereby actors struggle for national identity representation in dialectic 
mediation between the Selbstbild and Frembild.10 His work addresses transnational 
milieu for national identities construction, i.e. mediation of national identity features 
between domestic and transnational realms. This way, Rusciano (2004) extends the 
notion of imagined community and enables analysis of national identity by accounting 
for transnational settings. Furthermore, with Ociepka (2003) I consider the ‘weak 
position’ of the Polish media enabling ‘bottom-up’ movement of actors defining 
national identities. The above intellectual architecture validates Madiano’s (2005) 
thesis on national identity dynamics in the Polish settings.   
NATIONALISM AND CORPORATE COMMUNICATIONS 
 
While media plays its role in national identity reproduction, there are groups of 
actors who require accounting for in this study: corporate enterprises. As mentioned, 
the Western promotional culture and the academic fields have led to the development 
of terminologies and practices that corporate actors perform in their management 
(Cornelissen 2009). The relationship between nationalism, corporate enterprises and 
policy making involves material and symbolic resources. The argument put forward by 
nation brand conceptualists (Olins 1999) implying that the state and corporations 
                                                          
10
  I remain faithful to the original, German terms used by Rusciano. His 2003 study explains them in 
the following way: “A theory has been advanced that the construction of national identity derives, in 
part, from a negotiation between a nation’s Selbstbild (or the nation’s national consciousness, or the 
image its citizens have of their country) and a nation’s Fremdbild (or the nation’s perceived or 
actual international image in world opinion) (Rusciano, 2003, p. 361).  
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‘trade identities’ is reductionist as the relationship between multinational corporations 
(MNCs) is contextual and broader than based on ‘branding’ practice. For example, 
Blanchard (2007, p. 67) reassesses ‘the state in command’ or ‘multinational 
corporations in command’ approaches to understanding dynamics of the relationship 
between the state and MNCs and by introducing a ‘bargaining power model’ he 
considers “the balance of needs, alliances, and the institutional environment”. 
Although this model considers power as a crucial factor in this relationship, his 
discussion, however, does consider nationalistic features in policy making.   
 
The relationship between the state and MNCs and business interest groups has 
been explored by Bucheli (2010). His socio-historical analysis reveals the role of 
economic nationalism in public policy making in Chile. After Johnson (1994, p. 237-
238), he defines economic nationalism as “a political sentiment that attaches value to 
having property in this broad sense owned by members of the national group.” 
Buchelli (2010) does not take a statist view on nationalism; he characterises economic 
nationalism as a form of ideological programme that empowers national actors as 
opposed to foreign ones. Although his analysis concentrates on property relations, he 
does not reveal specific forms of agency accompanying policy making as mobilised by 
economic nationalism. While his analysis concentrates on economic capital, he does 
not account for the symbolic dimension of economic nationalism as performed in 
public affairs and mediated via the structures of the Chilean nation and beyond.   
 
The symbolism of nationalism has been emphasised by communication scholars 
in accounts revealing the relationship between corporate reputation management and 
nationalism in the globalising economy. For example, Wang (2005) distinguishes ‘the 
state sponsored’ economic nationalism from ‘consumer nationalism’ among consumer 
groups; he sees the relationship between the two as a ‘bottom-up’ process enacted by 
consumers with reference to commodities and services, the media, entertainment 
products, and tourism destinations. It has been characterised by  
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...the invocation of individuals’ collective national identities in the 
process of consumption to favour or reject products from other 
countries (p. 237).  
 
Wang (2005) extends the attitudinal and behavioural notions of ‘country-of-origin 
effect’ and ‘consumer ethnicity’ into corporate reputation management. While he 
introduces the notion of ‘consumer nationalism’, his analysis does not account for the 
impact that state economic policies and mediated nationalism have on MNCs and their 
stakeholders. In his view, the agency of consumers as corporate stakeholders is a basis 
for categorisation of nationalism. His analysis, however, does not link nationalism 
with either broader political economy or specific corporate communication specialism. 
Elsewhere, scholars have revealed the entire body of works addressing the ways in 
which corporations and interest groups pursue their interests by means of complexities 
of corporate communication (Tench and Yeomans 2009). As far as the relationship 
between the state and interests groups is concerned, Moloney (2009) argues that the 
most common practice used to manage this dynamic are public affairs campaigns, 
employing lobbying as its most powerful tactic.  
 
 To further contextualise this study, I extend Moloney’s (2009) argument into 
the relationship between public policy making in Poland and nation branders as 
interest groups and by drawing from Rigg’s (1997) work, I recognise the role of 
nationalism and modernisation as settings imposed on the state bureaucracies to 
manage various interests. Finally, the relationship between the state and ideologically 
bounded ‘national interests’ has been discussed by Sklair (2001) in his work on a 
‘transnational capitalist class’. Sklair theorises corporate practices enacted by 
transnational actors as responsible for the advancement of globalisation. For him, the 
neo-liberal settings, national interests and national competitiveness are ideological 
categories whereby ‘national interests’ is a universalizing notion, and ‘national 
competitiveness’ is computed as a way of measuring national performance; and is 
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based on predetermined categories that are “politically central to the way politicians 
and professionals use the service of transnational capitalists class use the state” (ibid. 
p. 137). The categories of globalism, national competitiveness, and national interest 
echo in nation branding writings (Olins 1999; Alholt 2007).   
STRUCTURALISM, CONSTRUCTIVISM AND NATION BRANDING  
 
While this thesis recognises the polycentricism of agents involved in national 
identities construction, it adopts the state-centric ontology. Its analysis is set at the 
crossovers between the Polish state structures, business and consultancy actors whose 
actions are further mediated into domestic and transnational realms. Principally, this 
study draws on structuralism highlighting the role of national elites and their practices 
in the process of nation-building and its ‘constructivist offshoot’, emphasizing the 
process of reinventing, interpreting and constructing meanings that form the 
contemporary notion of Polishness. This thesis understands the nation as a material 
reality of the state-arbitrated political community organising itself in socio-economic 
structures and forming numerous, often competing, symbolic, mediated narratives of 
national identities developed in ‘top-down’ or ‘bottom up’ agency.   
 
In an effort to analyse nation branding, I borrow insights from the modernist and 
ethno-symbolic strands of nationhood. Following Geller (1983), I adopt the view that 
national consciousness is a modernist development and a product of the rise of 
industrialising and professionalising states. With Smith (2001), I recognise that 
cultural, religious, and ethnic roots of nations may sometimes be traceable to the pre-
modern era. Therefore, the symbolic power of nations, including their national cultures 
is significant to my thesis. After Porter (2002), I recognise that national cultures 
contain multiple components whereby the ‘multivocalness’ of national identities is 
mediated through numerous narratives and is negotiated between domestic and world 
public opinion (Rusciano 2003). With Brubaker (1996, p. 21), I approach nationalising 
features of nationalism in performative terms; that is, as “interlocking and interactive, 
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and susceptible to influences from other areas of practice”. Following Harvey’s (2005) 
position regarding the relationship between neo-liberalism and nationalism, I consider 
‘branding’ as an ideology and practice (O’Reilly 2006) aimed at bridging the gap 
between the Polish neo-liberal state, its nation and the transnational community.  
PROMOTONAL CULTURE AS NATIONAL CULTURE 
 
The analysis of national identity cannot be limited to nationalistic ideologies of 
the state: similarities and differences of national community are enriched by theorising 
culture in a social theory perspective of nationhood. The sociological turn towards a 
culturalistic approach in social theory marks a shift from the ‘hard’ sociology of 
complex social organisms towards a ‘soft’ analysis of action within a single field. 
Sztompka (1999, p. 3) characterises this change by introducing the notion of “duality 
of cultures”. He suggests that culture provides resources for action (e.g. symbols, 
values, codes of meanings, cognitive content,) and, on the other hand, action is 
proactively shaping and reshaping culture. Culture is a sediment preceding action 
whereas action is a determining factor of cultural morphogenesis (Sztompka 1999).11  
 
While, at this stage, I would not like to speculate if nation branders use Polish 
culture in the outputs of their practice, I use the existing notion of promotional culture 
(Wernick 1991) to contextualise the emergence of nation branding in Poland. Having 
recognised the role of cultures in structuralism, I merge it with promotional culture as 
a setting for the development of new promotional concepts such as nation branding. 
Although I am conscious of the relative autonomy of cultures, this thesis considers 
culture as a dependent analytical category. Thus, the underlying position of this 
section is that socio-cultural systems do not function in isolation and that they are open 
to influences. Following Kłoskowska (2005), I take the view that to speak of national 
cultures is to think of certain canons that are accepted as national.  
                                                          
11
  Sztompka (1993; 1993) explains this term after Buckley (1967) who sees ‘morphogenetic processes’ 
as innovations, the beginnings of new social conditions, or social structures. In essence, says 
Buckley, (ibid. p. 58) “the morphogenetic process will refer to those processes which tend to 
elaborate or change a system’s given form, structure or state”.  
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The notion of re-imagining is linked with promotional culture which Wernick 
(1991, p. 181-182) has defined as the social condition where self-advantaging 
communicative acts are “. . . virtually co-extensive with our produced symbolic 
world”. After Moloney (2006), I argue that by virtue of competitive markets, neo-
liberalism is an incubating milieu for promotional culture. The subjectivity of 
‘cultures’ requires consideration of promotional culture in Poland. Wernick’s (1991) 
analysis considers how the June 1989 elections in Poland become a ‘promotional 
spectacle’. While ties between politics and promotional culture in Poland have been 
attributed to political marketing, over the last several years, promotional culture in 
Poland has diversified. Moreover, scholars trace the morphogenesis of branding to 
agricultural cultures (Kapferer 2005), but throughout Western modernism, it was a 
corporate management practice. Recently, Kornberger (2010) highlights the 
transformative power of brands. His thesis on brand society is a revealing cultural 
studies view of branding. Following his position, my study aims at capturing those 
transformations leading to the re-invention of the Polish national identity into a brand. 
PROPAGANDA AND NATIONAL IDENTITY  
 
According to Combs and Nimmo (1993, p. 45) propaganda is an “indispensable 
form of communication” and is regarded as a “form of public discourse”. Indeed, my 
thesis recognizes propaganda as an integrative component between the political, 
cultural, and economical domains of political economy in Poland. Within this study, I 
do not consider propaganda in an instrumental manner. On the contrary, I stress a 
dynamic between relevant institutional actors, their understanding of communicative 
practices and signification of features that are considered as ‘national’. The bridging 
factor between nationalism, nation-building, and mediation of particular features of 
nationhood takes the form of various types of propaganda that, I argue, are subject to 
institutional re-invention. While nationalism scholars (Hobsbawm 1990) recognize 
‘propaganda’ as one of the key aspects in national identities construction and 
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representation, communications scholars re-invent propaganda into various 
‘specialisms’. Persuasive communication - an instrument for arousing emotional 
allegiances towards the state - has a long academic tradition. For example, Taithe and 
Thornton (1999), in their historical study, make an explicit connection between state-
building, propaganda, and collective identity politics throughout Europe. Here, I focus 
on explanations that exceed the instrumental approach to understanding propaganda.  
 
  Bernays (1928) indicates that ‘invisible governments’ of persuasion aim to 
create ‘loyal enthusiasms’. Ellul’s (1973) seminal ‘Propaganda: the formation of 
men’s attitudes’ highlights the relationship between nationalism and propaganda. In 
his view, propaganda can be categorised into the political and sociological. The former 
propaganda type describes dissemination of ideologies intending manifestation of 
political acts whereas the latter is embedded in a sociological context: the established 
economic and political structures are the media for further ideological penetration. 
Furthermore, descriptive insights explaining the ability to influence social agency by 
means of propaganda have been proposed by Lasswell (1934, p. 13) in his definition 
of this form of persuasion: “propaganda in the broadest sense is the technique of 
influencing human action by the manipulation of representations” and “both 
advertising and publicity fall within the field of propaganda”.   
 
Before nation branding emerged as a concept, the ‘soft version’ of propaganda 
(Moloney 2000), public relations, had also been identified as advantageous to nation-
building. Taylor (2000) and Taylor and Kent (2006) discuss public relations and 
public diplomacy, aimed at domestic and foreign publics, as beneficial to enhancing 
national identities, particularly among the ‘transforming societies’. Drawing on 
Kruckeberg and Starck’s (1988) notion of relationship building, they suggest that 
public relations practice is a useful developmental tool in constructing national 
identities. They argue that in the context of the ‘Eastern Bloc’, “communication 
campaigns can help people during difficult times of social, economic, and identity 
transformations” (Taylor and Kent 2006, p. 335).   
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Corner’s (2007, p. 673) analysis of the intellectual development of modernist 
propaganda suggests that “the growth of a culture of political publicity within the 
context of a more widespread promotionalism in public and commercial life 
complicates our sense of what propaganda is”. His analysis sheds light on the 
complexity of communicative practices. While conceptualists consider nation 
branding as ‘anti-ideological’, propaganda scholars emphasise the link between 
ideology and propaganda as central to its analytical process (Jowett and O’Donnell 
1999). Propaganda’s ‘soft version’, public relations, also requires consideration of its 
ideological values, principles, interests and purposes that are components of this 
communicative practice. In fact, Moloney (2006) describes them as ‘public relations 
ideological transmission’. The assumed ‘anti-ideological’ characteristics of nation 
branding, however, are presented in the conceptual literature on nation branding as a 
dialectical antithesis to ideological aspects of policy making and communication. 
Thus, discussion of the relationship of promotional culture; institutional settings for 
nation branding practice; the legitimization of its introduction, and analysis of key 
‘messages’ describing Polishness are critical to the understanding of the ‘branded’ 
vision of Polish national identities that branders are struggling to advocate. 
 
In summary, this chapter has presented structuralism and constructivism in 
nationalism studies as dominant schools of thought underpinning this thesis. Within 
this research, I extend our understanding of various forms of nationalism as an 
institutionalized form of practice (Brubaker 1996). Importantly, this thesis recognizes 
that the mass media and corporate enterprises are powerful actors involved in the 
mediatization of nationalism (Madianou 2005). Their global outreach and plurality of 
non-state actors accompanying the mediatization process, I argue, has the potential for 
re-invention of national identity features. Simultaneously, within this study, I 
recognize that nationalism involves a significant communicative component inherent 
to nation-building processes (Taylor and Kent 2006). This contextualization enables 
me to study nation branding as a new idea introduced into the local institutional 
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settings in Poland. The next chapter extends theoretical framework of this study by 
making Bourdieu’s reflexive sociology of practice as central to my investigation.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: SOCIAL THEORY AND NATIONALISM 
WHY BOURDIEU? 
This chapter outlines the theoretical underpinnings of my study as spelled out by 
the social theory of Pierre Bourdieu. It explains his notions of the field, habitus and 
explains Bourdieu’s understanding of the state, neo-liberalism and power. Bourdieu’s 
reflexive sociology is based on a relational dualism of social structures and subjective 
symbolic relations between agents and readily merges with the modernist and 
constructivist paradigms in nationalism studies. Why have I chosen Bourdieu since so 
many other theorists have discussed various forms of nationalism? 
There are a few answers to this question. First, following Sztompka’s (1999) 
categorisation of duality in social theory inquiry, this study aims to analyse the 
strategies of agents that have introduced nation branding into public affairs in Poland. 
Its overall impact on the structure of the Polish nation is beyond the scope of this 
analysis as this thesis is concerned with the logic of the social space within which 
nation branding has been introduced and performed. Second, following the modernist 
paradigm of nation-building, I set out to explore the relationship between the ideology 
of nationalism and practice. Specifically, I merge Bourdieu’s understanding of neo-
liberal power politics (Lane 2006) with his understanding of the political economy of 
practices and consider the state structures as a space where struggles for different types 
of capital are enacted.  
Although Bourdieu’s greatest contribution to social theory lies in an explanation 
of the economy of practices, his research on ‘communicative practices’ is limited 
(Bourdieu 2005). What is more, Bourdieu has never taken up discussion of French 
national identity, or nation-building by any other state. While his oeuvre had been 
previously used to theorise nationalism (Brubaker 1996), the link between the existing 
scholarship on nationalism and Bourdieu’s work has resulted in the development of 
the social theory of nationalism and is characterised in the following way:  
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...most scholars in the field of nationalism agree that we are all 
constructivists. Thus, the question that needs to be asked is no longer 
whether but how nations are socially constructed. Indeed, the axiom 
of constructivism has reached a dominant position in this field even 
though some argue that essentialist arguments still exist in seemingly 
constructivist approaches (Helbling 2007, p. 23). 
Moreover, contemporary media and marketing studies demonstrate that 
Bourdieu’s theories and concepts are much appreciated by scholars researching within 
these academic domains. In support of the Bourdieusian approach of this study, I 
summarise some of this research. For example, Marliĕre (1998) uses Bourdieu’s social 
theory to bridge the gap between the journalistic and political fields; Couldry (2003) 
discusses the mass media ownership as ‘meta-capital’; Mellor (2008) examines the 
symbolic labour of journalists as cultural intermediaries; Hesmondhalgh (2006) 
analyses the mass media as a field of cultural production. Bourdieu’s analytical 
concepts have also been applied in the context of mediated consumption (Friedland, 
Shah, Lee, Rademacher and Hove 2006) and analysis of symbolic goods (Couldry 
2001). Bourdieu’s work has also found recognition among researchers of promotional 
culture: Edwards (2006; 2007; 2008) and Hodges (2007) have applied Bourdieu’s 
theories to public relations research; Cronin (2004) has used them in research on 
advertising practice. While the above areas of practice have been studies outside of the 
national building context, this study places it at its centre of its investigation.  
As it stands, Kaneva (2007a) is the only researcher who used Bourdieu’s social 
theory to examine nation branding. Her pioneering study of nation branding in 
Bulgaria, however, neither explores the relationship between the dominant political 
economy in Bulgaria and previously institutionalised communicative practices nor 
addresses its links with overarching cultural settings in which nation branding was 
enacted. Therefore, her study does not explain the relationship between nation 
branding and propaganda. Kaneva’s (2007) study reveals discourses and practices of 
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nation branders in the Bulgarian context. This thesis aims to make an academic 
contribution by revealing specific discourses and practices of nation branders in the 
Polish settings. Finally, and most importantly, Bourdieu’s reflexive sociology enables 
us to distance the analysis from descriptive accounts which have emerged in the Polish 
academic field with reference to nation branding (Hereźniak 2011). Bourdieu calls for 
an empirical research whereby his “concepts only make sense when applied to 
practical research and the whole raison d’ĕtre of the approach is that they should be 
used in new projects” (Grenfell 2008, p. 247). Having identified a limited number of 
studies on nation branding, particularly exploring its enactment in Polish public 
affairs, it is anticipated that Bourdieu’s social theory proves fruitful in bridging the gap 
between my preconceptions, data collection, the analysis of the agency of actors 
involved in nation branding, and construction of Polish national identities.  
NEO-LIBERALISM AND FIELD OF POWER 
Prior to the explanation of Bourdieu’s concepts that this study draws on, I 
review his understanding of neo-liberalism. Essentially, nation branding argues for the 
competitiveness of nations, and this notion is central to neo-liberalism. To Bourdieu 
(2003), the efforts to apply neo-liberal solutions to the governance represent an 
attempt to impose a universal economic model that takes its roots in the political and 
cultural traditions of the US. He argues that within the global field of power, the UK 
has been acting as a ‘Trojan horse’, enabling the US neo-liberalism to penetrate 
Continental Europe. Neo-liberalism has resulted in the “insidious impositions 
representing a whole set of presuppositions imposed as self-evident” (ibid, p. 34-36). 
Therefore, it is important to understand “the mechanisms through which this neo-
liberal ‘doxa’ is produced and imposed” (Bourdieu 1998, p. 34-36). Those impositions 
are based on ‘structural adjustment’ policies and represent the ‘global’ and ‘local’ 
dichotomy in a neo-liberal political economy (Bourdieu 2003).  
Above all, neo-liberalism is an intellectual project, which according to Bourdieu 
and Wacquant (1999), is reproduced and imposed within the setting of a particular 
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state by a narrow group of people, typically of centrist affiliations, gathered around 
think tanks that aim to develop policies, rooted in the language of econometrics. Neo-
liberalism is therefore an ideology that  
…heads and executives of industrial and financial multinationals of 
all nations intend to impose by relying on the political, diplomatic and 
military power of an imperial state gradually reduced to its functions 
of law enforcement in domestic and foreign theatres (Bourdieu 2001, 
p. 107-108).  
This radical market agenda accompanies nation branding. Jansen (2008 p. 121-122) 
makes a connection between nation branding and neo-liberalism in the following way: 
Some constituents of nation branding that contribute to the production 
of calculative space are: a) overt embrace of commercial language, 
practices, and assumptions, reflecting the post-Cold War ascent of the 
logic of ‘market fundamentalism’; b) formation of public-private 
partnerships to advance specific trade, industry or corporate interests 
along with national agendas, policies and ideologies; c) use of private 
contractors to determine the salient features of a nation’s identity, 
based upon what can be marketed to tourists, international investors, 
and potential trade partners; and d) reduction of the input of citizens 
to what can be measured by market research. 
Bourdieu’s conceptualisation of society into fairly autonomous, but structurally 
homogenous fields of practice, consumption of various cultural and material recourses 
is interrelated with an overarching field of power. According to Bourdieu and 
Wacquant (1992) every field functions, and ought to be analysed, in relation to the 
‘field of power’. Swartz (1997) notes two uses of this term in Bourdieu’s oeuvre: that 
explaining the ‘meta-field’ in which various struggles take place and that signifying 
the ‘dominant classes’. I merge those two explanations with Bourdieu, Wacquant and 
 59 
 
Farage‘s (1994) understanding of the state as a contestation site and an arbiter for 
struggles among political or cultural elites. This ‘state-centric’ approach is consistent 
with Bourdieu et al.’s (1994) understanding of the state as an institutional holder of 
‘meta-capital’ and power. The state can be divided into different sub-fields, and its 
analysis involves positions, beliefs, and strategies of agents in a specific sub-field 
(Swartz 2004). There are some conclusions that can be drawn from this statement that 
permit reconciling structuralist and constructivist views on nationalism. 
The modernist thesis regarding nationalism as an elitist project emphasizes the 
state power over national identities construction (Geller 1983; Hobsbawm 1990). As 
mentioned, the state-centric view is aligned with the Bourdieusian view of the state. 
Bourdieu et al. (1994, p. 4) define the state as a space for “the culmination of a process 
of concentration of different species of capital: capital of physical force or instruments 
of coercion (army, police), economic capital, cultural or (better) informational capital, 
and symbolic capital”. In this approach, power of the state as a bureaucratic polity is 
manifested “in the realm of symbolic production that the grip of the state is felt most 
powerfully” (p. 2) and leads to effects of universality as the “symbolic dimension of 
the effect of the state” presented by “performative discourses” 12 in a struggle for 
legitimacy and symbolic domination (p. 16). The imposition and reproduction of neo-
liberalism also takes place due to the state’s bureaucratic complicity. Above all, the 
neo-liberal state’s nation-building politics sets market competition as a primary feature 
of its relationship with a trans-national community (Harvey 2005).  
Following Sztompka’s (1993) paradigmatic divide in social theories (system and 
field models) and supported by acknowledgement of this partition among nationalism 
scholars, this thesis falls into the field model of social change. Sztompka (1993) 
                                                          
12
  Bourdieu views on language and discourse are closely aligned with his ideas on symbolic power (see 
Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, p. 142). But most importantly, he understands exercising this power 
as inherent to symbolic exchanges whereby ‘performatives’ cannot be exclusively reduced to pure 
communicative exchanges of discursive messages. For him, the power of words to shape action 
exceeds the illocutionary function of language – it is a power that is exercised by a speaker via all 
aspects of delegation that is vested in him (Bourdieu 1991). See more explanation of the institutional 
discursive struggles on p. 60 of this thesis.  
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speaks of the ‘field image’: the underlying axiom of this perspective is the assumption 
that societies are dynamic entities. While stable elements (e.g. the state institutions) 
can be identified as in the system-model, ‘fields’ are endlessly subjected to changes 
determined by events and sequences of action. Consequently, I embed this research 
within the ‘field image’ of change and by uncovering social changes as mediated 
through nation branders, this study is an effort to reveal its dynamics in the field of 
national images management. With Kaneva (2007a), I take a similar analytical 
position. In her study of nation branding in Bulgaria, she identifies two meta-fields of 
nation branding: transnational and local. The first operates within a global field of 
power and refers to the practices of policy advisors, consultancies and transnational 
institutions that tout nation branding. The latter refers to practices and discourses of 
agents who have adopted nation branding as a model of national identities construction 
in their local settings. Whilst I recognise this relationship, the scope of my analysis is 
not equal: nation branding in Polish settings is central to this study. 
BOURDIEU: RELEVANT INFLUENCES 
 
This section outlines theories and concepts I specifically borrow from Bourdieu 
and offers a critique of the conceptual and analytical position developed in his meta-
theory. Bourdieu has been intellectually influenced by Marx, Durkheim, and Weber. 
What unites the above theorists is a ‘principle of non-consciousness’: they seek 
explanations of social realities that are not reduced to perceptions, ideas, or intentions 
(Bourdieu, Chamberdon and Passeron 1991). Although Bourdieu’s understanding of 
change is embedded and performed within a homogeneous field, Bourdieu shares with 
Marx materialist roots of consciousness. Following Weber he joins efforts to elaborate 
on symbolic systems, and with Durkheim he works towards a method that goes 
beyond “everyday understanding of social life” (Swartz 1997, p. 46). Those three 
positions have influenced Bourdieu’s praxeology that is central to this study.  
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THE FIELD 
‘Field’ is a fundamental analytical unit in Bourdieu’s oeuvre. It describes a space 
within which two other key categories of action and change are embedded - habitus 
and capital. Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992, p. 97) define a field as 
...a network, or configuration, of objective relations between 
positions. These positions are objectively defined, in their existence 
and in determinations they impose upon occupants, agents or 
institutions, by their present and the potential situation (situs) in the 
structure of the distribution of species of power (or capital) whose 
possession commands access to the specific profits that are at stake in 
the field, as well as by their objective relation to other positions 
(domination, subordination, homology, etc.). 
Fields, consequently, denote particular areas of social agents’ production, circulation, 
and appropriation of goods, services, knowledge or status, and the comprehensive 
positions held by actors in their struggle to accumulate and monopolise different kinds 
of capital. According to Jenkins (2002, p. 85) the existence of a particular field creates 
a belief on the part of the participants in the legitimacy and value of the capital which 
is at stake as a result of the struggle within it. The interest in the field is produced by 
the same historical process that permitted its initial existence. 
According to Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992), the concept of field links different 
forms of what is objective and subjective: it marks a relationship between social and 
cultural capital. Social actors, by virtue of their economic and cultural portfolio, have 
an objective position in the social space, and take positions within this structure based 
on subjective, relational, positions defined by habitual similarities of a specific ‘class’ 
(Crossley 2008). The field, as Bourdieu understands it, challenges the materialist 
reductionism where class relations are predominantly subjected to economic factors 
 62 
 
and access to the means of production. For Bourdieu, relationships between agents are 
more complex and culturally mediated within the structure of a particular field.  
ECONOMY OF PRACTICES 
  
Bourdieu’s meta-theory explains practice in terms of struggle over ideas, power 
and resources. His efforts concentrate on bridging structure and agency in their 
classical subjective-objective antimony. His endeavour to develop a general approach 
to theorizing ‘structure-agency’ leads him to the conceptualization of  society into 
social spaces – semi-autonomous fields of practice and demonstrate an attempt to 
bridge homo economicus and homo-sociologicus views of action. Bourdieu (1977, p. 
3) proposes “a science of dialectic relations between objective structures” revealing 
“subjective dispositions within these structures”.  
 
For Bourdieu (1977) the notion of ‘strategy’ underpins the essence of practice. 
In his approach, agency is characterized by uncertainty. Implicitly, he indicates that 
outcomes of actions are seldom unambiguous to the social actors. Swartz (1997, p. 99) 
summarizes the strategy metaphor as a “maze of constraints and opportunities” 
determined by the responses of other actors over time. For Bourdieu (1977), strategies 
are ritualised, but whether the action conforms to rules of the ‘field game’ depends on 
‘self-interest’. For Bourdieu, however, action cannot be exclusively understood as the 
intentional pursuit of material objectives (Grenfell 2008, p. 154-155). Neither, all 
action is conscious and is prone to ‘misrecognition’ (Bourdieu 1977). However, he 
considers actors as ‘practical strategists’ as they possess habitus that links them with 
the field. This analytical category is defined as 
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…a system of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures 
predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles 
which generate and organize practices and representations that can 
be objectively adopted to their outcomes without presupposing a 
conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery of the operations 
necessary in order to attain them (Bourdieu 1990a, p. 53). 
 
 
The concept of habitus marries readily with the notion of ‘class’ highlighted 
previously in the context of the nationalism analysis (Blum 2007). For Bourdieu, 
habitus remains in a dialectic relationship with field structures; those shape 
individuals’ internalised dispositions and, in turn, influence externalized actions that 
tend to reproduce the field’s objective structure. Bourdieu and Patterson (1977, p. 203) 
sum up this dialectical relationship as “circular relations that unite structures and 
practices; objective structures tend to produce structured subjective dispositions that 
produce structured actions which, in turn, tend to reproduced objective structures”. By 
implication, it permits legitimization of what is ‘taken-for-granted’ and accepted as 
doxa. Brubaker (1985, p. 770), in his introduction of Bourdieu to the English-speaking 
world, claims that habitus informs class relations whereby “class struggles are 
assimilated to sexual, generational, ethnic, and occupational struggles”. Indeed, 
Bourdieu (1991) argues that classes engage in a struggle over symbolic production, and 
various competing fields of symbolic reproduction struggle over the monopoly of 
legitimate symbolic violence. In his approach “the field of symbolic production is a 
microcosm of the symbolic struggle between classes” (ibid, p. 168). Of particular 
interest in those struggles are discursive aspects of action as, according to Bourdieu, 
habitus illuminates class by language. Myles (1999, p. 889) explains institutional 
discursive performativity as integral to Bourdieusian analysis in the following way: 
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...to succeed in discursive struggle is also paralleled by the 
institutionalization of their forms of discourse. But institution in 
Bourdieu's work, especially when he refers to language, is also to 
suggest rites of institution - the power to establish and protect 
classificatory boundaries or distinctions between groups. In this way 
Bourdieu views performativity as the outcome of the social structuring 
of the classificatory power of language...  
 
Finally, the dialectics between field and habitus, or between objective structures 
and subjective dispositions (and predisposition, tendency, propensity or inclination) 
would not be possible without the aforementioned self-interest as well as material and 
symbolic profits. In his meta-theory, Bourdieu (1986) speaks of four types of capital – 
economic, cultural, social, and symbolic – that have extended economic rationality into 
explaining the culturalistic dimension of struggles. Within the field, different forms of 
capital not only classify benefits of practice, but are also a measure of distinction: they 
form a mechanism of ‘inclusion’ and ‘exclusions’. Thus, Bourdieu conceptualizes 
action as an outcome of a relationship between habitus, capital, and field. Swartz 
(1997, p. 141-142) sums up Bourdieu’s praxeology and points out that “practices are 
not to be reduced to either habitus or the field, but grow out of the ‘interrelationships’ 
established at each point in time by the sets of relations represented by both”. The 
quality of those ‘interrelationships’ depends on symbolic power.   
SYMBOLISM OF POWER RELATIONS 
  
Bourdieu’s conceptualization of society into co-existing fields brings to mind the 
question about the possibility of social change and mechanisms of structuration that 
are central to this thesis. In order to bridge “the cognitive, communicative, and 
political systems” he introduces a theory of symbolic power aimed at combining both 
constructivist and structural aspects of the field (Swartz 1997, p. 83). Bourdieu (1977) 
supplements his understanding of practice with the notion of power that links 
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subjective and objectives features of social structures. To Bourdieu (1977), self-
interested action engages economic benefits vis-à-vis symbolic pursuits. His neo-
capitalist thinking goes beyond Marxist economic determinism and Althusserian 
interpellation. Bourdieu considers culture, which is “a system of symbolism and 
meaning” (Jenkins 2002, p. 104), as inherent to relationships between social actors. He 
terms culturalistic dynamics of those relationships as symbolic violence.  
 
The structural properties of the field are attributed to all symbolic systems within 
which the symbolic instruments form a consensus of the social order. Bourdieu (1991) 
synthesises ‘structuring structures’ and ‘structured structures’ with means of 
‘ideological domination’ whereby knowledge imposition is accompanied by discursive 
means of communication (Bourdieu 1991, p.165). For Bourdieu, inter-institutional 
settings are typical field contexts where symbolic violence is exercised by means of 
discursive markers in a struggle between classes. Myles (1999, p. 889) notes that for 
Bourdieu the institutional agency link with the notion of “performativity as the 
outcome of the social structuring of the classificatory power of language” creates 
misrecognition thanks to which the dominant class gains legitimacy. Swartz (1997, p. 
43) extends this argument and says that, in principle, this process denotes the 
disinterest of their actions. Thus, symbolic violence, inherent to all social structures 
manifests itself in ideological and pedagogic action. Its essence has been described by 
Bourdieu and Passeron (1977, p. 4) in the following passage:  
 
Every power to exert symbolic violence, i.e. every power which 
manages to impose meanings and to impose them as legitimate by 
concealing the power relations which are the basis of its force, adds 
its own specifically symbolic force to those power relations. 
 
Implicitly, symbolic violence holds worldmaking power (Bourdieu 1987). The 
symbolic violence metaphor enables Bourdieu to consider culture as an outcome of 
structured structures, means of communication as structuring structures, and 
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ideologies as instruments of domination. It is through symbolic labour – that is 
performative acts of the field – that the symbolic aspects of power are exercised 
(Jenkins 2002). To Bourdieu, the dominant class imposes its culture by social action, 
which aims at internalization of “the dominant symbols of meanings” (Lin 2001, p. 
14). Therefore, cultural capital has a bearing on the practice and reproduction of 
meanings. By the virtue of its function, language and discourses perform 
normalization in the process of subordination. Bourdieu (1991, p. 107) indicates that 
the power of language is extended from ‘symbolic exchanges’ and ‘informative 
content’, to the illocutionary function of language. He asserts:  
 
The power of word is nothing more than the delegated power of the 
spokesperson, of his speech – that is, the substance of his discourse 
and inseparably, his way of speaking – is no more than a testimony, 
and among others, of the guarantee of delegation which is vested in 
him.    
 
Finally, Bourdieu discusses ideology as an instrument of social domination and 
reproduction. The role that he assigns to ideology is that it “serves particular interests, 
which tends to be presented as universal, shared by the group as a whole” (ibid., p. 
167). In this regard, Bourdieu considers ideologies as forms of symbolic power, 
which, depending on instrument of domination, define relations between agents. 
Drawing from the Weberian notion of ‘domestication of dominated’, he suggests that 
symbolic systems are politicised, ensuring that one class dominates the other, and by 
holding symbolic power it aims to ‘demystify’ those who are dominated. Bourdieu (p. 
168) considers ideologies as means to legitimizing domination whereby agents’ 
engaged in 
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...a struggle either directly, in the symbolic conflicts of everyday life, 
or else by proxy, via the struggle between different specialists in 
symbolic production, a struggle over the monopoly of legitimate 
symbolic violence, that is, the power to impose the arbitrary 
instruments of knowledge, and expression (taxonomies) of reality – 
but instruments whose arbitrary nature is not realized as such.  
 
Bourdieu (ibid, p. 167) differentiates ‘ideology’ from ‘myth’ and explains that myth is 
a “collectively appropriate product” of ideologies.  
CULTURAL INTERMEDIARIES AND POLAND  
 
A specific class of agents - ‘cultural intermediaries’ - reproducing ideologies 
and constructing myths particularly related to the mass consumption has been 
introduced by Bourdieu in his work on taste-making. This term has been presented by 
Bourdieu in ‘Distinction’ to describe a ‘new petit bourgeoisie’ - that is a fraction of the 
middle-class which, in their professional fields, mediate cultural production and 
consumption. In a much cited passage, he reveals generic characteristics of this class 
in France: 
 
The new petite bourgeoisie comes into its own in all the occupations 
involving presentation and representation (sales, marketing, 
advertising, public relations, fashion, decoration and so forth) and in 
all the institutions providing symbolic goods and services . . . and in 
cultural production and organization which have expanded 
considerably in recent years (Bourdieu, 1984, p. 359). 
 
Given the different dynamics of the relationship between development and 
events forming modernism in the West and in Poland, I account for those differences 
by considering the ‘otherness’ mechanism in my study. The new petit bourgeoisie in 
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Poland tends to use the Soviet era to differentiate their own group identity. The prefix 
‘new’, as a signifier of their collective identities, implies social mobility whereby 
cultural intermediaries are “travelling in the space and time” (Featherstone 1991, p. 
91) as they acquired a specific type of ‘cultural valence’ (Kłoskowska 2001). 
Following Eyal et al. (2000), I recognise that in the post-Soviet societies cultural 
dispositions are more important to the social mobility than political or economic 
dispositions derived from the previous political era. In that respect, the new types of 
practical knowledge are crucial to understanding the concept of cultural intermediaries 
in the Polish society. This recognition suggests that cultural intermediaries in the post-
Soviet context form their collective identity on the basis of distancing themselves or 
reinvent the socialist past – its aesthetics, heritage, political forms, etc. Thus, I argue 
that they form their habitus, partly, on the basis of Westernised socialisation. For 
them, consumption, experiences, careers, status, aspirations, or self-presentation have 
gained a quasi-political and cultural significance in a renegotiation of lifestyles 
between 'Sovietised past’ and capitalist present.  
 
Finally, the position of cultural intermediaries in the structures of Polish society 
leaves us with a question of their social standing. Although the relationships among 
the political elites in Poland were characterised by social relations based on a ranking 
system whereby various social groups gained importance to the field of power on the 
basis of clientelism (Eyan et al., 2000), the post-Soviet era has reinforced on the 
Polish society different qualities of relationships. In the settings of transforming social 
relations, cultural intermediaries’ struggle for various types of capital on the basis of 
which they aimed at gaining legitimacy within the reconfigured field of power. In that 
respect, cultural intermediaries had to appeal to various universal concepts – e.g. 
nation, civic society or God - in order validate their habitus and gain legitimacy by the 
Polish state and its field of power. 
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REFLECTION ON BOURDIEU’S SOCIAL THEORY 
 
Although Bourdieu’s social theory constitutes a cornerstone for my analysis of 
nation branding in Poland, I recognise shortcomings to his meta-theory, particularly 
ideas within his oeuvre that I apply to my study. It is said that Bourdieu’s extensive 
theory and research, over the years, has led to criticism of his work in two major areas: 
his understanding of agency and the problem of field boundaries both of which are 
critical to this thesis. By highlighting ambiguities in his understanding of the state 
structures, I also consider shortcomings in Bourdieu’s analysis of the state. 
Simultaneously, I consider his existing responses to criticism and reflect on them.  
 
Although the Polish state is central to my analysis of nation branding, I begin 
with pointing out criticisms regarding praxeology as they are crucial to my earlier 
arguments. Jenkins (2002) accuses Bourdieu for failing to sufficiently address the 
structure-agency problem. His over-determinism leads him to over-emphasise the role 
of habitus. Edwards (2007, p. 73) states that although Bourdieu explains strategising 
as enactment of trajectories of action within the field, the “structures cannot limit the 
choices that agents are able to make”. This argument has implications regarding our 
understanding of symbolic power and the principle of misrecognition as the field 
agents might reflect on the trajectories of their actions. According to his critics, 
Bourdieu over-emphasises the role of structure, over-estimates habitus as a mechanism 
of class reproduction and underestimates the role of social change whereby agents are 
reduced to the medium reproducing the structures (Swartz 1997). Therefore his 
research does not always address factors external to the field agency.   
 
Another implication of this inadequacy concerns the class reproduction. This 
issue has been summarised by Brubaker (1985, p. 762) in his assessment of 
Bourdieu’s view on class. He comments:  
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...class and habitus, the twin linchpins of his metatheory, together 
explain anything and everything. Dispositions (the habitus) directly 
govern conduct, and because classes are defined as individuals 
sharing the same dispositions as well as the same external conditions 
of existence, class becomes the principle of intelligibility of all 
conduct, and sociology can take as its aim to ‘determine how class 
condition is able to structure the whole experience of social subjects’.  
 
The broadness in interpretation of ‘class’ that, in Bourdieusian analysis, extended into 
occupational fields and raises questions about abilities of adopting new sediments into 
habitus. While on the one hand, this results in a static image of the field, Bourdieu 
does not account for the possibility of gaining new dispositions outside socialisation 
fields (Bourdieu 1990a). This assertion results in ambiguous accounts of dynamics of 
social change. In a critique of the habitus, King (2000, p. 417) claims that “much of 
what Bourdieu describes under the name of ‘practical theory’ and which he believes 
justifies the concept of the habitus is, in fact, quite radically incompatible with the 
habitus”. He, however, defends Bourdieu’s position and notes that 
 
While the habitus is inadequate to the explanation of social change 
and, in fact, presupposes the kind of interpretive virtuosity of 
‘practical theory’, social change is intrinsic to Bourdieu’s ‘practical 
theory’. Bourdieu’s ‘practical theory’ insists social reality consists of 
the negotiation of social relations between individuals and can never 
be reduced to a static and timeless model. These relations can only be 
maintained by exchange (King 2000, p. 428).  
 
Bearing in mind this critique, the notion of exchange is at the centre of my interest.  
 
Another dimension to the agency-structure problem has been articulated by 
Edwards (2007) who points out that language is also a source of inadequacy in 
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Bourdieusian social theory. While Bourdieu (1991) argues that the illocutionary 
function of language exerts symbolic power, he does not explicitly address reflexive or 
non-reflexive decisions regarding vocabulary choices. This is particularly significant 
in studies addressing communicative practices, and given that there are several models 
of national images management, the questions on the relationship between them and 
possibility of explaining the connections between them as part of the strategic choices 
made by actors are limiting in Bourdieu’s field theory. The dichotomy of the 
relationship between discourse and practice suggests that they can be considered as 
separate analytical entities. This analytical position might limit the analysis of social 
changes within a particular field. This issue occurs in Kaneva’s (2007a) study of 
nation branding where she analyses ‘the field of nation branding in Bulgaria’ and does 
not address its relationship to propaganda that has been a dominant term used 
publically by institutional actors in the Sovietised political fields.  
 
Importantly, Bourdieu’s view on the state and its relationships with subordinate 
fields is central to this thesis. By talking about ‘the field of power’, Bourdieu 
implicitly considers ‘power’ as separate rather than inherent to symbolic violence 
exercised by the state. The ‘overarching’ characteristic of power does not address the 
micro-characteristics of power as inherent to practices that emerged, for example, in 
Foucauldian explanations of power as knowledge and practice. That aside, Swartz 
(2004) points out two key features in Bourdieu’s analysis of the state: while in his 
early writings Bourdieu et al. (1994) warns researchers against analysing the state 
without being aware of the categories of thinking imposed by the state (‘political 
doxa’), later he emphasises a predominantly ‘top-down’ aspect of symbolic violence 
wielded by the state (Bourdieu 1998). This perspective is a significant weakness as he 
does explicitly account for other trajectories of agency within the state structures.  
 
Overall, Bourdieu accounts for the classifying power of the state (Bourdieu 
1996) but he has not explicitly considered how different, state-centric or state-
sponsored practices form categories of ‘vision and division’. The classifying feature of 
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the state brings ambiguity to his conceptualisation with regards to categorisations of 
the sub-field within the state structures. Although Bourdieu speaks of political and 
bureaucratic fields, his reflection on the typology of the modern state is not as far 
reaching as to consider a detailed analysis of its structures. In that regard, his 
conceptualisation of the state demonstrates the problem of the field interconnections 
(Grenfell 2008). Finally, although I have indicated how I intend to address the global 
versus local dichotomy, it is important to point out that Bourdieu has not explored this 
feature in his analysis of the state. Summing up, the Bourdieusian perspective on neo-
liberalism, the state and his concepts surrounding theory of practice are strong 
analytical tools for the exploration of nation branding. Mindful of conceptual issues in 
his social theory, I move on to explain the methodological underpinnings of study. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: RESEARCH AGENDA ON NATION BRANDING 
OVERVIEW 
 
The preceding part of the literature review discusses relevant models, research, 
and debates in the area of national images management. This chapter, however, 
explains the changing contexts for analysis of nation branding; it offers a rationale for 
studying nation branding in the Polish setting and spells out the aim of this study. 
Overall, the rationale for this research stems from Moloney’s (2007) call for in-depth 
examinations of the relationship between marketing and politics enacted outside the 
electoral process and the nation branding research agenda outlined by Kaneva (2011).   
GROWING ANACRHY OR EXPANDING MARKETS?  
 
While the collapse of the ‘Soviet bloc’ resulted in changing discourses about 
world politics and constructivism (Wendt 1996) which gained a prominence in studies 
of reputation of the state as an actor in the international system (Mercer 1996), 
scholars of international relations take nation branding for granted (Sherman 2007) 
and do not explain how nation branding emerges in different political settings. The 
system theory, ‘helicopter view’, neither offers insights into the institutionalisation of 
nation branding nor explains the interests of actors pursuing nation branding. Thus, 
there is still a requirement for basic questions and empirical insights aimed at 
understanding nation branding as a ‘communicative’ and ‘policy’ orientated practice.  
 
Following the emergence of social theory inspired examinations of nation 
branding (Aronczyk 2007; Kaneva 2007b; Jansen 2008), the foregoing academic 
sources point out the influence of nation branding on rethinking nationalism as a 
political, cultural and ideological project engaging a specific set of practices. The 
review of the literature critically assesses the body of knowledge in the still infant area 
of nation branding research. By emphasizing the importance of ‘the nation’ as crucial 
to nation branding practice, the review has identified a conceptual difference between 
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nation branding and other elitist models of national images management - propaganda, 
public diplomacy or public relations. Finally, this section reveals limited research 
exploring nation branding in specific social settings (Kaneva 2007a).  
 
While Aronczyk (2007) has analysed symbolic outputs of nation branding in 
Poland, her work does not consider its legitimacy and the institutional scope of its 
reproduction. Reflection on existing explanations of nation branding suggests the need 
for bridging a gap between largely conceptual assumptions of nation branding, and its 
practice in the field settings. By reviewing the literature, I have recognised the 
migration of nation branding across borders and I question the ‘universalising’ 
premises of economic development made by its conceptualists. Principally, this thesis 
sets out to explore nation branding in its socio-historical settings.  
WHY STUDY NATION BRANDING IN POLAND? 
 
The rationale for this research stems from two sets of arguments: intuitive and 
academic. The intuitive arguments have developed as a result of news media reports 
reading; exploration of online sources; and reading of professional, marketing and 
public relations magazines in Poland. At one point, the Polish nation branding 
programme was pompously described as “the biggest nation branding programme of 
all times” (Saffron 2007). Having had some interest in governments’ transnational 
communication, I intuitively assume that nation branding in Poland requires more in-
depth interrogation. Although, in the light of my initial mass media exploration, it 
would be convenient to argue that I have selected Poland as a context for my study 
because this state has been undergoing a ‘branding exercise’ (Reed 2002) or, as 
professional marketing periodicals suggest, Poland needs ‘branding’ (Kiszluk 2010). 
While my initial readings left many questions open, the above sources directly 
stimulated my ‘academic curiosity’ to explore nation branders as a social movement 
shaping contemporary notions of Polishness. Apart from intuitive motivations, there is 
a set of academic arguments which have reinforced my interest in nation branding. 
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First, post-1989 Polish state identities have been redefined and democracy has 
been equated with a specific vision of neo-liberal market economy and considered as 
an intrinsic characteristic of the Polish state (Pachulaska 2005). The elementary 
evidence revealing the redefinition of the Polish state identities includes changes to 
political economy; redefinition of the role of state institutions; and decentralisation of 
the state bureaucracy (Horváth 1997). Moreover, the neo-liberalisation of the Polish 
state (Berend 2009) intensified the dynamics of ‘global’ and ‘local’ realms and 
accelerated dialectics of mediation of national identities. In fact, those changes are 
systemic demonstrations of renegotiation of the Polish state, whose elites conceived it 
as a ‘nation-state’, or as the state of the Polish nation; yet it is ‘incomplete’ or 
‘unrealized’ in a variety of ways. In that respect, for the political elites the Polish state 
is considered as ‘the nationalizing state’ requiring nation-building (Brubaker 1996).  
 
Second, the introduction of neo-liberalism in Poland has, partly, taken place as 
extension of other states’ ‘soft power’ political agendas (Ławniczak 2007). Some 
scholars argue that neo-liberalism has been introduced to Poland in two waves: via 
US- styled ‘shock therapy’ policies and through selective aspects of Europeanization 
(Shields 2008). From the outset, ‘shock therapy’ dominated the discourse on political 
economy in post-Soviet Poland, and, in consequence, the introduction of its policies 
has made an impact on social relations, construction of new markets and, by 
encouraging competitiveness, created an incubating milieu for the development of 
promotional culture (Werninck 1991). Simultaneously, within the Polish state 
structures, the notion of ‘transitology’ has resulted in changes marked by the 
replacement of the nomenklatura struggling with the inception of a consolidating 
technocratic class (Shields 2007, p. 172). This class of professionals has made a mark 
on the acceleration of promotional culture by introduction of promotional policies 
developed by the Polish state (Kiełdanowicz-Ryniejska 2007).  
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Third, re-ideologization of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) is the next reason 
why it is worth exploring the nation branding in Poland. Following Szabos’ (1993) 
arguments concerning reframing of old ideologies in the post-Soviet bloc, I argue, 
that, to an extent, political economy changes in Poland have gained support thanks to 
ideologies of nationalism, religious ideologies and right-wing populism. Those, 
practised at different levels of social structures, had an impact on the formation of 
Polish political discourse after 1989 and constitute a fertile ground for emergence of 
other nationalisms. Bohle and Greskovits (2007, p. 453) point out that thanks to the 
strong sense of Polish ethnicity, the Polish state avoided ‘the task of nation-state 
building’. Nationalism, however, comes in diverse forms. While multiple Polish 
national identities narratives endure in ethnic form (Porter 2002; Zarycki 2004)13 and 
the development of liberal nationalism is well underway (Auer 2004), a modern 
version of economic nationalism as a ‘nationalising mechanism’ has been a weak 
dimension of changes in Poland (Pickle 2003). Questions about Polish national 
identities were particularly vocal after 1989 and before the Polish state accession to the 
EU in May 2004. On both occasions, the proponents of the integration with EU 
enunciated them as a ‘return to Europe’ (Wilkiewicz 2003). In fact, research 
demonstrates that historical interpretations of ‘national past’ have resulted in the re-
emergence of a ‘Poland between the West and the East’ narrative. This notion of 
‘between-ness’ was yet again articulated in the context of the Polish state’s accession 
to EU structures (Galbraith 2009) as a signifier of ‘old’ and ‘new’ member states.  
 
Fourth, the post-1989 redefinition of the Polish state identities has led to the 
emergence of new institutional actors and intensification of communicative practices 
aimed at promoting the Polish state interests. Among them are the institutional actors 
empowered by the Polish state to project different versions of Polishness overseas. 
                                                          
13
 Following this logic, it can be argued that other neighbouring nations played their role in the 
formation of national identities in Poland. Ethnic minorities, particularly the Jewish community, 
contributed to this process (Michlic 2006) and took forms of, what Rae (2002) refers to as 
‘pathological homogenisation’ and was a feature of nation-building processes among many 
European states.    
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Traditionally, the state propaganda practice has been at the heart of advancing 
nationalisms (Hobsbawm 1990). The scholarly evidence suggests that genealogy of 
propaganda practice within the Polish state structures goes back to 1917 and coincides 
with the formation of its diplomatic service (Cull, Culbert and Welch 2004; 
Szczepanik 2005). Later, according to Ellul (1973), the Polish state’s propaganda 
belonged to the ‘socialist republics’ of Europe. For example, Dudek (2002) discusses 
overseas propaganda system of the Polish state and its institutional organisation 
between the years 1945-1950. Since 1989, the new political economy provided 
different settings for Polish government communication and its institutional capacity 
has expanded beyond the realms of diplomatic networks (Szondi 2009b). This way, 
the Polish state has moved into a multi-stakeholder approach to managing this field.  
 
While there is some descriptive evidence assuming that the Polish state engages 
in nation branding (Szczepankiewicz 2006; Florek 2006; Znoykiewicz 2008), those 
works lack sufficient empirical insights as to what are the social forces driving nation 
branding in Poland. The empirical research (Kubacki and Skinner 2006), on the other 
hand, uses marketing terminologies to explain the relationship between traditional 
national identity symbols and communicating ‘the brand Poland’. Although they 
discuss the relationship between national identity and nation branding, their work 
apriori assumes the ‘nation brand’ as inherent to the Polish state and does not 
explicitly reveal what nation branding practice involves. Similarly, Johnson (2010) 
sets to analyse some selected outputs of nation branding in Poland. While he analyses 
one of the governmental advertising campaigns, his starting point is an assumption 
that advertising is an outcome of ‘nation branding’. Given that the state bureaucracies 
(e.g. Taylor 1999; L’Etang 2004) have long used advertising in their propaganda 
efforts, I started wondering, is it just academics using different discourses to explain 
the same practice? Is nation branding both professional and academic fashion? None 
of the above texts question nation branding. They take nation branding for granted.  
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RESEARCH AIM AND CONTRIBUTION  
  
The above paragraphs demonstrate that nation branding has received attention 
of, not only Polish, but of many other nations. Its widespread suppositions assume a 
new dynamics in the relationship between the state and the nation. Stopford, Strange 
and Heney (1991, p. 1) argue that modern “states are now competing more for the 
means to create wealth within their territory than for power for more territory”. The 
era of ‘total wars’ has given way to ‘national competiveness’, and I argue, enabled the 
emergence of an ‘expansionist’, ‘universalizing’, ‘revisionist’ and ‘totalizing’ concept 
of branding into new social spaces. So far,  it is clear that nation branding is under-
researched and empirical works in this area include a few PhD studies (Dinnie 2005; 
Kaneva 2007a; Aronczyk 2009a) and subsequent works, the number of which 
explored nation branding in CEE in various national contexts (Dzenovska 2005; Bolin 
2006; Aronczyk 2007; Baker 2008; Jansen 2008; Volcic 2008; Kaneva and Popescu 
2011). The marketing perspective on nation branding, largely functionalist, has not yet 
offered an explanation of the implicit mechanisms of nation branding practice.  
  
From a Polish citizen’s point of view, questions regarding national identity 
construction are relevant on academic and personal levels. Henceforth, the issues 
surrounding agency of nation branders calls for a necessity to explore the meanings  
they attribute to their practice as a projection of the vision and division in process of 
the Polish national identity make-over. The multi-faced characteristics of nation 
branding and lack of clear paradigmatic shift (in Kuhnian terms14) between models of 
‘propaganda’; ‘public relations’; ‘public diplomacy’; and ‘nation branding’ in the 
academic field requires fundamental analysis concentrating on performative discourse 
in the field settings. Therefore, this thesis strives to contextualise this research problem 
by exploring the practice of nation branding in social, historical, and cultural settings. 
This approach should lend credence to the multidimensionality of the research 
                                                          
14
  See Kuhn, T. S., 1996. The structure of scientific revolutions, 3rd ed., Chicago: Chicago University 
Press.  
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outcomes and by accomplishing this study I aim to contribute to the body of 
knowledge in the following areas: a) studies of post-Soviet Poland; b) overseas 
government communications in Poland; and c) nationalism studies. By exploring 
nation branding in Poland, it is my intention to reveal its role in the nation-building 
process and the consequences of its imposition within the Polish state. 
 
To recapitulate, the above chapter has spelt out academic, pragmatic and 
intuitive arguments justifying this study as well as the research approach proposed for 
the analysis of nation branding in Poland. In principle, the key argument presented in 
this chapter suggests that there is a requirement to overcome a descriptive approach to 
nation branding in Poland and offer empirically-grounded insights into its practice. 
Therefore the conceptual framework outlined in this thesis aims to make conceptual 
features of this thesis alive and informed by multidimensional world-views of agents 
engaged in nation branding as a policy oriented communicative practice. The 
following chapter (six) explains how the conceptual features of my study aim to come 
‘alive’ in methodological and analytical terms.   
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CHAPTER SIX: METHODOLOGY 
OVERVIEW 
 
This chapter outlines the methodological underpinnings for the research. It 
begins with an explanation of questions guiding the research and, consequently, it 
explains the research objectives. Subsequently, this section spells out the ontological 
and epistemological position of this thesis, spanning its theoretical framework, and 
explains the research design, and methods used to generate data. Moreover, it provides 
a rationale for a case study design, an explanation of the reasoning behind selecting 
separate methods, and data analysis procedures. Finally, it presents a self-reflection 
narrative; notes on the fieldwork in Poland, and reflection on the data collected.  
RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND OBJECTIVES   
 
Andrews (2003) indicates that questions tend to surface out of the literature. The 
desk stage of this research allowed me to develop the following research questions:  
 
1. Who are the actors involved in nation branding in Poland? 
2. How actors perform nation branding in Poland? 
3. How has nation branding been institutionalised in Poland? 
4. How do outputs of nation branding practice contribute to nation-
building?  
 
Following Grenfell’s (2008) view on Bourdieusian research, this study sets out: 
 
1. To map out agents performing nation branding in Poland and establish 
their relationship to the field of power;  
2. To analysis the habitus of nation branders in Poland; 
3. To analyse discourses and practices of nation branders in Poland; 
4. To explore the relationship between nation branding practice and 
reproduction of Polishness. 
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ONTOLOGY: TWO ORDERS OF ‘THE SOCIAL’ 
  
A departure point for ontological considerations of this thesis is the structure-
agency relationship between the Polish state and a professional class of nation 
branders. The ontological positions of this thesis stem from modernist views of 
nationalism, Bourdieu’s praxeology, and cultural theory. As aforementioned, the 
agency in the setting of nation-building studies takes place on either macro, mezzo, or 
micro-levels. While Delanty and O’Mahony (2002, p. 101) explain structural-agentic 
ontology in nationalism studies, the links between those levels of analysis require 
specific insights. This thesis follows Bourdieu’s (1989a) ‘structuralist constructivism’ 
ontological position. His understanding of social reality is embedded in the notion of 
double structuring: social structures exist in the objectivity constituted by the material 
and non-material resources. However, structures also operate as subjective patterns 
driving the actions of social agents (Bourdieu and Waquant 1992). This notion of 
double structuring has been explained by Bourdieu (1989, p. 20) as:  
 
The perception of the social world is the product of a double 
structuring: on the objective side, it is socially structured because the 
properties attributed to agents or institutions present themselves in 
combinations that have very unequal probabilities: just as feathered 
animals are more likely to have wings than furry animals, so the 
possessors of a sophisticated mastery of language are more likely to 
be found in a museum than those who do not have this mastery. On the 
subjective side, it is structured because the schemes of perception and 
appreciation, especially those inscribed in language itself, express the 
state of relations of symbolic power.   
 
In research terms, this approach is referred to as praxeology: it starts off with mapping 
out objective structures, followed by analysis of lived experiences and understandings 
of the field actors (Everett 2002). Bourdieu (1989, p. 14) explains that structuralism 
and constructivism are complementary stances of the social world whereby: 
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By structuralism or structuralist, I mean that there exists, within the 
social world itself and not only within symbolic systems (language, 
myths, etc.) objective structures independent of the consciousness and 
will of agents, which are capable of guiding and constraining their 
practices and representations. By constructivism, I mean that there is 
a twofold social genesis, on the one hand of the schemes of 
perception, thought, and action, which are constitutive of what I call 
habitus, and on the other hand of social structures, and particularly of 
what I call fields and of groups, notably those we ordinarily call 
social classes. 
 
There are, however, inconsistencies to those positions. The ontological problem 
that this thesis faces is a concern about dispositions of the field actors. Jenkins (2002, 
p. 94) notes that Bourdieu’s field often refers to institutions and individuals. This poses 
difficulties in establishing features of habitus characteristic to a particular social space. 
How do I attempt to overcome this inadequacy? With regards to this ontological 
matter, this thesis turns to Lin’s (2001, p. 38) theory of social action which has adopted 
the notion of networks. The social networks are in flux and the positions of occupants 
and resources are defined by rules and procedures. Lin says that it is an agreement, 
through persuasion rather than coercion which dictate actors’ relationships. This view 
enables merging of institutional field settings with establishing the habitus of 
individuals driving directions of the field practices. Lin (ibid., p. 38) asserts that “a 
particular network may evolve naturally or may be socially constructed for a particular 
shared focus or interest regarding a resource. However, in general, a social network 
might be constructed for multiple interests in its different segments – different interests 
link nodes in different parts of the network”.   
 
Importantly for this study, in his ontology, Bourdieu attempts to distance himself 
from functionalist settings focused on consensus. In his view, double structuring 
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allows revealing connections and struggles between institutions, not only their internal 
structures (Swartz 1997). While this study considers the stable structural actors in the 
analysis of nationalism (Rokkan 1975), that is the Polish state, it aims at exploring 
social changes performed at the crossovers between its institutional structures, the field 
of mass media, and cultural intermediaries of nation branding. This ties with 
Bourdieu’s (1989a, p. 19) recognition that the world 
 
...does not present itself as totally structured either, or as capable of 
imposing upon every perceiving subject the principles of its own 
construction. The social world may be uttered and constructed in 
different ways according to different principles of vision and division-
for example, economic divisions and ethnic divisions. If it is true that, 
in advanced societies, economic and cultural factors have the greatest 
power of differentiation, the fact remains that the potency of economic 
and social differences is never so great that one cannot organize 
agents on the basis of other principles of division - ethnic, religious, 
or national ones. 
 
The third strand that philosophically underpins this thesis is that of Critical 
Theory. The Institute of Social Research in Frankfurt inaugurated critical 
communications studies, cultural studies, and discussed ideological effects of popular 
culture. The Institute’s contribution to social theory is thought of as the “interpretative 
approach with pronounced interests in disputing social realities” (Alvesson and 
Sköldberg 2009, p. 144). Their modernist sensibility on Western societies has 
advanced from a critique of capitalism and the rise of totalitarian regimes in Europe. 
The legacy of the Frankfurt School offers a philosophical and political project which 
reveals the structural relationship between political economy and culture. For Adorno 
(1997), the bridging mechanism between structure and agency is that of ideology. In 
his interpretation, identity is the primal form of all ideologies. In Eagleton’s words 
(2007, p. 126) “ideology for Adorno is thus a form of ‘identity thinking’”.  
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Although the Frankfurt School scholars are considered as overtly theoretical, 
their ontology leads to several implications regarding interpretations of the social 
world.  Its principles are based on critical hermeneutics and emancipatory interest in 
knowledge. According to Morrow (1994, p. 267), the work of critical theory “is open-
ended and fallibilistic in ways quite distinct from the totalizing theoretical ‘system’” of 
Western philosophy. The Frankfurt School maintains a dialectical view of society, 
arguing for consideration of historical context for analysis. For that reason, Alvesson 
and Sköldberg (2009) suggest that research based in a critical tradition reveals patterns 
of action in terms of negation of historically-grounded relationships. The Frankfurt 
School offers a cultural theory that transcends related disciplines, including studies on 
promotional culture (Wernick 1991). Kellner (1995, p. 30) comments on the Frankfurt 
School’s contribution to communication and cultural studies: 
 
Their studies dissected the interconnection of culture in artefacts that 
reproduce the existing society, positively presenting social norms and 
practices, and legitimating the state capitalist organisation of society.  
 
Summing up, this thesis shares the ontological position with the nationalism 
modernist paradigm in nationalism studies, Bourdieu’s praxeology, and The Frankfurt 
School’s cultural theory. It recognises that social structures are subject to changes 
(Sztompka 1993). Therefore, I do not take the view that there exists ‘a field of nation 
branding in Poland’ as a ‘crystallised structure’ of material and symbolic relations. 
Because nationalism scholars argue for finding interconnections between different 
levels of analysis, by following a constructivist objectivist worldview, this study 
explores culturally grounded, structural and agentic relationships at the crossover of 
mezzo and macro-levels of the Polish society. 
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EPISTEMOLOGY: SOCIOLOGY AS ‘MARTIAL ART’ 
 
Bourdieusian epistemological knowledge formation is echoed in the Anglo-
Saxon academic world preoccupied with empiricism. According to Bourdieu, the 
critical epistemological underpinnings of the scientific practice are three ‘Rs’: 
research, relationism, and reflexivity (Maton 2003, italics added).  
PRIMACY OF EMPIRICISM 
 
Bourdieu’s worldview is embedded in empiricism. His position on knowledge 
formation has been summarised by Wacquant (1989, p. 44) as: 
 
The proper object of social science, then, is neither individuals...nor 
groups as sets of concrete individuals, sharing a similar location in a 
social space, but the relation between two realizations of historical 
action, in bodies of (or biological individuals) and in things.  
 
Bourdieu’s distrust towards metaphysical and descriptive accounts of social 
worlds features widely in his sociology of knowledge. Bourdieu’s oeuvre has left 
researchers with a meta-theory that can be applied to different research settings. His 
analytical categories - field, habitus, and capital - gain meaning, if they have been put 
into the context of empirical research (Swartz 1997). Moreover, empirical research 
should consider reflexivity, and analysis should be done afresh to find particular field 
mechanics. Therefore, social classes are argued to be empirical as they do not only 
exist ‘on paper’ (Bourdieu 1985; Bourdieu 1987). By implication, following Helbling 
(2007), I extend this position to nationhood reproduction: in the search to understand 
how and why nation branding has become an ideological discourse shaping actions of 
selected institutions in Poland, I attempt to join together Bourdieu’s concepts with the 
fieldwork generated evidence. Despite the primacy of empirical research in Bourdieu’s 
epistemology, he attempts to integrate structures and practice by distancing his model 
from ‘substantialism’, ‘realism’ and ‘spontaneous’ theories of knowledge. He does so 
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by bringing relational thinking and reflexivity into his epistemology. By doing so, he 
spells out his view on the relationship between the knower and known.   
RELATIONAL THINKING 
 
Bourdieu’s route to understanding the interdependency between objective and 
subjective features of ‘the social’ is primarily based on the relational positions taken 
by agents. This principle is thought of as “a major contribution of structuralism to 
social sciences” (Swartz 1997, p. 61). Relational thinking aims at breaking up 
epistemological monism. In the light of this principle, the relational mindset allows 
extraction of an object of inquiry from practical interests of everyday life (Bourdieu, 
Chamberdon and Passeron 1991). It is the relations between agents in the field that 
should be examined rather than the elements that constitute it. Therefore the objective 
structure is not as important as how agents stand in relation to each other. It is their 
relative positions that define the relations of power between them. These relations 
“make the reality of the social world” (Bourdieu and Waquant 1992, p. 230).  
 
To avoid description of everyday relations between agents, the analysis of those 
relations must be done using tangible qualities (Bourdieu 1987). Put simply, to reveal 
‘relations’ of agents in the field, Bourdieu’s epistemology attempts to overcome 
positivist, phenomenological or existentialist ‘philosophy of the subject’ approaches 
(Swartz 1997, p. 61). All research using relational thinking must be embedded in 
empirical reality rather than based on theoretical or methodological preferences. It is 
the social relations that drive the research rather than examination of the phenomena in 
isolation. Social relations are meaningless unless comprehensively investigated in a 
specific context (Bourdieu 1984; Bourdieu 1990b). Therefore, Bourdieu allows 
methodological ‘laissez faire’ whereby research must be appropriate for the object of 
research rather than those favoured by a particular discipline. Only empirically 
grounded data should be used as a way of merging theoretical concepts with existing 
social settings. The choice of research options should include ‘all techniques that are 
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relevant and practically usable, given the definition of the object and the practical 
conditions of data collection’ (Bourdieu and Waquant 1992, p. 227). This toolkit, in 
consequence, facilitates the researcher’s modus operandi during the fieldwork. 
REFLEXIVITY 
 
The last epistemological feature in Bourdieu’s sociology of knowledge, and 
indeed the most important from the research objectification point of view, is the notion 
of reflexivity. Bourdieu’s reflexivity is underlaid by a view that, by investigating 
social reality, the researcher produces information that can contribute to the 
construction of reality. This distinction, between researcher and an academic inquiry 
process poses challenges and has implications for researchers as reflexivity should 
neither be “egocentric nor logocentric” (Ashmore 1989, p. 46). Given the symbolic 
feature of academic practice, researchers also have the ability to exercise power. If all 
symbolic systems, academic research included, embody power, is it possible to avoid 
exercising yet another form of symbolic violence? For Bourdieu and Waquant (1992), 
the answer to this dilemma lies in reflexive academic practice.   
 
Bourdieu identifies three levels critical to reflexivity: the social position of the 
researcher (e.g. gender, ethnicity); her/his position in the academic field; and the 
intellectual bias that can blur the sociological gaze (ibid., 1992, p. 39). All of these 
areas can be a largely unconscious sources of bias. The reflexive practice implies self-
awareness on the part of the researcher. While reflexivity requires incorporation into 
the research, epistemologically it aims at academic emancipation from influences of 
the social world under investigation. The researcher’s bias might be derived from: 
their status, field location, and the political component integral to every social science 
practice (Swartz 1997). Indeed, those factors also echo in the Bourdieusian epistemic 
position: as much as awareness of them is significant to self-reflexivity, it is suggested 
that bracketing, as a means to knowledge objectification, should be based on the 
sociologised idea of academic group reflexivity (Maton 2003, p. 58). 
 88 
 
 
Therefore reflexivity aims to: become one step removed from one’s own 
preconceptions; become one step removed from the analytical determinism; and third, 
a step removed from the practice that is investigated. Fourth, the ‘outsider view’ 
requires understanding the difference between practical knowledge and a scholastic 
approach to knowledge. Thus, a scholastic mode of apprehending the social world 
converts practical knowledge into theoretical knowledge which is “conscious, 
systematic, and timeless” (Swartz 1997, p. 274). The reflexive stance aids conversion 
of the practical knowledge into reconstruction of ‘the social’. The lived experience of 
the research objects can then be reintegrated into the analysis without prejudice and in-
depth understanding of the practical sense that drives their everyday lives (Jenkins 
2002). Or to use a comparison, reflexivity is a way of enacting epistemological 
‘bracketing’. Longino (1996), however, opposes this view. In her approach the idea of 
being separated from the object of study is untenable. Similar to Maton, she argues for 
collective reflexivity since “knowledge is constructed by individuals in interaction 
with one another in ways that modify their observation” (Longino 1996, p. 272). 
Mindful of these issues, the next section explains the practicalities of methods. 
SHAPING THE RESEARCH AND PILOT STUDY 
 
In order to present the research design, the pages following offer a brief 
explanation of how a pilot study contributed towards development of this thesis. 
Although, at that stage, I had done an initial review of my doctoral studies and a 
literature review was well underway, it was not entirely clear what I was investigating. 
As a graduate from an international relations degree, I knew how mediated politics 
impacts on the international reputation of a state (Mercer 1996). My literature review 
demonstrated the presence of varied communication-based models facilitating the 
political field. Throughout the research design phase, I often wondered if, in my area 
of research, communication scholars use different terminologies to analyse similar 
phenomena and this way enacted their habitus and pursued their interests. Or perhaps, 
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there are other interests at stake that I should consider? Simultaneously, I kept 
wondering what is the relationship between nation branding and Polishness? 
  
Drawn to the notion of nation branding, I was trying to make connections 
between concepts and actors. At the design phase, this exercise was only intuitive. I 
also lacked clarity of what was new about nation branding. Frequently, I found myself 
asking, is this really a new approach to national identity construction? If so, how is it 
different from propaganda? I kept reflecting on why the Polish media were reporting 
on some overseas governmental campaigns using ‘business language’? How did that 
happen and who was responsible for it? The question I was asking myself was is 
nation branding tactical, or should I understand nation branding in strategic terms? The 
pilot study set out to clarify those concerns. Therefore, between February and April 
2008, I conducted ten pilot interviews both in London and Warsaw (Tab.1., p. 327). 
 
Given the importance of a global-local relationship in the process of national 
identity formation (Rusciano 1998; Rusciano 2003) and having identified global and 
local fields of nation branding (Kaneva 2007a), the pilot enabled me to narrow down 
the scope of this study. While the pilot stage permitted initial mapping out of the 
actors, it also had an impact on the selection of methods. It became obvious, that the 
complexity of institutional relationships renders participatory observation by an 
externally based researcher impossible. This method proved inefficient in the context 
of multifaceted institutional relationships as it was difficult to apply it to the dynamics 
of inter-institutional relationships. Moreover, while this study intended to survey the 
objective positions of agents with reference to types of capitals, this exercise has not 
been possible as gaining access to data had been refused. During the planning phase, I 
was refused permission to administer a survey by the actors or attempts were made to 
influence its design (Appendix 2, p. 334). The multi-correspondence analysis that 
Bourdieu used in his research had to be replaced with an alternative procedure to 
capture the positions of actors in the field.  
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Because of the obstacles to collecting qualitative data, the overall research 
design was reconsidered. Bourdieu’s empirical works combine qualitative and 
quantitative sets of data (Bourdieu 1993; Bourdieu 2005). In this thesis, however, this 
mixed-methods design (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie 2004) has been replaced with a 
case study. Since this study is primarily concerned with nation branding in Poland, its 
exploratory approach aims to unfold the uniqueness of its modus operandi. Regardless 
of this change, this thesis aspires to be faithful to Bourdieusian ontology and 
epistemology. Therefore, this thesis departs from Bourdieu’s typical research design, 
but follows his methodological pluralism. This aside, this thesis is not concerned with 
a longitudinal design of Bourdieusian (1977) ethnographic studies. Henceforth, this 
research precludes the ambition of revealing every single factor shaping relationships 
between agents. In fact, researchers of media (Russell 2007) and public relations 
studies (Edwards 2007; Daymon and Hodges 2008) adopted Bourdieu to the local field 
circumstances. That said, the adjustment of the research design does not significantly 
impact on the aim of this study. Bearing in mind discrepancies between Bourdieu’s 
theories and his often used design, this chapter now moves on to present my approach 
to study nation branding in Poland.  
 
As aforementioned, pilot interviews preceded the main part of the fieldwork. 
Over time, it became clear that the qualitative component of this thesis would be 
dominant. Hence, at that point, my study of nation branding became even more 
influenced by quantitative analysis. As far as the practicality of data collection is 
concerned, Noy (2009) suggests that public officials often prefer interviewing. 
Interviewing enables targeting specific individuals in the search for particular data. 
Indeed, the pilot proved this argument right. While preparing pilot interviews, it was 
not entirely clear what was the focus of this study. Further events added to my 
confusion. In April 2008, I attended ‘The Thought Leaders’ conference held at 
Birmingham University. To my surprise, its keynote speaker, who had been engaged in 
nation branding in Poland, shouted at me in informal conversation: 
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Nobody is branding Poland. Do you understand, nobody in Poland is 
branding Poland! (Michael, personal interview, 2008). 
 
The above events were key motivations behind conducting pilot interviews to 
test my research questions and clarify the on-going tensions in my thinking. Although 
pilot studies are not always necessary, according to Daymon and Holloway (2002), 
many qualitative studies begin with unstructured interviews. They reduce the risk of 
making errors during the actual fieldwork. In fact, this argument corresponds with my 
further reflection on interrogation of nation branding. In the initial interviewing stage, 
I applied the snowball sampling technique: the intention was to follow a bottom-up 
approach to interviewing or what Goffman (1989) calls an ‘affiliation issue’ whereby 
making contacts with informants lets the researcher ascend the investigated field 
(Travers 2001). During the pilot study, sampling was not a primary concern as 
clarification of the object of study was of greater magnitude then procedural 
technicalities. While in the field, I identified ambiguities in my interview guide. 
Consequently, the interview protocol was amended for the main fieldwork.  
RESEARCH DESIGN: REFLEXIVE CASE STUDY  
 
This case study interrogates nation branding in Poland using an exploratory 
research design that aims to bring different categories of data to reconstruct the field. 
By definition, a case study is “an intensive examination, using multiple sources of 
evidence (qualitative, quantitative or both) of a single entity which is bounded by time 
and place” (Daymon and Holloway 2002, p. 105). Principally, a case study is 
concerned with the uniqueness of phenomena under investigation – that is nation 
branding in Poland. Specifically, qualitative case studies aim to reveal commonalities 
and differences within the investigated field (Denzin and Lincoln 2008). Sensitive to 
its features (Stouffer 1941), I consider practices understood as nation branding; the 
contexts of their enactment (e.g. historical, economic, political, legal, and aesthetic); 
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their physical setting; reflect on my findings in relation to other case studies; and 
involve the respondents through which the case of nation branding in Poland is known. 
 
This outline of case study principles marries with Bourdieu’s epistemology. 
Bourdieu (1989b, p. 10) explicitly asserts his “absolute rejection to the sectarian 
rejection of this or that research method”. His methodological polytheism suggests 
however that method must correspond with the research problem and must be 
constantly reflected upon in actu. According to Bourdieu and Waquant (1992, p. 30), 
in reflexive sociology “one cannot dissociate the construction of the object from the 
instruments of construction of the object and their critique”. Therefore, this study 
follows Bourdieusian procedural principles summarised by Grenfell (2008, p. 220): 
 
1. The construction of the research object; 
2. A three-level approach to studying the field of the object of research; 
3. Participant objectivation.  
 
The first of the above points relates to relational thinking whilst engaged in 
exploration of nation banding in Poland; the second, includes procedural techniques to 
do with mapping out the field; its relationship with the field of power; and analysis of 
habitus. The third point involves consideration of reflexivity as central to 
reconstruction of the field dynamics. Done this way, the cross-examination of 
qualitative and quantitative data facilitates development of this case study. With this in 
mind, by exploring discourses and practices of nation branders in Poland, that is the 
strategies of institutional agents involved in the field, this thesis takes the form of a 
reflexive and exploratory case study. At this point one clarification ought to be made: I 
do not define a reflexive case after methodology theorists who tend to describe it as a 
way of theory testing or hypothesis testing (Yin 2009). My approach to nation 
branding is critical and reflexive as I do not take nation branding as a given.  
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This case study answers questions about the influence of nation branding on 
statehood and nationhood as this thesis searches to explore how corporate branding, 
rooted in promotional culture (Wernick 1991) merges with political agendas and 
competes with republican (Delanty and O’Mahony 2002), Catholic (Porter 2001) and 
other types of Polish national identities. Moreover, in this thesis, an ‘exploratory’ 
analogy (p. 114) refers to the research direction and its rationale (Yin 2009). Enthused 
by previous critical works on nation branding (Kaneva 2007a; Kaneva 2007b), I 
extend my investigation into new frontiers. Thus, I do not intend to develop a branding 
model. Neither, is this a study in macro-marketing. Instead, it is a reflexive study, in 
the sense that it asks questions regarding merging practices drawn from traditionally 
different fields. To clarify: this study does not set out to produce a ‘business case’ or 
‘marketing case’, many of which exist in a functionalist approach to nation branding 
(Gilmore 2002; Dinnie 2008). In this study, I merge reflexive and critical 
epistemologies, structure-agentic ontologies with a case study design.  
 
Principally, the case study design serves as the operational fieldwork and 
analytical structure. In the effort to explore the Polish case of nation branding, this 
thesis is underpinned with four main guiding principles. First, it is a single case as it is 
concerned with the uniqueness of the research settings – Poland as a site of 
engagement with nation branding. Second, it is a unique case in the sense that it is sui 
generis of only one setting. Third, by drawing from different data, it takes a multi-
dimensional approach to design. Finally, because of the complexity of the social space 
it aims to explore, it adopts a latitudinal approach (Yin 2009). It explores material and 
symbolic relationships between agents engaged in nation branding in Poland.  
 
As aforementioned, research feasibility has played its role in developing a 
research design. On the whole, the achievability aspect has reinforced undertaking of a 
case study design. Among academic reasons contributing towards adopting this 
research strategy is flexibility of a case study to combine theoretical frameworks and 
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variety of methodologies. While feasibility is crucial to accomplishment of this study, 
its design enables consideration of the world-lives of the informants. As with most 
case studies, I draw from triangulated sources of data (Denzin and Lincoln 2008). The 
complexity of case studies matches the epistemological assertions of the conceptual 
framework (Stake 2008). As it stands, exploratory case studies, aspire to distance 
themselves from preconceived notions. This largely ethnographic notion is emphasised 
by case study theorists (ibid. 2008) who point out the differences between building 
cases by searching particular types of data and considering versatile world lives. This 
design concern has been captured by Malinowski (1984, p. 9):  
 
...preconceived ideas are pernicious in any scientific work, but 
foreshadowed problems are the main endowment of a scientific 
thinker, and these problems are first revealed to the observer by his 
theoretical studies.  
 
Indeed, this was a mindset accompanying the design of this study and one that matches 
the Bourdieusian notion of reflexivity. It was intended to search for all types of 
perspectives on nation branding in Poland - accounts of those who agree with nation 
branding claims and those who express resistance to it. 
DATA GENERATION: OVERVIEW 
 
Three data sources were used to meet the research objectives of this study: 
documents, interviews, and field notes. By applying triangulation, I aimed at a more 
in-depth understanding of nation branding in Poland (Denzin and Lincoln 2008). This 
section outlines how this data was generated and how methods facilitating the data 
collection were operationalized during the fieldwork. Later, I explain procedures 
applied for their analysis in an attempt to integrate the gap between the conceptual 
framework of this study and its research objectives. 
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DOCUMENT COLLECTION 
 
While methodologists (Bryman 2004) assert that documents contain a great deal 
of information of potential significance to empirical studies, Bourdieu (2005) used this 
source of data to explore ‘The social structures of the economy’. Similarly, the first 
stage of my fieldwork was based on document searches. Those were retrieved by 
‘Google.pl’ searches or by scanning the actors’ institutional websites; behest by email 
or during the fieldtrips. I attach a copy of the request letter in Appendix 3, p. 334.  
Principally, therefore, I collected documents enabling me to unfold the perpetuation of 
nation branding in ‘time and space’. The texts that I considered as relevant included 
the phrase ‘nation branding’ or ‘nation brand’ or its equivalents in Polish (‘marka 
narodowa’). Overall, the documents assembled offered insights into the Polish state 
policy; they revealed actors behind their development, disclosed large portions of the 
contextual data, and revealed progress in ‘implementation’ of nation branding. Upon 
completion of this task, documents collected were scanned in accordance with Scott’s 
(1990) quality criteria and categorised as per genre as part of my discourse archive: 
 
1. Polish state documents: policy documents; mission statements of 
the field actors; policy speeches; parliamentary questions; financial 
reports; evaluation and assessment reports; public bidding notices; 
press releases, campaign features.  
2. Corporate documents: consultancy reports; policy proposals; 
relevant websites; reports and professional research on the state of 
the industry; press releases; professional presentations; conference 
materials; projects documentation.  
3. Additional documents: research reports; biographical notes.   
The list of documents analysed in this thesis is enclosed in Appendix 4 (p. 335). 
Documents were clustered by their relevance and categories (e.g. policy type; political 
agenda; policy directions; historical background; practices; national identity features). 
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Principally, documents facilitated informing research objectives 3 and 4 (p. 80). The 
exegesis-based procedure was applied to explore the following aspects of nation 
branding: identification of the key institutional agents in the field; indication of their 
institutional tasks; understanding the emergence of nation branding; establishing 
connections with the field of power; outlining ‘structuring structures’ and ‘structured 
structures’; and analysing the relationship between nation branding and policies 
accommodating this practice. Governmental and non-governmental documents were 
largely used as a source of data enabling contextualisation of nation branding. 
Moreover, document facilitated cross-examination of data and status of actors 
identified during the pilot study and other objects involved in nation branding. Finally, 
this set of data enabled me to capture economic capital. This set of data includes 
mapping out the field based on cross-examination of capital types derived from 
document and interview data. In this study, this is a contextual procedural exercise. 
INTERVIEWS AND FIELD NOTES 
 
The second set of data aims primarily at establishing symbolic relationships 
between agents in the field; their habitus; legitimization and understanding of nation 
branding. Formally speaking, I used this set of data to inform objectives 1 and 2 (p. 
75). This information was obtained by a set of semi-structured interviews conducted in 
Warsaw and London between June and September 2009 and between March and April 
2010. In order to fix the interviews, participants were approached via email or phone. 
Interviews were digitally recorded and transcribed verbatim (Appendix 5, p. 343). 
Some excerpts cited in this thesis were translated from Polish to English whereby I 
attempted to present their meanings closer to the ‘targeted language’ (Malmkjær and 
Windle 2011). With regards to the Polish state field actors, I yet again follow the 
‘affiliation issue’ and targeted, in the first instance, press officers (as by Polish law 
they are the institutional ‘voice’), and later, middle or senior management. In case of 
the private sector actors, I strived to gain direct access to key players. Tables 1 (p. 327) 
and 2 (p. 328-330) contain a full list of participants. 
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During this part of fieldwork, reflexivity was exercised in relation to principles 
and subterfuges outlined in Bourdieu’s ‘The weight of the world’. From this 
exclusively qualitative study, I adopted the ‘non-violent communication’ principle, 
attempting, where possible, to minimise intrusion in the flow of exchange. Not only 
was I interested in the accounts produced by informants, but attention was given to the 
interview situation, and additional cultural clues. Thus the contexts of interviews 
enabled me to gain insights about my participants. Following Alvesson and Sköldberg 
(2009), attention was paid to conscious efforts to view nation branding from different 
perspectives, avoiding a priori assumption and vocabularies. This study applied semi-
structured interviews in an effort to uncover the purposes of nation branding and 
events in the field. The interviews were fixed with the key players forming a social 
network within the institutional field. The targeted actors either developed the vision 
of nation branding field in Poland or designed individual projects. The interview 
questions were aimed at revealing the discourses of agents involved in nation 
branding, their intentions, commitment to nation branding, interests, and specific 
practices. Most importantly, the interviews enabled me to establish qualities of 
relationships between agents. The relations disclose associations between the field 
agents (Silverman 2006).  
 
Furthermore, interviews were used to comprehend habitus. According to Maton 
(2008, p. 52), habitus “captures how we carry within us our history, how we bring this 
history into the present circumstances, and how we then make choices, to act in certain 
ways not the others”. Previously, researchers (Weinwright, Williams and Turner 2006) 
used interviews to explore types of habitus. By implication, this method, combined 
with additional information retrieved from secondary sources, was used to disclose the 
dispositions of the field agents. Moreover, interviews were used to reveal informants’ 
‘practical knowledge’ of nation branding and to account for their reflexivity. 
Predominantly, interview questions related to professional expertise and included their 
education background, religious orientation, social status, ethnicity and nationality. 
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Gender was also considered as a feature shaping the field dynamics. The interviews 
took place during three fieldtrips – 25 July until 19 September 2009; 7 April 2010 until 
25 April 2010, and 20 July 2010 till 3 August 2010.  
 
Overall, interviews in this study generated data facilitating understanding of: a) 
nation branding practice and events accompanying its development; b) types of 
habitus; c) and reported meanings which shaped relations between the field actors. 
Following Huberman and Miles’s (1994) strategies for interview analysis, meanings 
retrieved from transcripts and digital recordings enabled me to connect with the field 
network and discover features shaping the relationships between actors. While doing 
the transcripts (sample attached on p. 343), I reflected on this process as I realised that 
I was becoming more distant from the complexities of the field. In that I was not alone: 
Bourdieu (1999, p. 612) himself criticises transcription for limiting researchers as the 
written word does not allow to capture the rhythm of the interviews and blurs 
connections between multiplicity of statements. Although this procedure is 
inconsistent with the process suggested by methodology scholars (Silverman 2006), by 
listening to digitally recorded interviews, making notes, and summarising key themes 
and statements, I was able to better engage with digital data then transcribed data. 
Moreover, the interview data was facilitated with the field notes. Those enabled me to 
provide additional clues about participants, their surroundings, and interviews setting 
as well as proving fruitful in terms of recording their observed tastes.  
RECRUITING PARTICIPANTS: THE ‘NETWORK’ WITHIN THE FIELD 
  
For the purpose of generating interview data I applied a snowballing technique to 
recruit participants to my study.  This procedure has been defined by Bryman (2004, p. 
100) as a process whereby “a researcher makes a contact with a small group of people 
who are relevant to the research topic and then uses them to establish contacts with 
others”. Indeed, the field testing stage led to the recognition of organisations engaged 
in nation branding discourse from which interview informants were identified. 
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Initially, I made contact with a few brand consultancies and think tanks. From there, I 
followed personal recommendations as well as other agents emerging from the 
documents’ initial scanning. The interview criteria were based on decision-making 
capabilities; participation in policy formulation; engagement in consultancy; research; 
and involvement in creative aspects of nation branding practice. 
DISCOURSE ANALYSIS 
 
Bourdieu (1991, p. 78) considers language as a dynamic feature of practice and, 
for him, “discourses are always to some extent euphemisms inspired by the concern to 
‘speak well’, to ‘speak properly’, to produce the products that respond to the demands 
of certain markets”. In that respect, language is referential - it is socially constructed 
and constructing - and corresponds with class habitus (Myles 1999). Discourse is a 
way by means of which ‘speakers’ express dispositions significant to understanding 
their worldviews, actions and relationships with ‘the other’ field players. Although 
Bourdieu recognises the importance of language to the field mechanisms, he does not 
explicitly provide prescriptive advice as to how operationalize the analysis of data. 
Therefore, I reached out for the already existing explanations of discourse analysis 
provided by social theorists. As far as the examination of my ‘archive’ is concerned, I 
applied Foucault-inspired discourse analysis to interpret the data in an iterative way. In 
fact, scholars of sociolinguistics had previously explored nation branding by means of 
discourse analysis (De Michelis 2008), but I apply a Foucauldian approach to 
reconstruct the field. Although the objective structure is crucial to the field analysis, in 
my study, I did not want to lose track of the relational principle that is at the heart of 
the epistemology accompanying this study. Furthermore, it is the subjective relations 
between the agents that engender social change in which I am interested.  
 
Methodologically, ‘problem-orientated’ discourse analysis enables consideration 
of contextual features. Discourse is considered as “an institutional way of talking that 
regulates and reinforces actions and thereby exerts power” (Link 1983, p. 60). 
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Discourse can be used to study social action and scholars differentiate between 
‘practice in discourse’ and ‘discourse in practice’ (Holstein and Gubrium 2008) 
accounting for some reflexivity among the actors in the structures. But discourse 
analysis can facilitate understanding of outputs of social action. For example, 
Galasińska and Krzyżanowski (2009) apply critical discourse analysis (CDA), to the 
analysis of the political field in order to unfold transformations in the Polish national 
identities. As my study problematizes social change and considers the notions of 
ideology and power, Foucaudian analysis is intellectually closer to this study. In the 
analytical process, I have considered the features of discourse not merely as ‘textual’ 
or ‘oral’ representations of practice (van Leeuwen 2008). In order to address ‘hows’ 
and ‘whys’ of nation branding, in the analysis process, I remained conscious of 
contextual features of discourse. To maintain critical analysis, I considered 
Foucauldian discourse analysis principles as outlined by Hook (2005), particularly:  
 
1. The role of history in contextualisation of discourse; 
2. Discourse-as-knowledge conditioning the statements emerging; 
3. Discourse as material connected immediately to textual elements.  
Myles (1999, p. 886) reveals that Bourdieusian analysis of language aims at 
capturing structural differences that “...are not simply to be discovered, counted, and 
categorized (as in sociolinguistics) but signify fluctuating “battle-lines” or the “stand-
off” positions in discursive struggles”. With this in mind, my analysis focuses on 
making connections between legitimizations of nation branding, performative speech 
acts, and subjective relationships between actors in the field (McNay 2002). For that 
reason, policy documents and professional accounts of the field agents enable me to 
capture ‘performative discourse’ (Bourdieu 1991; Lane 2006) on nation branding as 
dynamic, flux, and changeable. Having outlined conceptual principles of discourse 
analysis, I draw from other methodologists’ work that puts this type of analysis into 
practice. In order to reconstruct the field dynamics, I follow discourse analysis 
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methodological procedures put forward by Burchell, Gordon, and Miller (1991) so that 
I can clarify the areas of discourse that Foucault defines as central to understanding the 
relationship between power/ knowledge. They are: 
 
1. The limits and forms of sayable – elements of discourse revealing 
what it is possible to speak of and what is the domain of discourse; 
2. The limits and forms of conversation – consideration for elements of 
discourse retained by actors over time, and reasoning behind it; 
3. Discursive memory – consideration for utterances and statements 
regarded as valid, debatable, and invalid; 
4. Limits and forms of reactivation – consideration for elements of 
discourse reconstituted and transformed over time; 
5. Limits and forms of appropriation – consideration for access to 
discourse and the role institutions play in formalising the relations 
between discourses, speakers and audiences; How does the 
ownership of a discourse determine struggle between actors? 
 
Parker (1994) uses Foucauldian discourse analysis to illustrate the strength of social 
assumptions in every day texts that are doxic. In his view, discourse analysis should 
reveal the identities presented in an ‘archive’, and the links between them and the 
themes underpinning these identities. As important during the analytic process is to 
examine alternatives modes of expression that are not used, or search for unspoken 
aspects of discourse, in a process of ‘free association’. Finally, the source of the text 
and the audience for it are critical to understanding subsequent versions of truths and 
power relations that are normatively defined and presented in the collected archive.  
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RESEARCH ETHICS 
 
Voluntary participation and protection of informants from harm are two aspects 
of research on people (Bryman 2004). This research follows Bournemouth 
University’s (2009) research ethics guidelines. With regards to voluntary participation, 
solicitation emails were distributed among prospective informants and followed by the 
phone or Skype conversation before the interviews. During the fieldwork, the purpose 
of this research was explicitly explained at the start of my interviews: participants were 
informed of the research procedures; anticipated benefits from participation; and their 
rights to ask questions or withdraw from participation or refuse to answer certain 
questions. As a benefit from participation, I offered each participant a summary of the 
findings. While some participants explicitly asked to remain anonymous, to protect all 
of them from potential risks (e.g. threat to their job), I have kept separate the names of 
informants in presenting the findings in this study. This was also done for consistency 
reasons. To anonymize my participants, I either refer to them by false names or by the 
role they act within the field. Thus, in this study, their identities remain confidential. I 
am, however, ready to give examiners fuller profiles of participants if this is needed to 
further establish authenticity. 
LIMITATIONS 
 
 As with every research, this study has also its limitations. If this case is to be 
assessed against its generalisability and universality, its design precludes any ambition 
of forming ‘context-independent’ knowledge. Because this case study uses a largely 
interpretive approach in the reconstruction of the dynamics of nation branding as a 
socially constructed performative discourse, it uses historical contextualisation as well 
as culturally grounded sources for analysis. Thus it is less concerned with forming 
universalising statements about applicability of nation branding into other national 
settings. On the contrary, it aims to use multiple-source data sets to capture the socially 
conditioned settings which this case study explores. While I was mindful of all quality 
assessment criteria outlined by Yin (2003), I was primarily concerned with assuring 
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construct validity and internal validity. From my analytical process, I have consciously 
excluded the procedure of getting feedback from the key field actors as some of them 
explicitly attempted to shape the directions of this thesis. This, in my view, would 
introduce an unnecessary source of bias. I can, however, reassure readers that the 
language used to report my findings about participants’ insights remains faithful to the 
language they used.  
  
Because socio-historical analysis is primarily concerned with the conditions of 
agents in the field, it is the researcher’s responsibility to interpret those conditions. 
Reflexive research includes two key elements: careful interpretation of data and 
reflection. The first implies interpretation of data and anything outside of data remains 
in an equivocal relationship to the object of analysis. Interpretation is at the forefront 
of this research. The second element, reflection, concentrates on the researcher, his/her 
relationship with the society and a broader academic community and their assessment 
of their own work; it can be defined as interpretation of interpretation. In Bourdieu’s 
(2000) view, research biases are the result of the position of the researcher in the social 
space and the orthodoxies of the field. Those issues transcended my position as a 
researcher as the reflexive research is not free from “‘power effects”, including 
“domination, silencing, objectification, and normalization” (Burawoy 1998, p. 4). 
Having been exposed to orthodoxies of the field, I realise that while all my efforts 
were to ground the findings in the data archive, its analysis remains subjective. 
  
In his outline of reflexive case studies, Burawoy (1998, p. 11) comments that 
“history is not a laboratory experiment that can be replicated again and again under the 
same conditions”. Therefore issues of replicability are also of minor consideration in 
this study. In order to safeguard the quality of this study, I explicitly report which 
multi-source data I have drawn from; I explicitly present the procedures and cross-
examination patterns of its analysis as well as report and reflect on shortcomings in the 
data sets. The last issue is particularly sensitive: it primarily concerns sources of 
information revealing ‘private’ relationships between key actors in the field. I was not 
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offered all materials contributing to the formation of subjective relationships between 
them (e.g. report of meetings between private and public actors). As contemporary 
performative politics is conducted by emails or by phone, those symbolic exchanges 
have the potential to shape the dynamics of the field. In that respect, lack of evidence 
accompanying those exchanges is a limitation of this study. Another limitation is the 
physical location issue - had I been engaged in institutional ethnographic research, the 
data set of this study would have been different. Nevertheless, this case study strives to 
remain idiographic; to elucidate the uniqueness of nation branding in Poland. I reflect 
on the missing relationships in the field in the last section of the analysis chapter.  
 
Finally, I would like to stress that this study does not aspire to make generalising 
statements about nation branding as a socio-political phenomenon. It is therefore 
neither a universal critique of nation branding nor an attempt to capture all politicised 
relationships in the field. This study aims at revealing institutional connections leading 
to the emergence of the idea of the nation brand or nation branding within the Polish 
field of power in the setting of the dominant, neo-liberal political economy. In the 
worst case, this study can be considered as a descriptive account of nation branding as 
a means of national identity construction in Poland. At best, it is the first exploratory, 
analytical insight into changes to the dynamics of the Polish field of power driven by 
new entrants - nation branders - struggling to make an impact on public policy making. 
Either way, the analysis offers exploratory insights into nation branding as a type of 
knowledge, the imposition and invasion of which bears ideological consequences for 
the reinvention of nationhood. Below, I present a self-awareness narrative to reflect on 
my relationship with the object of this study.  
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ENACTING REFLEXIVITY: ACADEMIC ‘CONFESSION’  
 
Following principles of reflexive sociology, this section offers an ‘academic 
confession’ regarding the research process. Primarily, it follows Bourdieu’s (1992) 
epistemology concerning research reflexivity, but it is also informed by other 
methodologists working within this social theory tradition (Alvesson and Sköldber 
2009). This statement serves two purposes: it is designed as a self-awareness exercise 
and as clarification of how biases and preconceptions were ‘bracketed’ from the 
research process. To reduce the analytical bias, reflective components are spelled out 
in the next chapters as an additional narrative explaining my position vis-à-vis 
knowledge formation.  
 
According to Marton (2003) autobiographical reflection requires an explanation 
of interest in the particular research. Although my initial proposal aimed at exploring 
Poland’s overseas propaganda, the emergence of nation branding in Poland drew my 
notice to this concept. Previously, my interest in government and corporate 
communications had been shaped by reading Polish academics’ works as a MA 
student. I quickly realised that majority of those texts are based on ‘imported’ Western 
models, lacked empirical insights, and were exceedingly descriptive. Initially, my aim 
was to merge international relations studies with research on Polish government 
overseas communication. Throughout the desk stage research, however, I discovered 
that there is a need to ask fundamental questions about relationships between the 
Polish state and nation branders. 
 
I begin this self-awareness narrative with identifying existing preconceptions 
regarding the subject that I investigated. Having established that nation branding 
writers advocate neo-liberal agendas (Bolin and Ståhlberg 2010) and marketization of 
national identity, I would like to highlight here that I am against neo-liberal 
marketization of every aspect of public policy or field. I am, however, in favour of 
modern economic nationalism. While this thesis attempts to reveal the construction of 
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national identity, indirectly this research is a personal quest to understand changes to 
my own national identity. While the Polish technocratic class (Hardy and Clark 2005) 
and their policies of ‘capitalism without a human face’ contributed to the biggest wave 
of migration from Poland, nation branding conceptualists imply that, myself as an 
expatriate, should be a ‘brand ambassador’. I was intrigued by this redefinition of my 
relationship with the Polish state. I was keen to better understand what narrative of 
Polishness I should present to the world and assess whether I agree with it or not.  
 
As far as my political worldview is concerned, I define myself as a political 
liberal; social-democrat with regards to economics issues; and conservative as far as 
social matters are concerned. Like Bourdieu, I was educated and brought up in a 
republican spirit where history and tradition played a greater role in the formation of 
national identities than a business ethos. Unlike Bourdieu, however, I grew up in a 
state dominated by an authoritarian regime. I belong to the generation of Poles which 
has experienced systemic social changes. However, throughout my schooling (1994-
1998), I was neither subjected to business classes nor marketing courses. On the 
contrary, within my social networks, marketing practice, at the time of my education 
was considered as shallow and marketing careers as second-rate. When I entered the 
University of Wrocław, it was clear that the rising popularity of marketing in the 
Polish academia was a sign of advancing neo-liberal hegemony in Poland. 
 
The social class also plays a role in this research. Schwartzmantel (2006, p. 250) 
notes how socialist versions of nationalism were embedded in national cultures. After 
the Second World War, the Polish state favoured ‘socialist nationalism’. Indeed, my 
parents adopted certain aspects of ‘socialist living’ (e.g. popular culture, aesthetics) but 
within my family network the imposition of neo-liberalism and re-introduction of 
democracy in Poland triggered new reflection on Polishness. Capitalism allowed me 
social mobility, but this has happened at a cost. My sedimented class legacy merges 
with certain pre-understandings of Polishness, including: political history of Poles, 
Catholic beliefs, republicanism, and traditionalism. Regardless of those and other 
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cultural bonds with Poland, I decided to reject the Polish capitalism and in 2003 I 
settled in England. In my experience, the English version of ‘professionalising’ neo-
liberalism stimulated my reflection on this version of globalising political economy. 
While I declare Polish roots, my residency in England has lead to renegotiation of my 
national identity; it has opened up new avenues of thinking about the contemporary 
Poland. Moreover, my residency in England also developed a sense of resistance 
against the reification of collective identities that has been reinforced by Thatcherism. 
The exposure to ‘English living’ has put my relationship with Poland into a new 
perspective thanks to which I better understand the Westernisation of Poland.  
 
Importantly to this study, my academic habitus has been predominantly formed 
by my parents, teachers at the K.K. Baczyński High School in Wrocław, Wrocław 
University, and my professional life at Bournemouth University and the Sorbonne, 
Paris. Formally speaking, I am at the beginning of my academic career. In my practice, 
I aspire to take a reflective view on corporate communications and consider its socio-
political contexts and ideological features. Likewise, this research does not, serve any 
political agenda; it has neither been financed by any government nor interest group. Its 
direction has been shaped by a motivation to develop my research and analytical skills.  
 
At this point, my relationship with the supervisory team requires considerations 
as reflexivity “constantly assesses the relationship between ‘knowledge’ and the ways 
of ‘doing knowledge’” (Calás and Smirchich 1992, p. 240). The team has the ability to 
exercise their ‘pedagogic power’. Indeed, the team has made an indelible mark on the 
shape of this thesis, but their guidance was Socratic in approach. They did not imply 
either selection of a theoretical framework or methodological approach. In my view, 
their work predominantly concentrated on the discussion of concepts guiding this 
research. I perceive their supervisory philosophy as based on critical debates rather 
than prescriptive advice. The supervisory team has placed an emphasis on critical 
thinking, balancing arguments and eliminating preconceptions. Put simply, the team 
reassured the intellectual development of this study via questioning. Their power over 
 108 
 
my thinking focused on rigorous and coherent analysis and delivery of arguments. 
Throughout the study, there was no explicit conflict of interests among supervisors. 
 
Against this background, I hope to understand nation branding in Poland through 
the world lives of its agents. During my fieldwork, I attempted to reduce the researcher 
bias by bracketing out my preconceptions and my ‘images of Polishness’. Among the 
strategies that I applied during the fieldwork were field notes, in which I attempted to 
make connections between different types of data and my participants. I strived to 
understand their social setting; my field notes recorded narratives of self-reflection and 
further clarifications. Those notes have been included in my analysis section.  
DOING RESEARCH IN POLAND 
 
Every study poses methodological challenges. In their Bourdieusian study, Eyal 
et al. (2000) note that their fieldwork in Poland and other CEE states, resembled 
‘detective investigation’ rather than sociological inquiry. Indeed, I reflect on three 
similar issues that I have encountered during my fieldwork: limited trust, data access, 
and attempts to influence the shape of the study. I reflect on them one-by-one.  
 
First, the notion of distrust has been prominent feature of my fieldwork. In 1996 
Sztompka characterised the Polish society as penetrated by a ‘culture of distrust’. 
While this feature of the Polish society might be deemed dated, the grasp of it was 
revealed in interaction with some field agents. During my three months fieldwork in 
Poland, it occurred to me that informants who lived the majority of their lives during 
the Sovietised era were more distant and explicitly defensive. Initially, my Western 
location facilitated fixing the interviews. It is only in the face- to-face situations when 
some participants expressed uncertainty or they explicitly accused me of having a 
‘thesis in my mind’ that allegedly I was trying to prove as a result of my questioning. 
Some of my informants were genuinely amazed that I bothered with all those 
interviews. To gain the participants’ trust I took a proactive stance: if required, I 
offered explanations exceeding basic introductory statements; I offered explanations 
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that my interviews were not a knowledge test. On a few occasions, I was made to feel 
that I was interrogating a terrorist plot, not the process of nation-building.  
 
The data access was second issue that I encountered during the fieldwork. 
Although the Freedom of Information Act (2001) in Poland talks about access to 
public information in Poland, its reinforcement by the Polish state was rather loose. 
Very quickly, I realised that it was one of the ways that the Polish state attempts to 
exercise symbolic violence. As aforementioned, I was not allowed to survey some 
actors. While the Act has no bearing on surveys in public institutions, the access to 
public policy information is crucial to exercising citizens’ rights in a democratic 
society. Although interviews allowed building rapport with participants and offered an 
opportunity to request documents that I had not been aware of before data collection, I 
was not granted access to all of them. When I requested a piece of consultancy on 
nation branding, paid from public funds, it was explained:  
 
We cannot grant you an access to this document. There was a bit of 
scandal around it. In fact, it is all bit of a sensitive issue (Zofia, 
personal interview, 2009).  
 
Consequently, I began to reflect on those defensive attitudes and look for the 
data elsewhere. The dismissive attitude towards my request took various forms. One of 
them was a ‘wait-and-see’ strategy; in the case of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it 
took me two months to get access to documents. While setting up the fieldwork, I 
encountered the following statements made on the behalf of the Ministry’s dominant 
coalition:  
 
The department is undergoing reorganisation. And because of staff 
issues and other structural changes, it is simply not feasible to 
conduct your interviews with our employees... (Krycki, personal 
communication, May 29, 2009, see Appendix 2, p. 333). 
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Attempts to influence data collection were, on the other hand, common:  
 
...the survey would have to be sent to the Department of Public 
Diplomacy. The management would indicate which staff should fill it 
in. It is a possibility, however, I am not sure if it would be successful. 
The survey, according to information that was passed on by the 
management would have to short and synthetic (ibid. 2009).  
 
However, informants representing the private sector were welcoming and came 
across as genuinely interested in sharing their views on nation branding. In the light of 
my fieldwork experiences, I began to wonder whose culture I was studying: is it my 
culture? Is it the informants’ culture? These ongoing questions encouraged my 
willingness to analyse changes to Polish national identity dynamics. My mindset 
accompanying the fieldwork in Poland was based overall on considering my 
informants as fellow countrymen discussing their vision of Polishness. Over time, I 
have managed to establish on-going relationships with those participants closer to my 
life stage or of similar academic interests. 
 
By outlining epistemological and ontological position of this thesis, this chapter 
has merged the conceptual framework of my study with procedural and analytical 
technicalities accompanying the fieldwork and data analysis. The chapter presents 
questions guiding my interrogation of nation branding in Poland and the research 
objectives aligned to the overall design of this thesis. Subsequently, this chapter spells 
out the justification for a case study design and methods deployed during the 
fieldwork. Finally, it presents limitation to this study; a self-reflection narrative; notes 
on the fieldwork in Poland, and reflection on the data collected. Having explained the 
methodological underpinnings of this study, throughout chapters seven, eight, and 
nine, I present findings emerging from the data collected.   
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CHAPTER SEVEN: STRUCTURES AND STRUCTURING MECHANISMS 
OVERVIEW  
 
This chapter reveals the ‘imposition’ and ‘invasion’ (Bourdieu 2001) of nation 
branding within the Polish state’s field of national images management on the basis of 
emic professional accounts and public policy documents. First, it demystifies branding 
in Poland as it is prerequisite to understanding the emergence of nation branding. 
Second, by unfolding the field’s  ‘structured structures’ and ‘structuring structures’, it 
discloses the settings of this study and accounts for relevant communicative practices 
preceding nation branding. It moves from an historical exegesis to report on its 
findings within a social space where the government interests have met with business 
interests: it maps out the positions of agents and explains their relationships to the field 
of power. In keeping with an ontological worldview (p. 80), this thesis uncovers 
buried structures that make up the field, presents mechanisms that ensure its 
structuration and reveals the resources used by agents engaged in nation branding.  
In essence, the findings reveal that nation branding, as envisioned by nation 
branders, have not been fully institutionalised as a routinised practice (Reckwitz 2002) 
characterised by its own professional code of practice. While the Polish, private sector 
marketers and public relations actors explain their understanding of nation branding in 
ambiguous, often tactical terms, the Western nation branding consultants travelling 
across the Polish state structures and beyond, alongside their business employers, 
explicitly define their vision of the field and offer insights into assumed requirements 
for nation branding practice. The ideological discourse on nation branding has 
emerged as an ‘idealised model’ that has been imposed on the Polish state by the 
newcomers to the state bureaucracy. The advocates of nation branding employed 
‘succession strategies’ enacted by public affairs campaigning to secure their interests 
in nation branding consultancy and made an impact on the Polish state’s promotional 
policy making. Thus, nation branding has been performed through attempts to form 
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their vision of the field and by attempts to formalise nation branding as part of the 
public policy in which the Polish state articulates its transnational economic interests. 
I start off with demystifying nation branding and offer insights into how this 
powerful promotional culture idea and practice is rooted within the cognitive 
structures in Poland. Later, I report on the interrogated field by outlining the historical 
overview of relevant actors. This section follows a reflexive approach to the analytical 
process emphasised by scholars studying early modernist government communication 
(L’Etang 2004). This section also offers a flavour of terminology used by participants. 
During my fieldwork, I was regardful of the context in which the phrase ‘nation 
branding’ was used and meanings attributed to it. Altogether, the assumption that there 
exists an autonomous field of nation branding in Poland is highly contestable.  
In fact, the early stage of the fieldwork reveals different ‘institutional labels’ 
(Everett 2002) within the field, signifying institutional practices: ‘public diplomacy’; 
‘national marketing’; ‘investment marketing’; ‘destination marketing’; ‘cultural 
diplomacy’ and amidst them ‘nation branding’. These are markers of change. These 
practices are linked with promotional policies of the Polish state and, are defined by 
the state actors, as aiming at challenging the ‘images of Poland’. Why is it important? 
First, it captures the conditions within the field. Second, it supports the view that 
“influxes of new agents into the field can serve either as forces for transformation or 
conservation” (Benson and Neveu 2005, p. 5). Against this background, nation 
branding emerges as an additional policy and communicative practice in the nation-
building process. The fieldwork data reveals that the first initiative explicitly signified 
as ‘nation branding’ took place in August 1999, but central to this study, ‘Nation 
brand building programme’, was contracted on 15th December 2003. 
THE MYTH OF BRANDING IN POLAND 
 
Although I had conducted preliminary interviews in London and Warsaw prior 
to my fieldwork, I was still asking myself, if at all, nation branding is different to its 
conceptual predecessors? How is it practised? And what purpose does it serve in the 
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context of political economy and promotional culture in Poland. I arrived in Warsaw 
on 25th July 2009, having fixed few interviews prior to the fieldtrip. Straight from 
Chopin Airport, I set out for the city centre. I decided to take up a role of a ‘native 
tourist’ during my fieldwork. Having put my ‘researcher as a tourist’ glasses on, I 
headed towards the city centre. Warsaw welcomed me with beautiful weather. The 
eclectics of Gothic, Art Nouveau and Soviet-style architecture intertwined with the 
omnipresence of promotional artefacts scattered across the city. Soon after landing, I 
was drawn to the public information campaign called ‘Choose branded’. In fact, it is 
an ongoing campaign run by the Polish Association of Branded Goods Manufacturers 
(2009) tailored to persuade Poles of the virtues of branded commodities. This growing 
clutter of messages reveals expansion of promotional culture that nowadays is integral 
to the iconographic landscape in Poland (Chmielewska 2005). 
 
My fieldtrips to Warsaw became an opportunity for a reflection about Poland. 
Apart from the colonising promotional culture, occupying public spaces, the streets of 
Warsaw welcomed me with public spaces where the homeless, prostitutes, 
unemployed, and the impoverished took advantage of the philanthropic support of the 
Roman Catholic Church. I began to wonder if these social classes of the Polish nation 
find representations in performative discourse on nation branding. I kept thinking 
about the culture in which I grew up. I could clearly recall that within my social 
networks across various fields in Poland, Western branded commodities, services, and 
corporate brands had been considered as a symbol of ‘long-lasting quality’; ‘high-
tech’; often idealised as ‘luxurious’ or ‘conspicuous’ in the impoverished socialist 
economy15  by the authoritarian governed Polish nation. I could recall, how ‘branded’ 
ex definitione meant ‘better’. 
 
                                                          
15
  I consciously use the term ‘socialist’ as the latter has never been an ideological form of governance 
in Poland in its purity. A distorted version of socialism has been reduced by the Polish Communist 
Party to an authoritarian regime imposed in Poland by the Soviet government after World War II 
(with the UK and US governments’ consent) and subservient to its policies. To think of Poland as 
the communist state is a simplification and does not reflect writings of Marx and Engels.   
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The representations of commercial branding practice are hardly new to Poland: 
its myth, or what Bourdieu (1991, p. 167) terms as “collectively appropriated 
product”, had existed in Poland prior to the emergence of nation branding. As far as 
promotional culture in Poland is concerned, the myth of branding has gained 
momentum driven by socialism-capitalism dialectics: branding has gained its impetus 
thanks to shortages of goods and promotion culture in which Polish socialist 
enterprises did not use professionalised corporate communication language. 
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, a growing demand for basic products and products 
rationing were frequently aligned with ‘inefficiencies’ of the socialist system of 
production. Simultaneously, branding was attributed to Western corporate symbols. In 
these settings, the myth of branding had been reproduced as self-fulfilling prophecy of 
Western capitalism. Sidorenko (1998, p. 9) summarises the above points in the 
following way:  
 
...Polish reality from the late 1970s on compared unfavourably with 
images of life in the West. These images helped to create a fantasy of 
communism’s other through the unfortunate medium of the feel good 
American movies, imported alongside real denim jeans and Pepsi-
Cola during the populism of the Gierek regime. 
 
Those contrasting relationships, based on the communism-capitalism dialectics, 
underpinned by growing demand and inefficient supply logic are also relevant to this 
study. Indeed, my findings remain consistent with the above observation. The insights 
presented by the field actors explicitly demystify preconceptions concerning 
representations of brands and branding as well as contextual meanings attributed to 
this practice. One of them, in an insightful way, unfolds the culturally loaded myth of 
branding in Poland, which was presented to me in the following exchange: 
 
Interviewer: Why is it so important for contemporary Poland to have 
a brand? 
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Interviewee: You see, your question brings about a thesis, a certain 
assumption. Hm...there are people who claim that it is important for 
Poland to have a nation brand. They claim that having a nation brand 
means that a country is better perceived, it is better recognisable. In 
their view, this can leverage into, say, the economic performance. So 
if a country is better recognisable and perceived positively.... Because, 
you see, ‘a brand’ is a positive term, it is not pejorative, right? It has 
clear positive connotations. So if we say, in Polish, don’t know about 
English as this might be culturally different, but in Polish, if we say 
‘this is a brand’, we automatically assume ‘quality’. We do not 
explicitly have to say ‘good quality’. We subconsciously assume that 
we talk about a ‘good quality’. Henceforth, going back to nation 
branding, if you assume that Poland needs to have a nation brand, 
some argue, that it would automatically increase Poland’s 
international prestige. That is what some people think.  
 
Interviewer: Is that what you also think? 
 
Interviewee: I think that the building of national prestige is much 
more complicated than drawing from a set of brand features (Kinga, 
personal interview, 2008). 
 
Nowadays, the term ‘brand’ can be demystified as an attribute of ‘outstanding 
recognition’, ‘prominent position’ or ‘extraordinary qualities’. The perpetuation of 
branding has gained a dominant meaning whereby making a reference to ‘an object’ as 
a brand creates ‘a subject’ which is in an assumed privileged market or social position. 
 
Another culturally grounded and contextual feature of the branding myth lies in 
a presupposition that commodities, services, and organisations in Poland had not been 
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thought of in ‘branding’ terms and that until recently in marketing practice, Polishness 
has been rarely signified. Another field actor reveals:   
 
“Even today, the specificity of marketing in Poland is that the 
commercial enterprises are reluctant to draw on a country of origin 
effect as a marketing technique. Only now they are awakening to the 
potential of this tactic in their product and corporate branding 
(Adam, personal interview, April, 2008). 
 
Further, he recognises the dynamics of marketing practice and gives an example of 
their client - Kompania Piwowarska16 - that widely signifies Polishness in its corporate 
communications. Indeed, before 1989, commodities, services or organisations in the 
Sovietised Poland had their own representations, but managerial terminology was not 
widespread. The myth of branding, further reinforced within the promotional culture, 
has developed explicit representations of brands and implicit representations of 
branding. While I was aware that participants of my study lived similar experiences of 
the political economy in Poland prior to 1989, their construction of meaning regarding 
branding could have been significantly different. With this in mind, I embarked on the 
fieldwork eager to understand how nation branding has been enacted in Poland. As 
shown later in this study, the culturally loaded pre-understandings of branding have 
played their role in the effort to legitimize nation branding by private sector actors. At 
this stage, however, the following pages sketch out types of policy and outline the 
settings accompanying institutionalisation and perpetuation of nation branding.  
PROMOTIONAL POLICY AND PROMOTIONAL CULTURE 
 
Although there are existing academic accounts for overseas propaganda practice 
enacted by the Polish state actors (Dudek 2002; Cull, Culbert and Welch 2004; 
                                                          
16
  This corporation has signified Polishness in their advertising campaigns and through other forms of 
corporate communications. In an act of professional recognition, their advertising agency, DDB 
Corporate Profiles, received Effie Awards for advertising one of their brands, Tyskie.  
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Szczepankiewicz 2005), a key development that has been routinised post-1989 within 
its structures is the emergence of codified, national promotional policies. Those 
policies are new dimensions of political symbolic power, which are the means for 
enacting specialised communicative practices by the Polish state’s administration. 
Additionally, since the beginning of systemic changes to the political economy in 
Poland, the state institutions have been adapting to the market settings and this process 
is also prominent among the Polish state institutions managing ‘collective identities’ 
and ‘multiple images’ of Poland and Poles overseas. Particularly, an accelerated shift 
from thinking of Poland as a ‘national market’ to its reinvention as a ‘transnational 
market’ player was highlighted in promotional policies (e.g. Polish Ministry of 
Economics 2003). Their emergence has affected legitimacy of policy making and the 
requirement to address interest groups’ (e.g. Polish businesses institutions, market 
actors, and policy consultants) position on the directions of the policy development. 
Although the promotional policies developed by the Polish state do not explicitly 
reveal the role of the Cabinet in terms of mediated representation of Polishness, it was 
implicitly assumed that ‘promotional policy’ is enacted on behalf of the Government. 
 
In theory, those promotional policies overlap with foreign policy, cultural policy, 
economic policy and tourism policy goals. Although images of the Polish state can be 
understood as important from the perspective of those policies goals, the links between 
autonomous promotional policies of the Polish state and broadly defined goals of 
foreign, cultural, economic and tourism policies require a separate analysis as they are 
not explicitly revealed in the promotional policies texts discussed in this study. Those 
links, however, were sporadically highlighted by management of the state institutions 
engaged in their making and implementation. The characteristic of those promotional 
policies in the Polish settings is that they have become a separate type of Polish state 
institutions’ policy discourse revealing insights into various communicative practices, 
including nation branding. Their making, however, is based on a ‘silo effect’: their 
goals, relationships with other policies and relationships with various communicative 
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practices and tasks are not immediately explicit. What is more, promotional policies 
are advanced at the ministerial or departmental levels and their status within the 
political field is ambiguous. Development of those policies and relevant 
communicative acts were considered by my participants as politics with a small ‘p’. 
My findings reveal that nation branders or their business employers travelled at 
the upper reaches of the Polish society structure and they were, indeed, particularly 
interested in promotional policies advanced by the Polish state actors. The field of 
power overseeing planning, making, and enacting of the promotional policies involves 
actors representing three forms of power: executive power (the Polish government 
structures including specialised bureaucratic departments or governmental agencies); 
legislative power (the Sejm); and controlling bodies (the Supreme Audit Office). They 
represent a triadic division of power of the Polish state. In the light of my findings, this 
triadic division of power in Poland can be extended by the notion of the fifth estate 
apparatus exercised at home, over the Polish nation, or abroad.  
Indeed, the Polish state policy documents reveal that promotional discourse on 
Poland can be traced back to mid-1990s. Those policies have been institutionalised 
within the Polish state structures in the aftermath of neo-liberal ‘structural adjustment’ 
policies imposed by the rising technocratic class and advanced further in the run-up to 
the EU accession (European Union Integration Committee 1997). Since the mid-
1990s, by means of self-devised regulations, the Polish state institutions have been 
empowered to develop policies sketching out their role in promoting the state interests, 
including management of intangible aspects of those policies. The clear change 
evident in those policies is their attribution as ‘strategies’; this is explicit in names of 
the policy documents. For example, the most recent policy made by Polish Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (2009a) was entitled ‘The framework strategy for Poland’s promotion 
until the year 2015’ and the policy proposed by the Ministry of Economics (2010) was 
called by its makers as ‘The strategy for internationalisation of Polish economy’. A 
change to linguistic tokens for policy signification is a marker of institutional change.   
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Prior to 1989, the Polish state policies of a centrally commanded economy were 
signified as ‘plans’ and, particularly during 1970s, were a significant component of 
symbolic power mediated by ‘propaganda of success’. Although the findings of this 
study do not reveal intentions behind this change, it demonstrates that the Polish state 
actors adopt new discourses as instruments of domination. Nowadays, the main aim of 
promotional policies is to present the Polish state interests principally defined as per 
transnational market priorities. Within the field of power, promotionalism is explicitly 
linked with global market competitiveness; a governmental report, ‘Poland 2030: 
development challenges’ states: 
 
Poland shall define its image and promote it professionally and in a 
consistent way abroad; this image is coherent with regard to identity 
and value with the image promoted inside the country, so as to – on 
the one hand – support the Polish citizens abroad in their positive 
identification with the home country and with each other, and on the 
other hand create a positive image of Poland as a modern, 
dynamically developing country amongst foreigners. Such activities 
are especially crucial in the era of global capital and investment 
competition (Chancellery of the Prime Minister of Poland 2008, p. 
34, English original). 
 
Apart from outlining a link between the contemporary promotional policies with 
global market forces, the above governmental report is an explicit statement that points 
to a relationship between promotional policies and national identity construction. This 
process and its qualities, however, are subjected to instructional relationships. 
 
From the institutional stance, the Polish state has established channels and areas 
of promotion divided into ‘political’, ‘economic’, and ‘cultural’ areas of the state 
interests, which, according to policy makers, intertwine with global market forces.  
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Although this division is arbitrary, it is nevertheless featured in policy documents 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2009a, p. 14). Notably, practices of political, economic 
and cultural fields in Poland are far more complex than those including actors involved 
in promotional policy making. It is, therefore, the Polish state that is responsible for 
selection and representation of dominant, pre-defined aspects of political, economic, 
and cultural interests. Furthermore, my fieldwork reveals that the first codified policy 
of this kind appeared within the state structures in the year 2000 (Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs 2000) with a view to facilitate Poland’s EU accession, but formerly ‘The 
national integration strategy’ presented a short statement on the role of ‘promotion’ of 
the Polish state with regards to a political objective of EU accession:  
 
The aim of promotion is to strengthen international image of Poland 
as a democratic state, characterised by a stable economy and society, 
respecting the rights of the free markets, respecting private 
ownership, a dynamically developing economy, as well as enjoying 
strong relations with its neighbours and as being active on the 
international arena, etc. (EU Integration Committee 1997, p. 40). 
 
To sum up, it is crucial to distinguish between a broad and narrow understanding of 
the term ‘promotion’ in the context of public policy making in Poland. The initial 
findings suggest that a broad view of promotion of the state interests involves every 
aspect of policy making and implementation defined by the state institutions or elites 
as national. Its narrow understanding is closer to cultural theorists’ stance on 
‘promotion’ as involving self-advantageous communicative acts aimed at changing 
transnational symbolic representations of the Polish state and its nation.  
PROMOTIONALISM AS SYMBOLIC MEDIATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 
 
A significant feature of discourse on Poland’s promotion is the definition of 
outputs of institutionalised communicative practices that have been aligned with the 
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state policy. The promotional policy documents disclose multiplicity of concepts 
signifying symbolic outputs of the promotional policy. Among them was ‘world public 
opinion’, ‘reputation’, ‘image’ and, finally from 2003 onwards ‘nation brand’ emerged 
as an output of the promotional policy developed by the Ministry of Economics (2003, 
p 5). While the relationship between those terms remains ambiguous, nevertheless they 
reveal a symbolic dimension to this policy and practices accompanying accomplishing 
its goals. Thus communicative acts stemming from its agenda play their role in the 
mediation of this policy. Those acts, I argue, are inherent mediations of promotional 
policies and they are the product of the institutionalised communicative practices. 
 
Before, however, nation branding became part of the policy Polish state actors 
used the term ‘image’ to signify symbolic output of their communicative practices. 
The evidence surfacing from the institutional mission statement of the state actors 
supports the above claims. This is supported by the following statements:  
 
The Department of Public and Cultural Diplomacy creates a positive 
image of Poland that is favourable to Poland’s foreign policy by 
stimulating public opinion and promoting Polish culture, science, 
education and tourism (Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2010, 
underline added). 
 
Another field actor represents their practices in the following way:  
 
“The mission of The Polish Information and Foreign Investment 
Agency is, amongst other objectives, the formation of a positive image 
of Poland.” (PIIA 2010, underline added); 
 
Followed by the Polish Tourism Organisation’s (2010, underline added) statement 
revealing one of its objectives as: 
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Formation and consolidation of a positive image of Poland as a 
tourism destination. 
 
The Institute of Adam Mickiewicz (2010, underline added) in a presentation of its 
objectives for the year 2010, reveals that one of its aims is:  
 
To increase the presence of Polish cultural offering in selected 
countries and regions of the world aimed at strengthening of positive 
image of Poland on the international stage. 
 
Similarly, PL.2012’s mission reveals states that one of its institutional goals is:  
 
Coordination of preparations and execution of the plan covering 
promotional actions before tournament that impact country's image 
(PL.2012, 2012, English original). 
 
Arguably by using a singular signifier ‘image’ the state actors either presume 
that they can form a single, dominant reception of the Polish state, or the above 
statements are streams of misrecognitions concerning collective identities (e.g. the 
state identities or various types of nationalisms) and multiplicity of their mediated 
representations. The overarching signifier of ‘positive’ reception of communicative 
acts engendered by communicative practices is a discursive feature common within the 
field. Notably, each of the above statements foregrounds ‘image’ as a singular output 
of the institutional practice as if there was only ‘one’ dominant version of collective 
identity. Therefore, in the light of findings presented above, I refer to the investigated 
social space as the field of national images management. Simultaneously, I recognised 
that in the field of power, political actors have the capabilities to mediate their version 
of collective identities, e.g. the Chancellery of the Prime Minister, the Presidential 
Palace, and the Polish National Assembly traditionally hold statist capital enabling 
them to symbolically represent their visions of collective identities. For example, the 
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official overseas state visits provide such an opportunity (Wang 2006)17. However, I 
contain the findings of this study only to those actors in the field of national images 
management who were subjected to the discourse of nation branding.  
 
At the surface level, the discourse of promotionalism emphasises ‘state 
identities’ over ‘national identities’. Within the mission statements, the field actors 
articulate the importance of ‘positive image’ of the Polish state as crucial to their 
agency. A localised feature of the discourse emerging from the mission statements is 
the misrepresentation of the symbolic aspect of communicative practices through the 
articulation of ‘positive’ over ‘negative’ features of collective identities. In other 
words, the field actors represent those versions of collective identities that are 
considered by them as ‘truthful’. This insight remains in line with Bourdieu’s (1991) 
emphasis on connections between discourse, credibility and truth as bearing power 
over the social order. In that respect, the Polish state actors in the field are committed 
to a symbolic dimension of promotional policy and by emphasising that through their 
praxis, they struggle for a ‘positive image’ of the Polish state abroad. What is more, 
the above insights reveal that nomos, that is an organising law guiding the principle of 
vision and division in the field, is the institutional commitment of the field actors in 
promoting those aspects of collective identities that are considered suitable to the 
institutional goals.  
 
In the light of the above insights, I argue that these finding are consistent with 
Corner’s (2007) explanation of the re-invention of the term ‘propaganda’ that has been 
subjected to routines of promotionalism within political and public domains of modern 
societies. In the case of the Polish state’s overseas propaganda, dynamics of its re-
contextualization were partly manifested by changing signifiers of policies and 
changes to the names of departments among the institutions which have accumulated 
                                                          
17
   There are many examples of symbolic violence exercised by Polish political leaders through the 
official state visits. For example, see ‘Channel 4’ TV news on 6 May 2004 (Kwasniewski 2004).  
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statist capital to perform communicative tasks. Those surface changes took up more 
compound strategies and involved practices demonstrating re-contextualisation of the 
legitimacy of instruments of symbolic power wielded by the Polish state actors. As far 
as the complexity of promotional policies is concerned, they reveal that the promotion 
of the Polish state’s neo-liberal interest is broader than the construction of Polishness 
via persuasive means of communications. It is explicit that promotion of the Polish 
state interests and promotional culture as understood by cultural studies scholars are 
merging in the new context of the culture-economy interplay. Their boundaries, 
however, are context-dependent and localised within the institutional setting and can 
be explained through the relationship with non-state actors.  
GENESIS OF THE FIELD ACTORS AND STATE-BUILDING 
 
Despite the fact that ‘stable structural elements’ (Rokkan 1975), that is pre-1989 
year actors, are involved in promotional policies making, from the early 1990s, new 
institutional actors have been established by the Polish state and equipped with the 
statist capital to perform technocratic, promotional interests. I present an outline of 
actors that voluntarily reported involvement in nation branding, bearing in mind that 
the Polish field of national images management exceeds this social space. Within it, 
the institutional actors represent themselves as specialised in various areas of 
promotional policy. Their strategies are versatile and their power stems the statist 
capital that particular institutional actors acquired (Bourdieu et al., 1994). It is beyond 
the scope of this study to present agency of all institutional actors engaged in 
government communication abroad as, to date, not all of them have been targeted by 
nation branders in Poland and subjected by their performative discourse.18  
                                                          
18
 The Polish Ministry of National Defence has been considered as ‘too political’ to be part of the 
archetypical nation branding programme. Yet, this actor holds the statist capital (Bourdieu et al., 
1994) to secure Polish state interests and construct national identities. On the other hand, the 
Ministries of Culture and National Heritage and of the Regional Development were envisioned to 
part take in the central nation branding programme. Prior to the fieldwork in Poland, their 
management voluntarily explained that they are not pursuing ‘nation branding’ in their institutional 
settings. One of the Ministry of Culture and National Heritage subsidiaries, however, the Institute of 
Adam Mickiewicz, has been subjected to discourses of nation branders.  
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In an effort to contextualise the research objective number 1 (p. 80), this section 
presents a historical overview of relevant field actors and accounts for new relevant 
entrants into this social space. To guide the reader through the complexity of findings 
presented in this section, its key insights are presented in a timeline in Figure 1. 
Historically speaking, the communicative practice of overseas propaganda was aligned 
with the Polish state field of power, particularly with diplomatic service and its relevant 
networks. Under this name, this communicative practice was institutionalised at the 
beginning of the early modernist era and propaganda was a dominant term applied by 
the field of power during the Sovietised period of governance. In the outline presented 
below, however, I demonstrate that post-1989 the Polish state has expanded its overseas 
communicative capacities by engaging in a state-building exercise and a series of 
institutional re-inventions of communicative practices. From 1999, those actors, by 
forming various relationships with external consultants, were involved in nation 
branding. To report on these findings, in this section I draw from secondary data, which 
for factual accuracy was cross-examined with information retrieved from interviews. At 
this stage, I account for institutional developments from 1989 as this year was 
considered by policy-makers as a benchmark for re-defining the Polish state interests, 
which enabled the emergence of nation branding. In a reflexive statement, one of the 
promotional policy documents supports this in the following way:  
 
After 1989, no sufficiently expanded, coordinated and modern system 
responsible for promotion of the country’s interests was established. 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2009, p. 14).  
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FIGURE 1 HISTORICAL OUTLINE OF KEY INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENTS:  ACTORS AND POLICIES
  1989   2003   2010 
Formal 
beginning of 
political 
economy 
changes in 
Poland 
1995 
Emergence of 
‘The programme 
for restoring the 
role of and 
importance of 
brand names and 
trademarks; and 
establishing of the 
Institute of Polish 
Brand 
 
Emergence of 
Advertising for 
Poland Association; 
the initiation of first 
nation branding 
project 
 
  1997   1999 
Emergence of 
‘National 
integration 
strategy’ 
Early modernism 
era: propaganda 
is a dominant 
institutional 
practice shaping 
manage images 
of Polishness 
Ministry of 
Economics launched 
its first promotional 
policy; nation brand 
building programme 
become a feature of 
public policy in 
Poland 
2008 
2009 
Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs launched 
‘The framework 
strategy for 
Poland’s promotion 
until the year 2015’ 
Polish Tourism 
Organisation was 
established 
Institute of Adam 
Mickiewicz was 
established 
2000
0 
Polish Information 
and Foreign 
Investment Agency 
was established  
 
Polish Agency 
for Enterprise 
and Development 
was formed 
2007 
PL.2012 
was 
established 
2001 
Saffron Brand 
Consultancy was 
employed by 
Polish Chamber 
of Commerce 
2005 
New 
Communications 
consulted the 
Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 
2006 
Beginning of ‘PR 
for PL’ initiative 
by local public 
relations industry 
Communication 
Unlimited was 
commissioned by 
the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 
Stafiej & 
Partners 
consulted the 
government 
Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 
institutionalised 
‘public 
diplomacy’ by 
reinventing its 
Department of 
Promotion and 
public 
representation 
of propaganda 
Jack Trout 
Poland 
consultants 
entered the 
Institute of 
Adam 
Mickiewicz 
Young & 
Rubicam 
commissioned 
by Polish 
Tourism 
Organisation Ministry of 
Economics 
develops ‘The 
strategy for 
internationalisati
on of Polish 
economy’ 
 1990 
Polish Chamber 
of Commerce 
was established 
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Although promotional policy-makers highlight insufficiencies in this area of the state 
activity, this section shows that since 1989 the Polish state expanded its institutional 
overseas communicative capabilities. New governmental agencies were established 
and their management, over the years, became mesmerised by the idea of nation 
branding. The attempts to form the field of nation branding in Poland overlapped with 
the field of power and included actors that historically are the ‘stable elements’ of the 
institutionalised  political processes of national identities making: the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Economics. Data shows that both actors put 
forward their own promotional policies; the first one by the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (2000) soon followed by the Ministry of Economics (2003). These actors 
enjoyed institutional stability, but their subsidiaries were established in the aftermath 
of changes to political economy. I discuss them in the latter part of this section.  
 
Given that there is evidence suggesting that the Polish Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs had first institutionalised propaganda as apparatus for managing international 
public opinion (Szczepankiewicz 2005), I begin with this particular actor. Until 2008, 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had its own unit coordinating the promotional policy-
making process and overseas communicative tasks steaming from this policy. This 
institutional structure was called the Department of Promotion (set up in the aftermath 
of a merger of Department of Press and Department of Cultural and Academic 
Exchange on 1 September 1994; renamed on 14 September 1998 as Department of 
Cultural Diplomacy; and from 28 December 2001 renamed as Department of 
Promotion). While academics (e.g. Ociepka and Kiełdanowicz 2005) assumed the term 
‘public diplomacy’ in the Polish settings without explaining its institutional 
appropriation, it was only recently, in 2008, when the Ministry’s management 
renamed its overseas communicative practice as ‘public diplomacy’ and ‘cultural 
diplomacy’ and named this structure as Department of Public and Cultural Diplomacy. 
The head of public diplomacy offered the following statement concerning this 
institutional change: 
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I have been a director of this department for one year and since then I 
have changed the name of this department to ‘public diplomacy’. By 
doing so, I wanted to demonstrate that we are reaching out to various 
stakeholders rather than elites; I’m not exclusively interested in 
governmental elites; I’m also interested in journalists, artists, 
curators of arts, and archaeologists from a particular country (Zofia, 
personal interview, 2009) 
 
From 2008 onwards, the Ministry’s management consistently re-invented 
propaganda as public diplomacy and institutionalised it at its own pace within their 
policy. Reading of ‘The framework strategy for Poland’s promotion until the year 
2015’ reveals the following insights on this practice: 
 
The results of public diplomacy should be the strengthening of 
political and, in fact overall prestige of Poland worldwide, 
particularly by increasing our influence over decisions significant to 
us made by international institutions and organisations (Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 2009, p. 17).  
 
 Done this way, the Ministry’s communicative practice aimed at managing world 
public opinion has started the process of representing it as more contemporary and 
needing to address the expanding stakeholder environment of diplomatic networks.   
 
The next relevant actor, the Ministry of Economics, has also been historically 
closely aligned with the field of power and has had links with the political field. 
During the Soviet era, a key role in facilitating international trade exchange was 
played by the Departments of Trade located in Polish embassies abroad. They were 
aligned to the Ministry of Industry and Trade and managed centrally. Since the 
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beginning of 1990s, this actor initiated policies aimed at supporting Polish business 
enterprises and co-operated with organisations representing industries’ business 
interests, for example the Polish Chamber of Commerce or the Foundation ‘Teraz 
Polska’. At that time, the symbolic value of commercial successes of Polish 
enterprises became of concern to the Ministry; back then bureaucrats started explicitly 
defining Poland’s economic standing through the prism of country of origin effect of 
its products and services. On 25 April 1995 the Ministry, then named the Ministry for 
Industry and Trade, launched ‘The programme for restoring the role of and 
importance of brand names and trademarks’ (Ministry of Economics 2003, p. 4). A 
decision accompanying launching this governmental programme was establishing the 
Foundation Institute of Polish Brand. The programme was the first policy that aspired 
to bridge a gap between commercial brands as symbols of national identities and 
national images overseas. The ties with the political field were manifested by 
endorsement of this initiative by the president of Poland, Aleksander Kwaśniewski 
(Institute of Polish Brand 1999).  
 
Historical records within the Ministry’s first promotional policy reveal that, 
between 1995-2001 a body responsible for advising the Minister on policy issues was 
called The Council for Export Promotion. It was primarily an advisory body and did 
not hold any communicative tasks to manage images of Poland. Although back in 
2003 the Ministry had policy plans to replace this body with a more specialised and 
centralised Council for Economic Promotion. Initially, this entity was conceived by 
the promotional policy-makers as a structure, which ought to have its competences 
extended from advisory to executive and to manage issues to do with “foreign direct 
investment and national images matters” (Ministry of Economics 2003, p. 3). This 
entity, however, has never been established. A failure to establish this body resulted in 
a situation whereby promotional policy making within the Ministry was institutionally 
dispersed and several departments were involved in its development (e.g. Department 
of Support Instruments; Department of Bilateral Cooperation; Department of 
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Department of European Affairs). In the meantime, the Ministry did not establish an 
internal department responsible for overseas communication practice and those tasks 
have been divided between its press office, commissioned to private sector actors or 
passed on to its subsidiaries, the Polish Information and Foreign Investment Agency, 
the Polish Tourism Organisation and the Agency For Enterprise Development.  
 
While the above ministries constitute institutional foundations for promotional 
policies making, their subsidiaries played a role in their enactment. According to the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ policy (2009), setting up new government agencies is 
attributed to the demands of new political economy in Poland. From 1999 onwards, 
both ministries have expanded their influence over new policy priorities in a state-
building exercise. The government established new institutional actors and equipped 
them with resources enabling management of world public opinion. Among the actors 
established post-1989 were the Polish Information and Foreign Investment Agency, 
the Polish Tourism Organisation, the Institute of Adam Mickiewicz and PL.2012. The 
collected evidence shows that the state-building exercise resulted in decentralisation in 
implementing of those policies. Below I present them in a chronological order.  
The first actor established in a state-building exercise is the Polish Tourism 
Organisation which was formed on 25 June 1999 and started operations on 1 January 
2000. Its legitimacy is based on the enactment of tourism policy and has been 
articulated in its public mission statement in the following way:   
Our aim is to promote Poland as an attractive country for tourists - 
modern, offering high standard services and competitive pricing. 
Our promotional activities and development of the Polish tourism is 
conducted at home and abroad (Polish Tourism Organisation 2010).  
The mission statement also reveals its areas of institutional agency among which are: 
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...promotion of Poland as a tourist destination; development and 
maintenance of the Polish tourism information system at home and 
overseas; assistance with modernisation of tourism infrastructure; 
and cooperation with local governments and local businesses to 
further develop tourism industry (ibid. 2010).  
Until 23 July 2007 the Polish Tourism Organisation was directly linked with the 
Ministry of Economics, but the field of power has re-shaped its ties and structurally 
aligned this organisation with the Ministry of Tourism and Sport. Above all, the Polish 
Tourism Organisation has built a network of semi-autonomous offices in thirteen 
overseas locations facilitating its operations in foreign markets. This actor develops its 
own marketing strategy which, in theory, links to ministerial policies. According to its 
2008 strategy the contribution of this actor to promotion of the state interests’ lies in 
the implementation of tourism policy; one of its excerpts reveals the following insight: 
The result of those [promotional] activities should be enhancement of 
Poland’s recognition as an attractive and hospitable destination for 
tourists, which offers competitive, high quality tourist products (Polish 
Tourism Organisation 2008, p. 5). 
The communicative practices of the Polish Tourism Organisation are guided by this 
strategy. In terms of development of its strategy, this actor engages with multiple 
stakeholders. This document is important to understanding of nation branding in 
Poland. At the time of the fieldwork (2009), this actor celebrated its tenth anniversary.  
The second actor relevant to this study, which was established in the aftermath of 
systemic changes to the political economy was the Institute of Adam Mickiewicz. The 
institute was established on 1 March 2000 as a result of the agreement between the 
Ministry of Culture and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs signed on 6 October 1999. In 
2006, the field of power divided responsibility for the implementation of cultural policy 
between the Institute and the National Centre of Culture; the Institute goals included the 
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enactment of cultural policy overseas and cultural diplomacy. Its contemporary status 
was spelled out by the Ministry of Culture and National Heritage in a ministerial 
regulation on 1 June 2008. This actor is structurally aligned with the Polish Ministry of 
Culture and National Heritage, but it also shares personal links with the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and its diplomatic network (e.g. Polish Institutes). In its public mission 
statement, the Institute is represented as:  
...a state cultural institution whose task is to promote Polish culture 
around the world and actively participates in international cultural 
exchange (Institute of Adam Mickiewicz 2011b, English original).  
The statement further reveals the institutional goals of this actor:  
We promote Polish culture around the world and cooperate with other 
countries. We present both the heritage and contemporary 
achievements of Polish culture (ibid. 2011). 
This task, according to its public mission, is enacted in the relationship with institutions 
responsible for cultural policy making, cultural exchanges, and management of public 
and cultural diplomacy; liaising with the Polish diplomatic service; renowned overseas 
cultural, media, and academic institutions; Polish overseas institutions popularising 
national culture and history; individual researchers; and non-governmental organisations 
established by the Polish diaspora (Institute of Adam Mickiewicz 2011a). Its apparatus 
for world public opinion management consists of the Communication Department, the 
existing institutional networks overseas (e.g. Polish Institutes), private sector actors 
specialising in management consultancy, or networks of their partners overseas (e.g. 
museums, galleries). A stakeholder approach to management was also evident in case of 
this institution as it engages with various social and professional groups. Furthermore, 
the operations of the Institute are defined in a long-term strategy, e.g. ‘The IAM strategy 
2010-2016’ whereas its communicative tasks are outlined in ‘The communication 
strategy and operation principles for the Communication Department’.    
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The third actor involved in nation branding performative discourse that was 
established as part of the state-building exercise is the Polish Agency for Enterprise 
Development. Officially, this governmental agency was established on 9 November 
2000. Its mission presents the legitimacy of its agency as for the benefit of Polish 
economic and social development that aims at supporting:  
...entrepreneurship through implementation of actions aimed at using 
innovative solutions by entrepreneurs, development of human 
resources, expansion on international markets, and regional 
development. Its achievement will contribute to the improvement of 
the competitive position of Polish economy, both on European Union 
markets and on the international market (Polish Agency for 
Enterprise and Development 2011).  
This governmental agency is structurally aligned with the Ministry of Economics and 
from 2003 was made responsible for the enactment of communicative tasks linked to 
promotional policy. As far as promotional policy tasks are concerned, this state actor is 
a recent entrant into the field. In 2009, this agency was empowered by the Polish 
government to manage the organisation of the Polish Pavilion at the 2010 EXPO 
Exhibition in Shanghai. Historically, exhibitions were considered by the policy makers 
as a significant opportunity to showcase Polish economic and cultural achievements 
and to manage its mediated representations. For instance, the Ministry of Economics’ 
(2003) policy revealed that the field of power allotted app. £8.5 m. to the EXPO 
exhibition in Aichi (Japan). Furthermore, the communicative tasks accompanying 
EXPO 2010 were divided between a team of public relations practitioners who were 
responsible for servicing Chinese and other transnational media outlets.  
The fourth pertinent actor established post-1989 is the Polish Information and 
Foreign Investment Agency. It is responsible for the implementation of promotional 
policy developed by the Ministry of Economics. Among the tasks stemming from this 
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policy is the management of world public opinion with a view to attract foreign direct 
investment to Poland. In a historical overview the extract from its public mission 
statement discloses the following institutional commitments of this actor:  
The Polish Information and Foreign Investment Agency was 
established on 24th June 2003, resulting from the merger of the State 
Foreign Investment Agency and the Polish Information Agency. The 
Agency in its activities makes use of its predecessors’ inheritance 
(Polish Information and Foreign Investment Agency 2010a).   
Simultaneously, its management defines the statutory objectives in the following way: 
The aim of the agency is to promote Poland and its regions 
worldwide, with a particular focus on Polish economy, products, 
businesses and brands as well as in-flow of foreign direct investment 
(Polish Information and Foreign Investment Agency 2009).  
With regard to the organisation of departments which are relevant to this study, 
this actors set up internal structures that were responsible for the implementation of 
promotional policy goals: the Economic Information Department and the Economic 
Promotion Department. The latter had abilities to manage world public opinion; those 
operations are enacted by the Public Relations Division and National Marketing 
Division. The contribution of the Economic Promotion Department to the institutional 
goals of the agency was presented in the following way:  
 
[the department] works on promoting Poland as an attractive 
business partner on the international markets and creating a positive 
image for the country. The Department does this by organising 
seminars, conferences and international exhibitions, presenting the 
Polish economy and its achievements in the fields of technology and 
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science. It is also responsible for publishing promotion materials 
(Polish Information and Foreign Investment Agency 2010b).  
Its management defines this aspect of operations as ‘investment marketing’ and this 
was made explicit in the following statement: 
Broadly speaking, the agency is responsible for investment marketing 
and that includes issues related to images of Poland abroad (Wioletta, 
personal interview, 2009). 
Above all, in the past, this actor used external consultancies to manage communicative 
tasks. For example, in 2005 its management commissioned to BBC World Global 
Solutions, part of the BBC World, a production of an advertising campaign featured in 
CNN, BBC World, ‘Time Magazine’, ‘The Financial Times’, and ‘The Wall Street 
Journal’ (Polish Information and Foreign Investment Agency 2007). Later, in 2008, 
alongside the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Polish Tourism Organisation, the 
Polish Information and Foreign Investment Agency co-financed another advertising 
campaign aimed at attracting foreign investment. By virtue of its policy ties and 
complexity of external environment, this actor operates as a multiple stakeholder player. 
 
Of relevance to this study is also a recently formed governmental agency called 
PL.2012. This is the last state actor which simultaneously emerged as a part of the state-
building exercise. It was established as a result of a decision stemming from an act (7 
September 2007) regulating coordination, organisation and the management of EURO 
2012 tournament in Poland. Yet again, this actor is a purpose-formed entity, which is 
aligned with the field of power, specifically with the Polish Ministry of Tourism. It 
represents itself as relying on multiple stakeholder environments; its public mission 
reveals the following statement:  
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Polish preparations for Euro 2012 are coordinated by PL.2012, 
special purpose entity of the Ministry of Sport and Tourism. In these 
preparatory works the company collaborates with 173 partners. Never 
before has such a great number of institutions been involved in any 
preparatory or organisational actions carried out in Poland (PL.2012 
2011). 
 
The institutional strategy of this actor, referred to as ‘The Road Plan’, consists of eight 
programmes, which also includes:  
 
Coordination of preparations and execution of the plan covering 
promotional actions before the tournament that impact country's 
image (ibid. 2012). 
 
In 2009, there were two offices responsible for this task: the office of National 
Promotion of Coordinator and the Communication Office. At that time, both offices 
were being formed and plans were made to conceptualise a communication strategy 
aimed at mediated representation of Polishness preceding the EURO 2012 tournament.   
 
The above actors were at the receiving end of nation branding, whereas the 
actors which initiated nation branding are listed below. The collected evidence reveals 
that nation branding has been instigated by local marketing and advertising industry, 
and representatives of business groups. Their relationships with the above Polish state 
actors are central to this study. Yet again, I present the newcomers to the Polish state 
structures in a chronological order. My fieldwork revealed that the first documented 
‘nation branding’ exercise began in August 1999. It was an initiative of a local 
marketing industry, which was conceived as a non-for-profit coalition and formalised 
under the name ‘Advertising for Poland Association’ (2000, p. 1). Later, marketing 
and public relations actors entered or attempted to enter the Polish state structures. 
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They were: BNA of Corporate Profiles Group (August 2001); Saffron (December 
2003); New Communications (December 2005); ‘PR for RP’ initiative (August 2006); 
Communications Unlimited (January 2006); Stafiej and Partners (2006); Young & 
Rubicam (2008); Jack Trout Poland (2009). While nation branding is not exclusively 
the only area of expertise among those actors, they embrace this Western idea and this 
way, they expanded their consultancy portfolio.  
 
Finally, a fundamental role in the development of nation branding discourse has 
been attributed to the Polish Chamber of Commerce. This actor was established on 13 
February 1990. The Chamber presents itself as being affiliated with international trade 
organisations. It also enacts the role of commercial arbitration in Poland. From 1995 
the Chamber of Commerce reinforced ‘branding culture’ in Poland. From 2000 
onwards, the Chamber was commissioned to manage a few international events aimed 
at promoting Polish state interests overseas (Polish Chamber of Commerce 2009). 
Within it, there were purpose-set (1992) organisational units to address the Polish state 
promotional policy issues - The Promotion for Poland Foundation and The Institute of 
Polish Brand. Their role in nation branding practice is analysed in chapter nine.  
 
A few points can be made with regards to the historical outline. Since 1989, the 
Polish state’s capacity to manage its images overseas has expanded beyond its field of 
power. There are a few processes accompanying this shift: a state-building exercise 
involving foundation of new actors; a development of market-orientated promotional 
policies; more open management approach and engagement. As a result, the state 
institutions diversified and specialised in communicative practices and embraced 
Western names for pursuing Polish state interests: ‘public diplomacy’; ‘cultural 
diplomacy’; ‘investment marketing’; and ‘destination marketing’. Simultaneously, 
propaganda as a form of persuasive communication has been silenced. This reinforces 
questions about the legitimacy of branding. Why does the Polish state require nation 
branding since there are existing actors holding statist capital for mediation of 
collective identities and interests overseas? Who is nation branding targeted at? Those 
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questions, stemming from the above outline, are sound in the context of this 
investigation. While the state-building policy has expanded the Polish neo-liberal 
‘structured structure’, the business actors have been consolidating to enact their 
interests. Moreover, the policy and interview accounts reveal that nation branding 
discourse has been also perpetuated by other actors, but they played a secondary role 
in enactment of nation branding. These actors form ‘structuring structures’ expressed 
as symbolic power wielded by the state structures and nation branders.  
STRUCTURED STRUCTURES: MAPPING OUT THE POSITIONS 
 
Bourdieu and Waquant (1992) argue that every field analysis should begin with 
a mapping out of the agents in the field and establishing their relationship to the field 
of power. While I have already indicated that the Polish state actors, representing 
‘public administration’, overlap with the field of power, additionally there are private 
actors in Poland forming a social space in which nation branding has been introduced 
as a discourse on national identity construction. In the aftermath of political economy 
changes, the field has grown in complexity. Chong and Valencic (2001, p. 3) note the 
multifaceted character of contemporary national images management and emphasise 
the impact of the private sector on its actions. Given that pre-1989 the first 
governmental departments empowered by the political class to represent the Polish 
state and national identities overseas were aligned with the diplomatic sub-field, and 
later grown in complexity, the above argument is relevant for the contemporary field 
of national images management in Poland. For Moloney (2005, p. 551), public 
institutions and other actors of the competitive game “speak multiple voices.” This 
pluralism, characteristic to level playing fields, echoes in the Polish field of national 
images management: the public administration actors are responsible for promotional 
policies, but private sector newcomers struggle to change its institutional dynamics.  
 
Because I demonstrate that nation branding has been used as source of symbolic 
power, I present the outline of the field in accordance to theory of symbolic power 
(Bourdieu 1991). In my outline of the field, I include ‘structured structures’ and 
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‘structuring structures’ enabling discursive performativity of nation branders and 
facilitating dissemination of this discourse. Thus far, among the ‘structured structures’ 
of the social space investigated in this study are the state actors including the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs; the Ministry of Economics; the Polish Information and Investment 
Agency, the Polish Tourism Organization; the Adam Mickiewicz Institute; the Polish 
Agency for Enterprise Development; and PL.2012, a governmental agency responsible 
for organisation and overseas communication practices during the EURO 2012 
football tournament. They are the ‘stable elements’ (Rokkan 1975) of the field that 
were targeted by nation branders, but they relied on other ‘trans-connected’ spaces. 
The newcomers’ to the field listed earlier (p. 138), not only offered expertise in nation 
branding, but their entry into the field demonstrate new dynamics of capital relations.  
 
The state field actors are aligned to the Government by the Council of Poland’s 
Promotion, a body formed by the government disposition (legal source) on 30 March 
2004 and equipped in its share of the statist capital stake of advisory in the process of 
policy making. While all those actors enjoy a degree of autonomy in terms of 
management, every day operations, and decision-making, the primary feature of the 
relationship between them was based on legal, cultural, political, economic, and 
personal relationships within the dominant coalitions. It is the management of those 
actors that was responsible for accumulation and distribution of resources relevant to 
the field operations. The managements’ power stemmed from their dominant 
positions, their-decision making abilities and close affiliations with the field of power.   
 
While it might be convenient to assume that the dominant capital in the field of 
national images management is that of symbolic capital engendered from transnational 
images of Poland and Poles, this universalising discursive statement begs a question 
about the other, field specific evidence of resources generation. In theory, nation 
branders turn this argument on its head. They argue that nation branding offers an 
opportunity to exchange symbolic capital into economic capital (Olins 2005). The 
Polish state as a holder of meta-capital (Bourdieu et al. 1994) accumulated multiple 
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resources and symbolic capital is only one aspect of the state meta-capital. Indeed, the 
recorded field evidence suggests that, at the time of this investigation, the relevant 
types of field resources included: economic capital; human capital, cultural capital; 
social and political capital. In line with Bourdieu’s (1986) forms of capital, it is 
economic capital that forms the basis for performative discourse on nation branding.   
The struggle for advancement of an autonomous field of nation branding in 
Poland involved particularly those agents which derived their statist capital from: (a) 
economic capital required to implement policies and its symbolic dimensions; (b) 
human capital within their structures; (c) social capital of networks; (d) cultural capital 
encapsulated in competences and expertise; (e) symbolic capital of reputation held by 
individual field actors; and (f) political capital. Finally, and most importantly, by 
deriving from those resources, the Polish field of power holds the decision-making 
capabilities with regards to the promotional policy goals and their directions, which, in 
return, has bearing on the quality of their relationship with nation branders. The above 
resources are highlighted in field discourse on nation branding.  
While I do not reveal its ‘amounts’, the dominant indicators of cultural capital in 
the field have been indicated by capturing the ‘amount of institutional competences’; 
‘professional experience in nation branding consultancy’; ‘amount of projects 
accomplished’; ‘knowledge of place branding’; ‘amount of previously accomplished 
projects’; ‘knowledge of public relations techniques’; ‘amount of academic or 
professional publications on the subject of nation branding’; ‘academic titles’; 
‘linguistic abilities’; ‘knowledge regarding images of the Polish state and the Polish 
nation’; and ‘market research expertise’. Additionally, a tacit feature of the field 
resourcing is social capital accumulated through access to the relevant institutional 
political and business networks (Zofia, personal interview, 2009). Finally, nation 
branding has been understood as a having potential to be exchanged into unspecified 
political careers (Darek, personal interview, 2009). Particularly, central to this study, 
‘Nation brand building programme’, if successful, was seen as an opportunity to 
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convert prestige derived from its accomplishment into political capital and was 
explicitly linked with a political career opportunity. In Bourdieusian terms, all the 
above, represent institutional resources accompanying the enactment of nation 
branding and correction of trajectories of performance. The findings section further 
accounts for how agents reported on this capital and used it to their advantage. 
It is beyond the scope of this study to capture the amount of all sources of capital 
within the field. Later, its main narrative reveals those exchanges explicitly relating to 
practices signified as nation branding and its corresponding ‘revenue streams’ pursuit 
by nation branders. At this stage, however, I only indicate the relevance of sources of 
capitals and their links with the field. Moreover, I use ‘economic capital’ and ‘human 
capital’ to contextualise the positions in the field (Bourdieu 1986). The relevance of 
those capitals is articulated in a policy statement: 
...Poland allocates on promotion of its overseas interests 
comparatively small funds, even if compared with budgets of 
commercial actors operating in Poland. Despite that there are 
significant differences in allocating funds into different areas of 
promotion, it is hard to argue that in any of those areas funding is 
sufficient. Therefore, we argue, that promotion of Poland is 
significantly underfinanced. 
 
This argument is reinforced further if we compare budgets in Poland 
with relevant budgets of other countries in the region (e.g. Czech 
Republic, Hungary) which spend more on some aspects of promotion 
(e.g. economy, tourism) and are considerably smaller then Poland. 
The insufficient funding is particularly visible if we look at specific 
institutions, e.g. Swedish Institute has a budget eight times bigger than 
its corresponding Institute of Adam Mickiewicz in Warsaw. If 
compared to the Korea Foundation in Seoul, the Institute’s budget is 
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forty times smaller. What makes the situation in Poland look 
comparatively worse is that those institutions are well-known for cost-
effectiveness and employ small number of personnel (up to 100 staff). 
The financial situation in Poland does not even compare with the 
British Council or the Goethe Institute frequently recalled in Poland 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2009a, p. 42-43). 
 
The structuring contextual exercise has enabled me to sketch out the field 
structure. It was clear from the data archive that economic capital enables the Polish 
state actors to operate and this type of capital was derived from either the Polish state 
budget or the EU funds. Furthermore, human capital was considered by the Polish 
state actors as important to the field, particularly because pre-1989 promotional 
policies making was underinvested by the field of power in terms of manpower.  
What is fundamental to understanding this section, and indeed is an indicator of 
the infancy of nation branding, is the fact that this communicative practice has become 
an additional, but not an exclusive, streams of capital revenue for the institutional field 
actors. This aside, at this stage, I present a map of the field structure based on ‘human 
capital’ and ‘economic capital’ as an indication of the ‘objective positions’ of the field 
actors. The financial data revealing economic capital presents an aggregated annual 
turnover of each field actors. In fact, nation branding has not been an exclusive source 
of economic capital generation, neither for public nor for private sector actors. The 
distribution of funds among actors has been cross-examined between the interview 
data, policy documents and financial reports. Despite the fact that nation branding has 
become a source of capital, all field actors, public and private, were engaged in 
additional practices enabling economic capital exchanges. The field stratification that I 
present below is based on findings of aggregated annual economic capital, integrated 
with human capital of the institutional actors participating in performative discourse 
on nation branding. This procedure enables contextualisation of the field structure and 
captures the positions of the agents by using data for the year 2009 (Figure 1).   
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This positioning map helps to understand the socio-economic conditions within 
the field and highlights structural relations between the agents. Although it is an 
oversimplification to claim that economic capital is dominant in the field, it drives the 
agency and the field itself. While economic capital is significant to the analysis of 
nation branders’ actions, human capital is an indication of the backstage resources of 
the state and non-state actors engaged in nation branding. Nevertheless, there are other 
types of capital crucial to understanding ‘the exchange rates’ (Swart 1997) between 
actors in the field. Economic and human capital, however, speak for redistributions in 
the field in terms of allowing access to the field by non-state actors. Put simply, labour 
relations in the field are being reconfigured and extended beyond its initial boundaries.
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With regards to aggregated human capital, the state departments responsible for 
promotional policy making that have been involved in nation branding discourse are 
medium size institutional structures. Given that the Polish field of national images 
management has grown in specialisation, it is critical to recognise the specificity of 
particular aspects of institutions: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of 
Economics, the Polish Tourism Organisation, the Polish Information and Investment 
Agency, the Polish Agency for Enterprise Development or the Adam Mickiewicz 
Institute as well as institutional commitments that those actors hold in relation to 
promotional policy making and its implementation. Those actors are diverse in terms 
of their statist capital, including institutional tasks. Although, human capital among 
those actors is diversified, private sector actors have sufficient resources to be able to 
interact with the field, shape it and offer services required by the field.  
The number of actors responsible for development and enactment of promotional 
policies indicates the expansion of the field of national images management within the 
field of power. The institutional state-building exercise that I had revealed previously 
is reflected in figures enabling positioning in the field: the numerical breakdown of 
human capital captures capitalisation of the field with human resources. In 2009 there 
were 35 staff employed by the Department of Public and Cultural Diplomacy at the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The department was run by one director and two deputy 
directors. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has its own Press Office responsible for 
media relations. Apart from performing media relations and reporting on policy issues, 
the Press Office did not contribute towards development of policy making.  
In the same year, there were 19 members of staff within the Polish Tourism 
Organisation directly involved in marketing activities and one independent public 
relations post. Each marketing department reports to its own managing director. Above 
all, additional posts have been created on an ad hoc basis to manage short term 
marketing projects. The Polish Information and Investment Agency which has overall 
accumulated 100 members of staff, has its own Economic Promotion Department 
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employing 21 staff and the Press Centre employing 3 media officers. The Economic 
Promotion Department reports to its director. The Press Centre is headed by its own 
communication manager. Media relations and marketing including market research are 
the key functions of both departments. Overall, the Agency staffs are responsible for 
enacting policies as developed by the Ministry of Economics which in its own 
structures holds the Department of Promotion employing 10 members of staff. 
The remaining actors, closely aligned with the field of power, are in 2012.PL 
employing 5 members of staff in its communication office and the Expo Office within 
the structures of the Polish Agency for Enterprise Development employing 10 staff 
reporting to its manager and a team managing the Expo Pavilion on the site. Those 
actors were not a driving force in the development of promotional policies, but their 
statist capital and their practices accompanied by other forms of capital, placed them 
on the map of the nation images management field as actors engaged in performative 
discourse on nation branding. While the above chart represents the accumulation of 
human capital among the private sector actors engaged in performative discourse on 
nation branding, the coalitions of organisations targeting the state actors located within 
the field and the field of power comprised its senior and middle management. In this 
scenario their employees became a resource. The greatest aggregated human capital 
was revealed by DBB Corporate Profile and the smallest by Safiej & Partners. The 
figures presented are subject to constant changes, some of which are the result of 
external fields’ forces. In the case of the private sector actors, it was reported that the 
recent economic downturn (2007 onwards) affected their resources. Nevertheless, the 
collected data enables sketching out a structural map of positions that agents held in 
the field. Interestingly, it is non-Polish human capital that was the most predominant 
in terms of advancing nation branding practice. The significance of other species of 
capital on the field formation and exchange rates is discussed further.  
While, in part, the field demonstrates reliance on foreign human capital, sources 
of economic capital predominantly come from the Polish state budget and the 
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European Union structural funds. In other words, they are the Polish and the European 
taxpayers’ funds that had been accumulated and monopolised by the Polish state and 
are redistributed as ‘grants’ into specialised governmental departments or agencies. 
Following Bourdieusian neo-capitalist theory (1986), they are exchanged into different 
forms of capital, including attempts to shape symbolic capital of national reputations. 
Put simply, it is Poles and other Europeans paying for being subjected to the symbolic 
power and symbolic violence exercised by the Polish state and its stakeholders and 
enacted by means of political and marketing communications.  
‘STRUCTURING STRUCTURES’ IN NATION BRANDING 
 
The above overview presents insights into the field’s material basis and records 
those resources that which relevant to enactment of nation branding. Yet, according to 
Bourdieu (1991) power-centred analysis of symbolic systems should also account for 
‘structuring structures’, which constitute a means for objectification of the world. To 
further contextualise nation branding at the mezzo-level, that is at the crossovers 
between the state and business interests, I present below this structuring mechanism. 
The outline of ‘structuring structures’ - including the mass media, the Polish academia, 
and research organisations - is the second stage of my interrogation of nation branding. 
Those structures shape ‘given’ aspects of social understanding of nation branding: they 
determine trajectories of action, symbolic relations within the field and enable one to 
disclose the settings for objectification and agreements regarding nation branding.  
 
According to Bourdieu (1991, p. 164-165), structuring structures are instruments 
for “constructing the objective world”. Henceforth, this exercise sets the scene for the 
analysis of nation branding dynamics and further outlines its relationship with the field 
of power. As indicated in the methodology section (p. 88), the structuring structures 
that I reveal in this section relate to the dissemination of nation branding in Poland. 
This process has been facilitated by the distribution of nation branding ideology and it 
corresponds with the worldviews of nation branders. One of the consultants noted:  
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...in fact, it is interesting how it [nation branding] is being 
disseminated. [...]. All of a sudden, somebody has bought into this 
language, so that idea had already begun to circulate (Franciszek, 
personal interview, 2009). 
 
Thus, structuring actors have played a role of ‘transmitters’ in this dissemination 
process. Although within the performative discourse of nation branding external actors 
- UK brand consultants, EU, transnational media, the World Tourism Organisation, 
and other stakeholder groups - became as a reference point, they are not as prominent 
to my investigation as the mezzo-level inter-relationships between the Polish state, 
business actors, and nation branders.  
‘CREATIVE INDUSTRIES’   
 
Given that documented nation branding discourse has been instigated by the 
local, marketing communications industry coalition, I start off with an outline of both 
marketing and public relations industries, their professional bodies and relevant media 
outlets. The term ‘creative industries’19 has been used in recent years as a reference 
point for marketing, public relations industries and visual arts professionals in Poland. 
Both relevant industries - public relations and marketing - strive for more professional 
recognition, social status; and they enjoy a fair deal of autonomy from the government 
policy regulations. The data reveals that marketing and public relations industries in 
Poland are in their infancy, particularly in terms of their social capital of prestige. 
 
The insights into the industry yet again reveal that the neo-liberal changes to the 
Polish political economy became a competitive social milieu to seek for opportunities 
for marketing and public relations consultancy. What is also revealing, those industries 
seek to protect their interests and struggle for professionalism and social prestige 
                                                          
19
   For a critique of this term and explanation of the relationship between public relations and marketing 
see Stiegler (2010).  
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within a broader community of professionals. Over the period of investigation, the key 
players within those industries have enacted discourse on promotion of the Polish state 
and in various ways have adopted the discourse of nation branding. The marketing 
‘industry leaders’ involved in discourse on nation branding operate in a milieu where 
economy-culture relationships are fundamental to their professional praxis. Although 
there is evidence suggesting that state enterprises in ‘socialist Poland’ applied 
‘organisational communications’ (Koźmiński 1976) and marketing20 (Samli and 
Jermakowicz 1983), post-1989 political economy changes offered an opportunity to 
create markets where demand for consultancy lead to the emergence of the industry as 
a profession in its own rights. This process accelerated development of promotional 
culture driven by competitive relationships between enterprises operating in Polish 
national markets and those professionals themselves. At the time of my fieldwork 
(2009-2010), the marketing industry was affected by the economic crisis. This 
downturn was also reported in Poland. Reputable industry research states: 
 
“2009 was particularly difficult for the integrated marketing 
communications industry. Large agencies were particularly in 
trouble, which yet again had to reconsider their business models” 
(Media & Marketing Poland 2010a, p. 3).  
 
This report reveals the highly competitive environment in which consultancies 
perform. An economic crisis forms a specific context for any business operation but it 
demonstrates a market driven adaptation of the marketing communications industry as 
well as an appropriation and search for new business revenues. The industry’s reaction 
to the economic downturn was cost cutting; shift in media orientation towards the 
cheaper internet; reducing the consultancy fees, criticism of less professional ‘one-man 
operations’, investment in delivery of more services; orientation towards sales driven 
services, and maintenance of stable corporate clients’ accounts. The government 
                                                          
20
 Examples of marketing communication from Poland, prior to 1989, have been presented in 
‘Pictogram’ magazine. One of its contemporary editions offers reprints of advertisements by the 
following enterprises: FSO, Lechia, Technochemia, ORS, and Arged (Pictorial 2009, p. 126-147).  
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contracts have not been explicitly reported in this report. This industry is said to be 
highly competitive and demonstrating steady market growth in terms of the revenue 
value. However, the ‘Media & Marketing Poland’ report anticipated that throughout 
2010 the market revenue would demonstrate 1.2% growth and its boom would 
coincide with the football tournament EURO 2012 in Poland and Ukraine (ibid., p. 
17). This government managed event offered the industry additional opportunities.  
 
Social capital is also significant to the marketing industry. This has been made 
explicit in the statutory documents of its regulatory bodies. The first regulatory body 
of the marketing communications industry in Poland is the International Advertising 
Association that was established in 1991 and formally registered in 1993. The 
association emerged as a response to the economic changes in Poland at the beginning 
of 1990s and recognised an opportunity to formalise and institutionalise the 
advertising industry in Poland. The overall mission of the association is to form 
positive attitudes towards advertising, including its benefits to the market economy; 
shaping and maintaining the industry’s prestige; facilitating professional cooperation; 
and supporting freedom of choice and professional trade standards. It reports that 
professionalization is enacted via education and professional training (IAA 2010).   
 
The second professional body, the Marketing Communication Association, was 
established in 1997, and from 1999 onwards it was affiliated with the European 
Association of Advertising Agencies. The association forms a professional coalition of 
seventy three firms in the area of marketing communications, online communications, 
brand consultancy, and media houses that are committed to the development of an 
effective marketing communications industry as well as promoting the industry’s 
interests. It reports involvement in the formation of the industry standards: it organises 
competitions and conferences enhancing those standards: ‘Effie Awards’, ‘Media 
Trends’, and ‘Polish Advertising Competition’. The Association describes itself as a 
platform for “knowledge exchange between adverting firms and lobbying the public 
administration, central and local, on behalf of citizens and industry” (SAR 2010).   
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One of the marketing industry’s ‘structuring structures’ perpetuating nation 
branding discourse is professional events enabling reproduction of marketing 
ideologies. Of particular significance is ‘The Festival for Promotion of Cities and 
Regions’ that have been formed by the industry, at the initiative of Ströer Group in 
Poland (supplier of outdoor and digital marketing solutions). This structuring structure 
was set up in 2007 and the first edition of this event was held between 17 and 18 April 
2007 in Warsaw. For its organisers, the first occasion of this event became an 
opportunity to invite Simon Anholt as a key note speaker: he delivered a talk entitled 
‘Competitive identity: the new brand management for nations, cities, and regions’ 
(Anholt 2007). This structuring mechanism for dissemination of branding ideology 
and practice has been routinised into an annual event. Similar events include ‘The 
Promocity’ organised by the Association for Development of Cities and Regions that 
presents itself as a network of experts in “place marketing, advertising, public 
relations, intellectual property issues, the public bidding law, the EU law, online 
marketing and e-business” (Proregiona 2011). A similar type of ‘structuring structures’ 
is event organised by think-tanks; they also became instruments for objectifying nation 
branding. ‘Krynica Economic Forum’ organised by the Eastern Institute, constitutes a 
‘structuring structure’ where nation branders have an opportunity to showcase their 
ideas, and network with the media and policy makers. Anholt was a keynote speaker at 
this event on 10 September 2009 (Economic Forum 2010). Local nation branders also 
reported participation in this event (Leon, personal interviews, 2010)  
 
The public relations industry in Poland has also had an involvement with nation 
branding discourse, but rather ambiguously and poorly documented. The existing 
market analysis on the industry’s state of the art demonstrates that public relations 
firms, in-house departments, or Polish government structures have embraced “public 
relations discourse ” (L’Etang 2006b, p. 23) more frequently legitimizing it with 
market competitiveness or a growing demand for news stories in local and national 
politics (Institute for Market Economics 2004). Despite the economic recession, the 
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revenue value of public relations market in Poland was estimated to grow by 15% in 
2010 (International Communications Consultancy Organisation 2010). Moreover, the 
Polish industry data indicates that the profession is not highly reputable in Poland 
(Press Service 2009). Thus far, public relations practice has not even been formally 
recognised as an autonomous profession by the governmental field of power. It is 
considered as a broad business consultancy and management function (Central 
Statistical Office 2007). Moreover, a low social capital of public relations practice is 
derived from negative associations of this term with what academic discourse defines 
as ‘black propaganda’ (Jowett and O’Donnell 1999, p. 13) and has locally gained a 
popular understanding as ‘black public relations’.21 
 
These ‘structuring structures’ presented above demonstrate potential for 
homologies of positions within the field of power. These homologies might have an 
impact on increasing ideological effects within the field of power. Bourdieu (1993, p 
.44) speaks of homologies as a “basis for partial alliances: the struggle within the field 
of power is never entirely independent of the struggles between dominated classes and 
the dominant class, and the logic of homologies within the two spaces means that the 
struggle going on within the inner field are always over- determined and always tend 
to aim at two birds with one stone”. Those unifying forces had an impact on the 
relationship between the marketing and public relations professionals and their 
relationship with the governmental field of power whereby nation branding became a 
source of unification of language used by them.  
 
 
 
                                                          
21
  During the fieldwork, I was drawn by the board member of the Association of Public Relations Firms 
to an interesting public information campaign. I received a ‘media intelligence’ report and a few 
related items demonstrating contemporary campaigning efforts attempting to address the social 
capital of public relations as a response to the misplaced use of the term ‘public relations’ that has 
the potential of contributing to reinforcement of preconceptions regarding this area of practice in 
Poland. The report is a supporting evidence for the campaign (Press Service 2009).  
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NEWS MEDIA AND PROFESSIONAL PUBLISHING 
 
A separate category of ‘structuring structures’, contextualising performative 
discourse on nation branding are the Polish news media. Given that promotional policy 
and campaigning are in line with aims of promotional policies, the broadcasting, print 
and digital media outlets monitor and report on the developments within the field and 
a broader field of power.22 The news media rely on stories provided by the Polish 
government structures and other actors (e.g. nation branding consultants or their 
clients). In fact, media relations play their role in this process. There are three key 
media relations techniques used by nation branders: networking,23 press releases.24 and 
media interviews25 on the subject of nation branding. The news media are ‘structuring 
structures’ channelling messages produced by agents seeking to advance nation 
branding. Moreover, news media have the ability to appropriate discourse on nation 
branding and present it as ‘everyday practical knowledge’ (Bourdieu 1991). Through 
their newsroom and reporting practices, they have ability to normalise and legitimise 
nation branding. For example, ‘Wyborcza’ (2011) reported on the position of Poland in 
the ‘Country brand index’ by presenting the following loaded statement: 
 
                                                          
22
  The news stories linking the Polish state’s promotional discourse go back to the accession of   Poland 
into the EU.  
 
23
  The evidence for networking with journalists is not less common. This media relations technique has 
been either enacted at professional events (e.g. ‘The Festival for Promotion of Cities and Regions’; 
‘Krynica Economic Forum’) or is explicit at the conference introducing the ‘Nation brand building 
programme’ to policy makers on 6 December 2004 (Polish Chamber of Commerce 2004a).  
 
24
  The Polish Chamber of Commerce, a client of transnational nation branding consultancy, circulates 
press releases on developments of their projects. For example, in a press release dated 18 April 
2007, they state: “How is brand Poland? One thing is for certain: its building is in progress. 
Throughout the last decade, The Polish Chamber of Commerce has been working on enhancing 
images of Poland abroad, assuming that a strong brand Poland would benefit everyone” (Polish 
Chamber of Commerce 2007, p. 1).  
 
25
   Examples of media interviews are available in both print and digital media. For example, the CEO of 
Saffron Brand Consultancy commented in ‘Rzeczpospolita’ (2010) on nation branding in Poland.   
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There were 113 countries considered in the index and six criteria 
were accounted for, among which were quality of life, business 
climate and tourism. Poland’s came out weak in the rating. In the 
ranking, it took only 79th position, three points better then last year. 
Even among the European countries, Poland is placed on 29th 
position, only ahead of Russia, Serbia, Ukraine and Romania.  
 
Although news stories of promotional policies are more likely to feature in the 
national media, local media have also reproduced nation branding discourse. Given the 
economic importance of promotional policies, marketing and public relations 
industry’s professional press took up interests and proactively reinforced contributions 
to perpetuation of nation branding in Poland26. While the mass media outlets report on 
the development of policies, the professional marketing press in Poland comments on 
the Polish state field of power for lack of sufficient organisational solutions, and of 
coherent vision for representation of Poland or Poles overseas; and poor coordination 
of campaigns produced or commissioned by the Polish state structures empowered to 
influence world public opinion27. Conversely, the mass media content has had an 
impact on public policy making28. The relationship between policies and the media 
occurred throughout the development of nation branding initiatives.  
 
While the news and professional media played a role in the development of 
promotional policies, initially, nation branding has been perpetuated within another 
                                                          
26
 Examples of the media outlets professional objectifying nation branding are: voice of the Polish 
marketing industry, ‘Brief – Marketing Magazine’ and its supplement ‘Brief for Poland’; and the 
voice of public relations industry, ‘Piar.pl’. Another professional media outlet that comments on the 
field of national images management is ‘Press’ and ‘Media & Marketing’, both of which are 
formatted for media and marketing industries professionals.  
  
27
  ‘Rzeczpospolita’ on 27 May 2010 offers an example of this kind of reporting in an interview with 
one of the nation branding consultants. More media relations features on behalf of nation branders 
have been documented on the Institute of Polish Brand website. 
  
28
  A promotional policy of the Ministry of Economics (2010, p. 22) uses media sources to inform the 
direction of nation branding in Poland.  
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media related category of ‘structuring structures’ of symbolic domination. They are 
publishing houses that contributed towards the reproduction of nation branding 
ideology. For example, the Ströer Group published ‘Promotion of cities: new 
perspective’; The Institute of Polish Brand published Polish versions ‘On brand’ and 
‘Competitive identity – the new brand management for nations, cities and regions’ and 
Polish Economic Publishers published ‘Nation brand’. 29 This way of disseminating 
knowledge enabled further objectification of nation branding and provided intellectual 
foundations for this model of national identity construction.  
TRANSNATIONAL MEDIA OUTLETS 
 
The transnational media conglomerates are also crucial to understanding nation 
branding in Poland. While the transnational media can be seen as having power over 
national representations, the transnational broadcast and print media increasingly offer 
special broadcasting programmes, sell adverting and advertorial spaces and conduct 
marketing research30 into the transnational perceptions of nations and their states. This 
part of their business revenue has made a mark on discourse and practice of nation 
branding in Poland. Given that nation branding conceptually merges domestic and 
overseas realms of national representations, the transnational media have become 
‘structuring structures’ for constructing objectifying knowledge on nation branding as 
well as outlets for nation branding practice- driven representations of Polishness. The 
‘Financial Times’ of The Financial Times Group is a good illustration of this point. 
There are however more media which contextualise performative discourse on nation 
                                                          
29
   All those publications are listed in the reference list at the end of this thesis. 
  
30
   Market research was considered by all nation branders as an integral part of their practice. During 
my fieldwork in Warsaw, I was introduced to several pieces of consultancy reports including market 
research. For example, one of the local brand consultants introduced me to the report entitled ‘Focus 
on travel and tourism: online consumer survey’ produced by ‘CNN International’. This research was 
produced as part of an advertising campaign contract, coordinated by a cultural intermediary of 
nation branding in Warsaw, but commissioned by the Polish state. In a further part of this thesis, I 
discuss the most prominent nation branding market research. 
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branding: they are US and British media corporate structures, e.g. CNN;31 BBC World; 
‘Time’; ‘Fortune’; ‘The Economist’; and ‘Fortune’.  
POLISH ACADEMIA 
 
In ‘The state of nobility’, Bourdieu (1996) recognises the role of education to 
organisation of the contemporary ruling classes worldwide: its division of labour 
between economic and cultural capital, and its transmission into the field of education 
that disengages and entwines the two. Their understanding is determined, however, 
through the specific political economy of practices. The Polish academia is yet another 
social space contextualising performativity of nation branding. This network of 
‘structuring structures’ occasionally delivers lectures, seminars (e.g. Warsaw School 
of Economics, Warsaw School of Social Sciences and Humanities; Cardinal Stefan 
Wyszyński University) workshops and professional events on nation branding.  
 
Thus far, nation branding has been introduced in lectures and seminars in the 
curricula of the higher education institutions, delivering courses in marketing, 
transnational communications, politics, international relations and business degrees. 
First, functionalist PhDs on nation branding have emerged legitimising nation 
branding within Polish academia (Raftowicz–Filipkiewicz 2009). In that respect, 
academic publishing on nation branding in Poland is considered as “constructing the 
objective world” (Bourdieu 1991, p. 165). To date, Polish academia has not produced 
a single critical account of nation branding. If anything, in their works, Polish 
academics neither recognise its limitations nor explore the consequences. The Polish 
academia has also been as a source of labour for nation branders and an intellectual 
powerbase for actors engaged in nation branding discourse. For example, the Institute 
of Polish Brand offered traineeships to young scholars, some of whom turned their 
                                                          
31
 There are transnational media outlets which struggle to expand their revenue to capitalise on 
marketing research, consultancy, strategy, creating and selling media spaces. For example, CNN’s 
Tourism Advertising Solutions and Knowledge Tasks unit was established in May 2007. CNN has 
its own local, organisational representation in Poland. Its interests in Warsaw are represented by 
New Communications.  
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knowledge into career opportunities. In 2008, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs awarded 
a prize for the best dissertation (Krycki 2007) in the area of international relations for a 
MA dissertation on nation branding that had been produced by one of the Institute’s 
trainees. He was later employed by the Ministry.   
NGOs, THINK TANKS, MARKET RESEARCH ORGANISATIONS  
 
A separate category of structuring structures in terms of mediation of nation 
branding discourse is constituted by think tanks located in Poland. While some non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) in Poland have participated in campaigning as 
actors commissioned by the Polish state,32 among the NGOs are also public policy 
think tanks that in their professional reports mediate nation branding discourse. Their 
engagement in discourse on nation branding is secondary as they did not struggle to 
form the field of nation branding directly, but their practices have been described by 
nation branders as bearing ‘hallmarks of nation branding’. They have been 
occasionally contracted by the field of power to produce projects, and the outputs of 
their professional practice reproduce nation branding discourse.33 
 
The most prominent in this category of structuring structures is the Institute of 
Public Affairs. It is a public policy institution which was established in 1995 “to 
support modernisation reforms and to provide a forum for informed debate on social 
and political issues” (IPA 2010). The Institute positions itself as an actor acting at the 
                                                          
32
   One of the mechanisms facilitating enactment of promotional policies by the Polish state technocrats 
is distribution of economic capital in the form of subsidies amongst the NGOs in Poland. Those 
subsidies are donated to finance cultural events and campaigns that are primarily aimed at 
challenging images of Poland and Poles overseas. For example, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
enacts this policy mechanism via competition called ‘Promotion of knowledge about Poland’. In 
2009, the economic capital donated to NGOs amounted to 1996286 PLN (app. £ 400.000) (PMFA 
2009b).  
  
33
  The latest example of a text reproducing nation branding discourse is a consultancy report entitled 
‘Images of Poland and Poles in Great Britain’. It was produced after the governmental ‘Polska! 
Year’ campaign in UK in 2009.One of its findings reveals the following discursive statement: “The 
brand Poland is rather blurred and indistinct. Polish products admittedly, to be sure can be found 
everywhere, but there is still lack of brand leaders that can be immediately associated with Poland” 
(IPA 2011, p. 5). This report was co-financed by the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the 
British Embassy in Warsaw.  
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crossovers between academic fields, the political fields, the media and NGOs 
structures. Among its statutory priorities is the implementation of projects significant 
for the public domain, identification of social issues, and public policy development. 
The Institute enjoys a network of associates and publishes the outputs of its selected 
practices as books, policy papers and consultancy reports. Its publications are targeted 
at the Polish state field of power, the mass media and other non-state actors. One of 
the practices performed by the Institute is the production of the research reports 
exploring the transnational perceptions of Poland and Poles. In 2003, the Institute 
legitimised its research with the following utilitarian statement:   
 
The research results presented in this publication might be used to 
develop overseas promotional policy of Poland and might be used in 
the National Marketing Programme (Kolarska-Bobińska 2003, p. 8).  
 
The term ‘national marketing’ was used by the Polish Chamber of Commerce 
(2003) in its policy proposals, prior to employing a Western nation branding 
consultant. In fact, the Chamber of Commerce co-financed this particular piece of 
research (IPA 2009). Over the years, the Institute of Public Affairs normalised the 
term ‘nation brand’ in its publications. Its 2011 report revealing perceptions of Poland 
and Poles in the UK explicitly includes references to ‘nation brand’ and to a selling 
scheme for nation branding consultancy called ‘Nation Brand Index’ (IPA 2011, p. 18-
20). Finally, research organisations form a ‘structuring structure’ that enables a 
supporting discourse of nation branding in terms of the legitimacy. Among them are 
TNS OBOP34 and Maison both renowned in for their market research. The above 
‘structuring structures provide’ “instruments for knowing” (Bourdieu 1991, p. 165) for 
                                                          
34
 Although the professional accounts of nation branders reveal references to the existing market 
research as evidence legitimizing nation branding, there is no evidence that the TNS OBOP has not 
used the term nation branding itself, but its polling services were used by nation branders to produce 
their consultancy reports. This actor in the structuring structure has produced research on the 
reputation of Poland (TNS OBOP 2005) and its polling research reveals that a sample of Poles 
supports promotion of the Polish state. 
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those involved in the distribution of acts of symbolic power inherent to nation 
branding practice. 
CORPORATE ENTERPRISES IN POLAND: THE ACADEMY OF BRANDS 
 
Finally, a remaining category mediating discourse on nation branding is selected 
corporate businesses operating in Poland, but closely aligned with the social space 
where nation branding was introduced. The literature review reveals that economic 
nationalism can be enacted by corporate organisations both by corporate 
communications, including public affairs, and can be reinforced by national sentiments 
enacted through marketing or public relations messages resulting in extension of the 
symbolic capital of reputation (Wang 2005). These are the critical prerequisites for 
enacting economic nationalism by corporate organisations. Nevertheless, the 
structuring structure that is emerging from the data - the Academy of Polish Brands - 
has been formed by nation branders on commercial promises as well as national 
sentiments. In the publication produced by the Institute of Polish Brand (2001), ‘An 
economy under its own flag’, nation branders in Poland reveal the organisations 
forming this structuring structure.  
 
Among them are enterprises operating the Polish markets, some of which were 
MNCs and their ‘Polishness’ in terms of economic and symbolic capital mediating the 
Polish national identity features is questionable. This structuring structure consists of 
sixty one organisations (Institute of Polish Brand 2001). The Academy of Brands 
scheme was organised by the Polish Chamber of Commerce that awarded membership 
certificates to thirty one businesses on 27 March 2000 and, once this scheme was 
formalised by the Ministry of Economics, a further thirty organisations have joined it 
as per ministerial nomination on 26 October 2000. The Institute of Polish Brand 
(2001) reveals plans to expand this structuring structure to approximately 2000 
organisations. One of the statements emerging from the Institute’s publication (2001, 
p. 444, original in English) says:  
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Members of the Academy constitute an unusual intellectual, 
promotional, patriotic, and financial capital and a huge but as yet 
untapped driving force. It is time for that potential to start working for 
the benefit of the Poland brand.  
 
This ‘structuring structure’ extends the performative actions of nation branders 
into the realm of business organisations and demonstrates the acceleration in the 
development of ‘branding culture’ in Poland (Kornberger 2010) that had been 
previously relatively sealed off from the promotional culture within Polish field of 
power. Its role in the archetypical nation branding project is discussed further (p. 214). 
Furthermore, consultancy discourse accompanying the central ‘Nation brand building 
programme’ discloses that the following institutional actors were planned to be 
included in the envisioned field nation branding: the Ministry of Culture and National 
Heritage, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Economics, Polish Chamber 
of Commerce, the Council of Poland’s Promotion, and the Ministry of Regional 
Development (Saffron 2007, p. 120). This vision does not correspond with the social 
reality presented above. 
This chapter has presented this set of my findings which have enabled me to 
further contextualize nation branding practice. In the first section of this chapter I have 
uncovered culturally-grounded myth of ‘branding’ as an idea and demonstrated that it 
is present among Polish state actors in the field. Further, I have presented ‘structuring 
structures’, which in the settings of my analysis, facilitates the dissemination of nation 
branding as an ideology. Finally, having identified key types of resources in the field, I 
have outlined ‘structured structures’ of the field and mapped out positions of the 
agents in its structure. Notwithstanding shortcomings of my approach to the mapping 
exercise, this procedure has demonstrated how resources within the field operate as a 
structuration mechanism. This aside, I proceed to the presentation of types of habitus 
that have enabled the emergence of nation branding in the field structures. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: TYPES OF HABITUS AND LEGITIMIZATIONS 
THE FIELD HABITUS 
 
The finding that is central to understanding the relationship between class and 
national identity construction (Blum 2007), and reconstructing the inter-institutional 
field dynamics is the habitus of agents enabling the emergence of nation branding in 
the Polish settings. In this section, I report on a habitus of those actors forming 
‘dominant coalitions’ as, by virtue of their decision-making abilities or consultancy 
initiatives, they had the biggest impact on the field. Those dominant coalitions include, 
on the one hand, decision-makers among the Polish state actors and, on the other hand, 
private sector interests groups and nation branding consultants that are newcomers to 
the field. Therefore, in this chapter I present those collective characteristics “moulding 
social practices” in the field (Weinwright, Williams, and Turner 2006, p. 537).   
 
The procedure for unfolding habitus, similar to Weinwright et al.’s (ibid.) study, 
is based on analysis of common characteristics revealing dominant types of habitus in 
their field. This part of the findings is informed by revealing personal, professional, 
and institutional dispositions as those were articulated through the interviews as 
critical to the field dynamics: the internalised tastes, predisposition, tendencies, 
propensities or inclinations are drawn from the interview data, curriculum vitae and 
biographical notes used for self-presentation by the agents. All (n=43) participants of 
the main fieldwork stage shared their dispositions enabling me to disclose the 
intersections between dominant types of habitus and their role in the field agency. 
Given that the relationships between the agents were reported as performed in their 
professional settings, the crossovers between individual, institutional, and professional 
dispositions is critical to understanding how the professional class of nation branders 
applies those dispositions in their interactions with the Polish state bureaucrats. 
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INDIVIDUAL HABITS  
 
I start off with disclosing the individual features of habitus as the relationship 
between individual and society is significant to understanding their trajectories. 
Among the professional class of nation branders are senior management of the Polish 
Chamber of Commerce, senior players in marketing, advertising and public relations 
industries and senior and middle bureaucrats within the governmental field of national 
images management. Given the subject of this study, this section captures personal 
dispositions of the field actors. Although national identity construction has been linked 
to the proprietors’ class (De Cillia, Reisigl, and Wodak 1999), its understanding has 
been extended into the institutional and professional classes (Artaraz 2006). Indeed, 
the record of those characteristics enabled me to make explicit links between the field 
and practice and remains in line with the class-driven vision of national identity. 
 
The field actors here are predominantly representatives of business with some 
background in corporate communications. Although social theorists until recently have 
been reluctant to talk about the emergence of a ‘middle class’ in Poland, the majority 
of them are middle class professions or reveal inclinations to bourgeois behaviour, 
tastes, and experiences. For Bourdieu (1984) ‘taste’ is the category which indeed 
operates as a ‘class marker’ (understood as a quality). What is worth noting is that not 
all the Polish field actors come from the ‘intelligentsia’ background (Eyal at al., 
2000), but nation branders have been attempting to exchange their dispositions to 
facilitate their upwards mobility in their professional milieu. Their professional 
backgrounds also indicate a belonging to the middle class, which is, on the one hand, 
structurally close to the field of power, and on the other, by virtue of their professional 
skills, enjoys privileged access to the field of power. Because nation branders claim 
expertise in practice which has a symbolic dimension, it was seen as of relevance to 
policy goals.  
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The dominant field actors operate as a senior and middle management within the 
Polish or they are entrepreneurs with business consultancy, politics, marketing, 
advertising journalism, the media production, or public relations backgrounds.  
 
While the data does not explicitly register ages of the field actors, there was a 
notable generational gap in the field. Particularly, those representing Polish youth 
emphasised the division on the basis of ‘bureaucratic’ or ‘apparatchik’ mind-sets as a 
characteristics of distinction between older and younger players in the field. In this 
context, a distinction between bureaucrats and nation branders was made with regards 
to understanding nation branding practice:   
 
For us it was clear, but for decision-makers nothing is clear. This is a 
completely different world (Franciszek, personal interview, 2009). 
 
 Readiness for adaptation of nation branding by the state institutions in Poland was 
also highlighted by private sector consultants:  
 
 Similar to individuals, institutions also undergo a process of 
maturing” (ibid. 2009).  
 
He further continues: 
 
I think that among the employees of those institutions, there is a 
developing feeling that, we are ‘civil servants’ [original in English] 
and we have some aims to meet. And one of those serious aims is, 
indeed, promotion of Poland (ibid. 2009). 
 
In other words, age has been seen as a generational differentiator in assessing 
‘consciousness’ of marketing knowledge in general and nation branding in particular. 
For nation branders, the bureaucratic mindsets, associated by them with the Soviet 
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past, were seen as an obstacle to understanding the importance of nation branding. It is 
not to say that the ‘homo sovieticus’ was a feature revealing different qualities in the 
field. On the contrary, specific aspects of the Sovietised sedimentation that might have 
been an impediment to enacting nation branding have not been explicitly revealed, but 
age as a quality was associated with professional mobility, interest and understanding 
of marketing and requirement for nation branding practice. Those closer to the state 
structures were allegedly less inclined to fully recognise its practical value.  
 
Given the complexity of the investigated social space, biographical differences 
among dominant actors in the field are not revealing. However, they have inhabited 
few widespread features. With regards to cultural clues, the interview places, such as 
cafes (e.g. Coffee Heaven; Coffee Karma; the staff café at the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs; Bar Teatralny Syrena; Numery Litery), restaurants (e.g. Nesebar; Dyspensa), 
work settings (e.g. institutional or business offices or conference rooms), or private 
flat, revealed some of their tastes. Although different from one another, the taste 
markers of the field actors suggests that they surround themselves with middle class 
aesthetics and attributes: books, including professional publications, and reports (the 
book collection of senior managers at the PTO and the PMFA included  Polish 
editions of texts on nation branding written by Olins and Anholt), reproduction of 
paintings (e.g. ‘Pologne Polen Poland Polska Zakopane’ by Stefan Norblin in the 
IAM), posters (e.g. posters representing UK ‘Cool Britannia’ nation branding 
campaign, featuring Mark Leonard were displayed  on corridors of the Polish Chamber 
of Commerce); furniture (e.g. Art Nouveau style interior design at the PMFA and the 
IAM); architecture (e.g. purpose redecorated for the IAM, Art Nouveau styled Sugar 
Refiner’s Palace); national symbols (e.g. Polish national emblem in case of the PMFA 
or the ME displayed in offices); classical music (e.g. ‘Four seasons’) or display their 
past achievements (e.g. professional awards, certificates, media clippings), including, 
in some cases, nation branding related projects displayed in their offices (e.g. framed 
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pieces of publicity and nomination certificate to the Effie Awards in case of Corporate 
Profiles). Those symbols form professional class attributes. 
 
The interviews offered an opportunity to reveal another aspect of the individual 
habitus: formal dress code (either formal, e.g. suits or smart casual, e.g. jeans, jackets 
shirts, polo shirt, brief cases); courteous linguistic social interaction (e.g. small talk 
before the interviews); tactful individual conduct (e.g. for example, interactions with 
co-workers); and, with few exceptions, attention to etiquette. The class markers have 
been common across the field actors both in private or professional social milieus. 
Regardless of the institutional belonging and self-account of their practice, the field 
actors declared enacting their communicative practice in the field for a common good. 
Their professional practice has not, in their views, served exclusively their individual 
pursuits, but served the overall public interest. It was seen in utilitarian terms. This 
sense of public service was also shared by marketing, public relations and advertising 
consultants: their professional practice has been ‘performed for Poland’. Although 
those worldviews have not always been appreciated by the bureaucratic class in the 
field, nevertheless they have been seen as important in the field.  
 
An additional characteristic that was common across the field is a Westward 
orientation, or the Western professional experiences of the field actors. The Westward 
orientation is notable in policy making by the field actors. The Western experience, by 
and large professional, discloses development of an extra layer of sedimentation that 
has shaped the field mechanisms. For example, the Deputy CEO of the Polish Tourist 
Organisation, director of the Adam Mickiewicz Institute and director of the Public and 
Cultural Diplomacy Department had worked in the US and Western Europe. Also 
private sector nation branders revealed Western professional experiences, either in the 
marketing industry or elsewhere. As far as their understanding of the branding skills 
set is concerned, it was explicitly associated with the Western worldviews:  
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We were pioneers of this kind of thinking [about ‘branding’]. It 
arrived in Poland from the West (Tymoteusz, personal interview, 
2010). 
 
With regards to the remaining aspects of the individual habitus sedimentation, 
the actors studied were males n=27 and females n=16. One of the myths concerning 
national identity in Poland often emphasises religious affiliation as a true essence of 
Polishness. As far as the religious sedimentation is concerned, the actors studied 
reported wider believes affiliations: Roman Catholics (n=22); not practising Roman 
Catholics (n=2); Protestants (n=2); Agnostics (n=4); Atheists (n=1); Buddhists (n=1); 
unidentified or not revealed (n=11). Those working locally were all Caucasian, ethnic 
Poles. Only one of the local field actors reported as from a multi-ethnic, Polish-
Russian family background. The transnational nation branding consultant, who played 
a significant role in advancing nation branding in Poland, was British by birth. He did 
not reveal his religious affiliations. He was a Caucasian male.  
 
As far as the assessment of personal features required to work in the area of 
nation branding, the field actors predominantly emphasised individual skills including: 
‘performer’; ‘charismatic’; ‘authoritative’; ‘analytical’; ‘visionary’; ‘committed’; 
‘patriotic’; ‘critical’; ‘powerful’; ‘influential’; ‘independent minded’ or enjoying 
‘cultural sensitivity’. Interestingly, no taught skills have been identified as critical to 
nation branding practice. As far as recognition of the expertise in nation branding is 
concerned, the field actors have struggled to recognise them. On a very few occasions, 
the names of Simon Anholt, Wally Olins, Mark Leonard, and local Polish consultants 
(e.g. creative director of the Escadra Group or the CEO of the Institute of Polish 
Brand) were seen as holding sufficient dispositions to perform nation branding in 
Poland.  
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Although this is not the central vector in my analysis, data archives reveal that 
gender has been explicitly noted as having its role in performative discourse on nation 
branding. Although, my findings are not conclusive, among the seventeen private 
sector branding consultants there was one female in a senior position. Her grasp of the 
field explicitly links gender with nation branding; she made an explicit connection 
between competitive relationships among actors in the field and masculinity:  
 
Interviewer: There are many institutions in Poland talking about 
nation branding. How would you, as an external observer, describe 
relationships between them?  
 
Interviewee: Terribly competitive in the sense that they all say ‘this is 
my field and I have the monopoly for knowledge’. Thus, without 
having to wait... 
 
Interviewer: Sorry, I understand competition for knowledge, but what 
are those people competing for? What is at stake here? This is what I 
am trying to understand... 
 
Interviewee: For implementation, completion of projects, I am 
guessing. I don’t really know. And because for so many years nothing 
was happening and I was observing how different men were jumping 
down each other’s throats. I finally concluded that I should do my 
own thing (Natalia, personal interview, 2009, underline added). 
 
Although for Bourdieu (1998) gender is an important aspect of habitus, and his 
publication of ‘Masculine domination’ sparkled a debate with feminist writers on the 
position of females in the Western societies, the evidence I collected does not allow 
me to present an exhaustive insight of the relationship between gender and nation 
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branding in Poland. The above statement explicitly reveals male domination among 
nation branders, and in my view, has been made explicit as it has emerged in the 
account presented by the only female nation branding consultant in the field. None of 
the male nation branders commented on gender related features of the field dynamics 
or their attributes. Some of them, however, drew the line of distinction between them 
and a female consultant by referring to her as a “clever business woman” (Arkadiusz, 
personal interview, 2009). Gender division in the field requires further data.   
INSTITUTIONAL HABITUS  
 
Vis- à -via personal habitus, the institutional dispositions are a second essential 
dimension facilitating understanding of the field dynamics. Given that nation branding 
was discussed at the crossroads of few institutions, it is worth capturing how broadly 
defined practices interlink with the settings of a particular field actor. With respect to 
the institutional interactions, this study follows the view that “institutions and 
incumbents of institutional positions shape each other in an unpredictable way” (Eyal 
et al. 2000, p. 44) and class distinctions between the dominant coalitions shape the 
directions of relevant institutional agency.  
 
The difficulty of capturing all qualities of the field management lies in the fact 
that some of the actors changed and moved beyond the field. For example, the former 
head of public diplomacy in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Agnieszka Wielowieyska 
travelled to the Chancery of the Prime Minister to become a director of the Foreign 
Affairs Department and Andrzej Sadoś, was sacked by the Prime Minister Donald 
Tusk from his position as the head of public diplomacy.35 Personnel changes at the key 
positions in the field are characteristic of the government actors there. Until 2008, the 
Institute of Adam Mickiewicz had eight directors. Changes among senior management 
in other institutions have been also reported, but those at the Ministry of Foreign 
                                                          
35
 Throughout the fieldwork, those actors refused to be interviewed. In a telephone conversation, Sadoś 
refused to offer insights into his professional practice and Wielowieyska’s office informed me on 
her behalf that it is best to speak to the policy makers at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  
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Affairs are critical to promotional policy making and its relationship to nation 
branding projects. However, management operating with the field at the time of the 
fieldwork operate partly driven by their instructional objectives, partly from trans-
institutional relationships with other actors. In fact, the institutionally signified ‘we’ or 
‘us’ is equally important as trans-institutional connections between the players. The 
institution-centric view, however, remains a prominent feature of the field. The 
collective ‘we’ and ‘us’ have been emphasised in the professional accounts by actors 
forming dominant coalitions in the field. Those emerge as markers of institutional 
belonging, including directions of policy making and projects planning. The Deputy 
Director of the Polish Chamber of Commerce reveals it in the following statement:  
 
Nation branding has arrived in Poland thanks to us, and it can be 
said, that it was imported by us” (Maciej, personal interview, 2009, 
underline added);  
 
Similarly, the department director at the Ministry of Economics discloses the 
development of nation branding and links it with institutional world-view as sediment 
of habitus:  
 
We are starting off with a big European project, promotion of the 
Polish economy that is part of ‘The Innovative Economy’ programme. 
Thanks to this programme we are hoping to finalise the construction 
of the overarching ‘meta-message’ about Poland and then transfer it 
into our area to do with promotion of branded exports. (Tadeusz, 
personal interview, 2009, underline added);  
 
The institutional dispositions are also revealed by the head of public diplomacy and 
cultural diplomacy at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs:  
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To me, a practitioner, but also a governmental official... hm, I 
associate branding with products or commodities. Many marketing 
and nation branding publications that I have read told me that Poland 
can be considered as a commodity and it should be sold. I don’t quite 
believe in this. It is not about launching or selling a product. Poland 
already exists in the international communication flow, but the main 
issue at the moment is its presentation (Zofia, personal interview, 
2009, underline added). 
 
The organisational habitus of group belonging was also emphasised by nation 
branders. The leader of a local initiative, The Advertising for Poland Association, the 
first non-governmental organisation engaged in nation branding in Poland, reveals: 
 
The Association was a very cool idea as it was all about combining 
expertise. You see, everyone in the industry is interested in serving the 
national brand as it is prestigious and who knows what else and we 
have attempted to pre-empt the competition. We said, let’s don’t do 
the public bidding, let’s don’t compete with each other, let’s do 
something together for this country (Igor, personal interview, 2009, 
underline added).  
 
The closest institutional settings in which nation branding has been performed is 
critical to understanding dynamics of trajectories, but the field where this discourse 
has been contested has one common denominator: both policy data and professional 
accounts of dominant actors in the field declare responsibility for or vested interest in 
symbolic representations of Poland overseas. It would be a simplification to claim that 
senior and middle management of the field institutions are exclusively closed within 
their own institutional life-worlds. On the contrary, a central characteristic among the 
management of public institutions is openness to listen to new institutional voices 
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whereas marketing and public relations professionals or their clients have been less 
flexible with regards to accepting varying institutional practices or policy solutions.  
 
Furthermore, institutional habitus is important to the field dynamics as nation 
branding advocates offer their institutional solutions on how Polish nation branding 
should be performed; who should enact its praxis and who should manage it. Indeed, 
the statement by a transnational nation branding consultant suggests that public and 
private sector actors should set up their own institutional framework to perform nation 
branding in Poland:   
 
We should have a coordinating committee (Michael, personal 
interview, 2010, underline added).   
 
This narrative unfolds in the consultancy report, ‘A brand for Polska: further 
advancing Poland’s national identity’ produced as part of the central nation brand 
building programme:  
 
There are five main elements: a new national branding directorate, a 
steering group, an advisory panel, task forces and brand champions 
(Saffron, 2007, p. 119).  
 
This institutional arrangement, as envisioned by nation branders, is to liaise with the 
so called, ‘steering group’, including: the Ministry of Culture and National Heritage; 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Ministry of Economics; Polish Chamber of Commerce; 
the Council of Poland’s Promotion; the Polish Tourism Organisation and the Ministry 
of Regional Development and the assumed inclusion of chairman from Saffron Brand 
Consultancy (Saffron 2007, p. 120). This centralised approach to leadership is closer 
to the habitus sedimented by corporate managerialism than an institutional network 
developed in the state-building process done through the legislation process.  
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As it stands, institutional habitus enables understanding of the actors as nation 
branders entered in a specific institutional setting in Poland; nation branding had been 
contested within pre-defined institutional network, and nation branders had their own 
vision of institutional management. Further insights into the actors’ characteristics 
enabled me to divide the habitus into the institutional settings: bureaucratic or 
technocratic fraction, driven by various policies and business habitus, driven by 
predispositions to manage nation branding. With regards to the Polish bureaucracy, 
their institutional habitus unfolds their relationship to the type of policy making they 
are engaged with. The senior and middle management of the Polish state actors also 
emphasised the significance of communicative practice within the institutional 
structure they manage. The head of public and cultural diplomacy at the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs links its institutional communicative practice and the Polish foreign 
policy objectives; she states that the primary role of public diplomacy is:  
 
...communicating the Polish story overseas by simultaneously making 
sure that it fits with objectives of the foreign policy (Zofia, personal 
interview, 2010).   
 
The professional account by a senior manager of the Polish Information and 
Foreign Investment Agency reveals that his institution is accountable for marketization 
of Poland and facilitation of economic policy aimed at “attracting external investors” 
(Jacek, personal interview, 2009). Similarly, institutional policy ties are reported by 
the senior manager of the Polish Tourism Organisation where tourism is considered as 
part of the economic policy therefore “requiring management by applying wide tools 
to enact this policy” (Daniel, personal interview, 2009). The institutional habitus has 
also been shaped by historical features: the struggles over competences and changing 
links between actors which impacted on the contemporary situation within the field. 
 
The institutional habitus also emphasises interdependency with the broader field 
of power. This feature demonstrates relationships between the political field in Poland, 
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leadership style, and the quality of relationships as defined by dominant coalitions 
among the field actors. Indeed, the institutional processes and visions were reported as 
dependant on the political field: both political alliances within it and personal qualities 
of politicians. One the one hand, the links between political alliances and the field was 
explicitly linked to the representations of Polishness; an advisor to the Polish Tourism 
Organisation states:  
 
...Law and Justice would like Poland to be represented overseas in a 
Romantic, 1920s sort of way, whereas the Civic Platform seem to 
strive towards more modern representation of Poland via promotional 
activities (Igor, personal interview, 2009).  
 
On the other hand, the head of public and cultural diplomacy reports how her 
superiors’, minister Sikorski habitus, links to institutional dynamics:  
 
Sikorski is a new type of minister in his thinking about Poland [...] He 
understands, quite rightly, the fact that [...] we shouldn’t be ashamed 
of anything, that we should be down with martyrdom, and that we are 
a strong country. To me his thinking is more of a result of his 
personality, education, and a traveller’s mindset, than an actual idea 
that is being conceived here (Zofia, personal interview, 2009).  
 
While the approach to representing the institutional processes has had links with 
the field of power, it was reported that the state actors can also benefit from their own 
managers’ career progression. It was reported by one manager at the Polish Tourism 
Organisation that one of their former employees was nominated to the rank of the 
undersecretary of state in the Ministry of Sport and Tourism and this progression 
better positions this actor in the field of power (Kinga, personal interview, 2010).  
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As far as bureaucratic class properties are concerned, the management of the 
field plays a key role in the field dynamics. This has been reported by the managers by 
revealing their commitment to the statutory either institutional or departmental tasks, 
struggles as part of the policy making (e.g. consultation processes), adherence to 
procedures (e.g. public bidding), interests and analysis of in the market research and 
media reports (e.g. market reports), attention to changing legislature (e.g. institutional 
changes proposals), sensitivity to the external auditing (e.g. policy reviews), learning 
from ‘best-practice’ from the overseas institutional competitors, and most importantly, 
to their decision making capabilities.   
 
Furthermore, institutional habitus, depending on the levels of institutional 
seniority, clearly exceeds boundaries of a single institution. Particularly, the senior 
management of key institutional actors report cooperation and exchange of ideas on 
the level of policies making, institutional consultations, personnel crossovers and 
governmental projects or campaigns managed within the field. Although, it was 
characterised as not an ‘ideal cooperation’ in terms of inter-institutional exchange of 
ideas or projects coordination, nevertheless, it undoubtedly exceeds the boundaries of 
a single state institution. For instance, it was reported that promotional policy making 
at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is subject to broader consultancies (Zofia, personal 
interview, 2009); the head of public and cultural diplomacy at the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and one of the undersecretaries of state at the Ministry of Economics have a 
seat on the Council of Polish Tourism Organisation (consulting body on tourism 
policy) (Polish Tourism Organisation 2011); in 2004, a body called the Council of the 
Promotion of Poland was set up to stimulate cooperation on promotional policy. 
 
As far as the institutional habitus is concerned, it is also characterised with a 
high level of formalism, particularly regarding qualifications. This quality remains in 
line with Bourdieusian notion of the bureaucratic class whereby the state tends to 
legitimize their views of academic credentials (Poupeau and Thierry 2005). For 
example, a senior manager with a well-established tract of service for the Polish state 
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emphasises this formalism by accentuating the importance of formal qualifications 
over practical skills among the bureaucrats; in the context of career progression 
description for the Polish state, he states:  
 
I had to get my own money, go to a private university, and pay. 
Nobody here [in public administration] is asking you about practical 
skills. You have a piece of paper and this is it [reference to 
qualification certificate]. Unfortunately, that’s how it is (Jacek, 
personal interview, 2009).  
 
As aforementioned, management of the state institutions and departments 
responsible for specific areas of promotional policy making have reported holding 
academic qualifications (either on MA or PhD levels) in their relevant areas of 
institutional practice. Interestingly, none of the actors, either the state or non-state, 
revealed the requirement of formal qualifications to practise nation branding.  
 
On the other hand, the collective habitus of private sector nation branders is less 
formalised with regards to education and qualifications. I define their disposition as 
‘business habitus’. Given that the habitus is characterised by “older forms of 
behaviour and prior ideas continue to shape actions within new collectivities” (Eyal et 
al., 2000, p. 44), the emerging themes support that their entrepreneurial dispositions 
facilitated venturing into the new avenues of business and consultancy. Dominant 
nation branders are aligned with either marketing or public relations industries, and 
specialise in consultancy and ‘brand management’ practice. For public relations 
marketing, and advertising consultants - local or transnational - nation branding is an 
‘extra service’ in their business portfolio or operations. For them, nation branding is 
not their exclusive consultancy area: it is a part of their business framework. For 
example, the corporate websites of the Saffron Brand Consultancy (2011); the Eskadra 
Group or Corporate Profiles (2011) offer corporate branding consultancy. On the other 
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hand, the management of the Polish Chamber of Commerce took interest in nation 
branding as it is concerned with national economy; its deputy CEO states: 
 
Overall, Polish elites have limited knowledge of the economy. Perhaps 
it is understandable in our historical context, but it’s very harmful 
[...]. To break through with certain economic agenda therefore is very 
difficult (Maciej, personal interview, 2009).  
 
As far as institutional dimensions of the business habitus reveal, it is linked to 
business opportunities. One of the local nation brander presents her world-view on 
Poland as a dynamic ‘Never, never land’ offering plenty of opportunities: 
 
...so if we live in a country in which dynamics of change are so vast, a 
country in which opportunities, ‘those opportunities’ [original in 
English] are enormous, so dynamics of change are so fast that it is 
difficult to define anything in a specific timeframe and say, this is how 
it is, because it will change in a second. The landscape is changing 
every single day (Natalia, personal interview, 2009). 
 
Therefore, the business habitus sediments are based on a set of professional 
identities valued in marketing and creative industries: strategic thinking; creativity; 
research skills; networking skills; presentation and organisational skills; professional 
writing skills; analytical and research skills; understanding of bureaucratic procedures 
(e.g. public bidding), communication and advocacy skills. Those qualities have been 
emphasised in discourse on nation branding by advocates of this model in their 
professional testaments on their practice. The crossovers between the institutional 
habitus and the business habitus is represented in the following statement by the head 
of public and cultural diplomacy at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs:  
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I am against generating all ideas by bureaucratic heads. Because this 
is my life-world, I am limited in some ways. I am not a branding or 
marketing expert so I might find it difficult to figure everything out on 
my own (Zofia, personal interview, 2010).  
 
This openness to listen to new ideas was common across the state bureaucrats within 
the field. However, the selection of newcomers’ qualities remains in line with 
specificity of the project or type of external expertise required by the institution 
operating with the governmental field of national images management and the field of 
power. This openness to marketing ideas was also characteristic of other governmental 
actors across the field, but some treated them with greater reflexivity than the others, 
leading to resistance against some solutions offered by nation branders. For example, 
the centralised approach to nation branding management was questioned by the 
Deputy Chairman at the Polish Tourism Organisation; he points out:  
 
There are some people who argue that everything that involves 
promotion of Poland abroad should be under the one wing, in one 
institution. But, if you consider, for instance, the European solutions, 
there is no country with such institutional setting...for a moment, just 
a short moment, not so long ago, perhaps four or five years ego...that 
all aspects of promotion of foreign direct investment, trade, including 
tourism were attempted to be integrated by Portuguese government. 
Namely, they merge, I believe it is called ISEP, but they quickly gave 
up this type of institutionalisation...in Poland this tendency for some 
reason still exists (Daniel, personal interview, 2009). 
 
While the institutional dimension of habitus was important from the point of view of 
understanding how my participants’ ‘life-worlds’ shaped the inhabited social space, the 
next layer of sediments of their socialisation reveals insights into habitus that was an 
outcome of their professional trajectories and performativity.  
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PROFESSIONAL HABITUS 
 
In a Bourdieusian study of making capitalism work in CEE that also explored 
Poland, Eyal et al. (2000, p. 41) characterise the socio-economic conditions preceding 
the democratic 1989 revolutions in the following way:  
 
Surviving in Central and Eastern Europe in the last past half century 
can be linked to travelling in outer space and trying to plot a safe 
course. The course of action has not always been clear. Learning how 
to navigate in this strange, ever changing environment eventually 
reinforced self-confidence. One stayed on the course, no matter what.  
 
This section demonstrates sediments of professional habitus of the field agents as 
reported in their education and overall career trajectories. The above statement 
strongly resonates among the field actors. Their professional habitus also important to 
this study as performative discourse on nation branding has been reported to be 
enacted in their professional milieu and their past professional sediments translate into 
their understanding of nation branding practice. The professional habitus has also a 
strong bearing on nation branding performative discourse. In fact, the professional 
habitus of key Polish bureaucrats travelling across the field varied from institution to 
institution, specifically with regards to attitudes to nation branding. Overall, the 
managers of public institutions are primarily policy driven, competences orientated, 
and procedures sensitive. The crucial feature of their professional habitus is their 
empowerment to shape directions of public policy. Their professional careers have 
been aligned with the Polish state whereas the professional habitus of the newcomers 
to the field has had the greatest impact on advancement of nation branding in Poland.    
 
Principally, nation branding in Poland has been seen by marketeers as another 
level of the marketing toolkit that can be applied into yet another social space. Their 
professional accounts reveal that nation branders have a background in business, 
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public administration, management, or the professional fields of marketing, 
journalism, public relations, visual arts, or a combination of the above. Data reveals 
that only two participants (Arkadiusz - The Charted Institute of Marketing certificate; 
and Jacek - MBA) reported having a formal marketing qualification. Although nation 
branders have declared senior executive positions in transnational marketing 
consultancies, their career trajectories reveal that they have learnt their profession on 
‘the job’. Given that nation branding is a derivative of marketing practice, one could 
assume the field actors would potentially have marketing education. Nation branders, 
however, merged their previous professional socialisation with the one acquired later 
in their lives and applied their professional discourse into the context of opportunities. 
Even, a so-called ‘guru’ in nation branding, a transnational brand consultant, spoke of 
himself as a ‘self-made man’. This statement reveals how he has conceived an idea of 
nation branding: 
 
I have read history at the university and I have always been very 
interested in history, always been very interested in aspects of history 
that you might describe as cultural or anthropological, or sociological 
or something. And it occurred to me very many years of ago that 
nations have a path of identity. And if you read about, say, the French 
revolution, or for that matter the first or the second French revolution, 
you will continually see this dynamic of change. When I started using 
the phrase nation as a brand, I really don’t know. Probably around 
1985 or something like that, something like that, I would think. 
(Michael, personal interview, 2010) 
 
He further unfolds the impact that Eric Hobsbawm, a Marxist historian, has had on his 
thinking on national identity while he was thinking on ‘brand’ and reveals that: 
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So I think my interest in history, and my interest in, what we then 
called identity got me into that world (Michael, personal interview, 
2010).  
 
While Hobsbawm’s (1990) structuralist view of nationalism is influenced by Marxist 
explanations of history, and he was comfortable with the term propaganda, the use of 
this term is shunned by nation branders with a professional background in corporate 
communication or brand management. However, the selection of specific words to 
signify branding practice remains a conscious behaviour among nation branders and it 
becomes a part of the professional habitus that marketers are engaged with. One of the 
local nation branders describes this process as “marketing the marketing ideas” 
(Arkadiusz, personal interview, 2008). Indeed, links between a careful selection of 
words and nation branding have been made explicit, contextual and depend on what 
type of clients nation branders are talking to: 
 
These are terms that people use ahhh... in different situations. If I am 
talking to a very academic individual or to very academic institutions 
or if I am talking to a charity, the word ‘brand’ is anathema, they 
don’t like, but they do like reputation. So, if I am talking to Amnesty 
International, let’s say, or Oxfam, I might talk about your reputation. 
If I am talking to Oxford University, actually, Oxford University is all 
about brand now, because they know all about that. Well, destination 
branding, destination...it is all just words people use, they are 
semantics (Michael, personal interview, 2010).  
 
As far as the Polish nation branders are concerned, the specificity of their professional 
habitus lies in the distinction between the type of education they have internalised and 
their contemporary professional occupation. One of the interviewers reveals dynamics 
of a dichotomy between ‘education’ versus ‘career’ in Poland, particularly at the 
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beginning of the 1990s. In a self-presentation statement revealing the generational 
situation of the Polish youth post-1989 he states: 
 
It was the beginning of all changes in Poland. People ended up in 
various jobs, often completely by accident. To an extent, it was pure 
luck that determined where people worked as all you had to do is to 
have a common sense approach and ability to speak a foreign 
language and you could do whatever you wanted (Wojciech, personal 
interview, 2010).  
 
He further goes on to report a lack of academic courses in marketing in Poland at the 
beginning of 1990s:  
 
 When I started my studies, marketing and other related academic 
courses did not exist (Wojciech, personal interview, 2010).  
 
Although a few actors stated that marketing (but nation branding) had been part of the 
curricula of their academic courses at home or overseas universities. Indeed, his case 
was not isolated: it was clear those actors who pursued careers in marketing industry, 
despite having different educational backgrounds, spoke of nation branding with a 
great enthusiasm. Among the field actors, travelling in the institutional field, there 
were two people with formal, academic or professional qualifications in the area of 
marketing. It was clear that nation branding had not been studied as a separate 
academic discipline in Poland (or anywhere else in the world) and as far as this sub-
field of marketing is concerned, Poland was considered as ‘a desert’ in terms of 
qualifications and even academic publishing.36 Some of the field actors shared their 
professional experiences within the field of education in Poland: they extend their 
                                                          
36
  During the pilot study, I was drawn by one of the nation branding advocates to a book manuscript 
that has been considered as one of the very few publications exploring the relationship between 
marketing in cities and regions (Szromnik 2010). Later, during my fieldwork, another book 
publication that I was drawn to is by Proszkowska-Sala and Florek (2010).  
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professional identities by academic teaching, e.g. tourism management, public 
relations, or organise seminars on nation branding at Polish universities. Few of the 
field actors have been educated to PhD level. All of them had a higher education 
degree, typically at MA level.  
 
 Yet another aspect of the professional socialisation of nation branding in Poland 
was a professional development of nation branders. While one of the transnational 
consultants reported that he conceived an idea of nation branding (p. 183), local 
marketing, advertising, and public relations consultants reported that they have been 
following the sub-field of marketing by reading professional publications, professional 
press, professional workshops, and the news stories reporting on nation branding. One 
of the key figures in the local advertising industry stated: 
 
The first Michael’s visit to Poland was the beginning of a vast debate 
on the subject of nation branding. Back then, the first logo was 
created and, I think, it was a turning point, a milestone so to speak, in 
building branding for Poland. It was the beginning of a debate when 
his ‘Creative Tension’ idea was produced. We tried to understand 
what he meant by it and how to implement this idea; this resulted in a 
debate (Leon, personal interview, 2010).  
 
Apart from following ideas of key industries’ professionals, professional socialisation 
also took place by exchange of ideas within the industry networks (e.g. professional 
events) and collaboration of mutual projects with nation branding ‘gurus’. Notably, 
one of the nation branders offered a critical commentary of his industry colleagues as 
“not reading, not developing as professionals, but constantly replicating industry 
slogans and ideas” (Arkadiusz, personal interview, 2009). His critical reflection on 
professional development among nation branders was unique and, in that regard, stood 
out from other interview accounts.  
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Overall, the professional habitus of nation branders in Poland remains in line 
with that previously defined by Aronczyk (2009b), but it can be extended to public 
relations practitioners who adopted nation branding as part of their professional 
portfolio of business and expertise. Although my findings do not entirely correspond 
with her definition, the professional class doing nation branding in Poland express an 
interest in consultancy and promotional policy developed by the state actors. The 
difference between Aronczyk’s (ibid, p. 295) definition and my findings lies in level 
areas of operations: nation branders travelling within the Polish state structures are 
engaged in consultancy for commercial, not only government clients. Another 
discrepancy between my findings and Aronczyk’s definition is a clear distinction 
between transnational and local class of nation branders explicit in my study. While 
UK nation branding consultants travel across many national locations (including 
Poland), the local class of marketing, advertising, and public relations consultants 
pursuing nation branding have not been, at the time of my fieldwork, engaged in 
consultancy for any overseas governments. In that respect, my findings suggest that 
the UK consultants belong to a corporate fraction of ‘transnational capitalist class’ 
(Sklair 2001) whereas Polish consultants’ agency was restricted to national settings; at 
the time of my investigation they targeted exclusively the Polish state clients.   
 
Overall, the above findings regarding characteristics of dominant agents in the 
field can be graphically represented using Eyal et al.’s (2000, p. 45) institutional 
trajectory correction model of social change (Figure 3). This model demonstrates that 
types of habitus do not only account for rational choices made by actors but articulates 
how their dispositions influence institutional trajectory of action that is not exclusively 
driven by economic criteria and choices. The idea of habitus connects the structure to 
individual motives, world-views, and performativity in fairly autonomous, context-
dependent but also, I argue, to persuasive relationships. In the context of nation 
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branding dissemination in Poland, those relationships form a new type of bricolage 
bridging the state structure and self-interested pursuits of nation branders within it.  
 
Eyal and colleagues (2000) explain their model of institutional change using two 
key axiomatic assumptions. First, they highlight that social change is an outcome of 
agency which does not only occur as a result of reproduction of social structures as a 
path-dependence model would have it. For them, social actors change and build 
institutions in an attempt to stay on their social trajectory in order to preserve as much 
of their identity as possible. This way, Eyal et al. (ibid.) reject a thesis that if the 
‘right’ institution is created, the ‘appropriate’ behaviour will inevitably follow. On the 
contrary, they emphasised that “institutions and incumbents of institutional positions 
shape each other in unpredictable way” (ibid. 2000, p. 44). Second, the trajectory 
correction model of social change highlights that the institutional imposition of neo-
classical economics might not instantly lead to the development of a class of capitalist-
minded citizens. This is explained by diversity of habitus in the structure as agents 
might subvert, constrain and obstruct radical social changes.  
 
In the context of this study, the neo-classical ideology of neo-liberalism in 
Poland has led to the formation of new structures, such as new institutions in the field 
of national images management. It also enabled new entry of new actors to pursue 
institutional strategies crossing over ‘path dependence’ between traditional economic 
pursuits and new, culturally-grounded ideas and practices that that have sedimented 
among them and been brought into new institutional settings. In that, nation branders 
represent a class of professionals that build and/or change institutions and social 
relations and by following their habitus they aspire to “preserve as much identity as 
possible – in a rapidly changing social space” (ibid. p. 42). Thus, an institutional field 
is not being only reproduced, but also shaped in mutually reinforcing relationships. 
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FIGURE 3 THE TRAJECTORY CORRECTION MODEL OF SOCIAL CHANGE. SOURCE: EYAL, 
SZELÉNYI, TOWNSLEY (2000, P. 45) ‘MAKING CAPITALISM WITHOUT CAPITALISTS: THE 
NEW RULING ELITES IN EASTERN EUROPE’.  
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Having established individual, institutional, and professional habitus within the 
field, this thesis moves onto outlining legitimacy of nation branding and emic 
explanations of its practice. While the habitus section outlines key characteristics of 
the dispositions acquired in the past, the next section reveals how those sediments 
translate into the enactment of nation branding in Poland. By drawing primarily from 
policy documents and the interview archive, it shows how nation branding was 
understood by the participants of my study engaged in nation branding.  
LEGITIMIZATIONS OF NATION BRANDING  
 
This section reveals how nation branding in Poland has been legitimised by the 
field players. Bourdieu and Passeron (1977, p. 5) claim that “representations of 
legitimacy” contribute to the exercise and perpetuation of power. According to 
Bourdieu (1991), power is partly enacted by legitimation: it is the cement of class 
relations (including the professional class) and all forms of power require legitimating. 
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The ideology of nation branding as a system of symbolic violence has the capacity to 
impose meanings, which, in turn, have the ability to articulate different position-
taking. For Bourdieu (1987, p. 13) every symbolic imposition involves aptitude to 
“legitimate a vision of the social world and of its divisions”. Following Bourdieu’s 
(1989, p. 377) claim suggesting that “legitimization of power leads to justification of 
the arbitrary character of ideologies”, it reveals why Poland and Poles need nation 
branding. This section also reveals the ideological misrecognitions accompanying 
nation branders. By doing so, this section informs the research objective number three.  
 
Within this study, the problem of nation branding’s ideological legitimisation 
has been addressed by interview questions. This research objective was transferred 
into interview questions enabling me to highlight various positions by participants of 
my study. At first, I was trying to capture the worldviews of my informants with 
regards to their understanding of the emergence of nation branding in Poland. The 
macro-micro divide is an inherent feature of all social realities. Although participants 
brought to attention macro factors while legitimizing nation branding, this section is 
not an attempt to bridge the macro-micro divide, but to understand why, in their views 
nation branding should be turned into a component of policy. My efforts concentrated 
on revealing their understanding of why, given that there are the state actors equipped 
with resources to symbolically represent collective identities, Poland, in its post-Soviet 
socio-historical context requires a brand building programme.  
 
On a surface level, the need for nation branding practice in Poland has been 
legitimised in accordance with the supply-demand logic. It was stated by one of the 
nation branders: 
 
Poland does not have a distinct brand, therefore it needs one (Leon, 
personal interview, 2009).  
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This professional account creates, in its own right, the requirement for nation 
branding practice. The alternative statements among nation branders suggest that 
although Poland has a brand, it requires more professional management (Krzysztof, 
personal interview, 2009). Regardless of the differences in fundamental rationalisation 
of nation branding, there are more compound discursive meanings emerging about this 
area of practice. In their approach to interpretative practice analysis, Holstein and 
Gubrium (2008) argue that ‘why’ questions can reveal directions of performative 
practices. Those types of questions enabled me to understand the invasion of nation 
branding within the state structures and their emergence within localised settings. The 
complex legitimisations ‘why does Poland need nation branding’ are explicitly 
articulated by the actors travelling in the field. They unfold in the following order: 
competitiveness, marketization, modernisation, mediation, and professionalization. 
TRANSNATIONAL COMPETETIVNESS OF POLAND  
 
The reoccurring narrative legitimising nation branding practice in Poland is a 
growing need for transnational competitiveness. There are a few themes that surface 
from the data archive which justify this aspect of nation branding. Interestingly, nation 
branding, similar to the writings of nation brand conceptualists (e.g. Anholt 2005) has 
been justified by actors with advancing the competitive position of Poland as well as 
requirement for building a sense of national identity that fits the changing global 
position of the Polish state. This argument has been presented as a metaphor whereby 
a comparison of competitiveness among firms to competition between the states is an 
inherent feature of globalisation. For nation branders, EU membership has further 
interdependence of transnational relations and therefore increased requirement for 
nation branding. This remains in line with Stopford et al.’s (1991, p. 1) argument that 
contemporary states are competing more for “the means to create wealth within their 
territory than for power over more territory”.  
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The governmental technocrats who have been sympathetic to nation branding 
reveal that national competition takes place over “capital, knowledge, resources and 
technology” (Jarosław, personal interview, 2010). However, this generalising 
statement demonstrates ideological misrecognition as the relationship between the 
symbolism of nation branding and competition over material resources is more 
complex than the one presented by nation branders or its sympathisers. It is economic 
capital that is at the centre of producing exchange value, whereby symbolic capital is a 
derivative of this process. Implicitly, competitiveness as a feature of neo-liberalism 
(King and Sznajder 2006) had been appealing to the Polish technocracy in the past. 
Nowadays, it also forms a defence for market-orientated ideology of nation branding. 
The legitimacy of nation branding unfolded throughout the interviews reveals 
metaphorical comparisons of competitive relations whereby marketing in general and 
nation branding in particular are considered as “warfare of the twentieth first century” 
(Igor, personal interview, 2009). While those legitimisations are largely metaphorical, 
the exchange of relationship between symbolic and economic capital remains an 
unspoken part of the legitimising statements on nation branding.   
 
First, themes reported by the architects of nation brand building programme 
justify their practice with a notion of reinforcing Polish competitive identity and its 
relationship with a ‘country-of-origin effect’. For them, nation branding has the 
potential to position national brands within better segments of international markets 
(Maciej, personal interview, 2009). This, in return, according to this rationalisation, 
increases the probability of capitalising economically Polish enterprises and 
strengthening the economic position of Poland as a player within the global markets. 
This justification is also common amongst the field of power: Polish public 
administration institutions responsible for influencing world public opinion; 
technocrats working in those institutions competitiveness of Polish commodities; 
Polish tourist products and cultural products. They are all important aspects of national 
image making, but they are not always sympathetic to consultancy and terminology of 
nation branders.  
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The second competitiveness related theme rationalises nation branding by 
articulating the ‘otherness’ utterance. There were examples of alleged nation branding 
exercises which have increased the necessity for nation branding practice in Poland. 
Among them a special role has been played by Spain and Ireland as examples to 
consider in debates on nation branding. In the view of nation branders, the success 
stories of nation brand make-over were worth paying attention to (Krzysztof, personal 
interview, 2009). This, by implication, significant aspect of competitiveness, is crucial 
from the national identity construction of the notion of ‘otherness’ (Wodak et al. 
1999). Given the pro-market orientation of nation branding, ‘the otherness’ is utilised 
simultaneously in national and market terms. Therefore, a common validation for 
nation branding practice is either the fact that ‘the others are engaged in nation 
branding, therefore we ought to’; or ‘we have to do it; otherwise we will be left 
behind’. The following statement demonstrates that: 
 
Interviewer: Why, in your opinion, does contemporary Poland need a 
brand?  
Interviewee:  Most contemporary countries in Europe and around the 
world think of themselves as brands and attempt to 
strengthen their brand images. There are measurable 
profits that can go along with it (Leon, personal 
interview, 2009).  
 
The third theme within this competitiveness line of argumentation is the notion of 
contemporariness which also plays its role in national competitiveness. A pragmatic 
legitimising position that has been brought to the attention by nation branders is that 
nation branding has become a mark of our times: Poland and Poles need nation 
branding “because this is the world we are living” (Natalia, personal interview, 2009). 
This theme integrates well with the notion of modernisation. The sense of ‘space and 
time’ has merged together in order to legitimise nation branding practice.  
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 MARKETIZATION 
 
Although branding practice (O’Reilly 2006) had been defined as a capitalist 
meaning making process, nation branding, by means of specific discursive statements, 
has been legitimised in market terms. Among the legitimising discursive tokens used 
by nation branders, were those capturing socio-historical settings for this ideology and 
practice in Poland: ‘between past and present’; ‘Polish success story’, and the most 
prominent, ‘competitive identity’ of the contemporary national market.37 The latter, 
was spoken by nation branders as neglected by the Polish neo-liberal faction of the 
political class. The policy-making was characterised by them as lacking a dominant 
entrepreneurial orientation in terms of facilitating national enterprises by the Polish 
state. This policy issue, combined with ambiguous attitudes within the political field to 
promote national industries, and subsequently corporate brands, or product brands, has 
encouraged the Polish Chamber of Commerce to manifest the competitive identity of 
Poland via ‘Nation brand building programme’. To the management of the Chamber, 
since 1989 Polish enterprises did not construct a strong enough recognisable corporate 
brand or product brand that would enjoy reputable status on transnational markets and 
could have been used as a national flagships by the actors in the field of national 
images management in their communicative practices. This is how nation branding has 
been defensible in the context of the first wave of neo-liberalisation of the Polish state:  
 
The neo-liberals rejected discussion on the questions of identity. If 
anyone discussed questions of identity, it was the identity derived from 
nineteenth century Romantic tradition of uprisings [...]. Overall, the 
Polish history has had a tendency towards Romantism at the expense 
of Positivism (Maciej, personal interview, 2009). 
 
                                                          
37
  The ideological notion of a Polish national market has been articulated in a book produced by the 
Institute of Polish Brand and entitled ‘Market identity: attributes of the competitive state’. This book 
contains chapters written by prominent Western nation branders and managers from the Ministry of 
Economics and the Polish Chamber of Commerce.  
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This state of affairs, according to nation branders, has been harmful for the 
Polish economy. With regards to the notion of Polish national identity, the national 
market was a dominant notion among nation branders. Therefore, nation branding 
driven manifestations of collective identity yet again necessitate the need for modern, 
dynamic, and contemporary vision that would fit with the logic of competitiveness. 
The relationship between identity of the national market (assuming that there is only 
one Polish market) and Polish national identity (assuming that there is only one Polish 
national identity) is not always clear in the legitimising discursive order. Nation 
branding, however, aspires to perform this imagined frame of reference by bridging 
the gap between Polish markets, and social attitudes of Poles and foreigners towards 
Poland. The marketization theme has also been revealed by governmental actors in the 
following utterances: ‘tourism market’ (Leon, personal interview, 2009); ‘tourism 
products’ (Daniel, personal interview, 2009); ‘cultural products’; ‘heritage as a 
product’ (Jarosław, personal interview, 2009) that were reoccurring in discourse on 
nation branding. Those reinforce the view that Poland should be thought of primarily 
in market and commodities terms as well as being marketed to other nations. 
Interestingly, this changing dynamic of the relationship between Poland as a market 
and Poles as citizens is also justified with the need to shape existing and new 
generations of ‘brand ambassadors’. This forward-looking view of nation branders is 
justified with a long term commitment to nation branding as a way of changing the 
self-images as well as images of Poles amongst the community of nations.   
MODERNISATION AND DEVELOPMENT 
 
Modernisation is the next legitimising theme which features in discourse on 
nation branding practice. Yet again, participants reveal conditions that enabled its 
emergence in public affairs and references were made to macro factors shaping the 
necessity for nation branding as a ‘modernising process’. For them, post 1989 changes 
to the political economy of Poland and changes to the international position of the 
Polish state signify justifications for nation branding make-over. The interview 
 192 
 
accounts reveal that democratisation of Poland is a feature of the political field 
enabling the emergence of the nation branding idea. It is emphasised in the following 
way: 
 
“Post 1989 everyone was focused on building democratic structures. 
It was important back then. Now, that we have moved onto a different 
level we can think about the national brand” (Edyta, personal 
interview, 2009).  
 
While a link between democracy and nation branding emerges as a legitimising 
notion, a silent aspect of the discourse on nation branding practice is the relationship 
between democracy and the market forces influencing the Polish state. A discursive 
feature which was foregrounded within the ‘modernisation’ theme is the assumption 
that modernisation is seen in progressive terms and in this context nation branding is 
legitimised as having the ability to describe what Polishness is ‘truly all about’. For 
nation branders, their practice involves manifestation of ‘modernising ambitions’ 
whereby changes in Poland can be manifested in conspicuous ways. Moreover, the 
notion of truth is linked with the notion of normalisation understood as, on one hand, 
enjoying democracy, and on the other hand, as having a free market economy and 
broader participation within communities of nations. The following statement by one 
of the bureaucrats is revealing:  
 
For the first twenty years [after 1989] we did not engage with nation 
branding as there were other priorities – national security, border 
issues, bilateral agreements with neighbours, NATO accession, the 
European Union membership. Nowadays, in my opinion, on the one 
hand, we need to politically catch up with the European states in 
order to demonstrate that we are a normal European country and, on 
the other hand, catch up with them economically (Edyta, personal 
interview, 2009).  
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The private sector nation branders take a different position and largely explain the 
requirement for nation branding as a result of negligence of this idea by the Polish 
state. They also, however, make an association between nation branding and 
modernisation in the context of discussing challenges to this area in Poland:   
 
...not just to convince [cultural and political elites] that nation 
branding is a recipe for economic success and that thanks to it 
everything can be easier, but it would be interesting to  talk about how 
to make ordinary Poles’ lives better (Arkadiusz, personal interview, 
2009).  
 
Although modernization features widely within discourse on nation branding 
practice, its ‘politicised’ aspect is a setting for the nation branding. There are two 
dominant aspects of nation branding as a modernisation project that, in the view of my 
participants were strongly emphasised: economic and socio-cultural. With regards to 
economic modernisation, it was argued, that nation branding should bring relevant 
economic effects by attracting tourism, investment and export support for Polish 
commodities and services (Krzysztof, personal interview, 2008). This legitimisation of 
nation branding practice, however, does not emphasised explicitly who is the 
beneficiary and how specifically nation branding facilitates the economic exchange.  
 
Socio-cultural legitimizations of nation branding merge with the notion of 
national identity. While nation branding was justified by facilitating transnational 
economic exchange, its practice simultaneously aims to address the alleged inferiority 
complexes of Poles. Moreover, it was revealed that nation branding is understood as 
having the ability to update specific aspects of traditionalism existing within the Polish 
national community: e.g. Polish commodities, Polish cultural heritage, Polish tourism 
destinations, Polish historical events, political movements and Polish political figures. 
Those features of national culture carry a modernising value to nation branders. In 
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fact, the socio-psychological aspects of nation branding have been legitimised as a 
form of national spiritual healing - a cure against the trauma of the Polish past (Adam, 
personal interview, 2008). In that respect, nation branding was presented as a forward 
looking practice seen in terms of moving from traditionalism to modernism.  
MEDIATION 
 
While, within a modernisation theme, nation branders emphasised a crucial role 
of nation branding in terms of representing the contemporary notion of Polish national 
identity, mediatisation of their representations was equally important to understanding 
the significance of nation branding practice. The mass media play a dual role in this 
process: it was seen as a mirror for understanding Polish national identities abroad and 
a means to challenging pre-existing identities of Poles overseas (Rusciano 2004). The 
mass media was spoken of as a solution to the negative representations of Polishness 
and as a problem. Alongside cultural, economic or sport events that had the marketable 
potential to be mediated and to represent Poland and Poles in a ‘positive way’. Those, 
‘pseudo-events’ (Boorstin 1985) were praised by nation branders for their outreach 
and marketable storytelling opportunities. Additionally, those events were considered 
as the potential contexts for launching a nation branding programme.  
 
Within this underlying legitimizing theme nation branders and the Polish state 
bureaucrats shared a view that Poland is quantitatively underrepresented, particularly 
in the Western media: its political, economic and cultural achievements were 
considered as undervalued by the media outlets. Among local nation branders, the 
Western media were mythologized as powerful transmitters of opinions. With regards 
to the mediation of national identities, the struggle for contemporary representation of 
national features has been described in practical terms. Against this argument, nation 
branders emphasised that even mediation by advertising can bridge a gap between 
underrepresentation of Polishness in the Western media and new identities:  
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It is better to do something than do nothing (Natalia, personal 
interview, 2009) 
 
A strong Westward orientation with regards to mediation of identities by means 
of publicity generation and advertising was also reported by the state actors. To stay 
connected with the voices of world public opinion, state actors monitor overseas media 
content. Within the legitimizing narratives certain media stories about Poland or Poles 
have been used in an anecdotal way to demonstrate the requirement to challenge the 
Western mass media representations by, supposedly, bringing Poles into disrepute: e.g. 
lost football games by the Polish national team or, purportedly, bad behaviour of Poles 
overseas (Arkadiusz, personal interview, 2009). Among the local nation branders, 
there was a tendency to highlight the negative media stories. This causality of 
explanations was common among local nation branders whereas a key consultant 
travelling across the Polish state structures takes a position that nation branding 
requires a clear branding idea that can be further mediated. He states:   
 
We should then talk to all...you have to get the media on our side. This 
is very important. You need to get the media on the side because the 
most important audience for Polish identity is the Polish people 
(Michael, personal interview, 2009).  
 
In professional accounts, the significance of the mass media to nation branding 
practice was considered as an oracle without a clear prophecy. What remained a silent 
aspect of nation branders’ discourse were characteristics of the Polish markets, 
political issues, social issues, or cultural production that are mediated by the field of 
journalism regardless of their vision. Although the mediation was stressed as 
fundamental to nation branding practice, the distinction between ‘manageable’ and 
‘non-manageable’ aspects of national identity representation were not spoken of by 
nation branders. For nation branding consultants, management of the national brand 
assumed the mediated control of messages manifesting their core idea. This modernist 
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mind-set of ‘command and control’ did not consider multiple interpretations of their 
messages. Furthermore, the requirement for careful media planning was emphasised as 
“no nation is able to afford exposure in all media” (Natalia, personal interview, 2009). 
Those generalising statements concerning media planning lead, as it turned out, to a 
struggle over channels and messages construction. Those are discussed later in this 
thesis (p. 217).  
 
Another argument that emerges within the mediation theme is acceptance of 
third party endorsements as reinforcers of positive features of Polishness flowing 
within transnational news media. For example, local nation branders consider opinion 
leaders and their mass mediated commentaries on Poland (e.g. Michel Platini) as 
endorsers of favourable opinions. This ‘third party tactic’ was considered as useful to 
national identities representation, but connections of those news media stories and 
consultancy projects were not made. In the light of this ambiguous explanation, a 
distinction between stereotypes and auto-stereotypes has been difficult to capture: it 
was not always clear whether local nation branders referred to their auto-stereotypes or 
foreign stereotypes of Poles. The anecdotal selection of news media stories as a 
discursive strategy legitimizing nation branding has one more feature, namely, some 
realms of representation of Poland and Polishness are more important than another:  
 
Interviewer: Let me ask differently. If, during his official state visit, 
Aleksander Kwaśniewski [former Polish president], 
appears drunk on the TV or openly acknowledges that he 
used to work illegally in the UK and this event or 
interview is mass mediated, is that nation branding?  
 
Interviewee: Everyone has weak days. Besides, during communist 
times a lot of Poles worked illegally overseas” (Natalia, 
personal interview, 2009).  
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An assumed disconnectedness of nation branding from political representations 
of Poland and Poles is reoccurring within nation branding discourse. The bureaucrats 
in the field took a position that their institutional communicative practices can be more 
effective in terms of challenging perceptions of Polishness. Among them there was a 
sense that their agency is less politics-driven, therefore has greater potential to shape 
images of Poland in comparison to the actions within the political field (Daniel, 
personal interview, 2009). The influence of the mediated qualities of the Polish 
politics, domestic and foreign, on the Polish national identity representation has been 
silent among nation branding consultants. Furthermore, neither nation branders nor 
state policy makers explicitly emphasised the mass media as an actor in the 
promotional policy planning or policy making. This feature has not been reported in 
the legitimising order of discourse.   
 
As far as the overseas mediation theme reveals, those who refer to Poland as a 
brand also emphasise journalistic professionalism as an issue regarding building of the 
brand Poland. In their view, cases of foreign journalists reporting within a specific 
‘thinking paradigm’ about Poland leads to the reproduction of negative opinions on 
Poland (Bronisław, personal interview, 2010). Yet again, to demonstrate their points, I 
was introduced to the news media stories perpetuating anti-Polish stereotypes. While 
research discussing stereotypes of Poles abroad (e.g. Kolarska-Babińska 2003) was 
brought up by nation branders, their interpretation of this study was vague. For 
example, the analysis that had been referred to by participants is that of the Institute of 
Public Affairs, a Warsaw-located public policy think-tank. Prior to Poland’s EU 
accession, it conducted a serious of studies. Among them were two noticeable streams 
of research: quantitative research on stereotypes of Poles among selected European 
national samples (e.g. Kolarska-Babińska 2003) and a stream of research aimed at the 
analysis of the mass media content (e.g. Babiński 2004). The interpretation of this 
research by one of the local nation branders was the following:  
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In the case of Poland, it is difficult to determine its brand, as Poland 
has one common feature among all countries in which the Institute of 
Public Affairs has conducted its research: it is lack of clear 
associations with Poland and, overall, limited knowledge about its 
people...  (Natalia, personal interview, 2009). 
 
And further; 
 
...therefore, every true information about Poland which is 
disseminated overseas contributes to the formation of positive images 
of Poland (Natalia, personal interview, 2009). 
 
This statement suggests that the Polish state and Polish nation, virtually, do not 
exist in the consciousness of the transnational community of nations. It enables 
legitimization of nation branding as a way forward to defining collective identities of 
Poles. A detailed discussion of the Institute of Polish Affairs’ research is beyond the 
scope of this section. However one aspect of this research is worth emphasizing. Its 
findings demonstrate that Polish identities feature in the foreign mass media and Poles 
enjoy some recognition among the transnational community of nations. The results of 
those studies reveal that images of Poland and Poles differ from one national sample to 
another. The media content analysis also reveals differing insights. The above 
statements by consultants reveal the role of research in legitimising nation branding. 
PROFESSIONALIZATION AND PROMOTIONAL POLICY MAKING 
 
Yet another legitimizing theme within the discourse on nation branding practice 
in Poland demonstrates the necessity to further professionalise the field and relevant 
policies and organisational strategies produced within it. This sense of advancing 
professionalism also included communicative practices exercised by the field actors 
whereas the emergence of nation branding was seen as a trigger of professionalization. 
Furthermore, the management of the nation brand building programme in accordance 
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with the vision put forward by nation branders had further potential to advance the 
field expertise. Within this theme, justifications for nation branding were argued as 
contributing to professionalization of public life in Poland, particularly manifested 
through the prism of public-private enterprise. A contractual advisor to the Polish 
Tourism Organisation, sympathetic to nation branding took the following position: 
  
Among those factors is the requirement of professionalization of 
public life, especially in the context of emerging entrepreneurship 
laws enabling a mix public and private funds in common projects 
(Igor, personal interview, 2009). 
 
The professionalization of policy making has been explicitly linked to nation 
branding practice. The initiators of the nation branding brand programme for Poland 
consider it in terms of ‘public education’ targeted at “young academics, the mass 
media as well as the Polish public administration” (Maciej, personal interview, 2009). 
To them, discussion of nation branding and public education is also a feature of on-
going professionalization in policy making. Indeed, the practical solutions that the 
discourse offers, e.g. ‘strategy’, ‘programming’; ‘projects’; ‘execution’; ‘effectiveness’ 
are appealing managerialist buzzwords normalised within the field and they are 
considered as having an impact on professionalization of promotional policy making. 
In that respect, the archetypical ‘Nation brand building programme’ was 
acknowledged by policy makers within the field in ‘professionalising’ terms:  
 
At the beginning of the decade, a grassroots initiative by the Polish 
Chamber of Commerce and Prof Olins from London - ‘Brand for 
Poland’ - has resulted in an in-depth reflection on images of Poland 
and promotion of our interests. This project resulted in the 
professionalization of debate on promotion of Poland. Only in recent 
years, an understanding for the systemic approach to promotion has 
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been created: strategic planning, coordination, and redefining the 
institutional reforms” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2009a, p.15).   
 
The professionalization of policy making and implementation as a feature of public 
affairs has not, however, been consistent with positions taken by nation branders. They 
took a view suggesting that there were shortcomings in their implementation by the 
Polish state actors: lack of clear policy vision (Tymoteusz, personal interview, 2010); 
decentralised approach to policy making (Maciej, personal interview, 2009); poor 
coordination of campaigns (Mirosław, personal interview, 2009); diffused resources 
(Franciszek, personal interview, 2009); and unclear campaign objectives (Arkadiusz, 
personal interviews, 2009). To them, there was room for improvement in the 
enactment of this policy and nation branding could facilitate this process. 
 
 Chapter Eight has presented findings informing the second research objective. 
By outlining characteristics of dominant - individual, institutional, and professional - 
types of habitus in the field, this chapter has revealed that within the field habitus is 
one of the mechanisms for institutionalization of nation branding in Poland. 
Throughout this part of the thesis, I have also presented this set of findings explaining 
how habitus translates into the legitimacy of nation branding and requirement for 
enactment of nation branding as a feature of public policy. While on the one hand, 
nation branders perceive their new practice as advancing and modernizing symbolic 
aspects of Polishness, Polish state bureaucrats contest features of nation branding as a 
consultancy practice enacted on the basis of ‘public-private’ partnership. Therein lies 
the tension between those who advocate nation branding as an institutional practice 
and those actors who are supposed to accept it. In the next chapter, I present symbolic 
relationships between agents and struggles in the field. This chapter accounts for those 
field events which have led to the emergence, reproduction and appropriation of nation 
branding as an ideological discourse in the Polish settings. 
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CHAPTER NINE: SUBJECTIVE RELATIONSIPS IN THE FIELD 
MAKING SENSE OF NATION BRANIDNG: DISCOURSE ON PRACTICE  
 
The departure point for this section is a statement that initial nation branding 
projects, including the paradigmatic ‘Nation brand building programme’ (2003-2007), 
have failed to be implemented as masterminded by their proponents. Above all, there 
was no agreement among the Polish field actors that nation branding can be spoken off 
as a sustainable practice within the field of national images management in Poland. It 
was clear, however, that most institutional ‘objects’ have been ‘subjected’ to nation 
branding discourse (Foucault 1988). Therefore, in this section, I start off by revealing 
nation branders’ discourse on their practice. While the field actors predominantly 
associate nation branding with the expertise of Simon Anholt, Wally Olins or Mark 
Leonard, or a nation brand building programme commissioned by the Polish Chamber 
of Commerce, its breakdown lead them to a reflection revealing that this area of 
practice in Poland has not gone beyond ‘endless meetings’; ‘conferences’; ‘policy 
consultations’; ‘policy statements’ by governmental field actors (Arkadiusz, personal 
interview, 2009). However, a coherent nation brand building programme has not been 
pursued by the Polish field of power or the actors empowered to manage national 
images abroad. The advertising campaigns commissioned by the governmental actors 
in the field have been characterised as ‘bearing hallmarks’ of nation branding practice, 
but lacking a common denominator in terms of representation of Polishness.  
 
Having revealed the legitimisation of nation branding in Poland, this study 
moves on to unfolding the field mechanism. First, this chapter presents how nation 
branding practice is understood by actors (Bourdieu 1990). Second, it reveals events 
leading to the institutionalisation of this nation-building exercise (Brubaker 1996). 
Following design of this study (p. 89), I present nation branding practice through the 
prism of its practitioners; their views, however, were cross-examined with reference to 
outputs of their practice. The link between agency and outputs of their actions allows 
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better insights into communicative practices. While nation branders reveal multiple 
positions on nation branding, they explicitly reported it as a communicative practice:   
 
Nation branding is about communicating positive aspects of 
Polishness (Natalia, personal interview, 2009).  
 
By means of comparisons, nation branders spoke of nation branding as a practice 
involving a commodifying process: 
 
Poland is a similar product to foodstuffs; it is a similar product to a 
politician. Its attributes need to be defined, highlighted and presented 
(Natalia, personal interview, 2009).  
 
A comparison between commodities branding and nation branding has been reiterated 
in a few other accounts by the local national branders. In that respect, to them nation 
branding was closer to commodities branding than to corporate branding. However, 
the crossovers between corporate branding and nation branding emphasised in nation 
branding writings (Olins 1999) have not been captured by the local nation branders. 
The practice of nation branding has been reported as requiring a central, inspiring idea:  
 
You have to have a coherent, consistent idea, which is of course 
fragmented in the sense that what you do is for you, but it relates to 
somebody else. The United States is a good example of that...   
(Michael, personal interview, 2010).  
 
Nation branding was understood in terms of meaning-making, e.g. 
  
It is about building a recognisable brand of a country and 
connotations referring to the experience of this country (Edyta, 
personal interview, 2009). 
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There were also accounts which link nation branding with statehood: 
 
You know what, for me, nation branding is a set of activities in 
various areas of the state agency, which will result in improving the 
position of the state on the international stage. And this should, 
naturally, bring some real benefits in the areas of tourism, foreign 
direct investment, or international engagement (Arkadiusz, personal 
interview, 2009).  
 
The term ‘nation branding’ has also been identified as confusing: 
 
I am not sure if the term nation branding is adequate: given that one 
state can be a home to a few nations, I guess, state branding might be 
more appropriate (Leon, personal interview, 2010).   
 
Direct questions, about the relationship between public diplomacy and nation 
branding, although asked retrospectively, resulted in the following statements:  
 
Searching for words is a completely different discipline... that is 
choosing the adequate words. I am also inclined to accept the poetics, 
such as public diplomacy rather than branding. It is mainly to do with 
the fact that...uhh, if we talk about it on the national level we talk 
about nation brand. Nation brand is a fact. It is also a fact that nation 
brand exists or that reputation is important. It is also a fact. Branding, 
understood as a method of developing the brand is not necessarily a 
fact (Krzysztof, personal interview, 2008).   
 
In that respect, nation branding is concerned with reputation. It was also explicitly 
reported in functionalist terms: 
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Nation branding is one of the methods of increasing the international 
competiveness of a country (Maciej, personal interview, 2009).  
 
The above characteristics of nation branding emerging from the field were at times 
confused by examples demonstrating the scope of the nation branding exercise. For 
example, the Museum of Warsaw Uprising38 was reported as an exercise in nation 
branding. It was reported by a local nation brander:  
 
...but we are talking about marketing. This museum was set up so to 
expose the next generations of Polish youth to its ideas and 
simultaneously it was created to keep the memories of the Warsaw 
Uprising alive. And, I think, this is a marketing construct (Tymoteusz, 
personal interview, 2010).   
 
While museums as social spaces are considered (Blum 2007) as having potential to 
reproduce national identity, the literature nor my fieldwork make explicit connections 
between those social spaces and nation branding. I argue that this discursive statement 
demonstrates a professional distortion among some nation branders whereby in 
hypothetic examples, they have inclination to extend the scope of their emerging 
practice into new settings. The previously disused (O’Reilly 2006) discursive 
‘acquisition by merger’ strategy creates mythologized marketing notions. Furthermore, 
this insight offers evidence of dialectical interplay between the past that emerged from 
the fieldwork archive as more solid discursive theme.  
TIME AND SPACE DIALECTICS: PAST VERSUS PRESENT  
 
With regards to promotional policy implementation, the Polish experiences of 
the last two decades, have lead the field actors to some reflexivity on promotional 
policy making. In fact, a special theme that has emerged both in promotional policy 
                                                          
38
  A decision to open the Warsaw Uprising Museum was made by the former President of Warsaw, 
Lech Kaczyński, on 2nd July 2003.  
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and professional accounts, supports self-reflexivity among the field actors, part of 
which is the context of nation branding ideology and practices as a special role was 
attributed to Poland’s past. The agents often represent their overall institutionalised 
practices in relation to the socialist experiment in Poland. During the fieldwork, I was 
drawn to a report edited by the director of the Institute of Adam Mickiewicz (2010) 
which offers a self-reflexive institutional account on promotion of Poland, ‘From 
cultural exchange to new intelligent power: culture and promotion of Poland’. While 
this report documents a link between Polish culture and a nation’s brand, more 
importantly it reports on political economy changes in the following statement:  
 
In the aftermath of 1989, promotion has come out of its political 
isolation and remained only dependant on infrastructure, staffing, 
application of modern tactics, and methods of their implementation. 
All those elements, never gained importance in the Polish Peoples 
Republic (PRL).  
 
This overarching theme - ‘past and present’ - also emerges from the interview 
data with the field actors. Although, in their professional accounts, nation branding is 
legitimised through different statements, ‘past and present’ theme plays an important 
role in their understanding of the nation branding practice. A theme that strongly 
emerges from the interviews data is a dialectical understanding of promotional 
practices by the field actors: the contemporary promotional practices remain in a 
dialectic relationship with the pre-1989 era. An overarching discourse of promotion, 
underpinned, by neo-capitalist principles suits the technocrats for whom democracy 
and marketization coexist in an inseparable order. This logic was summed up: 
 
Post-1989 everyone was focused on building democratic structures. It 
was important back then. Now, that we have moved onto a different 
level we can think about the nation brand (Edyta, personal interview, 
2009).  
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Their attitude towards communicative practices is also dialectical and reflects 
how the Polish past is enacted in the contemporary performative discourse on nation 
branding: while propaganda carries a Sovietised stigma whereas promotion, including 
a set of institutionalised Western communicative practices (e.g. public diplomacy) is 
understood as performed, allegedly, for the benefit of all Poles. This position is shared 
by nation branders themselves; one of them stated:  
 
We are not talking about the previous system. We are talking about 
this reality, a normal reality. Previously there was propaganda, in a 
‘top-down’ sense – it was a one party line, you know. Now it is 
democracy and we cannot agree on common goals [in nation 
branding] (Franciszek, personal interview, 2009).  
 
This ‘command and control’ approach in the Polish state’s propaganda before 
1989 has been replaced with a plurality of interests, and complex institutional settings. 
Furthermore, for the field actors, Polish national history is seen as an obstacle to 
modern nation-building: nation branding is seen a forward looking practice, a new 
vision of Polishness for the future whereas the tendency to ‘unhealthy’ martyrdom that 
is present in the Polish public discourse does not match well with their outward 
looking vision of Poland as a brand. The historical conditions in which Poles live 
nowadays were described as an effort in ‘catching up’. In fact, the nation branding 
exercise aimed at describing some of those efforts: 
 
In the last twenty years we had to catch up approximately one 
hundred years: in many areas: knowledge, marketing, advertising; 
same thing happens in case of technology etc. [...]. There are plenty of 
things happening in Poland, we live very fast, but at the same time 
Polish capitalism is at its infancy (Natalia, personal interview, 2009).  
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MECHANISMS AND AGENCY IN THE FIELD 
 
This section presents nation branding as an institutionalised “event and 
happening” (Brubaker 1996, p. 21). In part it reads as a historical narrative as nation 
branders and government actors reported on the development of different nation 
branding initiatives. This part discusses how nation branders have been forming a 
relationship with the governmental actors in the field. There are three key field 
mechanisms that enabled establishing those relationships: marketization of the 
governmental side of the field; the influence of nation branders on the promotional 
policy-making, and mediation of nation branding beyond the boundaries of the field.  
 
These processes coincided with the development of projects which were an 
ideological interpelling force for cultural intermediaries of nation branding. At this 
stage however introductory, culturally grounded comments ought to be made in order 
to better guide the reader throughout the field mechanisms. A departure point for 
consideration for the nation brand building programme was an assumption that Polish 
enterprises have not developed strong enough brands that are highly reputable abroad. 
The reported initiatives in nation branding, particularly the archetypical ‘Nation brand 
building programme’, reveal how enactment of nation branding  has been put in place 
as an attempt to bridge the gap between the Polish state and the notion of ‘country-of-
origin effect’ that is not widely signified by the Polish enterprises. The key discursive 
events reported in this section are summarised in the Figure 4.  
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FIGURE 4 OUTLINE OF KEY PROJECTS LEADING TO IMPOSITION AND INVASION OF NATION BRANDING
  1989   2003   2010 
Formal 
beginning of 
political 
economy 
changes in 
Poland 
1995 
Emergence of 
‘The programme 
for restoring the 
role of and 
importance of 
brand names and 
trademarks’; and 
establishing of the 
Institute of Polish 
Brand 
 
Emergence of 
Advertising for 
Poland Association; 
the initiation of first 
nation branding 
project 
 
  1997   1999 
Early modernism 
era: propaganda 
is a dominant 
institutional 
practice to 
manage images 
of Polishness Ministry of 
Economics launched 
its first promotional 
policy; ‘Nation brand 
building programme’ 
become a feature of 
public policy in 
Poland 
2008 
Orbita New Media 
produces ‘Let’s 
boost about Poland’ 
advertising 
campaign  
2009 
Aleksander 
Kwaśniewski 
took the 
patronage of 
brands 
restoration 
programme 
Polish Chamber of Commerce 
set up ‘The Academy of Brands’ 
scheme; it also organises a 
conference in the Sejm called 
‘National marketing a challenge 
for Poland’  
2000
0 
Polish Information 
and Foreign 
Investment Agency 
was established  
 
Chamber of 
Commerce 
commissioned 
‘An economy 
under its own 
flag’ campaign 
in ‘Times 
Magazine’  2007 
Saffron produced ‘A 
brand for Poland: 
further advancing 
Poland’s national 
identity’ 
2001 
Corporate 
Profiles produces 
‘Poland: Europe 
is bigger’ 
campaign for the 
Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 
Saffron Brand 
Consultancy was 
commissioned by 
Polish Chamber 
of Commerce 
2005 
New 
Communications 
consulted the 
Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 
‘Autumn of 
Change’ and ‘Eye 
on Poland’ 
campaigns was 
commission by 
the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs; 
New 
Communications 
consulted the 
Ministry 
2004 
Saffron produced 
‘A brand for 
Poland: advancing 
Poland’s national 
identity’ 
2006 
Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 
launched ‘The 
framework 
strategy for 
Poland’s 
promotion until 
the year 2015’ 
 
The Minister 
of Economics 
set up an 
action 
committee to 
work on 
programme 
nation 
branding – 
liquidated in 
2008  
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NATION BRANDING AS LEVÉE EN MASSE 
 
The culturally grounded habitus of the local nation branders played its role in 
their reports on the field. For example, ‘levée en masse’ has gone down in Polish 
history as a phrase characterising the early modernist military mobilisation of the 
nobles at times of war. Principally, they were ‘bottom-up’ movements of the Polish 
aristocracy who were mobilised by an external threat to the security of the Polish state 
or sought to expand its territory. Interestingly, those ‘bottom-up’ initiatives in nation 
branding were reported in metaphorical terms as unified by mobilisation of marketing 
and public relations industries in a struggle to support the Polish state at the time of 
increasing market competitiveness. Those similarities were reported by means of 
socio-historical comparisons between marketing and military warfare: 
 
“Marketing is warfare of our times. Similarly, the Polish Hussars who 
advanced at Kircholm or Vienna and did a good job for Poland as a 
brand” (Igor, personal interview, 2009).  
 
The individual industry initiatives were reported as their mobilisation and 
attempts to build relationships with the Polish state actors. As far as development of 
nation branding is concerned, for the governmental field of power in Poland, corporate 
and product brand icons played a role in national and global political economy in 
terms of conveying messages of Polishness and national reputation. While actors in 
the field of national images management and a broader field of power recognise in 
their policies that brand images of corporate enterprises in Poland and their specific 
brands can benefit the Polish state, thus far, in the view of nation branders, the Polish 
enterprises have not produced brands that are recognised abroad.  
 
Back in 1995, the Ministry of Industry and Trade, upon the initiative of the 
Polish Chamber of Commerce, introduced ‘The programme for restoring the role of 
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and importance of brand names and trademarks.’39 From 1999, the President of 
Poland, Aleksander Kwaśniewski, endorsed this programme and called for the 
construction of ‘modern patriotism’ based on symbols of economic success (The 
Institute of Polish Brand 1999). The business organisations, marketing, advertising 
and public relations industries responded to this call for action. In fact, the enactment 
of this programme has laid later foundations for a number of initiatives that lead to the 
development of ‘Nation brand building programme’, including ‘The Academy of 
Brands’ and an extended market research project, ‘The Economy under its flag’. For 
their initiators, those projects were understood as predecessors of nation branding in 
Poland. Their details are reported later in the findings section. In the meantime, 
discourse on nation branding attracted other actors and mobilised their entrepreneurial 
efforts to contribute to development of nation branding practice in Poland.  
 
The competitive mechanism in the relationship between agents is evident in the 
proliferation (‘The Session of the Century’; ‘The Apple’; ‘Nation brand building 
programme’; ‘Poland: Europe is bigger’) of ‘bottom-up’ attempts to reinvent Poland 
as a brand. The local marketing, advertising and public relations industries welcomed 
a nation branding discourse as it coincided with their professional habitus. Several of 
those projects failed and, as it turns out, explanation of those failures depend on who 
was revealing them - the governmental field of power or private sector initiators of 
those projects. This reflects subjectivity as a feature in Bourdieu’s relational view of 
social spaces and corresponds with his notion of position taking in the field (Bourdieu 
and Waquant 1992). Furthermore, the multiplicity of initiatives, labelled as nation 
branding, demonstrates the reproduction of this ideology, and bodily effects on 
                                                          
39
 This programme has been reported in a discourse on nation branding practice as a foundation for the 
development of the archetypical nation brand building programme. However I have not been granted 
access to the policy itself. A documented account of this programme is included in a booklet 
produced by the Polish Institute of Brand, ‘Brand for Brands – the Programme for Restoring the 
Role and Importance of Brand Names and Trademarks in Poland’. One of its chapters spells out the 
accomplishments regarding this programme, including popularisation and professionalization of 
branding among the Polish enterprises, the mass media, and academic fields.  
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professional class agency. Most importantly, it illustrates compliance with a Western 
promotional culture and resistance against some of its features by the Polish state.  
 
To date, the field actors revealed three significant initiatives in nation branding 
that have been performed at the crossovers of the state structures and professional 
class of nation branders. In August 1999, a number of Polish marketing industry 
leaders formed a coalition attempting to establish a non-for-profit organisation for 
marketing Poland as a tourist destination. A key role in this enterprise was played by 
the Eskadra Group and publishers of ‘Brief Magazine’, AdPress. The management 
idea underpinning the partnership was to unify their expertise in order to prevent 
competition over individual campaigns. Its leaders aimed to achieve this goal by 
tightening cooperation between organisations committed to this project. Furthermore, 
its leaders were hoping that cooperation of key players on the market would prevent 
fragmentation of campaigns in the area. In the first instance, the industry leaders 
targeted the newly established, semi-autonomous governmental agency, the Polish 
Tourism Organisation (1999). The alliance of marketing consultancies and media 
agencies representatives operating in the Polish markets was initiated with a 
brainstorming session entitled ‘The Session of the Century’. This industry partnership 
was formalised as The Advertising for Poland Association. The management of 
participating actors offered their expertise to set the foundations for the “systematic 
promotion of the tourism dimension of brand Poland” (Igor, personal interview, 2009).  
 
The creative idea conceived for the first TV advertising campaign aimed to 
challenge historically grounded stereotypes of Polishness, particularly in Germany, the 
biggest tourist market for Poland. While strategy planning and brainstorming of 
creative ideas for the campaign began soon after the Association was established, it 
soon came to a stop. In the meantime, the Association’s initiative generated some 
publicity that mediated the project outside the field. Although the project temporarily 
attracted the attention of management at the Polish Tourism Organization, it soon lost 
its momentum. The remaining artefacts, outputs of their production are the 
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Association’s (2000) manifesto entitled ‘The Session of the Century’, a draft of a 
strategic document ‘On Poland with passion’ (Advertising for Poland Association 
2001) as well as an advertising brief, storyboards, postcards design and a booklet 
accompanying their campaign ‘Poland: an adventure with a happy end’ (ibid. 2001).  
 
The management of the Association revealed that the initiative did not meet with 
the interest of the Polish Tourist Organisation as a result of politically motivated 
changes among the senior management of this institutional actor (Igor, personal 
interview, 2009; Piotr, personal interview, 2009). However, the management of the 
Polish Tourism Organisation reveals the limitations to the creative side of the 
campaign as a reason for not executing this particular project (Daniel, personal 
interview, 2009). Further attempts to revive the Association were unsuccessful and 
some of its leaders moved their attention to the Polish city councils in the search for 
other consultancy and, this time commercial, opportunities. Later, however, The Polish 
Tourism Organisation commissioned advertising campaigns. For example, in a later 
newcomer to the field, Orbita New Media produced a TV advertising campaign for the 
Polish Tourism Organisation entitled ‘Let’s boast about Poland’ (2008).  
 
The subjective relationships between the two agents, the Association and the 
Polish Tourism Organisation, demonstrate position taking. While on the one hand, this 
suggests that nation branders understand their practice through planning, strategising, 
and tactical application of advertising, it simultaneously demonstrates how the Polish 
state actors within the field convert its statist capital into the exercise of symbolic 
power in deciding on partnerships. For the Polish Tourism Organisation, the creative 
idea behind the first campaign ‘Poland: an adventure with happy end’ was not 
acceptable. As far as the silent of this discursive order are concerned, the nation 
branders did not reveal details of their meetings with the state officials. They also did 
not report how long they were planning to work on ‘a no fee basis’.    
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A cultural artefact - the Polish national logotype (Appendix 7, p. 363) and 
accompanying brand book called ’Signifying a general promotion’ - was important to 
the performative discourse on nation branding in Poland and was produced by an 
advertising agency DDB Corporate Profiles and their affiliates from Brand Nature 
Access as part of ‘Poland: Europe is Bigger’ campaign. The logotype and a brand 
book materialised in response to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ promotional policy 
(1997) preceding the aforementioned in this study of EU accession. This project was 
formalised in an agreement between the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and DDB 
Corporate Profiles in August 2001. The objective for this campaign was to produce a 
visual identity representation for ‘brand Poland’. At that time, the idea accompanying 
the state policy makers was that this symbol should be used by all governmental 
agents in the field. Its significance for performative discourse is twofold: it was the 
first act of compliance toward the branding informed makeover of national identity in 
Poland and it was later considered for incorporation into a broader ‘Nation brand 
programme’. While the post 1989 changes in Poland yielded development of new 
national symbols and a revamp of the national paraphernalia, those are considered by 
nation branders as too political therefore requiring new symbols and ideas to reflect 
changes in Poland as “representing a break from the past” (Aronczyk 2007, p. 105). 
The notion of post-politics reappears further in discourse on nation branding practice 
with reference to the leadership of nation brand management.  
 
A similar scenario happened in the case of the local public relations consultants’ 
initiative, ‘Public Relations 4 Poland’. In 2006, a number of public relations 
practitioners formed a coalition which aimed at counselling the Polish government on 
the strategic direction for mediated aspects of promotional policy. This time, the 
consultants targeted the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. After a few months, this 
initiative lost its impetus and initial negotiations held with the Head of the Promotion 
Department at the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not yield results. The 
management of the Ministry’s Department of Promotion (nowadays Public and 
Cultural Diplomacy) at that time was characterised as distrustful of external strategic 
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consultancies and finalised tactical tasks itself. This enterprise of public relations 
consultants generated publicity in the professional press and the Polish news media 
shaping symbolic capital of prestige (Teodor, personal interview, 2010). 
 
For local marketing, advertising and public relations professionals, engagement 
in nation branding carries the symbolic capital of prestige and social recognition (Igor, 
personal interview, 2009. These projects are considered as high profile. Professional 
accounts present the above initiatives as ‘consultancy free of charge’ implying that the 
struggle for economic capital is of secondary importance to the marketing and public 
relations actors in the field. This mechanism has been, to an extent, reinforced by 
Polish technocrats within the field. For example, DDB Corporate Profiles charged the 
Polish state a symbolic sum of 1PLN (app. 20 pence) for the outline of the ‘Poland: 
Europe is Bigger’ campaign. How long private sector professionals were prepared to 
work for free was not revealed in their accounts. Overall, the economic capital matters 
remain ambiguous in discourse on nation branding practice: although the private 
sector industry professionals report on their coalitions as ‘non-for-profit’ or refer to 
them as ‘social marketing’ initiatives, it is not always explicit what is the dynamic of 
the relationship between economic and symbolic capital. Those projects, however, 
generated publicity as well as industry awards both of which engender symbolic 
capital of reputation. For example, the campaign developed by DDB Corporate 
Profiles and its sister BNA Brand Consultants generated publicity and hit the headlines 
of some international media outlets, including ‘The Financial Times’ (Reed 2002). In 
2003, DDB Corporate Profiles was also nominated for this campaign to the ‘Effie 
Awards’, a prestigious advertising industry contest (DDB Corporate Profiles 2010).   
 
To nation branders the competitive field conditions have led to a reassessment in 
the approach to operate in the field by looking for further opportunities with regards to 
what Polish state field might find appealing. For example, a senior manager of New 
Communications, a Warsaw-based branding consultancy and a business partner of 
‘CNN’, ‘Financial Times’, ‘The Economist’, ‘G+J’ and local representative of 
 215 
 
‘Superbrands Ltd’ had been involved in the development of a proposal for a nation 
branding project. While the senior management of this actor reported that Polish 
capitalism has not produced transnationally recognisable corporate organisations or 
commodities representing iconic Polish brands, New Communications had conducted 
market research and developed a consultancy proposal which indicates that as far as 
national symbols are concerned, Polish foodstuffs and cuisine are strong features of 
Polishness and equally can be considered as a icons in the development of the nation 
branding project with overseas outputs (Natalia, personal interview, 2009). Moreover, 
in their view, the existing transnational symbols of Polishness, e.g. Solidarity 
movement, do not carry enough exchange value. 
 
Therefore, a proposed symbol of national representation, in their view, should be 
traditional Polish cuisine and an overarching symbol of Polishness proposed in this 
project was an ‘apple’. Consequently, this proposal was presented to the Ministry of 
Agriculture, but had not been accepted. As a result, New Communications continued 
to facilitate generation of publicity featuring Poland, advertorials and production of 
advertising campaigns representing Poland and Poles overseas in global media. This 
field actor pressed on to provide tactical consultancy services to the Polish state actors 
state and Polish cuisine became part of the narrative story in an advertising campaign 
featured on CNN (2009a). The significance attributed to this campaign was that the 
field of national images management actors – the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the 
Polish Tourism Organisation, and the Polish Information and Foreign Investment 
Agency – co-financed this project. By the governmental technocrats it was considered 
as an act of cooperation and they attempted to generate publicity at home (Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 2008). While the projects of local nation branders lead to attempts to 
influence organisational agendas in the field and assumed trans-institutional 
cooperation, their projects have never become a part of the promotional policy. There 
was, however, one exception that was reported by the field actors and it is a central 
project of this study.  
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During the course of the investigation, I have encountered evidence suggesting 
that more private actors attempted to target the field of power with their ideas labelled 
as ‘nation branding’. They typically relate to what is considered by nation branders as 
a ‘national product’ or a ‘flagship product’. Some proposals (e.g. ‘Poland at 2010 
EXPO World Exhibition in Shanghai: a draft version of programme’)40 (Corporate 
Profiles 2008) produced by nation branders have neither been incorporated into any 
policy nor been enacted in practice. In return, it lead the nation branders to change 
their actions and, in the light of lack of unifying policy guidelines for nation branding, 
they maintain relationships with the Polish state field actors by producing or managing 
tactical communicative outputs: in 2008 TV advertising campaigns (e.g. New 
Communications initiated and managed parts of ‘Autumn of change’; ‘Eye on Poland’ 
campaigns41); generation of publicity (e.g. special reports on Poland published in ‘The 
Financial Times’ (2008; 2009); production of logos (e.g. selection of the visual 
identity system for the Polish Institutes was coordinated by a director of ‘Brief for 
Poland’); production of professional publications (e.g. ‘Economy under its own flag’; 
‘Market identity’) (Institute of Polish Brand 2001) on the subject of nation branding 
and organise events (e.g. Young & Rubicam organised workshops on nation branding 
for the Polish Tourism Organisation; other events in their portfolio of nation branding 
include ‘Everything can be a brand’) or produce market research (e.g. Young & 
Rubicam’s ‘Brand Asset Evaluator’). Although consultants criticised the Polish state 
actors in the field for not taking nation branding seriously, their interest in the subject 
continues to exist and, in the meantime, they were happy to pursue tactical projects. 
  
                                                          
40
 This documents re-invents Poland as a ‘brand’ – one of its sections is entitled ‘Poland as a brand’. 
 
41
  Those advertising campaigns were commissioned by the governmental agents in the field as 
prompted by a manager at New Communications. The field itself takes credit for those campaigns 
and reports on it in press releases (Polish Tourism Organisation 2008). The economic capital for 
those projects came out of promotional budgets at the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Polish 
Tourism Organisation, and the Polish Information and Investment Agency. Polish national airlines 
‘LOT’ co-financed those campaigns.  
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NATION BRAND BUILDING PROGRAMME: ARCHETYPICAL PROJECT 
 
A large-scale nation branding initiative, ‘Brand for Brands’ programme, was 
initially produced in a draft policy proposal, ‘The Programme of National Marketing’ 
(Polish Chamber of Commerce 2000). This programme reveals how nation branding 
had invaded the field in Poland from 2000 onwards. A special role in the struggle to 
reinvent Polish national identity as a brand was enacted by the Polish Chamber of 
Commerce, its institutional ally, the Institute of Polish Brand and a British firm, 
Saffron Brand Consultants. These field actors were the spiritus movens behind the 
‘Nation Brand building programme’ for Poland. Their efforts to reinvent Polish 
national identity as a ‘brand’ were propagated as “the biggest nation branding project 
of all times” (Saffron Brand Consultants 2007). Indeed, this project has gained a high 
recognition among policy makers in the field and local nation branders. Again, a 
reported departure point for this initiative was an assumption that local enterprises 
have not produced transnationally recognisable brands. This project was an attempt to 
bridge a bap between commercial interests of the business world with the reputation of 
the Polish state that potentially affects product and corporate brands (Dinnie 2007).  
 
The entry of Saffron Brand Consultancy to Poland, followed by the formation of 
a coalition including Saffron and the Institute of Polish Brand, was made possible 
thanks to the Polish Chamber of Commerce and its senior management. In their 
professional accounts, the management of the Chamber of Commerce revealed that 
they approached their chairman as their attempts to pursue their ‘Brand for brands’ 
programme that had been taken up by the Ministry of Economics (Maciej, personal 
interview, 2009). In result, the senior management of the Chamber attempted to pursue 
nation branding autonomously, without an initial engagement of the Polish state 
actors. What is more, it was revealed that the personal network of actors in the field 
structure enabled the exchange of ideas and suggestions made with regards to whom 
should be in charge of nation branding. Those relationships were formed on the basis 
of personal recommendations. Having worked for the Polish state, the management of 
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DDB Corporate Profiles reveals in their professional accounts that, back in 2001, the 
Polish state would not support the Polish marketing industry’s development of a long 
term nation brand building programme, partly as a result of the low symbolic capital 
of expertise in nation branding held among the local consultants.  
 
Following on from that, DDB’s management persuaded the Polish Chamber of 
Commerce to seek knowledge in this area elsewhere, hoping, that it would, not only 
result in the development of a strategic vision for the nation branding programme, but 
in institutional centralisation: concentration of economic capital; centralised enactment 
of promotional policy; definition of national identity features leading to its consistent 
application across various media platforms, and creation of its visual representations. 
This coincided with the corporate interests of the Polish Chamber of Commerce as this 
field actor was interested in the economic policy, commercial branding and had 
already been involved in enactment of the state policy formation back in 1995. 
Moreover, the Chamber of Commerce accumulated some symbolic capital of prestige 
among policy makers by contributing to the enactment of events stemming from the 
promotional policies. Among them were: ‘Expo Exhibition’ in Hanover (2000); 
International Arts Festival ‘Europalia’ in Belgium, Luxemburg, Spain and Denmark 
(2001; 2002); ‘Polish Year’42 in Sweden (2003); ‘European Economic Summit’ in 
Warsaw (2004); ‘Expo Exhibition’ in Aichi (2005) and other national exhibitions 
(Polish Chamber of Commerce 2008). These enabled positioning the Chamber as an 
actor proactively seeking solutions for management of national reputations.  
 
This initiative best demonstrates how nation branders struggle to enact their 
ideas in practice. Importantly to this study, this programme has been extensively 
recognised by actors within the field by both public and private sector actors and the 
policy documents confirm those statements: 
                                                          
42
  The ‘Polish Year in...’ are the field managed cyclical cultural events and accompanying campaigns 
organised by the Polish state overseas. For example, 2009/2009 was a Polish Year in Israel; 
2009/2010 was a Polish Year in UK. For the private sector players, those events provide an 
opportunity to enact commercial opportunities for research and consultancy.  
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“At the beginning of the decade, a grassroots initiative by the Polish 
Chamber of Commerce and Prof Olins from London - ‘Brand for 
Poland’ - has resulted in an in-depth reflection on images of Poland 
and promotion of our interests” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2010, 
p.15).   
 
While none of the initiatives by local consultants have made an impact on the 
policy making, over the years, the Chamber used their capital resources to secure 
enactment of nation branding on a policy level. Initially, this programme began as a 
bottom-up process: nation branding ‘climbed up’ from the mezzo-societal level of 
Polish business into the macro-level, penetrating policy at the Ministry of Economics 
(2003); Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2009a), and organisational strategies at the 
governmental agencies (Polish Tourist Organisation 2007; Institute of Adam 
Mickiewicz 2010). This way, nation branding has been appropriated by the Polish 
state players and turned into a localised institutional aspect of their agency.  
 
Prior to the instigation of the ‘Nation brand building programme’, management 
of the Polish Chamber of Commerce established ‘The Academy of Brands’ - a scheme 
that aimed at professionalization of branding practice among Polish enterprises 
(Institute of Polish Brand 2010). This scheme was considered as a step towards 
strengthening promotional culture among Polish enterprises. As part of this scheme, 
the Chamber awarded, ‘flagship brands’ status to those enterprises that had a further 
potential to be marketed abroad. Those solutions, initially supported by the field of 
power, were to become a source of capital of prestige for the Polish enterprises and a 
revenue source for The Chamber as it was The Chamber that was responsible for 
auditing applicants for this scheme. The corporate enterprises participating in this 
scheme formed a structuring structure through which nation branding was mediated as 
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symbolic power. A call for action accompanying ‘The Academy of Brands’ was the 
slogan ‘Support what is strong!’ (Krzysztof, personal interview, 2009).  
 
The marketable potential of the scheme and its mediation was exemplified in 
discourse on nation branding practice by an advertising campaign (2001), ‘An 
economy under its own flag’, commissioned by The Chamber of Commerce. A print 
advert (Appendix 8, p. 365) produced for this campaign, featured in ‘Time Magazine’, 
applied endorsement to present the corporate logos of businesses certified by the 
Chamber. Interestingly, this campaign offers another insight. In his professional 
account, the Chair of Institute of Polish Brand reveals the logic behind featuring this 
campaign in ‘Time Magazine’ was that “they [Time Magazine] used to write positive 
things about Poland” (Krzysztof, personal interview, 2008). Therefore, it was not the 
outreach of the message, but the symbolic capital of reputation of the specific media 
outlet that was the dominant feature in representing Polish corporate enterprises in this 
campaign. Simultaneously, this insight shows how powerful the myth of Western 
media is among nation branders both in terms of interpreting and representation of 
Polish collective identities. 
 
The ‘Academy of Brands’ scheme was officially recognised by the Polish 
Ministry of Economics as part of its promotional policy. In an explicit reference to the 
‘Nation Brand Building Programme’, the Ministry of Economics (2003, p. 4) 
acknowledged the following progress on the programme:  
 
As part of the nation brand building programme, the following has 
been achieved: (a) a system of commercial brands certification had 
been developed and put in place; (b) the Academy of Brands had been 
established; (c) two global advertising campaigns had been launched; 
(d) Economy Under its Flag had been implemented; (e) research 
exploring the best Polish brands, in the period 1996-2002 had been 
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conducted; (f) as part of The Library of Brands Academy project, six 
professional books had been published.  
 
This record in the governmental policy represents actions taken by nation 
branders preceding the development of the programme. Those projects enabled the 
Polish Chamber of Commerce and The Institute of Polish Brand to increase symbolic 
capital of expertise in nation branding. At this stage, it has not been revealed what the 
relationship was between the Ministry of Economics, the Chamber of Commerce, and 
the Institute of Polish Brand. By what means this policy record was made, remains a 
silent feature of the discourse on nation branding by the Chamber’s management. 
Nevertheless, the search for branded symbols of venture capitalism in Poland 
continued; as was the search for new consultancy and projects. The Chamber tried to 
dominate the discourse on branding by extending its position within the promotional 
policy. While their previous branding-driven schemes set the grounds for the vision of 
Poland as ‘brand society’ (Kornberger 2010), the remaining issue was to persuade 
decision-makers that Poland requires a concerted nation branding programme.  
 
In fact, the attempts to set the policy agenda for the programme were enacted via 
conferencing and public meetings. For example, on 7 March 2000 a conference 
entitled ‘National marketing: a challenge for Poland’ was held in the Polish 
Parliament43 (the Sejm) and aimed at consolidation of efforts between the field of 
power and the Polish business in developing policy solutions and, most importantly, 
laid out their vision of the field. The Chamber of Commerce also embarked on 
informal negotiations with the field of power, but having been unsuccessful, decided 
to hire an external consultant with a higher symbolic capital of expertise than theirs or 
any local marketing expert, and to develop the programme without the field of power’s 
consent. The holder of such symbolic capital was a British branding consultant. 
                                                          
43
  I consciously use the word ‘conference’ not ‘a parliamentary debate’ as this event was not a 
scheduled parliamentary session; the term ‘conference was used by nation branders themselves 
(Krzysztof, personal interview, 2009). This way, the Sejm has become a space for pitching the 
marketing ideas to the Polish policy-makers.  
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Although nation branding ideology initially met with the compliance of the 
Chamber of Commerce senior management, its implementation over time encountered 
acts of resistance among the field of power. The head of the Institute of the Polish 
Brand became a prominent ‘compliant professional’ (Cialdini 1993) who embraced the 
discourse of Western consultants. His familiarity with the subject, influenced by the 
quasi-academic publications of nation brand consultants, and his co-operation with 
Saffron became a source for upholding the nation branding ideology. Initially, the 
Institute facilitated the dissemination of this ideology by translating and publishing 
key nation branding texts by British consultants into Polish. This commercial scheme 
was labelled as ‘The Library of Brand Academy’. His effort was particularly targeted 
at Polish youth and was billed as ‘an act of education’. The Institute also relied on the 
Nation Brand Index, a recognized selling tool for nation branding consultancy, in its 
efforts to contextualise a large-scale branding programme. This background exercise 
facilitated further perpetuation of nation branding ideology.  
 
In the efforts to position itself as an expert in the area, the Institute also paid 
attention to its corporate communications, predominantly manifested via online 
communications which reports on the work of the Institute and offered selling features 
for its commodities and services. The website (www.imp.org.pl) reveals that among 
the tactics enabling reproduction of nation branding ideology are media relations, 
enacted in the form of interviews or production of featured articles. Additionally, press 
releases (Appendix 6, p. 367) on the subject of nation branding were produced by the 
Chamber of Commerce. Their corporate website also reveals that the genres of nation 
branding discourse and cultural production of the Institute involves production of 
professional presentations (e.g. ‘National Marketing Programme’), drafts of policy 
documents (‘National Marketing Programme’), production of featured articles for the 
mass media, production of case studies (e.g. ‘Poland: a case study’); translations of 
Western consultancy reports (e.g. ‘Marka dla Polski – idea przewodnia’); production 
of commentaries on marketing indices (e.g. ‘Nation Brand Index’) by Western nation 
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branders - all making explicit references to nation branding. While a detailed content 
analysis of the Institute’s corporate communications is beyond the scope of the 
findings section, it is clear that both traditional and new media have been used by its 
protagonists to mediate and normalise nation branding in Poland.  
 
The above mediated outputs of nation branding practice partly overlap with 
genres of public relations discourse (Courtright and Smudde 2010) and demonstrate 
inter-textuality of nation branding and its mutual reliance on the Polish journalistic 
field in the dissemination of ideological messages. Those features of performative 
discourse of nation branding demonstrate the problems with the field analysis that 
Thomson (2008) points out in her discussion: ‘the problem of field borders’ and ‘the 
problem of the inter-field-connections’. There is a thin line between corporate 
communications and other fields of praxis that enable redistribution of discursive 
formations. The struggle to fully enact the nation brand programme continued closer 
to the field of power and they were accompanied by additional, non-mediatised 
practices on the side of nation branders. The events started to unravel.  
 
On June 14, 2003 the Sejm hosted a conference, which was an attempt to 
publically introduce the ‘Brand for Poland’ programme masterminded by the Polish 
Chamber of Commerce. The purpose of this conference was to move the nation 
branding agenda forward. This conference received the patronage of the Speaker 
(Marek Borowski) and other primary stakeholders (including the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, the Ministry of Economics, the Polish Information and Investment Agency, 
and the Polish Tourist Organization) and it was a stepping stone to receiving financial 
and political backing from the Government for the launch of a large-scale nation 
branding programme. Simultaneously, it was an attempt to gain the status of strategic 
importance as the programme was defined as a ‘matter of national importance’ (The 
Institute of Polish Brand 2002a). At this stage, in 2003, the programme has gained 
support of the Ministerial technocrats (undersecretaries of state in the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Economics), but not the Government itself. 
 224 
 
 
In December 2003, the Polish Chamber of Commerce commissioned Saffron 
Brand Consultants to work on the nation branding programme. Their plan assumed 
implementation of a long-term (app. 10-15 years time span) branding strategy under 
the patronage of the Polish President (Michael, personal interview, 2010). Due to its 
five years tenure, the Polish presidential seat was seen as stable and less-politicised 
and therefore more appropriate for endorsement of the ‘Brand for Poland’ programme. 
It was speculated that implementing a long-term nation branding strategy combined 
with the support of the President would yield better outputs in terms of enactment of 
this strategy. At the outset, to obtain support for the programme, the Chamber of 
Commerce relied on a network of personal contacts developed by its management 
among politicians aligned with the Social Democratic Party (SLD). In fact, their co-
operation with the Polish Presidential Palace began when President Aleksander 
Kwaśniewski declared his patronage of their ‘Brand for brands’ scheme to propagate 
the symbolic value of product and corporate brands for the Polish economy (p. 210). 
However, Polish presidents, neither Kwaśniewski (1995-2005) nor his successor, Lech 
Kaczyński (2005-2010), have ever fully endorsed the programme. While 
Kwasniewski’s position became a silent feature of the discourse, it was highlighted 
that Kaczyński was not interested in the programme as he “hated the business” 
(Krzysztof, personal interview, 2009).  
 
The search for political backing for the programme continued. The professional 
accounts of nation branders aligned with the Chamber reveal that other political 
figures, i.e. the Prime Minister, Marek Belka, aligned with the SLD, had been targeted 
as a possible endorser for the programme by the Cabinet. Yet again, the programme 
had not received strategic, governmental support in terms of political and financial 
support. The lack of the Government’s consent to support this programme, however, 
did not, at this stage, stop the Chamber and Saffron to continue developing the 
programme further. At this stage, between 2003 and 2004, their ‘intellectual labour’ 
concentrated on defining the features of Polishness. The outputs of their production 
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have emerged in two consultancy reports - ‘A brand for Poland: advancing Poland’s 
national identity’ and ‘A brand for Polska: further advancing Poland’s national 
identity’ (Saffron Brand Consultants 2004b; 2007). These texts constitute discursive 
order on collective identity features that have been institutionalised as part of the 
process of ‘imagining’ Polishness as a brand (Anderson 2006). Below I reveal those 
features and demonstrate how they have been incorporated into performative discourse 
on nation branding. Thus, the findings in this section inform objective 4 (p. 80).  
WHAT KIND OF POLISHNESS?  
 
Saffron Brand Consulting and its chairman coordinated work on the nation 
branding programme. Alongside the search for the political support for the Chamber 
of Commerce coalition, Saffron’s team conducted a corporate styled-audit exploring 
overseas perceptions of Poles and their own self-perceptions (2004). According to 
Saffron, this exploration captures the features of Polishness. Their examination has 
lead to the articulation of ‘brand attributes’. The research side of the audit was based 
on interviews with representatives of Polish business, bureaucrats, arts professionals, 
sportsman, academics, the media professionals, and young opinion leaders (Saffron 
2004, p. 194-198). Additionally, diary notes of a single Briton travelling to Poland 
informed this report (ibid. p. 108-177). Feedback from ‘opinion leaders’ was collected 
by means of focus group interviews (ibid. p. 203-203). The production of consultancy 
reports was preceded with a desk stage research and within them the authors drew 
from secondary sources. Moreover, the procedures for analysis of the empirical data 
remain unexplained.  
 
While this investigation generated some empirical data, the team of Saffron and 
the Chamber of Commerce also relied on secondary data collected by the Institute of 
Polish Affairs (Kolarska-Bobińska 2002) to decode overseas perceptions. Saffron’s 
work did not reveal the morphogenesis of Polish stereotypes or the roots of Polish 
auto-stereotypes. Rather, through unknown procedural analysis, the Saffron audit 
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ended up articulating, yet another, discursive order of signifiers ascribed to Poles as 
their collective characteristics.44 The output of this investigation emerged in two 
consultancy documents produced by Saffron. Both texts were reported by nation 
branders from the Chamber and Saffron as central to understanding ‘branded’ features 
of Polish national identity and a guideline to action their programme. These 
consultancy reports were also the means to articulate the nation branding field in 
Poland. By using proposed procedures outlined on p. 99-102, I analyse them below to 
inform the research objective number four.  
THE FIRST STAGE: CORE IDEA   
 
In autumn 2004, Saffron drew up a consultancy report entitled, ‘A Brand for 
Poland – Advancing Poland’s National Identity’. While this piece of consultancy 
articulates a discourse order on Polish national identity features, other themes 
emerging are: legitimizing claims and contextual settings. Those themes of the 
discourse are excluded from presentation in this section as, at this stage, my analysis 
aims at revealing statements defining branded features of Polishness. Arguably, this is 
an important aspect of nation branding practice as it leads to the articulation of 
 
“...a simple and powerful core idea that could permeate the millions of 
messages that Poland sends out through political action or inaction, 
through popular culture, through its products, services, sport, 
behaviour and architecture” (Saffron Brand Consultants 2004b, p. 
13).  
 
This statement implies that other fields (e.g. political field, cultural production, 
and manufacturing, etc.) in Poland were aimed to be subjected to nation branding and 
inspire Poles to follow the core idea. Thus, the core idea for nation branding required 
                                                          
44
 It should be noted that in my interviews with Polish nation branders the term “stereotype” was 
avoided and replaced with professional marketing jargon, such as “nation brand image” or “Polish 
brand perceptions”.  
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consent. This structural bias is encapsulated within the consultancy discourse whereby 
nation branders see themselves as leaders and co-creators of Polishness. Principally, 
the core idea emerging from this consultancy report is an attempt to organise a 
‘cacophony of messages’ produced by the field and an attempt to organise them in a 
‘synergetic way’. The report also follows the assumption that nation branding is both 
an ‘overseas’ and ‘domestic’ exercise. Within it, attempts were made to uncover 
perceptions and self-perceptions among a sample of participants. With regards to the 
research presentation the report reveals its limitations in the following statement: 
 
“The ideas and quotations that follow are not meant as exhaustive of 
what people told us. Rather, they provide a snapshot – we hope an 
accurate, representative one – of views widely held amongst each 
group” (ibid. p. 42).  
 
While I am less interested in the research process accompanying development of the 
‘core idea’ for a nation brand building programme, nation branders have divided their 
assessment of Polishness into two categories: ‘round one’ and ‘round two’. These 
signify the process of presentation of the core idea, themes contextualising it, and 
attributes of the branded vision of Polish national identity. I present them below.  
ROUND ONE:  CORE IDEA ‘CREATIVE TENSION’   
 
The core idea on Polishness emerged from the examination and interpretation of 
data embedded within the consultancy discursive order. It has lead Saffron to suggest 
that Poland is ‘normalising’ and its ‘external perceptions’ are ‘catching up’ with the 
‘domestic reality’. Moreover, stakeholders engaged in promotional policy making and 
their implementation can be subjected to the ideas and prescriptions of Polishness 
advanced by Saffron. These collective identity features then became a basis for 
generating what the marketing industry calls ‘a big idea’ - a solution to the imagined 
marketing issue - namely, the lack of recognition of Poland abroad. Moreover, that this 
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issue emerged largely due to poor coordination of promotional efforts by the Polish 
field of power and the governmental field of national images management in Poland.  
 
This ‘diagnosis’ of Polishness, or to put it in corporate terms, brand Poland, was 
developed in two rounds, each of which was tested by collecting feedback from 
representatives of the Polish field of power. In the first round of the diagnosis 
articulation, the Saffron team has developed four thematic metaphors enabling a 
contextualisation of their vision of Polish identity as a brand. Among those metaphors 
is a comparison of Poland (yet again, accentuating the Polish state identity) to Janus, a 
god derived from Roman mythology. This god is typically represented in storytelling 
and its iconography as a two-faced persona, facing the opposite directions and 
personalising the past and the future. It has been embedded within nation branding 
discourse to signify that: 
 
Poland faces the West and the East (specifically Russia) and is at ease 
with the cultures and societies of both. Poland knows eastern 
mentalities and cultures, scientific achievements, and above all, soul. 
As one of the few countries in the West to occupy this position, it 
seems that Poland’s natural role is to act as a bridge between these 
two worlds, and to capitalise on its understanding of the post- 
communist psyche and the Eastern European construct (ibid. p. 65). 
 
The second metaphor underpinning the core idea concerns Polish individualism. In 
Saffron’s (2004) view, this is allegedly a collective feature of Poles; it is a point of 
differentiation or the otherness that is worth articulating further. The individualism 
metaphor is yet again, arguably, visible in several fields of human agency in Poland. 
The generalisations regarding Polish individualism are yet again confused between the 
identities of the Polish state and the community of Poles as references are made to 
both. The ‘individualism’ theme, demonstrating confusion of the object of reading, 
unfolds in the following statement: 
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Poland is a boisterous, unique, individualistic country. Poles are 
neither bland nor boring. They make their presence felt. Poles always 
have a point of view. That’s why Poland is such a great country for 
the arts, culture, sports, the creative world, tourism, and above all for 
business. Poles are natural entrepreneurs. Overall, Poland is just 
different (ibid. p. 67). 
 
Moreover, the above narrative emphasises the essentialist aspect of ‘entrepreneurship’ 
as a foundation for the business friendly capitalist political economy in Poland. This 
aspect of the Polish national identity remains in dialectic opposition to the 
authoritarian views of Polishness insofar as it articulates the state managed system of 
production embraced by the Polish elites and communities of people in Poland prior to 
1989. This report takes entrepreneurship for granted as it is a feature that, given the 
legitimization of nation branding, has a market value.  
 
From this statement, the narrative moves on to reveal interpretation of the 
dynamics of recent changes in Poland. This is done by using a ‘work in progress’ 
metaphor, which unfolds in the following passage of the consultancy report:  
   
Poland is inextricably changing, in every area – in business, the arts, 
tourism, in health, education, infrastructure, Poland is evolving 
rapidly. What you saw five years ago, two years ago, last year, is 
different and better every day. It will be more different and even better 
in five years or ten years. Poland is, brilliantly, a work in progress. 
You think you know Poland – you don’t! (ibid. p. 68).  
 
Among the factors behind the changes which Saffron’s report discusses are those to do 
with changes to the political economy in Poland. The discourse on nation branding 
suggests that contemporary Poland is a place of ‘endless opportunities’. It is not clear, 
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however, what those prospects are and who has access to them. Saffron’s (2004) 
report further exposes that the changes to Poland are predominantly explained in terms 
marketable features of the Polish cultural or natural landscape. While ‘the work in 
progress’ metaphor captures the changes in the political and economic landscape and 
hopes to empower Poles to believe that they are in ‘charge of their national identity’, it 
also, according to its narrative, facilitates the credibility of Poland.  
 
The last metaphor which materializes as part of the ‘core idea’ construction of 
the brand Poland is that of ‘polarity’. It emerges in a narrative of the dialectical 
characteristics presented as binary features of Poland and juxtaposed as ‘West-East’ or 
Poles as ‘romantic-down to earth’ or ‘ambition-unassuming’. Its full version unfolds in 
the consultancy discursive order in the following way:   
 
Poland is a very individualistic country that draws its personality and 
strength from multiplicity of apparently opposing characteristics. 
Poland is part of the West, but it also understands the East. Polish 
people are irrepressibly romantic and also down to earth. The Polish 
character is ambitious and also unassuming (ibid, p. 70). 
 
In the second part of the same narrative, the legitimisation of these dialectical features 
emerge as a means to understanding the prime mover of actions among Poles in 
different fields and changes in Poland; this is expressed in the following way:  
 
 This polarity at the heart of Poland engenders a restlessness that’s 
never satisfied with the present and boisterousness that is always 
stimulating and often creative. It explains why Poland produces so 
many entrepreneurs, artists, and sportspeople, why Poles have always 
tried to achieve the seemingly impossible, and why Poland is 
constantly moving on (ibid, p. 70).  
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Although this section of my study is concerned with reporting on national identity 
features as understood, defined and articulated by nation branders, interestingly their 
reports reveals that they were explicitly sensitive about the notion of truth. In one of 
the sections of ‘A Brand for Poland – Advancing Poland’s National Identity’ report, 
the following utterance emerges:  
 
Polarity embraces a whole set of characteristics that are true – some 
of which were considered covered in the other ideas as well – and 
presents them as a single positive idea (ibid. p. 70).  
 
This utterance links with the Bourdieusian (1991) notion of performative discourse, as 
Saffron as a newcomer to the Polish field of national images management, manifests 
its commitment to the particular vision of mediated ‘truth’ on Polishness. For 
Bourdieu (1991) discursive truth is connected with the notion of credibility and, as 
demonstrated later, credibility has had an impact on the destiny of ‘The Nation Brand 
Building Programme’. What is more, Saffron’s version of truth on collective identity 
of Poles is explicitly subject to revision of the report findings as they performed 
several ‘feedback sessions’ with representatives of different social fields in Poland 
including the governmental field of power, marketing and advertising fields, business 
field, the field of NGO’s, the journalistic field, the religious field, the field of fashion, 
the field of law, and the field of arts (Saffron 2004 p. 203-203). Furthermore, as 
indicated in the above utterance, the reinterpretation of those metaphors leads Saffron 
to the re-articulation of features of Polishness ascribing to them ‘positive’ signifiers. 
 
ROUND TWO: REVISITING ‘CREATIVE TENSION’ 
 
In the first instance, the discursive renegotiation of the core idea resulted in the 
reduction of the amount of metaphors, allegedly, capturing the notion of Polishness: 
the ‘Janus’ metaphor was dropped all together and remained a silent feature of the 
nation branding discourse on Poland. However, two remaining signifiers – 
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‘individualism’ and ‘work in progresses’ – have been kept unchanged in the 
consultancy report whereas ‘polarity’ has been replaced with a ‘creative tension’ 
metaphor which later on became a popular name for ‘The Nation Brand Building 
Programme’ for Poland.  As far as revisiting of the ‘polarity’ metaphor is concerned, 
the ‘creative tension’ feature of Polishness is explained in similar terms as its 
discursive predecessor. In fact, it is argued by Saffron that thanks to the dialectical 
features of Polishness: 
  
...these tensions create restlessness unsatisfied with the status quo, 
and a boisterousness that’s always stimulating and often astonishing. 
Indeed, this ‘creative tension’ is why Poland produces so many 
entrepreneurs, artists and sportspeople. It’s why Poland is constantly 
changing and evolving, sometimes tumultuously. And it’s why Poles 
have always tried to achieve the seemingly impossible – and often 
succeeded (Saffron Brand Consultancy 2004 p. 78) 
 
The core idea for the Polish brand programme was also labelled as ‘Creative Tension’ 
and uses three metaphors, which form, I argue, deification of the neo-liberal capitalist 
principles. The explicitly articulated characteristics, arguably, capturing Polish 
national identity  were summarised within the consultancy discursive order as: a) 
‘individualism’ - signifying this feature of Polishness as an attractive feature for 
investors and tourists;  b) ‘work in progress’ - defining Poland as a growing, 
expanding state, which thanks to the dreams and aspirations of Poles can be leveraged 
into investor relations, and, on the other hand, the liveliness, fashionables and buzz has 
the potential to be memorable for its visitors; and finally, c) ‘creative tension’ - 
standing for the interpreted opposing national identity features whereby  
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Poland draws its personality, power and perpetual motion 
from a wealth of apparently opposing characteristics: Poland 
is part of the West and also understands the East; Polish 
people are passionate and idealistic and also practical and 
resourceful; the Polish character is ambitious and also down 
to earth (ibid. 76-78).  
 
In spite of its institutional setting, an explicit feature of the discourse is that these re-
interpretations and representations of Polishness reproduce the tenets of neo-liberal 
ideology, which had been outlined by social theorists within academic discourse. For 
example, Eagleton (2007) illustrates how ‘individualism’ is a descriptor of neo-
liberalizing societies. Eyal et al. (2000) demonstrate how non-capitalist classes in 
Central and Eastern Europe, Poland included, struggled to build a neo-liberal political 
economy the complexity of which exceeds ‘work in progress’ as a way of defining 
post-1989 socio-political changes in Poland. The ‘creative tension’ metaphor builds on 
a geo-political myth of Polish post-Soviet past: formerly Polish nationalism, fuelled by 
populist explanations of the nation’s history, had faced the need to construct a 
narrative of “Poland between the West and the East.”  The idea of between-ness was 
re-articulated in Poland’s integration in the EU, where the divide between ‘old’ and 
‘new’ Europe has been explicit in the Polish public affairs in various fields (Galbraith 
2009). This narrative echoes in the consultancy discourse, particularly this part of its 
order re-imagining nation branding driven features of collective identity.  
THE CORE IDEA: ARTICULATION OF ‘BRAND ATTRIBUTES’ 
 
Although the above findings reveal the features of Polish national identity that 
were to be become part of the brand Poland architecture, according to Burchell et al. 
(1991), reactivation is also an important part of the discourse (p. 101) . While the 
discourse on nation branding has been reactivated by many field actors, as far as the 
core idea ‘Creative Tension’ developed by Saffron is concerned, it has been subject to 
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discursive reactivation on numerous occasions. The broader field circumstances of its 
reactivation by different field agents are to be discussed later. However, at this stage, I 
consider reactivation of national identity features by Saffron in a second consultancy 
report entitled ‘A brand for Polska - further advancing Poland’s national identity’ and 
produced in July 2007. This text was also commissioned by senior management of The 
Polish Chamber of Commerce that was its immediate audience.  
 
Yet again, the report unfolds practices related to nation branding and revisits the 
core idea which had been constructed by Saffron and presented back in 2004. This 
discourse order on nation branding unfolding in the second consultancy report begins 
with pointing out carefully selected issues ‘political’, ‘social’, ‘economy’, and ‘EU’ 
issues and current affairs in Poland. Those ‘issues and events’ are represented without 
an explicit intellectual or analytical connection between them and categorised in the 
following themes: ‘Poland in Europe’; ‘Poland in Poland’; ‘the economy’; culture and 
sport’; ‘Poland in the world’; ‘young Poles abroad’; and ‘young Poles in Poland’. 
They are sanitised utterances unfolding into justified narratives which, according to 
Saffron, can be defined in terms of their brand idea. While, this consultancy report 
makes references to political, cultural and social aspects of nationhood, it fits into the 
classical, systemic, social theory categorisations (Weber 1948). Those, however, have 
been reduced into a single idea that, arguably, is a source of competitive advantage 
among a transnational community of nations (Rusciano 2004).  
 
The consultancy discourse has been extended by articulating a set of signifiers, 
which have been characterised as ‘brand attributes’. According to Saffron they ‘flesh 
out’ the idea of ‘Creative Tension’ and among their features are the following 
keywords signifying Polishness: ‘creativity’; ‘imagination’; flair’; ‘talent’; 
‘adaptability’; ‘charm’; ‘intellectualism’; ‘pragmatism’; ‘energy’; ‘vitality’; ‘passion’; 
‘belief’; resilience’; ‘individualism’; ‘ambition’; ‘boisterousness’; ‘moodiness’; 
‘abrasiveness’; ‘tension’ (Saffron Brand Consultancy 2007, p. 65-67). The above 
‘brand attributes’ were presented as having potential to be utilised in ‘vectors’ through 
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which the Polish state communicates overseas: tourism, investment, brand export, and 
public diplomacy. The report recommends context-dependent application of brand 
attributes in the indicated areas of the statehood. For example, in the case of public 
diplomacy, it suggests to ‘play up’ ‘creativity’; ‘adaptability’; ‘flair’; ‘pragmatism’; 
‘passion and belief’ whereas ‘boisterousness’; ‘moodiness’; ‘abrasiveness’, and 
‘individualism’ should be ‘played down’ (ibid. p. 75).  
 
In the light of the articulation of the above signifiers, the relationship between the 
‘brand attributes’ and the complexity of public diplomacy messages that Poland 
projects overseas as well as their relationship to the transnational and intercultural 
communications among different publics overseas remain a silent part of the 
consultancy discourse. The implicit assumption is that the Polish brand attributes can 
be used to represent Polishness overseas on a basis of a ‘globalised approach’ 
(Schultz, Antorini, and Csaba 2005). What also remains unclear, however, and yet 
again becomes an unspoken feature of the consultancy discourse on nation branding is 
the relationship between the Polish foreign policy and public diplomacy as a means to 
achieve its goals. This discursive omission, I argue, demonstrates a limited 
understanding of foreign policy making by Saffron Brand Consultants as well as 
superficial reading of the complexities of pluralist democracies.  
 
To sum up, this discursive order leading to the reinvention of collective identity 
as brand attributes was informed by collection of anecdotal data generated and 
interpreted by unclear analytical procedures and expressed by corporate-styled modes 
of the discourse resulting in the articulation of a set of generalisations on Polishness. 
According to Saffron, the re-imaging of national identity as a brand, further required 
development and management of a system of visual representation of their core idea. 
While, consultancy reports discourse order reveals that Saffron had considered 
adopting the existing national logo (Appendix 7, p. 370) designed by DDB Corporate 
Profiles in 2001 as part of their ‘Poland: EU is bigger’ campaign, it eventually stated 
that this symbol does not capture well ‘the Polish spirit’. This logo was considered as 
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not “destined to be a cultural icon” (Saffron Brand Consultants 2007, p. 88). In a self- 
serving statement, Saffron sketched out the requirement for the production of new 
symbolic representation. This symbolic system was explained in the following way:  
 
Although the role of design is very different than that in corporate 
branding, it is nonetheless essential. A system of brand expression for 
Poland needs to be thought through and developed (ibid. p. 83). 
 
Despite the claims regarding the role of design and symbolism in nation branding and 
corporate branding praxis, the difference between the two remains a silent aspect of 
this nation branding consultancy discourse order. Although, within the discourse  it is 
foregrounded that nation branding is different to corporate branding, neither the 
consultancy discourse derived from the professional reports nor the interview archive 
reveals differences between a ‘nation’ and ‘corporate’ branding praxis.   
TENSIONS WITHIN THE FIELD OF POWER  
 
The emergence of ‘The brand building programme’ resulted in a discussion over 
the ways this idea could be implemented. Between January and September 2005, the 
Polish Chamber of Commerce and the Saffron team coalition aimed at establishing a 
system of visual representation for their programme and conducting an institutional 
audit in order to implement the project. The consultancy discourse claimed that, as far 
as nation brand building was concerned, Poland had an advantage over its competitors: 
 
Poland has both first and second mover advantage. Poland started 
early and correctly, achieving that most elusive component of a 
successful branding programme: a viable core idea. This happened 
more than two years ago. The idea and the ambition of the national 
reputation and branding programme are well known now in certain 
circles; the pump is primed (Saffron Brand Consultants 2007, p. 33).  
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The report also indicated that because other nations undertake nation branding, so 
should Poland.  The acts of compliance, inherent in promotional culture (Wernick 
1991; Moloney 2006), have another strong dimension in Polish nation branding 
discourse: its logic is, partly, rationalised by the fact that other nations engage in 
nation branding and therefore Poland needs to follow this market trend.  A special role 
in this discourse has been played by Spain and Ireland whose economic propaganda, 
as featured in global media outlets, was presented as a model to follow.45 Both of those 
states had, purportedly, been re-branded and are showcases of how to enact nation 
branding. Nation branders enthusiastically use them as examples to follow, but the 
failures of nation branding in the UK (Awan 2007) and the US (Fitzpatrick 2010) are 
not addressed in legitimations of nation branding. 
 
While the core idea for the programme was being constructed, Saffron Brand 
Consultancy (2007) also claimed the right to produce a ‘brand book’ - a guide to 
further the structural imposition of the programme and produced with a view to  
 
...to convince as many sub-brand holders as possible to embrace the 
national brand and adapt it for their purposes (ibid. p. 96).  
 
In another self-serving narrative, Saffron emphasised the requirement for continuing 
external consultancy for the next ten years since the launch of the programme, 
claiming that none of the local nation branders and their relevant firms hold the 
symbolic capital of expertise to enact this enterprise (ibid, p. 129). At this stage, the 
remaining aspect of nation branding praxis was to secure the specific vision of the 
                                                          
45 During the fieldwork, the CEO of the Institute of Polish Brand had drawn my attention to his 
exploration of nation branding in Spain. His thinking on this practice was, in part, informed by the 
content of the Spanish overseas propaganda: advertisements and advertorials commissioned in the 
overseas media outlets, compiled in a document entitled, ‘Introductory study of national marketing 
for Poland: Spain as the last frontier in Western Europe. National marketing. Campaign of 1988-
1992’. This text also re-emerges in ‘The nation marketing programme’ (Institute of Polish Brand 
2002a). It would be interesting to see whether the current economic crises in Ireland and Spain have 
changed nation branders’ understanding of their practice. 
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field by gaining the support of the Polish governmental field of power and by securing 
economic capital to impose the programme as envisioned by its advocates.  
 
In the light of Saffron’s (2007) consultancy discursive order, the field vision 
outlined in their report argues for the reconfiguration of the existing institutional 
settings in order to manage the programme. Although, in principle, the report takes the 
structuralist view of the field settings, it is based on a division of tasks between field 
agents. The report recommends establishing a ‘National reputation and branding 
directorate’ and  a ‘Steering group’ empowered to oversee the programme and 
manage its recourses (including bureaucrats representing the Polish state actors ); the 
‘Advisory panel’ consisted of representatives of ‘different walks of Polish life’; ‘Task 
forces’ comprising specialised teams managing selected tasks; ‘Brand champions’ 
opinion leaders from different industries. What is important to recognise is a 
consensual statement produced by Saffron with regards to how nation branding should 
be managed and implemented. This statement emerges in various contexts within the 
consultancy discourse as well as explanation of their practice: 
  
In our experience the most successful way to make a programme of 
this kind to work is to get people who are concerned with their own 
specific initiatives or substantive areas (e.g. fashion, or higher 
education) to agree to the overall direction, and to work with them to 
modulate their activity so that it fits in with, and even amplifies, the 
programme as a whole, thereby both giving strength to the 
programme and deriving strength from it (ibid. p. 122). 
 
This consensual mind-set of nation branders clashed with the socio-political 
reality in Poland and power relations between agents in the field. On December 6, 
2004, ‘Creative Tension’ was publically introduced to decision-makers. The Chamber 
of Commerce organised a second conference in the Polish Parliament which aimed at 
presenting the foundations for the programme. This event was an opportunity to get 
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further feedback on the programme and to make a case for the requirement for the 
programme. The imposition of the nation branding discourse within the confines of the 
parliamentary setting along with the senior ministerial technocrats from the Ministry 
of Economics and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was enacted by its nation branders 
via professional presentations, conference publications, networking, and media 
relations reproducing nation branding beyond the field boundaries (Institute of Polish 
Brand 2004a; Institute of Polish Brand 2004b).  
 
Throughout 2005 and 2006, the team Chamber of Commerce and the Institute of 
Polish Brand team were attempting to gain public support for their programme by 
enacting media relations, delivering presentations, participation in workshops with the 
government actors (e.g. Polish Tourism Organisation) and by engaging with Polish 
youth, predominantly students. Those features of performative discourse were 
described as “informing, interpreting, inspiring and engaging” with nation branding as 
the domestic introduction of nation branding was seen as requiring education (Maciej, 
personal interview, 2009). Among their reported non-government stakeholders were:  
 
It can be said that we educate three stake-holding groups. First, we 
educate young academics, because there were either MA dissertations 
or PhD theses produced as a result of cooperation with us. To us, 
those people are natural apostles of our cause [...]. Second group is 
the general public that we reach out to by media relations. There were 
numerous pieces in the press, either inspired by us or by our work that 
are widely cited by various people... [...]. And the third audience that 
we reach out to is business. However, we try to specifically reach out 
to business bigwigs as this way we can think of practical aspects of 
creating so called flagship brands (Maciej, personal interview, 2009). 
 
The key dimension of their struggle, however, was to convert nation branding 
ideology into an integral component of the promotional policy of the Polish state. In 
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their professional accounts the senior management of the Polish Chamber of 
Commerce and the Institute of Polish Brand took a position that one of the biggest 
issues behind nation branding in Poland was the fact that changes within the Polish 
political field, that is the reconfiguration of the field of power, were considered as 
obstacles to the introduction of a wide scale nation branding programme. Their 
description of the relationship with the field of power was represented by the 
utterances such as “attempts to influence” (Maciej, personal interview, 2009) or 
revelations of cancelled meetings with the Minister of Foreign Affairs (Krzysztof, 
personal interview, 2008). The reports on the struggle for the support of the field of 
power remains partly based on the articulation of issues and blaming the Polish field 
of power that they do not pay enough attention to the question of nation branding.    
 
Although the interview data only sporadically reveals actions of the Chamber of 
Commerce and the Institute of the Polish Brand, there is secondary data in the form of 
corporate websites and policy documents which unfolds, in part, the dynamics of this 
relationship. In December 2006, an actor aligned with the field of power - The 
Supreme Audit Office (the NIK) - released a ‘Report on the assessment of the 
governmental Programme of economic promotion of Poland until 2005’ that put 
pressure on the field agents. This is a record on the implementation of policy in the 
area of global economic exchange. Among the policy issues this report problematizes 
is the management of ‘world public opinion’ as a governance feature important to the 
Polish political economy and national markets. The policy control report unfolds 
limited cooperation between the field actors; poor professionalism with reference to 
management of the world public opinion; and overlapping competences between 
actors within the field, particularly the ministries of Economics and Foreign Affairs 
(ibid. p. 24) 46.  
                                                          
46
  According to one of my interviews (Jacek, personal interview, 2009), the institutional tensions and 
between the Ministries of Economics and Foreign Affairs have an historical origin and go back to 
the Polish Peoples’ Republic (PRL) era when there were disagreements over institutional structures 
and competences of the Polish embassies overseas. The institutional struggle takes place over the 
statist capital, including economic capital. Its recent manifestation has been articulated in the form 
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Indeed, the report explicitly argues that, initially, the Polish Chamber of 
Commerce established close professional relationships with the Polish Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and its Department of Promotion (nowadays Public and Cultural 
Diplomacy). The policy review by the Supreme Audit Office (2006, p. 23-24) reports 
that the Polish Chamber of Commerce and its institutional affiliate, The Institute of 
Polish Brand, used their relationships established during the development stage for the 
programme to further push the nation branding discourse and praxis by setting the 
policy agenda. At that stage, they managed to set the agenda within the Department of 
Promotion,47 bring the nation brand building programme to the attention of the Council 
for Poland’s Promotion, and secure cooperation on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ 
2006 policy document, in which the nation brand building programme was aimed at, 
according to the report’s narrative, becoming an integral part of this policy. The report 
reveals that on 1 July 2005 the Minister of Foreign Affairs passed on a memo to the 
Government suggesting moving on to the ‘implementation’ stage. The memo also 
included financial data estimating the cost of the programme at 12 m. PLN (app. £ 2. 4 
mln).  
 
On 22 July 2005 the ministers met with the Prime Minister, Marek Belka, but a 
common position on the programme was not proposed. Although this narrative unfolds 
the institutional discourse relating to the policy-making process, it also reveals that 
there were are no documented alternative narratives supporting these positions as no 
minutes were taken from the meeting on 22 July 2005. Above all, the Ministry of 
                                                                                                                                                                       
of debate on the institutional leadership over the Economic and Trade Sections located in the Polish 
Embassies. While, the embassies are the structuring structures of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the 
Ministry of Economics has control over their Economic and Trade units – this has been reported as a 
source of tensions that obstructs collaboration on other projects.  
 
47
  Back in 2005, before the fieldwork in Poland and London, I received a working version of the nation 
brand building programme from the Department of Promotion at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It 
was Saffron Brand Consultancy’s (2004a) memorandum entitled ‘Defining the Polish brand: core 
idea, brand attributes, and brand benefits’. This note was dated 12th November 2004.  
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Finance took a position that it was not certain if economic capital could have been 
provided to support the private sector’s initiative on the top of other costs 
accompanying promotional policy (The Supreme Audit Office 2006 p. 23). These 
bureaucratic inter-relationships were further complicated by shifting power relations 
resulting from changes to the political field in Poland. Simultaneously, one of the 
recommendations articulated in the report produced by The Supreme Audit Office was 
the suggestion that the field should continue works on ‘Nation brand building 
programme’. 
 
In October 2005, the parliamentary elections reconfigured the political field. The 
Polish conservative party, Law and Justice, took over power, and formed a coalition 
Government. At the start of their governance, the nation branding programme was 
preserved in the field and governmental discourse. Although, prior to the election date, 
the Ministry of Economics, did not participate in planning of the programme, in 
October 2006 a new Minister of Economics, Grzegorz Woźniak, set up an expert team 
with the aim of transformation of the consultancy discourse into an integral element of 
policy and, in consequence, embedding further the nation branding within its 
institutional settings. The policy was to be spelled out in a strategic document ‘Brand 
for Poland Programme, 2007-2017’. This document aimed at opening the second 
phase of the ‘Brand for Poland’ programme previously incorporated into the 
Ministry’s policy (2003). It was planned that the final version of the policy document 
would be presented to the Council of Poland’s Promotion in March 2007, a body 
mediating relations between the promotional policy-makers and the Government. 
 
Until early 2007, nation branding continued as part of the Government agenda. 
In fact, the annual action plan (Chancery of the Prime Minister 2007) accepted by 
Jarosław Kaczyński included work on the nation branding programme as an element 
of the governmental policy agenda for 2007. At this stage, the destiny of the 
programme was decided within the Ministry of Economics. The expert team that was 
responsible for coordination of work on ‘Nation brand programme’ lost its 
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significance. After two meetings, the last taking place in December 2006, changes to 
the team’s leadership and changes to the Ministry’s policy priorities and approach to 
its implementation were the reasons for withholding work on the programme.  
 
In the meantime, the early elections in October 2007, yet again changed power 
relations within the governmental structures and this time the Civic Platform and the 
Polish Peasant Party (PSL) formed the coalition Government headed by Donald Tusk. 
In the aftermath of elections, personnel changes took place at the management level in 
the Ministries of Economics and the Foreign Affairs. The bureaucratic newcomers 
reviewed promotional policies in both ministries and on 31 March 2008 a decision was 
made to liquidate the experts’ team working on nation branding and affiliated with the 
Ministry of Economics. This decision coincided with a receipt of an additional 
economic capital of 78 m. € by the Ministry from EU structural funds. Those funds 
were disposed as ‘Innovative economy programme’ and the Ministry, as a key 
beneficiary of this fund, secured app. 30 m. € of this capital for implementation of new 
promotional policy. During the fieldwork, I received a draft version of its document. It 
explicitly reveals that the policy discourse shifts away from the notion of nation 
branding programme. It reveals that the policy-makers revisited documents, 
correspondence, and policy proposals, which enabled the following position:  
 
In Poland too much attention is paid to thinking about the perceptions 
of the Polish national economy in terms of requirement to promote 
‘the Polish brand’ whereas not much is done, on the executive level, to 
support new export instruments or offering the Polish enterprises 
accessible, free of charge services aiming at stimulating their market 
share expansion overseas (Ministry of Economics 2010, p. 22). 
  
Soon after the release of Saffron’s second report in December 2007, the nation 
branding initiative lost its momentum as political elites were concerned with current 
affairs and election campaigning. With regards to the future of promotional policy by 
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the Ministry of Economics, nation branding did not become its integral component. 
The policy document (Ministry of Economics 2010) states that it is the Polish 
enterprises and their marketing that can further develop the national reputation of 
Poland and Poles48. Also the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2009), in its promotional 
policy ‘Direction of Poland’s promotion until 2015’, reveals a reflective approach to 
insufficiently coordinated governmental campaigns overseas. Their position reveals:  
 
At the beginning of the decade, a grassroots initiative by the Polish 
Chamber of Commerce and Prof Olins from London - ‘Brand for 
Poland’ - has resulted in an in-depth reflection on images of Poland 
and promotion of our interests. This project resulted in 
professionalization of debate on the promotion of Poland. Only in 
recent years, has an understanding for the systemic approach to 
promotion been created: from strategic planning, coordination, and 
redefining the institutional reforms (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2010, 
p.15).   
 
Interestingly, the self-critical narrative presented by the Ministry addresses 
policy prescriptions put forward by the nation branders. With regards to the formation 
of one institution that would be responsible for overseeing enterprises such as nation 
branding, the policy claims that this postulate is ‘unrealistic’ as no other state has a 
similar institutional structure (ibid. p. 60). The second, frequently emerging argument 
regarding tighter coordination on policy making and campaigning efforts received a 
sympathetic response in the Ministry’s policy by the creating of new mechanisms of 
policy planning (ibid. p. 60-61). Similarly in the Ministry of Economics, there was a 
                                                          
48
  Apart from the review of previous policy documents, the policy draft refers to an interview with 
Simon Anholt, a nation brand consultant, which was published by ‘Brief’ (professional marketing 
magazine) and further reprinted in the online edition of ‘Wyborcza’ (one of the Polish dailies). This 
demonstrates how policy-makers are influenced by media discourse in their policy-making process. 
Although Anholt was one of the leading figures advising on intangible elements of policy 
prescriptions, his position on nation branding, over the years, has changed (e.g. Anholt 2009). This 
change of position was illustrated in the interview that was embedded by the policy draft (Polish 
Ministry of Economics 2010, p. 22). 
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policy shift away from the notion of a nation branding programme and only sporadic 
references were made to the consultancy project masterminded by Saffron Brand 
Consultancy and their business partners from the Polish Chamber of Commerce.  
NATION BRANDING: A LOST BATTLE?  
 
For the Chairman of Saffron, the democratically elected conservative (Law and 
Justice) politicians leading the Polish political field, Jarosław and Lech Kaczynski, 
became a scapegoat for the breakdown of his programme. For example, in a talk at the 
Birmingham Business School in April 2007, he took Polish politicians to task for their 
lack of interest in nation branding. At this stage, the imposition of a centralized nation 
branding programme in Poland ceased, although in 2009 Saffron worked again with 
the of Institute Adam Mickiewicz on a visual identity for Poland’s campaigning efforts 
in Britain accompanying ‘The Polish Year in UK’. This government managed 
showcase of predominantly cultural events was rebranded as ‘The Polska Year’.  
 
Although between 2003 and 2007 nation branding in Poland was not enacted 
according to the nation branders plan, their activities left a legacy: nation branders still 
wanted to capitalise on their expertise; a consultancy bill of €300,000 that was paid to 
Saffron (Darek, personal interview, 2009); figures in the Polish political field that 
were sympathetic to nation branding, and a cohort of Polish academics who invested 
in reproducing nation branding ideology (e.g. Jasiecki 2004; Florek 2006; Ociepka 
2008; Hereźniak 2011). Over time, the private sector field actors have reassessed their 
altruistic priorities of supporting the government and their initial focus on symbolic 
capital is now also motivated by the possibility of gaining economic capital. For 
example, in 2006 the Institute of the Polish Brand charged the Polish Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs PLN 900,000 (app. £180,000) for a piece of consultancy exploring 
overseas perceptions (based on polling) of “brand Poland” (OBOP 2006), followed by 
a set of policy ‘recommendations’ (Krzysztof, personal interview, 2009). The Institute 
also offered its consultancy services to the Warsaw City Council in 2007 (see Institute 
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of Polish Brand 2007) and to the Polish Tourism Organization in 2008 (see Polish 
Tourism Organisation 2008).  The struggle for economic capital in the field is enacted 
on the basis of self-proclaimed expertise in nation branding. This point demonstrates 
that professional practice on nation branding develops faster than academic accounts 
analysing the development and consequences of the expanding, middle market of 
promotional culture and remains consistent with Wernick’s (1991) analysis.  
 
The resistance towards nation branding among Polish technocrats within the 
field since 2007 has been largely the result of their view of a conceptual weakness in 
‘Creative Tension’. It was argued that this creative idea misses the point with regards 
to the essence of Polishness. Moreover, nation branders underestimated the workings 
of democracy whereby changes in the political field often entail new institutional 
management and means of representation of Polishness via communicative acts. While 
Polish bureaucrats in the field offer reflexive insights into nation branding practice and 
how this idea has developed in their settings, the concept of “Poland as a brand” per se 
is not questioned. Saffron’s ‘Nation branding programme’ is seen as a step towards 
the professionalization of this practice: it resulted in a homology of language used by 
technocrats, and attempts to coordinate promotional campaigns as well as subjecting 
the institutionalised communicative practices to nation branding.  
 
There are also notable, culturally grounded acts of resistance towards nation 
branding ideology: among them is a disagreement and discontent with its exchange 
value principle (‘selling Poland’ has negative historical connotations going back to its 
partition in the 18th century and re-occurs as a narrative in interpretations of the 
‘Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact’ of 23 August 1939). Another position emerging from the 
interview data indicates that resistance towards nation branding is a result of an 
ossified management of the field institutions, post-Soviet style bureaucratic mindsets, 
and reluctance to institutional change (Arkadiusz, personal interview, 2009). But, 
private sector nation branders in Poland remain hopeful and believe that the political 
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field (political elites and political parties in Poland) will have to understand the 
requirement for nation brand programme.  
 
Similarly, a hopeful position on nation branding was taken by the Polish 
Chamber of Commerce. Their management turned changes within the political field as 
an opportunity and was struggling to influence the field of power. Although until the 
end of my fieldwork, the nation branding programme did not become a component of 
promotional policy, in November 2010, the management of the Chamber again 
targeted the Polish field of power in an attempt to gain support for the already 
developed ‘Nation branding programme’. Their discourse on nation branding was 
reactivated on 3 November 2010 when the Polish Chamber of Commerce passed on a 
letter to the President, Bronisław Komorowski, in which they pointed out the urgent 
economic issues. Among the arguments in this letter was a necessity for the nation 
brand programme. They argued that previous Governments ignored the requirement 
for the programme, which lead to poor coordination of governmental campaigns, and 
lack of synergy resulting in limited cost-efficiency of the state campaigning (Polish 
Chamber of Commerce 2010). However, they offer neither data nor analysis to support 
those claims. The management of The Polish Chamber of Commerce attempted to 
reinitiate nation branding agenda by means of mediated events. On 23 November 
2010, the Chamber organised an event, ‘Why not Poland, when Poland?’ Among the 
speakers at this event was the chairman of Saffron Brand Consulting, the head editor 
of ‘Brief’, and Polish academics who published on the subject of nation branding. 
Media relations have been employed to perpetuate nation branding ideology: a press 
release was circulated accompanying an invitation distributed to the Polish journalism 
field. 
LOCAL APPROPRIATIONS OF NATION BRANDING 
 
Although the ‘Nation branding building programme’ has not been enacted as 
envisioned by ‘vision and division’  (Bourdieu 1996) of The Chamber of Commerce 
and nation branders, it has left a powerful mark on the actors within the Polish field of 
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national images management and later re-emerged in the Polish political field. Despite 
the failure to enact the archetypical nation branding project, the Polish field of power 
still tends to reproduce ideological discourse on nation branding in order to legitimize 
its power and the prevailing Westernised social order. The dominant, assumed 
competitive world order encapsulated in the neo-liberal discursive ‘newspeak’ and 
practices derived from promotional culture, had previously attracted attention in the 
Polish political field, but never before so explicitly with regards to national identity 
politics and nation-building. According to Wacquant (2005, p. 3-4), proposing a lucid 
understanding of these qualitative changes is particularly important to sociology at the 
time when political institutions use “...the market rhetoric of efficiency, opinion polls, 
focus groups, and other political marketing techniques” and they “have become major 
ingredient in the rationalization of domination”. Indeed, marketing ideologies in 
general and branding in particular have become one of those rationalising and 
legitimizing mechanisms within the Polish political field. Bourdieu (2003, p. 163) 
himself discusses how this new science of market logic serves as a mechanism 
legitimizing power relations and, by corrupting democratic processes, advances 
arbitrary categories of market tyranny and presupposes depoliticization.   
 
Similarly, in this section, I demonstrate that the performative discourse on nation 
branding still reoccurs in the field, and thanks to its inter-institutional mediation, it is 
being transferred and rationalised within the Polish political field. In that respect, 
Bourdieu’s views on the market mechanisms remain consistent with my findings. As 
aforementioned (p. 187), the appropriation of discourse on nation branding has been 
taking place in Poland by normalising it within the localised institutional settings of 
the field actors. The insights into the Polish Tourism Organisation’s (2008, p. 7) 
strategy reveals that destination marketing leads to enhancement of brand Poland:   
 
The tourism dimension of brand Poland as the most important aspect 
of our mega-brand ‘Poland’ might become an engine for marketing 
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Poland overseas. The strategy can become a pioneering promotional 
artistry in a particularly important decade of modernisation already 
implemented in Poland as the EU member state.   
 
On the other hand, the institutional strategy of the Institute of Adam Mickiewicz 
(2010) provides insights into the normalisation of ‘nation brand’ within its local 
settings; its strategy reads reveals the following strategic goals:  
 
1. To increase the value of the brand ‘Poland’; 2. To enhance 
effectiveness and of brand Poland’s communication in the area of 
culture; 3. To maintain the fifth [market] position in the European 
cultural exchanges.  
 
What is more, the Institute’s (2010, p. 13) recent communications strategy demonstrates 
an explicit appropriation of the idea of nation branding by drawing from Saffron’s 
consultancy discursive order. One of its excerpts provides the following insights:  
 
Our vision fits into ‘Creative Tension’, that is a core idea developed 
for Poland by Michael. Although it has never been officially adopted, 
it is still remembered and recalled as, for example, part of cultural 
settings for EURO 2012 tournament. This indicates that the core idea 
had been accurately identified and that it touches the right emotional 
string of Polish identity.  
 
Indeed, the vision of the Institute presented in the strategy speaks of the ‘brands’ 
architecture’ and highlights points of convergence between product brands such as 
cultural events enacted as part of cultural diplomacy (e.g. ‘Polish Year in Israel’; 
‘Polish Year in UK’), the Institute’s corporate brand, and the concept of nation brand. 
Simultaneously, the strategy points out limited relationship between the above types of 
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brands and “lack of clear visual identity of brand Poland” (ibid. p. 17). The logic 
accompanying those statements is that communicative practice of cultural diplomacy 
activities enacted by the Institute contributes to the formation of national brand. In the 
case of the Institute, the perpetuation of nation branding ideology is demonstrated by an 
explicit reference to the archetypical nation branding programme which reveals that its 
management is compliant to consultancy ideas. Their reactivation demonstrates a doxic 
application of ‘nation brand’ and suggests that elements of nation branding discourse 
are reconstituted and transformed over time within the institutional settings.  
 
Another opportunity for the reactivation of nation branding discourse was during 
the organisation of the EURO 2012 football tournament in Poland. In this case, the 
setting for its re-occurrence was an actor responsible for its management - PL.2012. 
Although at the time of my fieldwork in Warsaw (2009-2010) this actor was at the 
planning stage of a formalised strategy presenting communicative practices or acts, I 
was drawn to a presentation produced by Corporate Profiles which summarised 
workshops entitled ‘Guidelines for promotion of brand Poland in the context of UEFA 
EURO 2010™ with elements of its implementation’49. The workshops were held on 13 
and 23 July 2009 and were attended by representatives of key stakeholders engaged in 
the organisation of the tournament, including some of the field actors. Within the 
presentation, local nation branders presented a set of ideas that could guide 
communicative acts accompanying this sporting event. Yet again, the discursive 
memory of Saffron’s programme was present within the presentation:  
 
The strategy for brand Poland is a’ supreme being’ and it is a 
reference point for thinking about the strategy for promotion of 
Poland in the context of EURO 2012.  
 
                                                          
49
  I was presented with this cultural artefact by one of the advisors at the Polish Tourism Organisation 
(Igor, personal interview, 2009). However, the managing director of Corporate Profiles did not 
acknowledge that his firm was involved in this workshop (Tymoteusz, personal interview, 2009).  
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As it stands, the weakness is a poor transferability of the Creative 
Tension core idea to a specific set of promotional activities, which 
could make up the main axis for promoting brand Poland via specific 
tactics (Corporate Profiles 2009, p. 10).  
 
While the core idea of ‘Creative Tension’ was recalled by local nation branders who 
organised the workshop, their professional presentation reveals changes to the nation 
brand attributes. Furthermore, in this section I am not able to account for density of this 
presentation as my fieldwork ended before the tournament. This appropriation of nation 
brand, however, was not always explicitly influenced by nation branders. For example, I 
did not find evidence uncovering that the Polish Agency for Enterprise Development 
normalised the notion of nation branding in their settings as a result of professional 
interactions with nation branders. Nevertheless, the doxic utterance of ‘Poland as a 
brand’ emerges in its institutional discourse. For example, in 2004 the agency produced 
a research report ‘The perceptions of Polish brand in the EU countries’ which not only 
signifies ‘Poland as a brand’, but offers insights into perceptions of Polish products and 
corporate brands in the European common market. Elsewhere, the agency reinvented 
‘Poland as a brand’ in the context of the 2008 EXPO Exhibition in Saragossa. One of its 
documents preceding the organisation of this event stated:   
 
According to the research conducted for the Organising Committee in 
November 2006, Poland, to an average Spaniard is a cold, dark, poor, 
and sad country. It is a country in which nothing exciting happens; a 
country that one should stay away from. Poles, on the other hand, are 
perceived as clever, hard-working and honest, but at the same time, as 
introverted and full of complexes. We are faced with an interesting 
situation whereby for Spaniards the brand ‘Poland’ virtually does not 
exists, but brand’ Pole’ has several positive attributes (Polish Agency 
for Enterprise Development 2008, p. 1).  
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The above evidence suggests that appropriation of nation branding by the above 
institutions leads to market orientated significations of the symbolic outputs of their 
communicative practices. The previously institutionalised communicative practice of 
‘cultural diplomacy’ by the Institute of Adam Mickiewicz, ‘destination marketing’ 
enacted by the Polish Tourism Organisation, or communicative acts performed by the 
Polish Agency for Enterprise and Development lead to the formation of brand Poland. 
In that scenario, the field is replacing the signifier ‘image’ to that of ‘brand’, which is, I 
argue, the output of their communicative narratives on Polishness. On the contrary, the 
resistance to the idea of nation branding by the management at the Public and Cultural 
Diplomacy Department demonstrates that the communicative practice of public 
diplomacy is not thought of in nation branding terms. 
 
The institutional perpetuation of nation branding went further and at a point, 
political elites began to refer to Poland as a brand. At this stage, I provide insights into 
the perpetuation of nation branding outside of the Polish field of national images 
management, and in the light of emerging evidence, suggest its appropriation by the 
Polish political field. Despite their discontent with the promotional policies, nation 
branders note transferability of nation branding discourse into the political field:  
 
A few months have passed and the Minister Sikorski says that he and 
his experts produced some kind of strategy and all of a sudden the 
talks about brand ‘Polska’, that in the branding efforts we should use 
the term ‘Polska’. Nobody says that it was Michael’s [changed name] 
idea; nobody says where it came from, but they sell those ideas as 
their own. OK, he is a politician. [...] But it is interesting how it is 
being disseminated [...] (Franciszek, personal interview, 2009). 
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This ideology enables the Polish political class to use it as a symbolic means of 
legitimising their power. A discursive formation supporting the Bourdieusian notion of 
power legitimation is explicit in the annual parliamentary speeches delivered by the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs. In fact, they are explicit in the Parliamentary exposes of 
2008, 2009, and 2010. For example, Radosław Sikorski, the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs unfolds the foreign policy directions that include the following statement:  
 
Third priority of our policy is to improve the perceptions of Poland 
overseas. Since the majority of foreign nationals visiting Poland leave 
the country having a better opinion of the country than on arrival, it 
means that our brand is worse than the reality (Sikorski 2008). 
 
The year after, Radosław Sikorski upheld his position regarding foreign policy 
priorities, included in the following statement:   
 
Poland as an attractive brand: a country of success, loving freedom 
and willing to share its freedom (Sikorski 2009). 
 
Interestingly to this study, Jarosław Kaczyński, also the alleged political opponent of 
the archetypical ‘Nation branding building programme’, has contributed to the 
reproduction of this discourse. While nation branders claimed that the former Prime 
Minister opposed the enactment of their branded vision of Polishness, in a recent 
interview on the state plane crash near Smoleńsk, in the context of its investigation 
Jarosław Kaczyński revealed the following rationalisation of ‘Poland as a brand’:  
 
It is the Government’s task to act determinedly to change this 
situation; to make sure that the investigation gets to the truth, but also 
act to protect the status of Poland and defend the Polish brand as its 
brand today is seriously threatened, weakened, and degraded 
(wPolityce.pl 2011).   
 254 
 
 
Nation branding also re-emerges in a relationship to a particular reported 
political event. The current Polish Presidency in the European Union has been also an 
opportunity for the Polish political class to engage in discourse of nation branding. For 
example, in October 2011 the European Parliament hosted a conference co-organised 
by the Ministry of Economics and the Eastern Institute entitled ‘Brand Poland – 
enhancing the images of Poland worldwide’. The official reports from the conference 
reveal that the attendees explicitly refer to the consultancy reports produced by Saffron 
Brand Consultancy (2004; 2007) and offer a similar line of rationalisation offered by 
their discourse (Economic Forum 2011). Elsewhere, a discourse on nation branding 
springs up in the field of power: the Ministry of Economics has recently published a 
consultancy report ‘The perception of Poland and its economy among main economic 
partners’ (Ministry of Economics 2011) which offers an insight into reactivation of 
nation branding by the field of power. While it is explicit that nation branding 
discourse is being reproduced in public affairs in Poland, this ideology is still very 
much alive and attracts the attention of the Polish political field. This new dynamics of 
branding culture (Kornberger 2010), susceptible to the discursive principle of 
continuity and discontinuity, is transforming the Polish field of power, but its overall 
direction is defined by what Bourdieu calls the ‘field uncertainly’ (Swartz 1997). 
 
Following Brubacker’s (1996) notion of nationalism as “event and happening”, 
this chapter has offered insights into the reproduction of nation branding in Poland. In 
essence, this chapter has informed the third and fourth research objectives. First, this 
chapter has accounted for projects which were labelled as ‘nation branding’ efforts. 
Second, it has demonstrated how those projects were institutionalised within the field 
boundaries of the Polish state. Third, this chapter demonstrates why nation branding 
was a bottom-up process and how the intersubjective relationships between the private 
and public sector actors, over the years, have lead to the emergence of new discourses 
within the Polish political field. Finally, this chapter offers insights into an intellectual 
design of nation branding programme, attributes of Polishness, and a dissemination of 
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ideas surrounding nation branding as a consultancy aimed at the Polish state. Chapter 
Ten, the analysis section, explains the consequences of introduction of nation branding 
within the investigated field.  
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CHAPTER TEN: ANALYSIS SECTION 
OVERVIEW 
 
This chapter offers an etic account, forming a foundation for my analysis of 
performative discourse on nation branding. It offers reflection on the trajectories of 
action of nation branders in Poland. Overall, nation branding performative discourse 
emerged as a communicative expression of neo-liberal political economy interests 
whereby the field of national images management has become a setting for private 
sector actors’ participation in policy making, consultancy, and co-production of 
national identity features. Specifically, this section unfolds the nation-building process 
that Kaneva (2007) eloquently calls ‘nationing the brand’ (Kaneva 2007) or what in 
nationalism scholarship is referred to as ‘nationalising nationalism’ (Brubaker 1996). 
Moreover, this chapter discusses the social and political consequences of nation 
branding ideology invasion within the structures of the Polish field of power. This 
chapter also reveals the misrecognitions of nation branding ideologists. Later, it moves 
forwards to draw conclusions. Furthermore, it presents a commentary on the 
reinvention of the Polish national identity as a brand. Its overall narrative ends with 
recommendations for further research on nation branding and the Polish field of 
national images management as a social and dynamic space.  
PRACTICES ACCOMPANYING NATION BRANDING 
 
The findings section of this study reveal that during 1999 and 2010 nation 
branding was contested within the field of national images management and the Polish 
government field of power. Overall, nation branding has been enacted at the crossover 
between the public and private sectors – implying lobbying on behalf of interests 
groups keen to contribute to promotional policy of the Polish state. The findings 
section reveals that central to this investigation the ‘Nation brand building 
programme’ was temporarily deposited within promotional policies and it shows that 
the notion of ‘Poland as a brand’ has been appropriated into the local conditions, but 
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has not been enacted in accordance with the vision developed by its proponents. 
Alongside the institutionalisation and designing architecture of the programme, over 
the investigated period, nation branding was supported by numerous auxiliary 
practices implying enactment of advocacy on behalf of nation branders and the Polish 
business. Not only nation branders were interested in developing communicative 
aspects of the programme, but in the case of the archetypical ‘Nation brand building 
programme’, the Chamber mobilised their skills and resources in an attempt to put 
pressure on the technocrats in the pursuit of their interests that have been legitimised 
as a ‘national interest’. Moreover, the Chamber of Commerce has gone as far as 
setting the governmental policy agenda and temporarily shaping its direction. In that 
respect, I argue, nation branding has become a matter of public affairs campaigning for 
private sector actors that used different strategies to capitalise on nation branding. 
Thus, the illusionary discourse on nation branding mobilised the agency among nation 
branders that goes beyond the emic explanations of the field actors and, I argue, 
requires analysis exceeding the reported logic of the field mechanisms. This section is 
a commentary on democracy and public policy making in post-Soviet Poland.  
 
The fundamental issue regarding sedimentation of nation branding within the 
promotional policy by the Ministry of Economics suggests practices enacted via 
lobbying, one of the most powerful practices in public affairs campaigning (Moloney 
2006). While the findings demonstrate that the term ‘lobbying’ has emerged in the 
discourse on nation branding practice, the practices exerting ‘influence’ had not been 
always explicitly labelled and therefore required careful consideration. The findings 
section of this study (chapters 7 and 8) confirms that nation branding was performed at 
the crossovers of macro level (government), where the promotional policies are made, 
and mezzo levels (corporate), where the Polish business and initiatives of nation 
branders originated. Following the Bourdieusian view of the field image, my analysis 
considers strategies used by advocates of nation branding. In his theory of practice, 
Bourdieu speaks of three main field strategies: “conservation, succession, and 
subversion” (Swartz 1997, p. 125). The conservation strategies are pursued by those 
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who hold a dominant position in the field and enjoy the seniority whereas succession 
strategies define attempts to gain access to the dominant positions by the new entrants. 
Finally, the last categories of subversion strategies are pursued by those who expect to 
gain little from the dominant field (ibid. 1997). Following this categorisation of 
strategies, I argue, that in order to preserve a dominant position over the promotional 
policies making, the state actors in the field applied ‘conservation strategies’ whereas 
new entrants into the field - nation branders - used ‘succession strategies’ to securing 
their interests.  
 
As far the peripheral aspects of nation branders’ praxis is concerned, their 
agency is driven by the search for attention within the field of power as a means to 
allocating resources to nation branding projects. With regards to the relationship 
between the private sector nation branders and the field of power, their actions have 
been marked by two trajectories: following the Polish state power and searching for 
the economic and/or symbolic capital. Given that the dynamics of the struggle are 
determined by the type of field (Bourdieu 1992), what is at stake in the case of nation 
branding is ‘promotion’ of the Polish neo-liberal political economy interests including 
modern representations of Polishness among the world public opinion and its 
‘reputation’. In Bourdieusian analysis “the establishment and the subordinate 
challengers, both the orthodox and heterodox views, share a tacit acceptance that the 
field of struggle is worth pursuing in the first place” (Swartz 1997, p. 125). Bourdieu 
(1992) calls it doxa which refers to a “fundamental agreement on the stakes of the 
struggle between those advocating heterodoxy and those holding orthodoxy” (Swartz 
1997, p. 125).  
 
The findings section demonstrates that nation branding, although implemented 
as per initial consultancy visions, has been enacted by private sector agents and 
introduced to the governmental structures by means of public affairs campaigning and 
further invaded the Polish political field. The situation of ‘conflict’ or competitiveness 
that is inherent to public affairs definitions fits the Bourdieusian view of the field 
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whereby the struggle for resources is the main driver of trans-institutional agency. The 
findings section reveals that the agents performing nation branding applied succession 
strategies to secure their corporate interests within the Polish field of power or within 
the field of national images management. As aforementioned, the Chamber of 
Commerce and their allies went as far as to influence the promotional policy in order 
to secure their corporate interests in projects stemming from the promotional policy. 
Their field vision attempted to override the existing institutional order and to privatise 
the field of national images management that enacts public diplomacy, cultural 
diplomacy and destination marketing on behalf of the Polish Government. They 
mobilised public affairs resources - economic, cultural, human, and symbolic capitals 
– in the attempt to gain access to and support by a highly politicised field agency. How 
were those resources enacted?  
 
The subversion strategies, particularly explicit in reports by the Polish Chamber 
of Commerce and the Institute of Polish Brand, adopted tools straight from the public 
affairs praxis. Harris and Fleisher (2005) reveal tactics used by public affairs managers 
and among them are the following applied by the Chamber of Commerce and its allies: 
lobbying, promotional policy monitoring; research and policy scanning; web activism; 
coalition building; community relations; engagement in action committees, and media 
relations. Additional tactics supporting enactment of nation branding in the field were 
based on the production and translation of consultancy reports; market research; 
professional publications; and production of policy-proposals; public meetings with 
government officials; organisation of workshops; conference participation; and public 
speaking. Those tactics have enabled setting the nation branding agenda in Poland and, 
over time, have led to influencing the state structures, particularly between 2003 and 
2005 when the ‘Nation brand building programme’ gained governmental support. At 
this stage, the Chamber of Commerce and its allies have left a mark by introducing 
nation branding to the promotional policy-making process.  
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The prominent discursive feature emerging from the policy proposals and 
consultancy reports (see, p. 166) is the reconfiguring of the institutional field 
boundaries. Part of the nation branding discourse was based around questions of its 
leadership. Given that, traditionally, the Polish government overseas communications 
and codified promotional policy making has been a component of the Polish state’s 
meta-capital and its field of power (Bourdieu et al. 1994), the attempts to participate in 
this field as a dominant force is evident, I argue, suggesting privatisation via 
influencing public policy making. While privatisation of the state enterprises (Jackson, 
Klich, and Poznańska 2005) was a prominent feature of systemic changes of the Polish 
political economy after 1989, nation branders have not been successful in their 
privatisation attempts: their role has been reduced to performing tactical projects rather 
than large scale nation branding projects or they moved on to seek opportunities 
elsewhere, including at the local government level. In that respect, the cultural 
productions of local nation branders illustrate their subordinate positions in relation to 
the field of power.  
 
Despite the commitment to convince the promotional policy makers that Poland 
requires a large scale nation branding programme, the findings also reveal how market 
research is making an impact on policy-makers in Poland. The findings remain 
consistent with Jansen’s (2008, p. 122-123) arguments that nation branding contributes 
to the production of calculative space defined as: 
 
a) overt embrace of commercial language, practices, and 
assumptions, reflecting the post-Cold War ascent of the logic of 
‘market fundamentalism’; b) formation of public-private partnerships 
to advance specific trade, industry or corporate interests along with 
national agendas, policies and ideologies; c) use of private 
contractors to determine the salient features of a nation’s identity, 
based upon what can be marketed to tourists, international investors, 
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and potential trade partners; and d) reduction of the input of citizens 
to what can be measured by market research. 
  
Indeed, all those characteristics have been explicitly put forward by nation 
branders’ discourse in regards to their practice. This insight also remains consistent 
with Bourdieusian studies exploring the manipulative role of marketing research 
techniques used in the French political field (Wacquant 2005).  
 
Given that public affairs campaigning became inherent to nation branders praxis 
in Poland, the idea of ‘Poland as a brand’ has been discussed by Polish academics. So 
far, however, nation branding has gained a non-critical status within the Polish 
academic field. To date, the Polish academy has not produced a reflexive study on 
nation branding. The critical approach to nation branding exploration has not been 
undertaken by Polish academics. The ‘Poland as a brand’ simile which emerged in 
public affairs has been legitimised by academic discourse. Existing studies on nation 
branding produced in Poland argue that the Polish state needs more branding and that 
this praxis requires further institutionalisation (Raftowicz-Filipkiewicz 2009). The 
implications of this are twofold:  given the high levels of symbolic capital50 academics 
in Poland enjoy, their discourse provides credibility to nation branding as an ideology 
advanced within professional contexts and actors who performed nation branding can 
further travel to the Polish academic field.  
 
Within the legitimating discursive order stemming from nation branders’ 
accounts, there are emerging appeals to ‘public good’ insofar that nation branding is 
regarded as a matter of ‘national importance’ (Institute of Polish Brand 2002a). This 
universalising ideological claim remains, however, largely based on the assumption 
                                                          
50
  The secondary data evidence suggests that, over the past decade, academics, particularly those with 
professorships have been consistently holding the highest stakes of symbolic capital of prestige 
among the surveyed samples of Poles. In 1999, 84% of a survey sample (n=1111) reported that they 
perceived professors as highly respectable professional class (CBOS 1999). A 2008 survey shows 
similar results - 84% of a sample (n=1050) considered professors as the most respectable profession 
(CBOS 2009).  
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that new investment capitalisation of Poland can happen thanks to the articulation of 
symbolic, simplified and trivialised aspects of national identity used as marketable 
signifiers in the branding programme. What remains an unspoken aspect of the nation 
branding discourse is its relationship to specialised aspects of the Polish state 
transnational political economy: foreign policy, economic policy, or tourism policy as 
articulated by the Polish governmental field of power and as having a potential impact 
on the reputation of Poland and Poles overseas. The complexity of those policy areas, 
including their mediation and reception among stakeholders, begs a question regarding 
the possibility of creating a synergy through transnational government communication 
praxis, either marketing or propaganda. Moreover, there is no evidence that nation 
branding can contribute to economic capital gains for the state as effectiveness of its 
praxis as a separate toolkit in the field of nation images management has not been 
assessed to date. In the light of findings and previous Bourdieusian studies, this is 
misrecognition of nation branders as it is economic capital that is a primary source of 
power. Finally, nation branding discourse does not address intercultural features of 
communication existing, for example, in public diplomacy scholarship (Seib 2010). It 
assumes representation of Polishness based on a globalised strategy.  
 
Indeed, the findings of this study demonstrate that doxa within the field is the 
policy requirement to ‘promote Poland’, that is to say the interests of the state, as 
defined by dominant institutional actors in the field. However, the ways to pursue 
those interests within the transnational community of nations include more complex 
solutions and other practices that go beyond nation branding projects. Technocrats 
used conservation strategies in order to maintain a dominant position over the field, by 
securing their dominant role in promotional policies making and their enactment and 
did not accept proposals put forward by nation branders in its pre-designed form. 
Those strategies varied between the Ministry of Economics and the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. In the case of both ministries, nation branding initially met with some 
interest, but their leaders ended up exercising conservation strategies as a means to 
maintain their dominant positions within the field (Bourdieu 1992). On the one hand, 
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it is the nation branders, particularly the coalition established by The Polish Chamber 
of Commerce, which held orthodox views of the field and nation branding practice 
that assumed a direct reproduction of their consultancy work into sustainable praxis 
financed by the Polish state. In return , the government technocrats offer a heterodoxic 
view on nation branding revealing that they see their existing practice - derived from 
promotional policy - as contributing to ‘building the national brand for Poland’. They 
use this term in a loose way - as synonymous to ‘national images’ or ‘reputations 
management’. 
 
A special role in public affairs campaigning aimed at the introduction of a large 
scale ‘Nation branding building programme’ has been performed by lobbying of the 
Polish governmental institutions. Particularly, the Polish Chamber of Commerce and 
the Institute of Polish Brand used this tactic to secure their interests. However the 
findings suggest that local nation branders also used their social capital of personal 
networks to secure benefits of participating in nation branding. Moloney (1997, p. 
168) defines lobbying praxis as “persuading public policy makers to act in the interests 
of organisations or groups”. The professional relationship between the senior 
management of the Chamber of Commerce and promotional policy makers reported in 
the findings demonstrates the dynamics of pursuing interests within this area of public 
policy making whereby nation branding has been used as a means to generate 
economic, symbolic capital (and aspirational ‘political capital’) for those actors and, 
allegedly, symbolic capital for the reputation of the Polish state. Bourdieu (2003, p. 
47) recognises the impact lobbying can make on creating policies of ‘depoliticization’. 
In fact, he argues for transparency in public policy making as a means to resist ‘brute 
economic interests’ of the corporate world. Indeed, transparency is a weak component 
of the Polish promotional policy making and initiatives such as nation branding are not 
documented in details and their promises thus far have been poorly scrutinised. Its 
weak aspect is a lack of public record and access to the records of the ‘private’ 
messages exchanges by the nation branders and policy makers.  
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Although nation branding has attracted the attention of the Polish field of power, 
and has temporarily become an objective in promotional policy, its advocates have 
soon been isolated from the field discourse on promotional policy. The themes 
emerging from the interview data reveal that it was the conceptual weakness of ‘the 
big idea’ -‘Creative Tension’ - and personality traits of its advocates that have, partly, 
led to a decision to cease the implementation of the programme. The state actors in the 
field of national images management at first exercised conservation strategy to 
preserve their dominant position by isolating nation branders from the policy 
discourse. Subsequently, nation branders lost their role in policy enactment. Between 
2005 and 2008, the policy-making has been dominated by the field of power: the 
government actors reduced consultancy input into the policy; changed the approach to 
policy making; liquidated the action committee working on nation branding planning; 
and made a decision on not granting economic capital for the programme. At that 
stage, the coalition of The Chamber of Commerce and their allies also found 
themselves in a subordinate position, subservient to the field of power on an ad hoc 
basis.  
 
Although the conditions in the field can be characterised by the competitiveness 
of actors, nation branding brings into this field another dimension: ideological 
misrecognition. Its advocates assume that regardless of power relations in the political 
field, under their management, the field can operate on principles dictated by their 
vision and division outlined in the consultancy (Saffron Brand Consultancy 2004; 
2007). They also assume that the market orientation of promotional policy and the 
pragmatism of branding praxis should not be subject to political influence. Therefore, 
it should be conducted on a long term basis to be successful. This way nation branders 
attempt to depoliticise their practice from power relations. Their argument that nation 
branding should be apolitical demonstrates limited understanding of power relations 
within the democratic societies whereby political elections might lead to personal 
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changes in the bureaucracy or policy changes.51 The notion of ‘depoliticization’ 
remains consistent with the Bourdieusian (2003) view on the myth of globalisation. He 
argues that the normative claims regarding ‘globalisation’, understood as mystifying 
neo-liberalism, are not a result of economic inevitability, but a conscious and 
deliberate policy making. Likewise is the case of nation branding in Poland: nation 
branding was aimed at inclusion into the promotional policy and, over the years, has 
become subject to public affairs campaigning whereby the relationships between 
actors within the field are subject to mechanisms of commercial pluralism over the 
policy solutions, resources and power exercised by means of ‘symbolic violence’ held 
by the Polish state (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992). This way, I argue, nation branders 
strived to further legitimise the universality of branding and the marketing profession 
within the field of power. Their struggle aimed at gaining greater social legitimacy. 
 
With regards to the normative utterances emerging from the consultancy 
discursive order (Saffron Brand Consultants 2004b; 2007), there are arguments that 
the field ‘should’ include the representatives of private sector, governmental actors 
and ‘should’ be organised on the basis of a centralised institutional worldview. This is 
against the interest of the field of power as every single institutional actor responsible 
for the development or enactment of promotional policy in Poland has accumulated 
various types of capital that they are attempting to secure and increase. For example, 
the promotional policy introduced by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2009) suggests 
that by 2015 government actors engaged in promotion of the Polish state should have 
their budget increased: up to 70-80 m. PLN (app. £15.5-17.8 m.) in the area of public 
diplomacy; up to 100 m. PLN (app. £ 22.3 m.) in the area of cultural diplomacy; up to 
120 m. PLN (app. £ 26.7 m.) in the area of economic promotion; and 100 m. PLN 
(app. £ 22.3 m.) in the area of tourism promotion. This policy, however, does not 
                                                          
 
51
  There is historical evidence to suggest that as far as the overseas propaganda apparatus is concerned, 
its management is politicised and tends to change as a result of changes in the political field. For 
details see Cull (2008) who reveals management changes in the United States Information Agency 
and its close alliance to the US political field.  
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include specific task budgeting and it is not clear where those additional funds would 
be specifically allocated to. Bourdieu’s view on field struggles corresponds with 
Moloney’s (2006) argument that pluralist democracies are underpinned by competing 
actors who speak with multiple voices in the general cacophony of messages. The field 
of national images management, however, defines those competitive relations on the 
basis of expenditure of public funds, either Polish or European funds, as a means of 
sustaining the competitiveness of the Polish state.   
 
Regardless of the power relations between the Polish state actors and nation 
branders, and competitive relationships within the field there are signs of ad hoc 
cooperation between the actors in the field on selected aspects of policies or individual 
campaigns overseas. Given that the promotional field actors in Poland have different 
priorities, various target markets, and tasks, they ‘speak’ by means of campaigning to 
different target publics in different ways. This is a feature of pluralist societies 
whereby power relationships within the political field tend to change the mediated 
aspects of national identities (Rivenburgh 1997; Madianou 2005).  
PROMOTIONAL CULTURE AND NATION BRANDING  
 
What is clear from the collected data archive is that the interpretations of what 
‘nation branding’ is varied among the field agents. This inability to differentiate, 
particularly between public diplomacy and nation branding, illustrates an unconscious 
and intuitive approach. That is activation of, what Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992) refer 
to as ‘practical sense’. For them, “practical sense precognizes; it reads in the present 
state the possible future states with which the field is pregnant. For in habitus the past, 
the present and the future intersect and interpenetrate one another” (ibid. p. 22). 
Although findings do not unambiguously isolate which of the virtual sediments of 
nation branders have the greatest impact on trajectories of action, it is explicit that their 
previously acquired professional background in corporate communications mediates the 
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practices in the field. Furthermore, it is explicit that for nation branders national identity 
can be imagined as a ‘brand’. But how is this notion conveyed in practice?  
 
Yet again, the notion of practical sense offers an insight into the process whereby 
silent features of Polish national identity are represented by outputs of nation branders’ 
practice. The ‘self-advantageous’ promotional culture (Wernick 1991) has the ability to 
advance new concepts taken by social agents into new institutional frontiers. Indeed, 
nation branding has entered the field of power as mediated by a class of professionals 
who struggled to be converted to an integral component of promotional policy. While it 
was legitimised as an expression of the Polish state’s political economy interests, it 
principally served nation branders in the struggle to accumulate higher states of 
economic, social and symbolic capital. Nation branders reveal that tactical features of 
nation branding ‘messaging’ should be enacted by means of symbolism, advertising and 
media relations (Saffron Brand Consultancy 2004; 2007); but its performative discourse 
draws from traditional propaganda tactics such as publicity and advertising (Lasswell 
1934; Moloney 2000). Those are the fundamental tactics of this practice and in the past 
they were enacted by governments (Manheim 1994). Nation branding emerges as an 
anecdotal concept that attempts to organise a cacophony of messages on Polishness. It 
was conceived as an idea that was meant to represent Polishness for all the field actors.  
 
The key explanation to changes in the field lay in the notion of accelerating 
promotional culture (Wernick 1991) whereby nation branders have been attempting to 
secure their interest in this area of the Polish state bureaucracy by formalising nation 
branding programme as a policy and a ‘fixed middle market’ for their services. The 
attempts to form the homogenous field of nation branding in Poland demonstrate a 
concerted effort by nation branders and/or their business employers to exploit a national 
context of promotional culture for the creation of ‘a middle market’ in a relationship 
between the Polish state and private sector actors involved in performative discourse on 
nation branding. How did that happen? What field mechanism allowed this change?  
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First, it is the field of power that has enabled marketization by commissioning 
tactical communicative tasks and their market orientated ‘position’ (Bourdieu and 
Wacquant 1992) encouraged nation branders to engage with the field. As a result, 
newcomers into the Polish field of national images management offered their 
consultancy services, labelled as ‘nation branding’, to the state actors within the field. 
This market exchange-based, contractual opening has encouraged private contractors to 
enter the field with a greater confidence. In fact, the Polish Chamber of Commerce and 
its coalition took nation branding a step further - beyond tactical means - and have been 
struggling to secure their institutional interests underpinned by national economic 
priorities by making an impact on the direction of public policy in Poland.  
 
Second, the state actors responsible for promotional policy making have been 
subjected to public affairs campaigning or they have been targeted with business 
proposals produced by nation branders. Given that the directions of the promotional 
policies have not always been explicit and that their enactment is characterised by the 
field of power as limited accountability (The Supreme Audit Office 2006), nation 
branders argue that privatisation might result in cost-efficiency and better economic 
outputs. For them, until 2000, promotion of Poland was poorly managed, involved 
chaotically designed messages, and poorly coordinated overseas campaigning efforts. 
Those field developments confirm the Bourdieusian notion of field ‘uncertainty’ 
(Swartz 1997) and reveal that in a complex institutional field there are many forces, 
centrifugal and centripetal, that strive for their representation of Polishness.   
 
Third, in Polish democracy, power relations within the political field have bearing 
on the bureaucratic field of national images management and they did not match the 
consultancy proposals by the Chamber of Commerce, Saffron Brand Consultancy, and 
the Institute of Polish Brand. On the one hand, a direct imposition of nation branding 
demonstrates ‘asymmetry of rationality’ (Staniszkis 2003) whereby Western practices 
invade Poland by social and institutional actors. On the other hand, it is the Western 
nation branding consultants who did not grasp the complexity of policies and autonomy 
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of actors engaged in national identities construction. For example, Prizel (1998) in his 
discussion of the relationship between foreign policy and national identity in Poland 
reveals the dynamics of this relationship. The complexity of this area of the state 
politics, the mediation of which has a great impact on national reputation (Mercer 
1996), is a political resource for developing relationships between imagined national 
communities (Rusciano 2003). The relationship between Polish foreign policy and 
nation branding consultancy has not been addressed by nation branders, which in my 
view demonstrates disconnectedness between their discourse and state politics. This 
argument can be extended to any other policy area (e.g. tourism policy or cultural 
policy) developed by field actors. The limited reflection on nation branding among its 
advocates, their grand promises, and a lack of broader relationship with specific policy 
goals demonstrate a mesmerising relationship of the Polish field of power with concepts 
conceived within Western promotional culture (Wernick 1991).  
  
Fourth, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Economics and their 
subsidiaries preserved their power over the promotional policy making and reduced the 
position of nation branding advocates to delivery of ad hoc tactical projects and minor 
consultancy services. This demonstrates how dominant field forces maintain their 
symbolic power over the instruments of dominations (public policy) and the means of 
their mediation (persuasive communication). If a ‘nation’ is considered as a symbolic 
system signifying an ‘imagined community’ (Andersen 2006), for Bourdieu (1991) the 
symbolic systems are ‘codes’ and deeply structured instruments for communication and 
instruments for knowing. Simultaneously, they are instruments for social domination 
whereby the dominant symbolic systems provide integration for dominant actors. The 
findings explicitly reveal that The Chamber of Commerce and its coalition attempted to 
use deep cultural codes of positive associations accompanying the myth of branding 
stemming from allegedly successful nation branding projects in the West, as a means to 
reinvention of national identity. However, over the years, the Polish field of power has 
used its statist capital to suppress them to subordinated positions in the field.  According 
to Swartz (1997), this is the very reason why fields perform a political function.    
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In sum, the collected evidence is consistent with cultural theorists’ arguments 
regarding marketisation of promotional politics, collective identity construction, and its 
crossovers with popular culture. Wernick’s (1991, p. 186) attribution of Adorno (1997) 
and his role in explaining ‘promotion’ as culturally conditioned and performatively 
enacted remains in line with the introduction and perpetuation of nation branding in 
Poland. Although the Frankfurt School’s claims were made with reference to the early 
modernist Western societies, after 1989 the imposition and invasion of the Polish 
political field with the codified policy discourse, the morphogenesis of which is rooted 
in the Anglo-Saxon political fields, became common (e.g. Sidorenko 1998). Adorno’s 
(1997) ontological, structuralist position, however, prioritizes structure over the action 
and limits the possibility for bottom-up agency. This worldview does not correspond 
with the findings of this study. Although nation branding ‘grass-roots’ initiatives in 
Poland were not enacted in its preconceived form, their advocates travelled across the 
field of national images management and the field of power, left a mark on the public 
policy agenda, and set priorities among the field players. In that regards, my findings 
demonstrate the greater analytical plasticity of Bourdieu’s field theory. Nation branding 
is yet another ideology which demonstrates efforts to impose the Anglo-Saxon 
worldviews (Bourdieu 2003) onto various social spaces in Poland. As far as normative 
aspects of its practice go, nation branders also argue for ‘monopolistic centralisation’ in 
nation branding management; ‘standardisation’ of language derived from the corporate 
lexicon; ‘sensate emphasis on style over work’ whereby ‘core idea’ is more significant 
than agency accompanying its implementation. More importantly, the construction of 
mid-market, merging ‘popular culture’ of branding (Olins 2003) with the statesmanship 
traditionally attributed to policy making networks responsible for the official 
representation of national identity features construction and mediation. 
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IDEOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF NATION BRANDING  
 
For Bourdieu (1979, p. 82), the field analysis involves consideration of the 
ideological effects of their actors as “the homology between two fields causes the 
struggles for the specific objectives at stake in the autonomous field to produce 
euphemized forms of the ideological classes between classes”. While I have already 
reported on the classes that have been participating in the field struggle (bureaucratic 
versus nation branders), the ideological effects of nation branding align with the 
Bourdieusian notion of misrecognition. In lieu of the traditional apparatus of 
propaganda, the Polish state has introduced specialised policies and stemming from 
them communicative practices, but nation branders put forward ideological claims that 
facilitated their legitimacy in the field and beyond.   
 
Among the discursive strategies used by nation branders are those containing 
utterances legitimizing nation branding as a form of ‘corporate managerialism’.  This 
phenomenon simultaneously corresponded with social theorists’ claims regarding, what 
Bourdieu (2003) terms as the inevitability of markets. In Poland, the market principles 
of nation branding were legitimized as ‘post-ideological’ (Bell 2000) whereby nation 
brand management serves as the representation of the ‘national market’ and therefore it 
is free of ideological intentions; ‘post-political’ (Žižek 1999) as nation branding should 
be bipartisan and not serve any political party agenda; ‘post-historical’ (Gehlen 1956) as 
it was considered that it was time for the Polish nation to move away from its gloomy 
history of suffering. Those statements remain in tension with the types of capitals that 
nation branders struggle for as well as the socio-historical context of their practices. 
Moreover, nation branders do not explicitly acknowledge auxiliary practices 
accompanying nation branding. But thanks to campaigning efforts they have been, 
however, able to set the institutional discourses and promotional policy agenda.   
 
For nation branders, their projects were a way out of a national inferiority 
complex and, in their worldviews this had to be free of self-interest. They strived to 
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legitimize the nation branding programme in universalizing terms as an economic  
‘matter of national importance’ contradicting themselves with regards to promises and 
ways of evaluating their project (Saffron Brand Consultants 2007). This misrecognition 
is based on singling out nation branding as a practice that, in its own right, has the 
ability to attract investment capital to Poland. I argue that this is an overestimation of 
the relationship between symbolic capital of reputation derived from branding and the 
complexity of attracting economic capital to Poland. By doing so, nation branders have 
failed to address non-manageable aspects of the Polish state’s reputation. In their view, 
corporate managerialism was a way forward for Poland and the enacted pragmatism of 
consensual nation branding model (p. 18) was assumed to be free of any ideological 
connotations. Thus they struggle to use it to legitimise their interests. 
 
I argue that nation branders’ misrecognition is twofold: they do not fully 
recognise a link between the political economy of their praxis and the purpose of the 
nation brand as they are driven by their own interests. As far as construction of a large 
scale nation branding is concerned, the Chamber of Commerce and the Institute of 
Polish Brand rely on verbal and quasi-academic accounts of nation branding among 
different nations and fail to accept the lack of empirical evidence of economic successes 
in nation branding. The mythologized, at this stage, nation branding serves largely as a 
signifier for reinventing collective identity symbols and messages that traditionally were 
attributed to propaganda practice (Sussman 2012). Interestingly, the transnational nation 
branding discourse is subject to change: on reflection, it can be added, that there is 
evidence suggesting that even those advocates of nation branding who accumulated 
high stakes of cultural capital of expertise in this area have reassessed their position on 
the idea that nation can be ‘branded’. For example, Anholt (2008, p. 1) claims that 
nation branding “does not exist; it is a myth, and rather a dangerous one”. In Poland, 
however, this discourse is being reproduced to perform ideological functions in the 
political field. This feature of ideological effect is revealed in the last part of this study.  
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The vision of nation branders capturing ‘Poland as a brand’ is consistent with the 
totalizing feature of ideology, described by Lukács (1971) as inherent to reification. 
Nevertheless, nation branding takes this process further: by merging its popular culture 
discourse with the field of power it strived to de-politicize selected aspects of 
nationhood and attempted to strip them of their original political, aesthetic, and 
cultural values. The Polish field of national images management has been subjected to 
a discourse, the logic of which was based on commodity fetishism that was directly 
applied into nation-building process. The re-inventing of national identity as a brand, 
by allegedly ‘anthropologically’ grounded attempts to distance the sense of national 
identity from its historical past, is a social change which is aimed at distancing from 
the past, ‘socialist’ vision of Polishness and attempting to reinforce a new one, based 
on neo-liberal values (Connors 1972). This is how, I argue, the Bourdieusian (1996) 
‘principle of vision of division’ is enacted in the field settings and has bearing on 
understanding national identity politics in Poland. 
IMPLICATION I: PROMOTIONAL POLICY COMMODIFIED 
 
The reflexive sociology approach characteristic to Bourdieusian inquiries brings 
us to the question of the consequences of exercising symbolic power by nation 
branders and their impact on public policy. While promotion of Poland is overall 
perceived by the state actors in terms of ‘evolution’ and a ‘learning curve’, the issue of 
the impact of nation branders and marketing research on promotional policy making 
raises questions about the professionalism, accountability and transparency of 
promotional policies advanced by the Ministries of Economics and  Foreign Affairs.  
 
On the one hand, the reliance of the Polish public policy makers on marketing 
data offers insights into trends in the Polish field of power. It discloses tools for 
domination and mediation of the relationship between nations and directions of policy 
making process. On the other hand, the entry of newcomers, nation branders, into the 
field of national images unravels what are the social forces facilitating changes in the 
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agency within this specific area of policy in Poland. It offers insights into how market 
research shapes the logic of promotional policy making by reinforcing the neo-liberal 
logic of ‘competitiveness’, ‘marketization’, and ‘privatisation’. Thanks to the agency 
of think tanks, local consultants and consultants representing the ‘transnational 
capitalist class’ (Sklair 2000), neo-liberal logic has entered yet another social space 
and public policy making-process. This marketizing logic has been normalised by the 
Polish field of power and left its legacy on the practices contributing towards 
perpetuation and self-presentation of nationhood and has been extended into the 
political field.  
 
Bourdieu (2005) and his colleagues reveal how in Western Europe market 
research has made its way into the policy making process threatening the quality of the 
democratic discourse and autonomy of public institutions. For example, Champagne 
(2005, p. 128) analyses the relationship between political marketing, opinion polling 
and democracy and concludes that “polls have become the agent and emblem of 
political cynicism par excellence”. The findings of this study demonstrate that in the 
case of nation branding in Poland a similar situation occurs - market research is used 
as guiding policy making and, in result, mediating relationships between the Polish 
state and transnational communities of nations.  
 
Furthermore, the interest of private sector actors in the promotional policies 
making reveals that those so called ‘strategies’, I argue, are becoming ‘public 
commodities’. Their primary stakeholders were attempting to capitalise on the input in 
their making. Partly, this is a consequence of subjecting the policy making process to 
nation branders’ consultancy discourse and public affairs campaigning enacted at the 
crossroads of corporate interests, i.e. representation of Polish business, the mass media 
and Polish state structures. Bourdieusian studies discuss the relationship between 
marketing praxis and the field of power in the Western contexts, but my findings offer 
insights into similar developments in public policy making in post-Soviet Poland. In 
case of nation branding, polling and focus groups are the main driver of collecting data 
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or developing their nation branding projects. Champagne (2005, p. 128), working 
within the Bourdieusian tradition, comments:  
 
Democracy presupposes spaces of debate, time for reflection, the 
diffusion of useful and reliable information, so that citizens can make 
up their minds with full knowledge of the facts – in short, a set of 
conditions that are bypassed or negotiated from the outset by the 
routine of polling in politics.  
 
The development of nation branding initiatives has not involved a greater debate 
engaging Polish citizens or the overseas publics. Instead, their role has been reduced to 
the expression of limited input into consultancy projects. In that respect, nation 
branding forms a calculative social space whereby citizens’ opinions are quantified 
and used to inform commercial interests. In that respect, market research contributes 
towards commodification of public policy at its design phase. As Hassan (2008, p. 
136) explains, commodification as a cultural process involves “...the physical 
embodiment of social relation. The insertion of particular logic of production and 
consumption into the lives of people that was constituted around ‘cash nexus’ - or the 
marketization of increasing realms of social interaction”. Those commodifying social 
relations, I argue, were accompanying performative discourse on nation branding in 
Poland. However, it remains to be seen if this will result in Polish citizens’ cynicism 
similar to the one resulting from the application of polling in the context of political 
elections (Lilleker and Scullion 2003).  
IMPLICATION II: NATIONAL IDENTITY COMMODIFIED 
 
This commodification is a result of the nation branders’ agency within the Polish 
field of power and their influence over public policy. In the aftermath, ‘colonisation’ 
of branding has been underpinned by economic developmentalism. However, thus far, 
nation branders in Poland have failed to explicitly provide evidence or measures to 
 276 
 
assess the growth of the Polish economy and its relationship to the nation branding 
programme. For Hassan (2008) commodification emerges from social relations that 
require understanding of the ‘object’ and ‘subject’ of this process. However, as the 
findings reveal, in the case of the performative discourse on nation branding in Poland, 
it is not always consistent about what was to be ‘branded’: the Polish state, the Polish 
nation, or the Polish flagship products. Consequently, it is not clear what is being 
commodified. On the one hand, the local, Polish marketing and public relations agents 
unfold requirements for ‘brand Poland’ management and do not explicitly reveal 
which features of the Polish state as an actor within the global economy can be 
branded. The argument that the state or the nation can be treated as a commodity, i.e. 
that they can have a ‘unique selling proposition’, I argue, is a great oversimplification.  
 
According to Hassan (2008), commodification is characteristic of modernist 
societies whereby its process is upheld by the political economy of practices, including 
those performed within the field of power. It is the extent of this process that raises 
doubts about the totality of nation branders claims. While they recognise the diversity 
of Poland, they define qualities of the Polish state and Polish national identities 
constructed at home and overseas and end up making commodifying statements: 
 
“Poland is a product amongst other countries. Nation branding is 
important as geographically, historically, and socially Poland is a 
cool country” (Arkadiusz, personal interview, 2009). 
 
For nation branders, Poland can be considered as product that can be ‘sold’ on 
international markets. Although the notion of ideological reification is present within 
nationalism scholarship (Brubaker 1996), the notion of commoditisation brings 
another layer of functionalist thinking on Polishness. More importantly, it is not the 
issue of terminology that immediately links ‘branding’ with ‘commoditisation’, but the 
complexity of legitimisation and dissemination of nation branding ideology within the 
Polish state structures. The branded attributes of Polishness are simultaneously linked 
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with the notion of ‘coolness’ and the importance of market transferability of flagship 
products. This insight stands in opposition to the literature whereby nation branding is 
conceptually closer to corporate branding rather than product branding (Olins 1999). 
In that respect, the rise of nation branding, I argue, entails commodification of social 
relations between citizens and the Polish state thorough the corporatisation process.   
 IMPLICATION III: CORPORATISATION 
 
This section offers a reflexive narrative analysing the implicit consequences of 
the ‘imposition’ and ‘introduction’ (Bourdieu 2001) of nation branding in Poland. It 
considers the intellectualisation, creativity and means by which the nation branding 
driven national identity construction was performed in Poland from 1999 onwards. 
Given that the contemporary meaning of ‘branding’ practice is derived from Western 
promotional culture, the institutionalisation of nation branding in Poland has been 
enacted by agents whose habitus is shaped by corporate marketing ideologies and their 
former professional practice which mediates social relations within the Polish state 
structures. The findings of this study demonstrate that imposing a set of unifying 
features of national identity as a means of generating economic and symbolic capitals 
is a simplification in understanding the complexities of political governance. 
Furthermore, it exemplifies the limits of branding in the process of nation-building.  
 
The archetypical nation branding programme, the vision of which has been 
primarily spelled out in consultancy reports (Saffron Brand Consultancy 2004; 2007), 
emphasises that it is the Polish national identity features that can drive this enterprise. 
Those consultancy reports use the notions of the ‘state identity’ and ‘national identity’ 
interchangeably and confuse ‘the object’ and ‘the subject’ of the commodification 
process. Therefore, the social consequences of its imposition in Poland illustrate how 
the new ‘cultural intermediaries’ in the field of power attempt to rearticulate the pre-
existing notions of Polishness and by subjecting them to the exchange values obliterate 
their original use-values. By interlocking the nation branding ideology into the 
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imaginative process of national identity commodification, it leads, however, to a more 
reflexive reading of its consequences; namely attempts to corporatise the Polish field 
national images management and the field of power by suggesting that the Polish state 
should  be considered as an ‘corporate entity’ operating within the competitive 
transnational markets. Post-1989, the field of power in Poland had been previously 
subjected to marketization and the agency of its actors resulted in commodification of 
the Polish national culture; but the nation branding programme constitutes an 
additional discursive layer of corporate- styled practice and aspires to be applied to 
explicitly signify the features of Polishness. The commodification of the Polish 
national identity does not emerge as a result of marketing practice, but as an 
ideological misrecognition based on the assumption that the complexity of the Polish 
state or a nation can be reduced to ‘brand identity’. This, I argue, leads to trivialisation 
of its features.  
  
The literature demonstrates the growing impact of corporate communications 
frameworks on the statehood and the government overseas communication. Similarly, 
the findings section also reveals how trajectories of agency among nation branders 
result, I argue, in the process of corporatization of the state structures in Poland. To 
explain this phenomenon, I follow Shirley’s (1999, p. 115)  understanding of  
‘corporatization’ as “efforts to make state owned enterprises (SOEs) to operate as if 
they were private firms facing a competitive market or, if monopolies, efficient 
regulation”. In her view, this process does not only include regulation of the state 
enterprises but “steps to put state firms on a level playing field with private firms by 
removing the barriers to entry, subsidies, and special privileges, forcing SEOs to 
compete for finance on an equal basis with private firms, and giving state managers 
virtually the same powers and incentives as private managers” (ibid.). The social space 
analysed in this study is characterised by the mechanism of competition whereby 
various actors’ struggles over the resources or ideas. Appropriation of nation branding, 
however, by some of the field actors is a manifestation of a corporatizing mechanism 
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underpinned by transnational market competiveness. Therefore, in the context of this 
study, the notion of corporatisation should be also understood by an increased amount 
of corporate styled activities. The Polish case of nation branding illustrates how the 
private sector interests operated to pursue their interests as part of the Polish state 
policy agenda. Particularly, the Polish Chamber of Commerce positions itself as the 
centre for bridging corporate, state, and national interests.  
THE WEAK ‘ESSENCE’ AND FASHIONABLE COLLECTIVE IDENTITY 
 
While nation branding practice is seen as a form of promoting neo-liberal state 
interests, the adoption of corporate marketing discourse, nation branding included, has 
been previously considered as a crisis in national identity (Gerard 2000). In the case of 
Poland, there are two streams of research demonstrating the relationship between the 
state and the nation: the emergence of civic forms of nationalism strengthening the 
democratic foundations of the Polish state as well as those emphasising the crisis of 
national identity and highlighting difficulties of transformation and inequalities among 
Poles (Auer 2004). However, at the core of the argument made by Girard (2000), is the 
fact that nation branding represents a reductionist version of a far more complicated 
issue addressed by social theorists and studies of economic nationalism (e.g. Greenfeld 
2001). In her analysis of nation branding and its relationship to national identity, 
Aronczyk (2008, p. 54) notes that  
 
...regardless of the makeup of stakeholders or the qualities of the core 
idea, the primary responsibility for the success of the nation brand lies 
with individuals: the nation’s citizens, members of the diaspora, or 
even non-citizens in distant locations who may find cause to engage 
with the nation and therefore wish to have a stake in its success. For 
national citizens in particular, the key function is to “live the brand” 
– that is, to perform attitudes and behaviors that are compatible with 
the brand strategy. By “immers[ing]” themselves in the brand 
 280 
 
identity, citizens carry “the microbes of the brand” and “infect” those 
with whom they come into contact. This role is described variously as 
a “brand ambassador,” “brand champion,” “brand exemplar,” or 
“brand carrier.”  
 
Thus far, neither the Polish state actors nor the private sector advocates of nation 
branding have explicitly revealed what the introduction of the ‘core idea’ does mean 
for Polish citizens. Needless to say, in the context of pluralist democracy and complex 
institutional setting a suggestion that all citizens or enterprises might be unified by one 
idea of Polishness raises questions regarding ‘latitude of its acceptance’. The reduction 
of nationalism, underpinned by promises of economic development, to a set of ‘brand 
signifiers’ and simplistic visual symbols is, I argue, an example of a populist approach 
to national identity construction and trivialisation of nation-building on the part of 
nation branders. This insight remains consistent with Lilleker’s (2006, p. 160) 
understanding of populism in political communication practice whereby “populist 
communication is propagandist and rhetorical and can draw from emotionalism and 
authenticity”. The main features of populism include appeals to nationhood; threats to 
the nation; extreme promises; production of symbolism images, and myths. Yet, the 
findings demonstrate that for the Polish field of power as well as nation branders,  the 
redefinition of citizens as ‘brand ambassadors’ signifies a qualitative change in the 
relationship between the Polish state, its citizens and the community of nations. The 
re-occurring utterance of ‘Poland as a brand’ is I argue, a ‘new speak’ of promotional 
social domination over the Polish community.  
MISSING RELATIONSHIPS  
 
While throughout this study I have revealed relationships in the field that have 
resulted in the reinvention of Polish national identity as a ‘brand’, I am also aware that 
not all of them could have been captured in detail. Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992) 
argue that the primary aspect of research relates to the reconstruction of the field in 
relation to the research object. No one study could uncover all possible relationships in 
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detail. As indicated in the findings section, I was not able to capture amounts of social, 
cultural, and symbolic capital. For example, as pointed out in the methodology 
chapter, I was not able to measure ‘quantities’ of cultural capital required to perform 
nation branding. Therefore, it can be argued, that capital relations require more 
insightful analysis and it is one of the limitations of this study. Second, it has been 
revealed that peripheral aspects of nation branding and wielding symbolic power over 
the policy makers have been performed in the privacy of institutional settings of the 
Polish state actors. The discursive archive implicitly reveals that this process took two 
plausible directions: a) subordinate state actors have lobbied dominant actors in the 
field to partially represent interests of nation branders; b) meetings between the 
bureaucratic class and private sector agents took place, but there is no public record of 
those events. On the one hand, this does not enable me to fully grasp personal 
relationships in the field; on the other hand, it much reduces the transparency in the 
promotional policy making. I argue that this is, in part, a legacy of the Sovietised era 
whereby bureaucrats have a tendency to withhold information to avoid criticism.    
    
 Furthermore, transparency has been blurred by other relationships in the field. 
The data collected also reveals relationships based on unlawful practices. Riggs 
(1997, p. 347) puts forwards the following argument: 
 
Industrialisation has vastly expanded both the tasks assigned to all 
contemporary governments and the resources (domestic and 
international) placed at their disposal. This has not only increased the 
need for efficient and humane public administration, but it has also 
magnified the necessity for bureaucratic power in order to ensure 
competence and impartial management of public affairs, but 
regrettably it also enhances opportunities for corruption and 
mismanagement.   
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As indicated in the findings section, promotional policy and its expanding 
stakeholder environment offers growing commercial opportunities. It was revealed by 
participants of my study that some elements of the promotional policy implementation 
were perceived as based on corrupt relationships (Zofia, personal interview 2009; 
Grzegorz, personal interview, 2009). Those allegations, however, were not made in 
connection to nation branding, but more about subsidising marketing activities of 
commercial enterprises by one actor in the Ministry of Economics. The indication of 
potential for corruption in interviews, however, only reinforces the importance of 
transparency in public policy making, including promotional policy of the Polish state. 
MODELLING EMERGING ‘CORPO-NATIONALISM’  
 
Finally, I arrive at the stage of my analysis in which I would like to present a 
model of social-institutional phenomena that I call ‘corpo-nationalism’ (Figure 4). 
This is the output of my interrogation that encapsulates the complexity of the Polish 
case of nation branding as nation-building. Done this way, I attempt to complete this 
study, following suggestions made by Bourdieu himself, whereby ’theorising’ requires 
the construction of “a very concrete empirical case with the purpose of building a 
model (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, p. 233). This study is a case in point: by 
drawing from various sources of data, I have revealed performative discourse on 
nation branding in Poland and its institutional sedimentation, but the density of its 
description cannot be reduced exclusively to ‘empirical passivity’. Thus, I 
contextualise my data with a graphical representation of the field relationships among 
various actors.  
 
 For clarity, this section focuses on a model, but I do not claim its 
generalisability in different national or institutional settings. It has been made explicit 
by Bourdieu (ibid., p. 233) that those models need not to be mathematical or abstract 
to be rigorous.    
What I present the reader with is an explanatory model contextualising how powerful 
dissemination of ‘bottom-up’ corporate ideas by the newcomers into the Polish field of 
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power can be. Principally, I do not claim that this model reflects the ideas of nation 
branders, but rather how the phenomenological reality of the field had been found in 
this study. What I propose, therefore, is a model that considers habitus as a crucial 
mediating element, triggering institutional change rather than the deployment of 
models of nation branding, either in its conceptual (Olins 1999) or consultancy 
discursive order (Saffron Brand Consultants 2004b; 2007). On the one hand, the model 
I put forward cannot be generalised, and on the other hand, represents exclusive 
trajectories of correction of performativity among the Polish field actors.    
 
In order to develop this model, I extend the trajectories correction model of 
social change (Eyal et al. 2000) into the context of my investigation and marry it with 
empirical insights drawn from the findings section. While the relationship between an 
individual and social milieu, or in this case, professional milieus, is crucial to all field 
dynamics, in my analysis I did not want to lose track of the specificity and contexts of 
agency among the actors in the field going beyond performative discourse on nation 
branding. In fact, the contemporary field of national images management in Poland is 
an institutional area that has only recently begun to clarify its role within the field of 
power and therefore struggles between social forces which are inherent to its 
dynamics, particularly shaped by the neo-liberal ‘shock therapy’ in Poland. Although I 
understand the shortcomings of historical analogies, a similar situation occurred in 
Poland post-1945 whereby the imposition and invasion of Sovietism in the political 
field radically recontextualised the priorities of overseas propaganda by the Polish 
state and organisation of its system (Dudek 2002).  
  
Similarly, nowadays, neo-liberalism in Poland creates a state of institutional 
chaos that is shaped under the influence of various forces leading to the “effect of 
universality” (Bourdieu et al. 1994). Those have been summarised by a client of 
nation branding consultants from the Chamber of Commerce in the following way:  
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These were the years devoted to basic education, you know. I think, 
after seven years, since 2007, we are at the different level of social 
consciousness and perception of the importance of nation branding 
among widely understood elites; we come across more people who 
recognise what we are talking about and who understand this problem 
(Maciej, personal interview, 2009).  
 
Indeed, scholars (Szondi 2009) have recognised how powerful the idea of nation 
branding has become in Poland and other CEE national settings, but in this study I 
attempted to reveal specific mechanisms, account for institutional settings and the 
dynamics of its appropriation, dissemination, transformation and normalisation. For 
Bourdieu the state structures are key settings for all social struggles. By recalling his 
understanding of the state as a space for “the culmination of a process of concentration 
of different species of capital” (Bourdieu 1994, p. 4), we see that it is “in the realm of 
symbolic production that the grip of the state is felt most powerfully” (ibid, p. 2). For 
him, the internal struggles within the state lead to effects of universality as the 
“symbolic dimension of the effect of the state” is manifested by “performative 
discourses” in a struggle for legitimacy and symbolic domination (ibid. p. 16). And, 
indeed, this thesis records this effect of universality by revealing how nation branders 
have reinforced construction a sense of national identity based on promises of 
transnational markets and corporate-style discourses and practices.  
 
Given that Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992, p. 97) suggests that a field is “a space 
within which effect of field is exercised, so that happens to any object that traverses 
this space cannot be solely explained by the object in question”. Henceforth his 
analysis involves an exploration of the interconnections between players in the field 
and, I argue that in modelling of nation branding in institutional settings in Poland we 
need to understand the specificity of its context and the process of sedimentation of 
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this form of discursive struggle. Myles (1999, p. 889) reminds us of this aspect of 
analysis in Bourdieusian studies. It is that... 
 
...to succeed in discursive struggle is also paralleled by the 
institutionalization of their forms of discourse. But institution in 
Bourdieu's work, especially when he refers to language, is also to 
suggest rites of institution - the power to establish and protect 
classificatory boundaries or distinctions between groups. In this way 
Bourdieu views performativity as the outcome of the social structuring 
of the classificatory power of language, the "management" of the right 
to name.  
 
In the light of the evidence collected, we can sum up the understanding of nation 
branding to institutional performative discourse that has been disseminated throughout 
the field structures and various structuring channels. While for Bourdieu and Waquant 
(1992, p. 105) “every field has its own logic, rules and regularities”, the field of 
national images management in Poland is, among many institutional tasks, concerned 
with persuasive communication of symbolic representation of collective identities of 
Polish statehood and nationhood. The ideological effects of nation branding stem from 
similarities between ‘identity, image, and reputation’ of the Polish state as wielded by 
the field and ‘identity, image, and reputation’ as developed by nation branders in their 
arbitrary attributions of identity features. The key issue, however, is what the Polish 
state and the field setting has done with nation branding and why it is that they 
continuously refer to Poland as a ‘brand’. And this is the key of point of this thesis: it 
demonstrates that the Polish state bureaucracy is mesmerised by promotional culture, 
new developments within it, and transforms it into its own use.    
 
The first point in making connections between nation branding and its Polish 
case is therefore a careful analysis of the mechanisms and logic of its institutional 
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dissemination of this idea. Principally, nation branding has emerged and been enacted 
as a bottom-up nation-building process and  demonstrates a pressure put on the Polish 
state by non-state stakeholder groups and a class of nation branders in order to more 
effectively manage its symbolic representations. While the ‘bottom-up’ aspect of 
agency is reductionist in Bourdieu’s (1992) approach to the field analysis, this feature 
of collective action corresponds with social theory approaches to nationalism studies 
(Delanty and O’Mahony 2002). These form the conceptual framework for this study. 
Therefore, I extend Bourdieu’s understanding of the field analysis into possibility of 
‘bottom-up’ action whereby emerging nationalism has a power as a cognitive 
‘scheme’, ‘categorisation’, and ‘myth’ (Helbling 2007) and it is institutionalised as a 
powerful social change accompanying political and bureaucratic processes. 
 
The second point that I would like to foreground in this model is that a key 
concept driving this social change in the field is that of habitus. I find this concept 
particularly useful to capture the discursive process of sedimentation of nation 
branding in the Polish setting and to inform interactions between agents. It makes the 
notion of habitus particularly interesting to conceptualise social and institutional 
change (Eyal et al. 2000). To reiterate, Bourdieu speaks of habitus (1990a, p. 53) as a 
 
... a system of durable, transposable dispositions, structured 
structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as 
principles which generate and organize practices and representations 
that can be objectively adopted to their outcomes without 
presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery of the 
operations necessary in order to attain them.  
 
Because performative discourse on nation branding is both socially constructed 
and socially constructing, it has lead its appropriation, transformation or resistance 
against it. Simultaneously, nation branders tend to adopt their trajectories of action 
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into local field circumstances or travelled outside of the studied field to pursue new 
opportunities elsewhere, for example at the level of local councils or city councils. 
While the agents in the Polish field of nation branding have rejected nation branding in 
the shape envisioned by nation branders in their commercial projects, some of them  
have appropriated nation branding in their institutional settings to re-invest the 
symbolic outputs of their existing institutional communicative practices as a ‘brand 
Poland’.  
 
Furthermore, their bureaucratic milieu has become an environment enabling 
facilitation of further dissemination of nation branding into the Polish political field in 
which the Polish political class uses this idea of nation branding as a means of power 
legitimation in public affairs and collective identity politics. Habitus, therefore, 
explains and captures changing trajectories of choices made by the field actors: if the 
nation branders are confronted in one institution, they make decisions to target 
different institutions or reshape their ways by which they ‘sell’ nation branding 
consultancy to the Polish state - on ‘national’ or ‘local’ government levels. This way, a 
powerful mechanism of the Polish state overseas communicative practices is being 
adapted to serve the purpose of national market priorities whereby transnational 
competitiveness plays a crucial role in nation-building. As pointed out by Brubaker 
(1996, p. 17), nationalism “is induced – by political fields of particular kinds. Its 
dynamics are governed by the properties of political fields, not the properties of 
collectivites.” Therefore, I argue, that nation brand is a communicative expression of a 
specific form of economic nationalism, which marries the corporate and the Polish 
state discourses and practices in order to: symbolically reinvent nationhood as a form 
of economic corporate collectivity; to accelerate economic growth; to historically 
condition the modernising aspiration of the Polish state; to further embed Polishness 
within neo-liberal political economy tradition; and to adopt nation-building to 
transnational competitiveness of the Polish state. Because, this process was induced by 
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corporate discourses of nation branders and further adopted by the field and political 
class in Poland, I call it a corpo-nationalism. 
 
FIGURE 5 DISSEMINATION OF NATION BRANDING AS A CONCERTED INSTITUTIONAL 
EFFORT OF SOCIAL CHANGE LEADING TO CORPO-NATIONALISM 
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Summing up, this chapter has offered an extensive interpretation of nation 
branding and has unravelled implicit mechanisms accompanying this area of practice. 
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In principle, this chapter is a commentary on public policy making in Poland as well as 
the complexity of relationships between the interest groups advancing nation branding 
and the Polish state actors. Throughout this chapter I have presented consequences of 
the ‘imposition’ and ‘invasion’ of nation branding on the Polish state institutional 
settings which include changes leading to: commodification of public policy, 
commodification of Polish national identity, and corporatisation of the Polish state. 
This chapter summarizes the findings and demonstrates that a localized appropriation 
of nation branding discourse within the Polish state structures leads to a concerted 
effort of reinventing communicative practices to the tune of the nation brand ideology. 
Finally, I present a model of corpo-nationalism which is the most significant aspect of 
social changes engendered by the performative discourse on nation branding in 
Poland. This model reflects dynamics of those changes and accounts for interactions 
between actors, their agency and the field structures. In the last section of this thesis I 
present conclusions and potential avenues for the future research on nation branding. 
  
 290 
 
CHAPTER ELEVEN: CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH  
 
This thesis makes an empirical contribution to the body of knowledge in the area 
of nation branding (1999-2010). Primarily, it demonstrates a discrepancy between the 
‘theoretical’ and ‘empirical’ features of nation branding discourse. By revealing the 
actions of a specific class of professionals - nation branders - and their performative 
discourses, this thesis reveals the process of the institutional dissemination of nation 
branding in Poland. While, in theory, nation branding as a practice involves conscious 
construction and communicative manifestation of national identity (Olins 1999), this 
thesis offers a problematizing approach to the interrogation of nation branding. The 
analysis of this study is set within the structures of the Polish neo-liberal state, 
specifically its sub-field – ‘the field of national images management’.  
 
This politicised, institutional space primarily includes the state actors that have 
been accumulating the statist capital including their capacity to exercise ‘soft power’ 
(Nye 2004) overseas and ‘symbolic power’ (Bourdieu 1991) at home. As this study 
demonstrates, nation branding has been institutionalised within the Polish state 
structures through a number of ‘bottom up’ initiatives; persuasively propagated by the 
private sector actors who engendered nation branding discourse; normalised it within 
their own institutional structures and public affairs; formed alliances; produced 
consultancy reports for governmental consumption, and travelled across the state 
networks in order to secure support for nation branding as an autonomous field and 
practice for advancing Polish national identity. Principally, this study reveals the 
private sector actors who have been mobilised by the issues of transnational 
competitiveness of the Polish state and who were particularly vocal in the public 
affairs before the EU accession (1 May 2004). In their struggle, they strived to 
legitimise their actions by linking them to national competiveness understood in 
symbolic, intangible terms. Their efforts took approximately six years and, I argue, 
were aimed at gaining legitimacy for ‘branding’ as a practice whereby nation branders 
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were a professional class seeking legitimacy within the field of power in Poland 
(Bourdieu 2003). 
 
Overall, the findings of this study support Valencic et al’s.  (2001) argument 
concerning a growing mobilisation of non-governmental actors in the process of 
symbolic national representations overseas. In that respect, nation branders advocated 
‘co-construction’ by ‘privatisation’ of national identity making. Whilst the events 
leading up to the emergence of nation branding in Poland coincided with the concerns 
over national reputations, the archetypical nation branding programme is a 
manifestation of more-complex social processes leading to changes in the Polish field 
of national images management. The preconditions enabling the emergence of nation 
branding within the studied social space include specific, localised features of 
‘promotional culture’ (Wernick 1991) in Poland: the myth of ‘brand’, particularly 
corporate brands understood as shortcuts for successful national organisations; belief 
in Western consultancy; national competitiveness of Poles; marketization of 
communicative tasks within the field of national images management; concern of the 
private sector actors over the mediated national identity features and the ways that the 
state  translates its meta-capital into ‘identity, image, and reputation’ politics. 
Moreover, the state-building process, entailing the emergence of new government 
actors in the field, and the subsequent emergence of codified promotional policies 
offered opportunities for newcomers into the field. Below I summarise the 
consequences of ‘the imposition’ and ‘invasion’ (Bourdieu 2003) of nation branding 
as conditioning mechanisms. Furthermore, I sketch out potential for future research on 
nation branding.  
 
Indeed, several conclusions arise from this case study. Its key findings verify the 
assumption that the role of the Polish state in national identity construction is 
characterised by a ‘marketplace of ideas’ metaphor (Price 1995). While the settings of 
this study are mapped out within ‘domestic’ officialdoms, nation branding as an idea 
exceeds the domestic principle in national identity making: its construction process 
 292 
 
should be shaped by ‘global’ and ‘local’ forces legitimizing it and informing directions 
for its enactment. The findings of this study demonstrate that nation branding is not 
merely a concept: it is an ‘intellectual project’ that has materialised as a discourse 
having traceable embodiment (Bourdieu 1977) and as merging idiosyncratic and 
systemic features hexis leading to social agency, including attempts to shape policy 
making process in Poland. In that respect, it remained a powerful and appealing 
‘metaphor’ to the Polish political class that is still being reproduced within the Polish 
political field as a means of power legitimisation. 
 
For nation branders, however, their grand vision of the ‘nation branding’ 
programme encompasses a set of neo-liberalizing, but ‘collective identity ’ signifiers 
that are underpinned by market fundamentalism whereby the role of the Polish state is 
defined as supporting ‘strong’ aspects of Polishness. Its legitimization and ‘magnetic 
promises’ stems from mediatization, modernization, marketization, competitiveness 
and a requirement for public-private partnerships in performing their branded vision of 
national identity. In that respect, nation branding stands in opposition to the old 
doctrine of economic nationalism as a protectionist mechanism: it is based on assumed 
power of attraction rather than coercion. Here lies the paradox of nation branding: 
while neo-liberalism assumes none or limited intervention of the state in 
entrepreneurial activities, it is the Polish state that was at the centre of attention by 
nation branders; the state was considered as a sponsor and an arbiter in the 
implementation of their projects. The second paradox of neo-liberalism and nation 
branding is an underlying assumption among nation branders that through nation 
branding efforts, the Polish state should been involved in marketing private sector 
organisations. Why it is that the Polish or the European taxpayer has to subsidise this 
process remains a silent feature of nation branding discourse.   
 
The findings of this study reveal that the political economy of neo-liberalism is 
an incubating milieu for the rise of the branded state. In lieu of a strong modern 
economic nationalism (Szlajfer 1997) doctrine, the discourse on nation branding in 
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Poland reveals the weak position of native commercial symbols - corporate and 
products brands. In their place, the Polish Chamber of Commerce aimed at enacting a 
nation branding programme that would facilitate the self-presentation of commercial 
successes on national market. While questions can be asked whether the Polish state 
should have co-produced branded content on behalf of the business organisations, I 
argue that the nation branders aspired to add greater value to the Polish economy than 
the material outputs their practice suggests. Or to use the marketing metaphor, the 
‘added value’ of nation branding in the formation of national identity is highly 
questionable. This is, I argue, due to ideological misrecognition of branding and its 
ambiguous relationship to more complex promotional policy.  
 
Nation branding has emerged as a discourse on Polish identity manifestation and 
as a means to develop a long-lasting national reputation overseas. However, my 
analysis reveals little understanding of international power politics among the self-
proclaimed nation branding experts, marketing and public relations practitioners in the 
field. National reputation is an extension of a specific dimension of mediated foreign 
and domestic politics and the behaviour of the state as an actor in the international 
system. Social theory approaches to international relations explore this matter. For 
example, Mercer (1996) offers a middle range reputation theory of the state; Sharman 
(2007) contextualises the complexity of national reputation within rationalist and 
constructivist frameworks and discusses how powerful foreign policy making is for 
national reputation. This is neglected by those who advanced nation branding ideology 
and attempted its semi-autonomous enactment in Poland. Given that nation branding 
in Poland does not address foreign policy matters in a strategic way, questions about 
its effectiveness and the credibility of nation branding consultants should be asked. If a 
prevailing aspect of national reputation is a derivative of a specific dimension of 
foreign or domestic policy, nation branding consultants miss the point in their 
approach to ‘identity, image, and reputation’ politics. As far as the reputation of the 
Polish state is concerned, nation branding discourse has emerged at the time when 
Polish foreign policy was geared up towards the Iraqi war that has been of contested 
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legitimacy. Soon after, transnational media reported on ‘CIA camps in Poland’ (Watt 
2005). But this is too political for nation branders. Instead, they offered a discourse 
that trivialised both the national reputation of Poles and of Polish national identity 
construction. In that respect, nation branding is a ‘smoke screen’ shifting public 
opinion towards promotional practices and distancing national reputation from foreign 
and domestic policy issues.  
 
Furthermore, in theory (Olins 1999), nation branding appears intellectually 
closer to authoritarian regimes than to the democratic politics and institutional 
structures of pluralist nations. Its commitment to unification and synergy of collective 
identity projections is hardly viable in any democratic political field where the 
institutional voices represent various interests. O’Shaughnessy (2009) demonstrates 
why the idea of brand is closer to the propaganda practices in totalitarian Nazi 
Germany, where the unification of messages underpinned organisation of its 
propaganda apparatus. The imaginative writings of prescriptive nation branding 
‘textbooks’ do not attempt to address the specificity of pluralist institutional politics 
and different versions of nationalisms and national identities stemming from a specific 
political economy and cultural settings. Their generic and normative approach, based 
on the modernist mindset of ‘command and control’ management (Holtzhausen 2000) 
of nation branding, demonstrates misrecognition of democratic processes whereby 
different actors ‘speak of Poland’ via their policies and communicative acts in a 
context-dependent way. Nation branding, however, is still present in public affairs in 
Poland. There is new evidence emerging that the political class reproduces the idea of 
nation branding in their everyday political struggles outside of the studied field. This 
process leads to the transformation of nation branding which results from the 
discursive notion of ‘continuity and discontinuity’.  
 
This brings me to the presentation of the potential for future research on nation 
branding in Poland and elsewhere. Given that nation branding has emerged in Poland 
thanks to the agency of cultural intermediates on a transnational capitalist class of 
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nation branders, I do not preclude the possibility of their success in persuading the 
Polish political class to enact their vision of the programme. This feature of 
performative discourse on nation branding itself requires further academic inquiry. 
Indeed, nation branding in Poland has still some proponents willing to continue 
engaging in its practice in its orthodox form. This offers an opportunity the future 
research with regards to enactment of this concept that might lead to further 
institutional re-inventions of propaganda practice. Moreover, having been already 
subjected to powerful institutional public affairs campaigning, nation branding 
ideology is reproduced by the Polish political class as a discourse legitimising their 
interests and power. This offers a next direction for the future research that might 
explore what the Polish political class do with the notion of nation branding in their 
everyday discourse and practices. The further research might also explore dynamics of 
the relationship between nation branding and political parties’ programmes in Poland. 
Notwithstanding the criticism of nation branding presented in this thesis, the concept 
of ‘brand’ and its nationalising offshoot has attracted the attention of a narrow group 
of professionals in Poland. While the Institute of Polish Brand no longer operates as an 
institutional entity, some of the cultural intermediaries discussed in this study reshaped 
their profile and established new organisations offering ‘branding’ as part of the 
portfolio of their ‘know how’ (cultural capital). For example, ‘Best place’, a 
consultancy established by one of the local nation branders has jumped on the 
transnational nation branding band wagon by engaging with institutional clients in 
Ukraine and Belarus. Similarly, consultancy outlets might also contribute to the 
perpetuation of nation branding.  
 
To sum up, the findings of this study reveal that The Chamber of Commerce in 
Poland and its Saffron team took a position suggesting that the Polish state does not 
sufficiently promote national interests and by attempting to legitimize the concept of 
branding and to increase the social standing of branding practice in Poland. However, 
the problems of Poland’s nation branding did not stem from a lack of political will for 
managing the images of Poland overseas. Rather, they were the result of the 
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intellectual shortcomings of nation branding as a concept which underestimates the 
values of democratic politics – i.e., a pluralism of ‘voices’ driven by different versions 
of nationalisms and represented via different communicative practices, acts and 
messages. This case study demonstrates that, regardless of the position of nation 
branders’ a nation branding programme cannot be directly imposed as per the 
‘handbook’ into different social realms. However, the findings of this study unfold that 
nation branding has left its legacy in Poland. The field image we are left with is that of 
a neo-liberal corpo-nationalism. It is a form of identity politics underpinned by global 
competitiveness, which aims to enhance the sense of national identity via the 
application of marketing ideologies and practices. Paradoxically, the emergence of 
nation branding is symptomatic of a national identity crisis in Poland: compliance with 
promotional culture and the belief that Poland can be reinvented as a brand 
demonstrates that Polish technocrats struggle to offer new viable visions of Polishness. 
In sum, nation branding in Poland has emerged as an ideological discourse that 
mediates the power structures of government with corporate interests and has been 
used by Polish technocrats to legitimize the dominant neo-liberal social order. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 297 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Adorno, T., 1997. Negative dialectics. 2nd ed. London: Continuum International 
Publishing Group.  
  
Althusser, L., 2008. On ideology. London: Verso. 
 
Alvesson, M. and Sköldberg, K., 2009. Reflexive methodology: new vistas for 
qualitative research. 2nd ed. London: Sage Publications. 
  
Anderson, B., 2006. Imagined communities. 3rd ed. London, New York: Verso. 
 
Andrews, R., 2003. Research questions. London, New York: Continuum.  
 
Anholt, S., 1998. Nation brands of the twenty first century. The journal of brand 
management, 5 (6), 395-406.  
 
Anholt, S., 2003. The upside of global branding. Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann.  
 
Anholt, S., 2004. Mapping a brand new world, Brand strategy, Feb., 50-52. 
 
Anholt, S., 2005. Brand new justice. How branding places and products can help the 
developing world. 2nd ed. Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann. 
 
Anholt, S., 2006a. Public diplomacy and place branding: where is the line? Place 
branding, 2 (4), 271-275. 
 
Anholt, S., 2006b. Is place branding a capitalist tool? Place branding, 2 (1), 1-4. 
   
Anholt, S., 2007. Competitive identity: the new brand management for nations, cities 
and regions. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Anholt, S., 2008. Why nation branding does not exists. Available from: 
http://orangecontest.nl/docs/SimonAnholtNationBranding.pdf [Accessed   on 10 
July 2012].  
 
Anholt, S. and Hildreth, J., 2004. Brand America: the mother of all brands. London: 
Cyan Books. 
 
Arnason, J. P., 1990. Nationalism, globalization and modernity. Theory, culture, and 
society, 7, 207-236. 
 
 298 
 
Aronczyk, M., 2007. New and improved nations: branding national identity. In: 
Calhoun, C. and Sennett, R., eds. Practicing culture. London: Routledge, 105-
128. 
 
Aronczyk, M., 2008. Living the brand: nationality, globality, and the identity 
strategies of nation branding consultants. International journal of 
communication, 2, 41-65.  
 
Aronczyk, M., 2009a. Branding the nation: Mediating space, value, and identity in 
global culture. Thesis (PhD). New York University. 
 
Aronczyk, M., 2009b. How to do things with brands: uses of national identity. 
Canadian journal of communication. 34 (2), 291-293.  
 
Arvidsson, A., 2005. Brands: a critical perspective. Journal of consumer culture, 5 (2), 
235-258. 
 
Auer, S., 2004. Liberal nationalism in Central Europe. London: Routledge.  
 
Awan, F., 2007. Young people, identity, and the media: a study of conceptions of self-
identity among youth in southern England. Thesis (PhD). Bournemouth 
University.  
 
Ashmore, R., 1989. The reflective thesis: writing sociology of scientific knowledge. 
Chicago: Chicago University Press. 
   
Baker, C., 2008. Wild dances and dying wolves: simulation, essentialization, and 
national identity at the Eurovision song contest. Popular communication, 6 (3), 
173–189. 
 
Balmer, J. M. T. and Greyser, S. A., eds. 2003. Revealing the corporation: 
perspectives on identity, image, reputation, corporate branding, and corporate-
level marketing. London: Routledge. 
 
Barber, B. J., 1995. Jihad vs. McWorld: how globalism and tribalism are reshaping the 
world. New York: Ballantine Books. 
 
Barston, R. P., 2006. Modern diplomacy. 3rd
 
ed. Harlow: Pearson Education. 
 
Bauman, Z. 1997. Postmodernism and its discontents. Cambridge: Polity Press.  
 
Baylis, J. and Smith, S. 2006. The globalization of world politics. Introduction to 
international relations. 3rd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
 299 
 
Beck, P. J., 1999. Projecting an image of a great nation on the world screen through 
football. British cultural propaganda between wars. In: Taithe, B. and Thornton, 
T., eds. Propaganda – political rhetoric and identity 1300-2000. Stroud: Sutton 
Publishing, 265-284. 
 
Bell, D., 2000. The end of ideology. Harvard: Harvard University Press.  
       
Benson, R. and Neveu, E., 2005. Bourdieu and the journalistic field. Cambridge: 
Polity Press. 
 
Berend, I. T., 2009. From the soviet block to the European Union. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Bernays, E., 1928. Propaganda. New York: Ig Publishing. 
 
Billing, M., 1995. Banal nationalism. London: Sage Publications.  
 
Biuletyn informacji publicznej, 2011. Ustawa o dostępie do informacji publicznej. 
Published 6 September 2001, Dz.U. 2001 nr 112 poz. 1198. Warszawa: Biuletyn 
Informacji Publicznej. Available from: http://www.bip.gov.pl/articles/view/41 
[Accessed 25 November 2011]. 
 
Blanchard, J. M. F., 2007. China, Multinational corporations, and globalization: 
Beijing and Microsoft battle over the opening of China’s gate. Asian perspective, 
31 (3), 67-102. 
 
Blanksten, G. I., 1967. Ideology and nation-building in the contemporary word. 
International studies quarterly, 11 (1), 3-11. 
 
Blitz, M., 1989. Public diplomacy and the private sector. In: Staar, R., ed. Public 
diplomacy: USA versus USSR. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 95-114. 
 
Blum, D. W., 2007. National identity and globalization: youth, state, and society in 
post-Soviet Eurasia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Bogart, L., 1995. Cool words, Cold War: a new look at the USIA’s premises for 
propaganda. Washington DC: American University Press.  
 
Bohle, D. and Greskovits, B., 2007. Neoliberalism, embedded neoliberalism, and 
neocorporativism: towards transitional capitalism in Central and Eastern Europe. 
West European politics, 30 (3), 443-446. 
 
Bolin, G., 2006. Visions of Europe: cultural technologies of nation-states. 
International journal of cultural studies, 9 (2), 189-206.  
 300 
 
 
Bolin, G. and Ståhlberg, P. 2010. Between community and commodity: nationalism 
and nation branding. In: Roosvall, A.  and Salovaara-Moring, I., eds. 
Communicating the nation: national topographies of global media landscapes. 
Nordicom, Göteborgs Universitet, Göteborg, 79-101. 
 
Boorstin, D., 1985. The Image: a guide to pseudo-events in America. New York: 
Vintage. 
 
Boulding, K. E., 1959. National images and international systems. Journal of conflict 
resolution, 3 (2), 120-131.  
 
Bourdieu, P., 1977. Outline of the theory of practice. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Bourdieu, P., 1984. Distinction: a social critique of the judgment of taste. Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.  
 
Bourdieu, P., 1985. Social space and the genesis of groups. Theory and society, 14 (6), 
723-733. 
 
Bourdieu, P., 1986. The forms of capital. In: Richardson, J. G., ed. Handbook of 
theory and research for the sociology of education. Westport: Greenwood Press, 
241-258. 
 
Bourdieu, P., 1987. What makes a social class? On the practical and theoretical 
existence of groups. Berkeley journal of sociology, 32 (1), 1-18.   
 
Bourdieu, P., 1989. Social space and symbolic power. Sociological theory, 7 (1), 14-
25. 
 
Bourdieu, P., 1990a. The logic of practice. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
 
Bourdieu, P., 1990b. In other words: essay towards reflexive sociology. Oxford: Polity 
Press.  
 
Bourdieu, P., 1991. Language and symbolic power. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
 
Bourdieu, P., 1993. The field of cultural production. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
  
Bourdieu, P., 1996. The state of nobility. Cambridge: Polity Press.  
 
Bourdieu, P., 1998. Acts of resistance: against the new myths of our time. Cambridge: 
Polity Press. 
 301 
 
 
Bourdieu, P., 2001. Contre-feux 2: pour un movement social européen. Paris: Liber-
Raisons. 
 
Bourdieu, P., 2003. Firing back: against the tyranny of the market 2, London: Verso.   
 
Bourdieu, P., 2005. The social structures of the economy. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
 
Bourdieu, P. and Passeron, J. C., 1977. Reproduction in education, society, and 
culture. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications.  
 
Bourdieu, P., Chamberdon, J. C. and Passeron, J. C., 1991. The craft of sociology: 
epistemological preliminaries. 2nd ed. New York: Walter de Gruyter.  
 
Bourdieu, P. and Wacquant, L. J. D., 1992. An invitation to reflexive sociology.   
         Chicago: Chicago University Press. 
 
Bourdieu, P., Wacquant, L. J. D. and Farage, S., 1994. Rethinking the state: genesis 
and structure of bureaucratic field. Sociological theory, 12 (1), 1-18. 
 
Bourdieu, P. and Wacqant, L., 1999. On the cunning of imperialist reason. Theory, 
culture and society, 16 (1), 41-58.  
 
Bournemouth University, 2009. Research ethics code of practice. Bournemouth: 
Bournemouth University. Available from: http://portal.bournemouth.ac.uk 
         /sites /Policies%20Procedures%20and%20Regulations/Shared% 
20Documents/Research%20Ethics%20Code%20of%20Practice%20Sept%20200
9.pdf [Accessed 1 July 2011].  
 
Brecher, M., 1974. Decisions in Israel's foreign policy. London: Oxford University Press.  
 
Breuilly, J., 1993. Nationalism and the state, 2nd ed. Manchester: Manchester 
University Press. 
 
Britzl, M., 1986. Public diplomacy and the private sector. In: Starr, R., ed. Public 
diplomacy: USA versus USSR, Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 95-116.  
 
Brubaker, R., 1985. Rethinking classical sociology: the sociological vision of Pierre 
Bourdieu. Theory and society, 14 (6), 745-775. 
 
Brubaker, R., 1996. Nationalism reframed: nationhood and the national question in 
the New Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Bryman, A., 2004. Social research methods, 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.     
 302 
 
 
Bucheli, M., 2010. Multinational corporations, business groups, and economic 
nationalism: standard oil (New Jersey), Royal Dutch-Shell, and energy politics 
in Chile, 1913-2005. Enterprise and society. 11 (2), 350-399. 
 
Buckley, W., 1967. Sociology and modern systems theory. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice 
Hall.  
 
Bullock, A. and Stallybrass, O., 1977. The Fontana dictionary of modern world 
thought. London: Fontana Books.  
 
Calás, M., and Smircich, L., 1992. Rewriting the gender into organizational   
theorizing: directions from the feminist perspective. In: Reed, M. and Hughs, 
M., eds. Re-thinking organization: new directions in organizational theory and 
analysis. London: Sage Publications, 227-253.    
 
Champagne, P., 2005. “Making the people speak”: on the social uses of and reactions 
to public opinion polls. In: Wacquant, L., ed. Pierre Bourdieu and democratic 
politics. Cambridge: Polity Press, 111-132. 
 
Chapleo, Ch., 2010. Branding a university: adding real value or smoke and mirrors. In: 
Molesworth, M., Scullion, R. and Nixon, E., eds. The marketization of higher 
education and the student as consumer. London: Routledge, 101-114.  
 
Chmielewska, E., 2005. Logos or the resonance of branding: A close reading of the 
iconosphere of Warsaw. Space and culture, 8 (4), 350-380. 
 
Chong, A., and Valencic, J., 2001. Preface. In: Chong, A., Valencic, J., and Hill, Ch., 
eds. Proceedings from conference on the image, the state and international 
relations, 24 June 1999. London: London School of Economics and Political 
Science, 3-6. 
 
Clifton, R., 2002. Brand and our times. Brand management, 9 (2), 157-161. 
 
Cohen, Y., 1986. Media diplomacy. The foreign office in the mass communication age. 
London: Frank Cass. 
 
Combs, J. E. and Nimmo, D., 1993. The new propaganda: the dictatorship of palaver 
in contemporary politics. New York: Longman. 
 
Connors, W., 1972. Nation-building or nation-destroying? World politics, 24 (3), 319-
355. 
 
 303 
 
Cornelissen, J., 2009. Corporate communication: a guide to theory and practice. 2nd 
ed. London: Sage.  
 
Corner, J., 2007. Mediated politics, promotional culture and the idea of ‘propaganda’. 
Media, culture and society, 29 (4), 669-677. 
 
Couldry, N., 2001. The hidden injuries of media power, Journal of consumer 
culture, 1(2), 155–78. 
 
Couldry, N., 2003. Media meta-capital: extending the range of Bourdieu’s field theory. 
Theory and society, 32 (5/6), 653-677. 
 
Courtright, J. L. and Smudde, P. M., 2010. A genre perspective on public relations 
message design. Gainesville: Institute for Public Relations. Available from: 
 http://www.instituteforpr.org/wp-content/uploads/PR_MessageDesign.pdf 
[Accessed 5 May 2011].    
 
Crane, D., 1987. The transformation of the Avant-Garde. Chicago: Chicago University 
Press.  
 
Cronin, A. M., 2004. Regimes of mediation: advertising practitioners as cultural 
intermediaries? Consumption markets and culture, 7 (4), 349-369.  
 
Crossley, N., 2008. Social class. In: Grenfell, M., ed. Pierre Bourdieu: key concepts. 
Stocksfield: Acumen Publishing, 87-99.  
 
Cull, N. J., 2008. The Cold War and the United States Information Agency: American 
propaganda and public diplomacy, 1945-1989. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Cull, N. J., 2009. Public diplomacy before Gullion: the evolution of a phrase. In: 
Snow, N. and Taylor, P. H., eds. Routledge handbook of public diplomacy. New 
York: Routledge, 19-23.     
 
Cull, N. J., Culbert, D. H. and Welch, D., 2004. Propaganda and mass persuasion: a 
historical encyclopaedia, 1500 to the present. Santa Barbara, Calif.; Oxford : 
ABC-CLIO.  
 
Cummings, C. M. Jr., 2003. Cultural diplomacy and the United States government: a 
survey, Washington, D.C: Center for Arts and Culture. 
 
Curran, J., 2002. Media and power. London: Routledge.  
 
 304 
 
Curran, J. and Seaton, J., 2010. Power without responsibility: press, broadcasting, and 
the Internet in Britain, 7th ed. London: Routledge. 
 
Daymon, Ch. and Holloway, I., 2002. Qualitative research methods in public relations 
and marketing communications. London: Routledge. 
 
Daymon, Ch. and Hodges, C. E. M., 2008. Researching the occupational culture of 
public relations in Mexico. Public relations review, 35 (4), 429-433. 
 
de Cillia, R., Reisigl, M. and Wodak, R., 1999. The discursive construction of national 
identities. Discourse and society, 10 (2), 149-173.     
  
de Michelis, L., 2008. Britain™ and corporate “national identity”.  In: Koller, V. and 
Wodak, R., eds.  Handbook of communication and the public sphere. Berlin, 
New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 202-222.  
 
Delanty, G. and O’Mahony, P., 2002. Nationalism and social theory. London: Sage 
Publications. 
 
Denzin, N. K. and Lincoln, Y. S., 2008. Strategies of qualitative inquiry, 3rd ed. 
London: Sage Publications. 
   
Deutsch, K. W., 1966. Nationalism and social communication: an inquiry into the 
foundations of national identity, 2nd ed. London: The MIT Press.  
 
Deutsch, K. W., 1969. Nationalism and its alternatives. New York: Knopf. 
 
Deutsch, K. W. and Foltz, W. J., 1971. Nation building. 4th ed. Chicago, New York: 
Atherton Press. 
 
Dinnie, K., 2005. Conceptualizing nation branding: a qualitative inquiry into an 
under-theorised domain in marketing. Thesis (PhD). Glasgow Caledonian 
University.   
 
Dinnie, K., 2008. Nation branding: concepts, issues, practice. Oxford: Butterworth-
Heinemann. Richardson. 
 
Dizard, W. P. Jr., 2004. Inventing public diplomacy: the story of the United States 
Information Agency. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 
 
Dutta-Bergman, M. J., 2006. U.S. public diplmacy in the Middle East: a critical 
cultural approach. Journal of communication inquiry, 30 (2), 102-124. 
  
 305 
 
Dutton, J. E. and Dukerich, J. M., 1991. Keeping an eye on the mirror: Image and 
identity in organizational adaptation. Academy of management journal, 34 (3), 
517-554. 
 
Dutton, J. E., Durkerich, J. M. and Harquail, C. V., 1994. Organisational images and 
members identification. Administrative science quarterly, 39 (2), 239-269. 
 
Dzenowska, D., 2005. Remaking the nation of Latvia: anthropological perspective on 
nation branding, Place branding and public diplomacy, 1 (2), 173-186.  
 
Eagleton, T., 2007. Ideology: an introduction. London, New York: Verso. 
    
Eder, K., 1993. The new politics of class. London: Sage Publications.  
 
Edwards, L., 2006. Rethinking power in public relations. Public relations review, 32 
(2), 229-231.  
 
Edwards, L., 2007. Exploring power in public relations: a Bourdieusian perspective. 
Thesis (PhD). Leeds Metropolitan University. 
 
Edwards, L., 2008.  PR practitioners’ cultural capital: an initial study and implications 
for research and practice. Public relations review, 34 (4), 367-372.  
 
Ellul, J., 1973. Propaganda: the formation of men’s attitudes. New York: Vintage 
Books. 
 
Entman, R. M., 2004. Projections of power: framing news, public opinion, and U.S. 
foreign policy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.  
 
Entman, R. M., 2008. Theorizing mediated public diplomacy: the U.S. case. The 
international journal of press/politics, 13 (2), 87-102. 
 
Everett, J., 2002. Organisational research and praxeology of Pierre Bourdieu. 
Organisational research methods, 5 (1), 56-80.  
 
Eyal, G., Szelẻnyi, I., and Townsley, E., 2000. Making capitalism without capitalists. 
The new ruling elites in Eastern Europe. London: Verso. 
    
Fan, Y., 2006. Branding the nation: what is being branded? Journal of vocational 
marketing, 12 (1), 5-14. 
 
Featherstone, M., 1991. Consumer culture and postmodernism. London: Sage 
Publications.    
 
 306 
 
Ferguson, M. A., 1984. Building theory in public relations: inter-organizational 
relationships as public relations paradigm. Paper presented to the conference of 
the Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication, August, 
1984. Gainesville, Fl. 
 
Fitzpatrick, K., 2007. Advancing the new public diplomacy: a public relations 
perspective. The Hague journal of diplomacy, 2 (3), 187-211. 
 
Fitzpatrick, K., 2010. The future of US public diplomacy: an uncertain fate. Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers/Brill Academic.  
 
Flora, P., Kuhnle, S., and Urwin, D., 1999. State formation, nation-building, and mass 
politics in Europe: the theory of Stein Rokkan. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
 
Florek, M., 2006. The country brand as a new challenge for Poland. Place branding, 1 
(2), 205-214. 
 
Foucault, M., 1988. The ethic of care for the self as a practice of freedom. In: 
Bernauer J. and Rasmussen G., eds. The final Foucault. Cambridge: MIT Press, 
1-20.  
 
Foucault, M., 2002. The archaeology of knowledge. London & New York: Routledge. 
 
Friedland, L., Shah, D. V., Lee, N. J., Rademacher, M. A., Atkinson, L. and Hove, T., 
2007. Capital, consumption, communication and citizenship: the social 
positioning of taste and civic culture in the United States. The ANNALS of the 
American academy of political and social science, 611 (1), 31-50. 
 
Fukuyama, F., 1993. The end of history and the last man. London: Penguin. 
 
Fullerton, J. and Kendrick, A., 2006. Advertising’s war on terrorism: the story of the 
U.S. State Department’s Shared Value Initiative, Spokane, WA: Marquette 
Books. 
 
Galasińska, A. and Krzyżanowski, M., 2008. Discourse and transformation in Central 
and Eastern Europe. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.  
 
Galbraith, M. H., 2009. Between East and West: geographic metaphors of identity in 
Poland. Ethos, 32 (1), 51-81. 
 
Gellner, E., 1983. Nations and nationalism. Oxford: Blackwell. 
  
Georgescu, A. and Botescu, A., 2004. Branding national identity. Thesis (Master). 
Lund University. 
 
 307 
 
Geertz, C., 1973. The interpretations of cultures. London: Fontana.  
 
Gertner, D., 2007. Place branding: dilemma or reconciliation between political  
 ideology and economic pragmatism? Place branding and public diplomacy, 3 
(1), 3-7.  
 
Gertner, D. and Kotler, P., 2004. How can a place correct a negative image? Place 
branding and public diplomacy, 1 (1), 50-57.  
 
Giddens, A., 1985. The nation-state and violence: a contemporary critique of 
historical materialism. Vol. 2. Cambridge: Polity Press.  
  
Gilboa, E., 2000. Mass communication and diplomacy: a theoretical framework. 
Communication theory, 10 (3), 275-309. 
 
Gilboa, E., 2001. Diplomacy in the media age: three models of uses and effects. 
Diplomacy and statecraft, 12 (2), 1-28. 
 
Gilboa, E., 2002. Global communication and foreign policy. Journal of communication, 
52 (4), 731-748. 
 
Gilboa, E., 2008. Searching for the theory of public diplomacy. The annals of the 
American academy of political and social science, 616, 55-77.  
 
Gilmore, F., 2002. A country – can it be repositioned? Spain – the success story of 
country branding. Brand management, 9 (4-5), 281-293. 
 
Girard, M., 2001. States, diplomacy, and image making: what is new? Reflections on 
current British and French experiences. In: Chong, A. and Valencic, J., eds. The 
image, the state, and international relations: proceedings from the conference 
on 24
th
 June 1999 at London School of Economics: selected papers. London: 
London School of Economics and Political Science, 20-26.   
 
Glover, N., 2009. Imagining community: Sweden in cultural propaganda then and 
now. Scandinavian journal of history, 34 (3), 246-263.  
 
Gnoth, J., 2002. Leveraging export brands thought a tourism destination brand. Brand 
management, 9 (4-5), 262-280. 
 
Goff, P. and Dunn. K., 2004. Identity and global politics – theoretical and empirical 
elaborations. N.Y.: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Goffman, E., 1989. On fieldwork. Journal of contemporary ethnography, 18 (2), 123-
132.  
 
 308 
 
Grainge, P., 2008. Brand Hollywood: selling entertainment in a global media age. 
London: Routledge. 
 
Greenfeld, L., 2003. The spirit of capitalism: nationalism and economic growth. 
Harvard: Harvard University Press. 
 
Grenfell, M., 2008. Pierre Bourdieu: key concepts. Stocksfield: Acumen Publishing.  
 
Greyser, S. A., Balmer, J. M. T. and Urde, M., 2006. The monarchy as a corporate 
brand, European journal of marketing, 40 (7/8), 902-908.  
 
Grunig, J. and Hunt, T., 1984. Managing public relations. Belmont: Thomson 
Learning.  
 
Grunig, J. E. 1992. ed., Excellence in public relations and communication 
management. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.   
 
Grunig, J., 1993. Public relations and international affairs: effects, ethics and 
responsibility. Journal of international affairs, 47 (1), 137-62. 
 
Guibernau, M., 2007. The identity of nations. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
 
Habermas, J., 1984. Theory of communicative action 1: reason and the rationalization  
of society. Boston: Beacon Press.  
 
Hall, S., 1991. Old and new identities, old and new ethnicities. In: King, A. D., ed. 
Culture, globalization and the world-system: contemporary conditions for the 
representation of identity. Binghamton, NY: State University of New York, 41-
68.  
 
Hardin, R., 1995. One for all: the logic of group conflict. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. 
 
Hardy, J. and Clark, N., 2005. EU enlargement, workers, and migration: implications 
for trade unions in UK and Poland. Paper presented at the Global Unions 
Research Network international workshop ‘Trade unions, globalization and 
development – strengthening rights and capabilities of workers’, Novo 
Hamborgo, Brazil, January 2005. Available from: http://www.tuc. org.uk 
/international/tuc-9472-f0.pdf [Accessed 11 January 2012].  
 
Harvey, D., 2005. A brief history of neo-liberalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Hassan, R., 2008. The information society: cyber dreams and digital nightmares. 
Cambridge: Polity Press.  
 
 309 
 
Hastings, A., 1997. The construction of nationhood: ethnicity, religion and 
nationalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Hechter, M., 1975. Internal colonialism: the Celtic fringe in British national 
development, 1536-1966. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
   
Helbling, M., 2007. Re-conceptualizing the construction of nations with Bourdieu’s 
help. Nationalism and national identities today: multidisciplinary perspective, 
12-13 June Surrey, Cronem Conference, 1-30. Available from: http://www. 
surrey.ac.uk/cronem/files/conf2007presand papers/helbling%20paper.pdf 
[Accessed 16 November 2011]. 
 
Held, D. and McGrew, A., 2002. Globalization and anti-globalization. Cambridge: 
Polity Press. 
 
Heller, K. S. and Persson, L. M., 2009. The distinction between public affairs and 
public diplomacy. In: Snow, N. and Taylor, P. M., eds. Routledge handbook of 
public diplomacy. New York: Routledge, 225-232. 
 
Hereźniak, M., 2010. Marka narodowa: jak skutecznie budować wizerunek i reputację 
kraju. Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Ekonomiczne.  
 
Hesmondhalgh, D., 2006. Bourdieu, the media and cultural production. Media, culture 
& society, 28 (2), 211-231.  
 
Hiebert, R. E., 2003. Public relations and propaganda in framing the Iraq war: 
preliminary review. Public relations review, 29 (3), 243-255. 
  
Hobsbawm, E. J., 1990. Nations and nationalism since 1780. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.  
 
Hobsbawm, E. J. and Ranger, T., eds., 1983. The invention of tradition. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.  
 
Hocking, B., 2005. Rethinking the ‘new’ public diplomacy. In: Melissen, J., ed. The 
new public diplomacy: soft power in international relations, 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 28-43.   
 
Hodges C. E. M., 2006. PRP culture: a framework for exploring public relations 
practitioners as cultural intermediaries. Journal of communication management, 
10 (1), 80-93. 
 
Holtzhausen, D. R., 2000. Postmodern values in public relations. Journal of public 
relations research, 12(1), 93–114. 
 
 310 
 
Hopkins, L., 2009. Citizenship and global broadcasting: constructing national, 
transnational and post-national identities. Continuum: journal of media and 
cultural studies, 23 (1), 19-32.   
 
Horváth, T. M., 1997. Decentralization of public administration and provision of 
services: an East Central European view. Environment and planning e-
government policy, 15 (2), 161-175. 
 
Huberman, A. M. and Miles, M. B., 1994. Qualitative data analysis: an expanded 
sourcebook. 2nd ed. London, Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications.   
 
Hutch, M. J., 1993. The dynamics of organizational culture. Academy of management 
review. 18 (4), 657-696. 
 
Innis, H. A., 1972. Empire and communications. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.   
 
Jackson, J. E., Klich, J., and Poznańska, K, 2005. The political economy of Poland’s 
transition: new firms and reform governments. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.  
 
Jansen, S. C., 2008. Designer nations: neo-liberal nation-branding – brand Estonia. 
Social identities: journal for the study of race, nation and culture, 14 (1), 121-
142. 
  
Jasiecki, K., 2004. The role of brand in the promotion of Poland’s image and Polish 
business. Polish foreign affairs digest, 4 (13), 121-149. 
 
Jenkins, R., 2002. Pierre Bourdieu. 2nd ed. London, New York: Routledge.  
  
Jervis, R., 1970. The logic of images in international relations. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. 
 
Jervis, R., 1976. Perception and misperception in international politics. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press.  
 
Jervis, R., Lebow, R. N., and Stein, J. G., 1986. Psychology and deterrence. Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press. 
  
Johnson, H., 1994. Economic nationalism in new states. In: J. Hutchinson and A. D. 
Smith, eds. Nationalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 236-240.  
 
Johnson, J. K., 2011. The curious tale of the Polish plumber: rebranding nations for 
new social and political situations. Advertising and society review, 12 (1). 
 311 
 
Available from: http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/advertising_and_society_  
review/v012/12.1.johnson.html [Accessed 15 November 2011].  
 
Johnson, R. B. and Onwuegbuzie, A. J., 2004. The mixed-method research: a research 
paradigm whose time has come. Educational researcher, 33 (7), 14-26.  
 
Jones, G. H., 2000. Reputation as a reservoir. Corporate reputation review, 3 (1), 21-
29.   
 
Jowett, G. S. and  O’Donnell, V., 1999. Propaganda and persuasion. 3rd ed. London: 
Sage Publications. 
 
Kaneva, N., 2007a. Re-imagining nation as a brand: globalization and national 
identity in post-communist Bulgaria. Thesis (PhD). University of Colorado at 
Boulder. 
   
Kaneva, N., 2007b., Meet the new Europeans: EU accession and branding of Bulgaria. 
Advertising and society review, 8 (4), 1-16. 
  
Kaneva, N., 2011. Nation branding: towards an agenda for critical research. 
International journal of communication, 5, 117-141.  
 
Kaneva, N. and Popescu, D. 2011 National identity lite: nation branding in post-
communist Romania and Bulgaria. International journal of cultural studies, 14 
(2), 191-207. 
   
Kapferer, J. N., 2005. The new strategic brand management. London and Sterling: 
Kogan Page. 
 
Kellner, D., 1995. Media culture. London, New York: Routledge. 
   
King, A., 2000. Thinking with Bourdieu against Bourdieu: a practical critique of 
habitus. Sociological theory, 18 (3), 417-433. 
 
King, L. P. and Sznajder, A., 2006. The state-led transition to neo-liberal capitalism: 
neo-liberal, organizational, world-systems, and social structural explanations of 
Poland’s economic success. American journal of sociology, 112 (3), 751-801.  
 
Kiousis, S. and Wu X., 2008. International agenda building and agenda setting. 
Exploring the influence of public relations counsel on US news media and public 
perceptions of foreign nations. International communication gazette, 70 (1), 58-
75. 
 
Klein, N., 2000. No logo: taking aim at the brand bullies. London: Flamingo. 
 312 
 
 
Kłoskowska, A., 2005. Kultury narodowe u korzeni. Warszawa: Państwowe 
Wydawnictwo Naukowe.  
 
Kolarska-Bobińska, L., 2003. Obraz Polski i Polaków w Europie. Warszawa: Instytut 
Spraw Publicznych, 47-49. 
 
Koschwitz, H., 1986. Diplomatie und Öffentlichkeit. Beiträge zur Konfliktforschung, 
16 (1), 53-68. 
 
Kornberger, M., 2010. Brand society: how brands transform management and 
lifestyle. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
 
Kotler, P., Haider, D. H. and Rein, I., 1993. Marketing places: attracting investment, 
industry, and tourism to cities, states and nations. Oxford: Free Press. 
 
Kotler, P. and Gertner, D., 2002. Country as a brand, product, and beyond: a place 
marketing and brand management perspective. Brand management, 9 (4-5), 249-
261. 
 
Koźmiński, A., 1976. Communication within the enterprises in the socialist economy. 
Paper presented at the Seminaire International Public Relations Association 
Conference, 7 May 1976. Orléans Sud.   
 
Kruckeberg, D. and Starck, K. 1988. Public relations and community: a reconstructed 
theory . New York: Praeger. 
 
Kruckeberg, D. and Vujnowic, M., 2005. Public relations, not propaganda, for US 
public diplomacy in a post-9/11 world: challenges and opportunities. Journal of 
communication management, 9 (4), 296-304. 
 
Kubacki, K. and Skinner, H., 2006. Poland: exploring the relationship between 
national brand and national culture. Brand management, 13 (4-5), 284-299. 
 
Kuhn, T. S., 1996. The structure of scientific revolutions, 3rd ed., Chicago: Chicago 
University Press. 
 
Kukliński, A. and Pawlikowska, K., 1999. Kreowanie wizerunku Polski w świecie. 
Nowy Sącz: Wydawnictwo Wyższej Szkoły Biznesu.  
 
Kunczik, M., 1997. Images of nations and international public relations. New Jersey: 
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
 
Leonard, M., 1997. Britain TM superscript: renewing our identity. London: Demos.  
 313 
 
 
L’Etang, J., 1996. Public relations as diplomacy. In: L’Etang, J. and Pieczka, M., eds. 
Critical perspectives on public relations. London: International Thomson 
Business Press, 14-34. 
 
L’Etang, J., 1998. State propaganda and bureaucratic intelligence: the creation of 
public relations in 20
th 
century Britain. Public relations review, 24 (4), 413-441. 
 
L’Etang, J., 2004. Public Relations in Britain: a history of professional practice in the 
20th
 
century. London: Lawrence Erlbaum. 
 
L’Etang, J., 2006a. Public relations as diplomacy. In: L’Etang, J. and Pieczka, M., eds. 
Public relations: critical debates and contemporary practice. London: Lawrence 
Erlbaum, 373-388. 
 
L’Etang, J., 2006b. Public relations and propaganda: conceptual issues, 
methodological problems, and public relations discourse. In: L’Etang, J. and 
Pieczka, M., eds. Public relations: critical debates and contemporary practice. 
London: Lawrence Erlbaum, 23-40. 
 
L’Etang, J. and Pieczka, M., eds., 1996. Critical perspectives in public relations. 
Boston:  International Thomson Business Press. 
 
L’Etang, J. and Pieczka, M., eds., 2006. Public relations. Critical debates and 
contemporary practice. London: Lawrence Erlbaum. 
 
Lane, J. F., 2006. Bourdieu’s politics: problems and possibilities. London: Routledge. 
 
Lasswell, R., 1934. Propaganda. In: Seligman, E.R.A. and Johnson, A., eds. 
Encyclopaedia of the social sciences, Vol. 12. New York: Macmillan, 521–528. 
 
Lee K. and Carter, S., 2005. Global marketing management: changes, challenges and 
new strategies. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press.  
 
Lerner, D., 1958. The passing of traditional society: modernization in the Middle East. 
Glencoe, IL: The Free Press. 
 
Lilleker, D. and Scullion, R., 2003. Voters or consumers: imagining the contemporary 
electorate. Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.   
 
Lilleker, D. G., 2006. Key concepts in political communication. Sage: London.   
 
Lin, N., 2001. Social capital: theory of social structure and action. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
 314 
 
Livingstone, S., 1997. Clarifying the CNN effect: an examination of media effects 
according to type of military intervention. Harvard Research Paper R-18, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts: Joan Shorenstein Barone Center on the Press. 
 
Longino, H., 1996. Subjects, power, and knowledge: description and prescription in 
feminist philosophies of science. In: Keller, E. F. and Longino, H., eds. 
Feminism and science. New York: Oxford University Press, 264-279. 
 
Lord, C. 1998. The past and future of public diplomacy. Orbis, 42, 49-72.  
     
Madianou, M., 2005. Mediating the nation: news, audiences, and the politics of 
identity. London: UCL Press.  
 
Malinowski, B., 1984. Argonauts of the western Pacific. Prospects Heights, IL: 
Waveland.  
 
Manheim, J. B., 1994. Strategic public diplomacy. The evolution and influence. 
Oxford:  Oxford University Press. 
 
Manheim, J. B. and Albritton, R. B., 1984. Changing national images: international 
public relations and media agenda settings. American political science review, 78 
(3), 641-657. 
 
Marliĕre, P., 1998. The rules of the journalistic field: Pierre Bourdieu’s contribution to 
the sociology of the media. European journal of communication, 3 (2), 219-234. 
 
Marion, G., 2006. Marketing ideology and criticism: legitimacy and legitimization. 
Marketing theory, 6 (2), 245-262. 
 
Martin-Barbero, J. 1998. Communication from culture: the crisis of the nations and 
the emergence of the popular. Media, culture and society, 10 (4), 447-465.   
   
Mark, L. S., 2010. Rethinking cultural diplomacy: the cultural diplomacy of New 
Zealand, the Canadian Federation and Quebec. Political science, 62 (1), 62-83.  
 
Maton, K., 2003. Pierre Bourdieu and the epistemic conditions of social scientific 
knowledge. Space and culture, 6 (1), 52-65.  
 
Maton, K., 2008. Habitus. In: Grenfell, M., ed. Pierre Bourdieu: key concepts. 
Stocksfield: Acumen Publishing Limited, 49-65.  
 
McFall, L., 2002. What about the old cultural intermediaries? An historical review of 
advertising producers. Cultural studies, 16 (4), 532–552. 
 
 315 
 
McLuhan, M., 2001. Understanding media: the extension of man. 9th ed. Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, MIT Press.  
  
McNeil, D., 2004. New Europe: imagined spaces. London: Hodder Arnold.  
 
Melissen, J., 2005a, Public diplomacy in tandem with branding. In: Government 
communication: the Dutch experience. Government Information Service, 
Ministry of General Affairs. The Hague: Opmeer Printing. 
 
Melissen, J., 2005b. The new public diplomacy: soft power in international relations. 
Basingstoke:  Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Mellor, N., 2008. Arab journalists as cultural intermediaries. The international journal 
of press/politics, 13 (4), 465-483. 
 
Mercer, J., 1996. Reputation in international politics. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
  
Michlic, J. B., 2006. Poland’s threatening others: the image of the Jew from 1880 to 
the present. Lincoln and London:  University of Nebraska Press. 
 
Mickey, T. J., 1997. A post-modern view of public relations: sign and reality. Public 
relations review, 23 (3), 271-284.  
 
Miyoshi, M., 1993. A borderless world? From colonialism to transnationalism and the 
decline of the nation-state. Critical inquiry, 19 (4), 726-751. 
  
Moloney, K., 1997.  Government and lobbying activities. In: Kitchen, P., ed. Public 
relations principles and practice. London: Thomson Business Press, p. 168-177. 
 
Moloney, K., 2000. Rethinking public relations: the spin and the substance. London: 
Routledge. 
 
Moloney, K., 2006. Rethinking public relations: PR propaganda and democracy. 2nd 
ed. London: Routledge. 
 
Moloney, K., 2007. Is political marketing new words or new practice in UK politics? 
Journal of political marketing? 6 (4), 51-65. 
 
Moloney, K., 2009. Public affairs. In: Tench, R. and Yeomans, L., eds. Exploring 
public relations. Harlow: Pearson Education Limited, 441-461.  
 
Moloney, K., Richards, B., Scullion, R. and Daymon, C., 2003. Mapping the 
production of political communications: a model to assist in understanding the 
 316 
 
relationships between the production and consumption of political messages. 
Journal of public affairs, 3 (2), 166-175. 
 
Montoya, P. and Vandehey, T., 2003. The personal branding phenomenon. New York: 
Millennium Advertising. 
 
Morgan, N., Pritchard, A. and Piggott, R., 2002. New Zealand, 100% pure. The 
creation of a powerful niche destination brand. Brand management, 9 (4-5), 335-
354. 
 
Morrow, R., 1994. Critical theory and methodology. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage 
Publications.  
  
Mosco, V., 2009. Political economy of communication. 2nd. ed. London: Sage 
Publications.   
 
Myles, J. 1999. From habitus to mouth: language and class in Bourdieu’s sociology of 
language. Theory and society, 28 (6), 879-901. 
 
Nagashima, A., 1977. A competitive ‘made in’ product image survey among Japanese 
businessman. Journal of marketing, 41 (3), 95-100. 
 
North, D. C., 1981. Structure and change in economic history. New York: W. W. 
Norton. 
 
Nye, J. S. Jr., 1990. Bound to lead: the changing nature of American power. New 
York: Basic Books. 
 
 
Nye, J., S. Jr., 2004. Soft power and American foreign policy. Political science 
quarterly, 119 (2), 255-270.  
   
O’Reilly, D., 2006. Commentary: branding ideology. Marketing theory, 6 (2), 263-
271. 
 
O’Shaughnessy, J. and O’Shaughnessy, N. J., 2000. Treating the nation as a brand: 
some neglected issues. Journal of macromarketing, 20 (1), 56-64. 
 
Ociepka, B., 2003. Dla kogo telewizja? Model publiczny w postkomunistycznej 
Europie Środkowej. Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego. 
 
Ociepka, B., ed., 2005. Kształtowanie wizerunku. Wrocław: University of Wrocław. 
 
 317 
 
Ociepka, B., 2008. Re-branding Russia: a neighbour’s perspective. Russian journal of 
communication, 2(2), 212-214.  
 
Ociepka, B. and Ryniejska, M., 2005. Public diplomacy and EU enlargement: the case 
of Poland. Clingendael discussion paper in diplomacy, The Hague, The 
Clingendael Institute.  
 
Olins, W., 1999. Trading identities: why countries and companies are taking on each 
other’s roles? London: The Foreign Policy Centre. 
 
Olins, W., 2002a. Branding the nation: the historical context. The journal of brand 
management, 9 (4-5), 241-249. 
 
Olins, W., 2002b. On Brand. London: Thames & Hudson. 
 
Olins, W., 2005. Making a national brand. In: Melissen, J., ed. The new public 
diplomacy: soft power in international relations. Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 169-178. 
 
Olins, W., 2008. The nation and the brand and the nation as a brand. In: The thought 
leaders – international conference on brand management, 15-16 April 2008 
Birmingham.  
 
Ostaszewski, J., 1971. Modern Poland between east and west. London: The Polish 
School of Political and Social Science. 
 
Pachulska, B., 2005. Polish democracy in transition. Political studies, 53 (4), 816-832.  
 
Pickle, A., 2003. Explaining, and explaining with, economic nationalism. Nations and 
nationalism, 9 (1), 105-127.  
 
Pike, S., 2008. Destination marketing: an integrated marketing communication 
approach. Oxford: Elsevier Butterworth-Heinemann. 
 
Plaisance, P. L., 2005. The propaganda war on terrorism: an analysis of the United 
States’ "Shared Values" public-diplomacy campaign after September 11, 2001. 
Journal of mass media ethics, 20 (4), 250-268. 
 
Ponsonby, A., 1928. Falsehood in wartime: propaganda lies of the First World War. 
Costa Mesa: Institute of Historical Review. 
 
Porter, B., 2001. The Catholic nation: religion, identity, and the narratives of Polish 
history, The Slavic and east European journal, 45 (2), 289-299.  
 
 318 
 
Porter, B., 2002. When nationalism begun to hate: imaging modern politics in nineteen 
century Poland. New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
 
Pounds, N. J. G., 1964. Poland between East and West. Princeton: Reinchold. 
 
Price, M. E., 1995. Television, the public sphere, and national identity. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.  
 
Prizel, I., 1998. National identity and foreign policy. Nationalism and leadership in 
Poland, Ukraine and Russia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Rae, H., 2002. State identities and the homogenization of peoples. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Raftowicz-Filipkiewicz, M., 2009a. Znaczenie brandingu narodowego w podnoszeniu 
konkurecyjności gospodarki Polski. Thesis, (PhD). Uniwersytet Wrocławski.  
 
Raftowicz-Filipkiewicz, M., 2009b. Efekty polityki brandingu narodowego w Polsce. 
In: Winiarski, M., ed. Nowe idee początku XXI wieku. Vol. 1. Prace Naukowe 
Wydziału Prawa i Administracji Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, Wrocław, 103-
115. 
 
Reckwitz, A., 2002. Toward a theory of social practices. A development in culturalist 
theorizing. European journal of social theory, 5 (2), 243-263. 
 
Reeves, P., de Chernatony, L.  and Carrigan, M., 2006. Building a political brand: 
ideology or voter-driven strategy. Journal of brand management, 13 (6), 418-
428. 
 
Richards, B., 2004. Terrorism and public relations. Public relations review, 30 (2), 
169-176.  
 
Riggs, F. W., 1997. Modernity and bureaucracy. Public administration review, 57 (4), 
347-353.  
 
Ritzer, G., 2008. The McDonaldization of society. London: Pine Forge Press. 
 
Robins, K. and Aksoy, A., 2001. From spaces of identity to mental spaces: lessons 
from Turkish-Cypriot cultural experience in Britain. Journal of ethnic and 
migration studies, 27 (4), 685-711.  
 
Rokkan, S., 1975. Dimension of state building and nation-building. In: Tilly, C., ed. 
The formation of nation states in Western Europe. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 562-600. 
 319 
 
  
Roy, I. S., 2007. Words apart: nation-branding on the National Geographic channel. 
Media, culture and society, 29 (4), 569-592. 
 
Rusciano, F. L., 1997. The impact of ‘world opinion’ on national identity, The 
Harvard international journal of press/politics, 2 (3), 71-92. 
 
Rusciano, F. L., 1998. World opinion and the emerging international order. London: 
Praeger. 
 
Rusciano, F. L., 2003. The construction of national identity: a 23 nation study. 
Political research quarterly, 56 (3), 361-366. 
 
Rusciano, F., 2004. World opinion and the imagined international community. 
International journal of the humanities, 1, 563-572. 
 
Russell, A., 2007. Digital communication networks and the journalistic field: the 2005 
French riots. Critical studies in media communication, 24 (4), 285-302. 
 
Samli, A. C. and Jermakowicz, W., 1983. The stages of marketing evolution in East 
European countries. European journal of marketing, 17 (2), 26-33. 
 
Scamell, P. and Cardiff, D., 1991. A social history of broadcasting, Vol. 1, 1922-1939: 
serving the nation, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.  
 
Schiller, D., 1996. Theorizing communication: a history. New York: Oxford 
University Press.  
 
Schultz, M., Antorini, Y. M. and Csaba, F. F., 2005. Corporate branding: purpose, 
people, process. Copenhagen: Copenhagen Business School. 
 
Schwartzmantel, J. J., 2006. Class and nation: problems of socialist nationalism.   
        Political studies, 35 (2), 235-255.   
 
Scott, J., 1990.  A matter of record. Cambridge: Polity.  
 
Seaton-Watson, H., 1977. Nations and states: an inquiry into the origins of nations 
and the politics of nationalism. Boulder: Westview Press. 
 
Seib, P. M., 1997. Headline diplomacy: how news coverage affects foreign policy. 
Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group.  
 
Sieb, P. 2010. Towards the new public diplomacy: redirecting the U.S. foreign policy. 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.  
 
 320 
 
Seers, D., 1983. The political economy of nationalism. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
 
Shah, H., 2003. Communication and nation building: comparing US models of ethnic 
assimilation and ‘Third World’ modernization. International communication 
gazette, 65 (2), 165-181. 
 
Sherman, J. C., 2007. Rationalist and constructivist perspectives on reputation. 
Political studies, 55 (1), 20-37.  
 
Shields, S., 2003. The ‘charge of the right brigade’. Transnational social forces and the 
neoliberal configuration of Poland’s transition. New political economy, 8 (2), 
225-244.  
 
Shields, S., 2007. From socialist Solidarity to populist neoliberalisation? The 
paradoxes of Poland’s postcommunist transition. Capital and class, 31 (93), 101-
121. 
 
Shields, S., 2008. How the East was won: transnational social forces and the 
neoliberalisation of Poland’s post-communist transition. Global society, 22 (4), 
445-468.  
 
Shirley, M., 1999. Bureaucrats in business: the roles of privatization and 
corporatization in state-owned enterprises reform. World development , 27 (1), 
115-136.  
 
Sidorenko, E., 1998. Neo-liberalism after communism: constructing a sociological 
account of the political space of post1989 Poland. Thesis (PhD). University of 
London.  
 
Signitzer, B. H. and Commbs, T., 1992. Public relations and public diplomacy: 
conceptual convergences. Public relations review, 18 (2), 137-147. 
 
Signitzer, B. and Wamser, C., 2006. Public diplomacy: a specific governmental 
function. In: Botan, C. and Hazelton, V., eds. Public relations theory II. London, 
Mahwah, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum, 435-464. 
 
Silverman, D., 2006. Interpreting qualitative data: methods for analysing talk, text 
and interaction. 3rd ed. London: Sage Publications. 
 
Silverstone, R., 2005. The sociology of mediation and communication. In: Calhoun, 
C., Rojek, C. and Turner, B., eds. The Sage handbook of sociology. London: 
Sage Publishing, 188–207.  
  
Sklair, L., 2001. The transnational capitalist class. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. 
  
 321 
 
Sklair, L., 2002. Globalization: capitalism and its alternatives. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.  
 
Smith, A. D., 1971. Theories of nationalism. London: Gerald Duckworth. 
 
Smith, A. D., 1990. Towards a global culture? Theory, culture and society, 7 (1), 171-
191. 
 
Smith, A. D., 1991. National identity. London: Penguin Books. 
 
Smith, A. D., 1995. Nations and nationalism in a global era. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
  
Smith, A. D., 2000. The nation in history: historiographical debates about ethnicity 
and nationalism. Hanover, NH: University Press of New England. 
 
Smith, A. D., 2001. Nationalism: key concepts. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
 
Smith, M., Little, R. and Shackleton, M., eds., 1981. Perspectives on world politics. 
London:  The Open University Press. 
 
Snow, N., 1998. The Smith-Mundt Act of 1948. Peace review, 10 (4), 619-625. 
 
Snow, N., 2003. Information war. American propaganda, free speech and opinion 
control since 9/11. New York: Steve Stories Press. 
 
Snow, N. and Taylor, P., M., 2006. The revival of the propaganda state. US 
propaganda at home and abroad since 9/11. The international communication 
gazette, 68 (5-6), 389-407. 
 
Snow, N. and Taylor, P., 2009. Routledge handbook of public diplomacy. New York: 
Routledge.  
 
Spinner-Halev, J. and Theiss-Morse, E., 2003. National identity and self-esteem. 
Perspectives on politics, 1(3), 515-532. 
 
Staar, R., 1988. Public diplomacy: USA versus USSR. Stanford, CA: Hoover 
Institution Press.  
 
Stake, R. E., 2008. Qualitative case study. In: Denzin, N., K. and Lincoln, Y. S., eds. 
Strategies of qualitative inquiry. London: Sage Publishing, 119-149.  
 
Staniszkis, J., 2003. Władza globalizacji. Warszawa: Scholar.  
 
Stiegler, B., 2010. For a new critique of a political economy. Cambridge: Polity Press.  
 
 322 
 
Storey, J., 2008. Cultural theory and popular culture: a reader. 4th ed. London: 
Longman.  
 
Stopford, J., Strange, S. and Henley, J. S. 1991. Rival states, rival firms: competition 
for world market shares. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Stouffer, S. A., 1941. Notes of the case study and the unique case. Sociometry 
(November), 4, 349-357.   
 
Surowiec, P., 2007. The new Polish conservative government (2005-), its media 
coverage in the British press and implications for perception of Poland as a 
country. In: Zarychta, A. and Donaj, Ł., eds. Media a polityka. Łódź: Wyższa 
Szkoła Studiów Międzynarodowych, 93-103. 
 
Surowiec, P. 2012. Toward corpo-nationalism: Poland as a brand. In: Kaneva, N. ed., 
Branding post-communist nations: marketizing national identities in the “new” 
Europe. Routledge: New York, 124-144.   
 
Swartz, D., 1997. Culture and power. The sociology of Pierre Bourdieu. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press.  
 
Swartz, D., 2004. The state as the central bank of symbolic credit. Paper presented at 
the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association, San Francisco, 
CA. Available from: http://www.bu.edu/av/core/swartz/asa-2004-paper-State-as-
the-central-bank-of-symbolic-credit-rev1.doc  [Accessed 16 November 2011].  
 
Synghel, K., Speaks, M., and Beric, F., 2002. City branding: image building and 
building images. Rotterdam: NAI Publishers. 
 
Szabo, T. 1993. The end and renewal of ideology in Central Europe and Hungary. 
History of European Ideas, 17 (6), 747-53. 
 
Szczepanik, K., 2005. Dyplomacja Polski 1918-2005 – struktury organizacyjne. 
Warszawa: Askon. 
Szczepankiewicz, J., 2006. From public diplomacy to a brand of Poland. In: Kuźniar, 
R., ed. Yearbook of Polish foreign policy. Warsaw: Polish Institute of 
International Affairs, 269-279. 
 
Szondi, G., 2006. International context of public relations. In: Tench, R. and 
Yeomans, L., eds. Exploring public relations. Harlow: Pearson Education 
Limited, 112 – 139. 
 
 323 
 
Szondi, G., 2007. The role of challenges of country branding in transition countries: 
the Central European experience. Place branding and public diplomacy, 3 (1), 8-
20. 
   
Szondi, G., 2009a. Public diplomacy and nation branding: conceptual similarities and 
differences, Clindendael discussion papers in diplomacy (October), The Hague, 
The Clindendael Institute. 
 
Szondi, G., 2009b. Central and Eastern European public diplomacy: a transitional 
perspective on national reputation management. In: Snow, N. and Taylor, P. M., 
eds. Routledge handbook of public diplomacy. New York: Routledge, 292-313.  
 
Szondi, G., 2010. From image management to relationship building: a public relations 
approach to nation branding. Place branding and public diplomacy, 6 (4), 333-
343.  
 
Sztompka, P., 1993. The sociology of social change. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.  
 
Sztompka, P.,1996. Trust and emerging democracy. International sociology, 11 (1), 
37-62.       
 
Sztompka, P., 1999. Trust: a sociological theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
 
Taithe, B. and Thornton, M., 1999. Propaganda: political rhetoric and identity, 1300-
2000. Stroud: Sutton Publishing.  
 
Tallents, S., 1932. The projections of England. London: Faber and Faber Ltd. 
 
Taylor, M., 2000. Toward a public relations approach to nation building, Journal of 
public relations research, 12 (2), 179-210. 
 
Taylor, M. and Kent, M., L., 2006. Public relations theory and practice in nation 
building. In: Botan, C. and Hazelton, V., eds. Public relations theory II. London, 
Mahwah, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum, 341-359. 
 
Taylor, P. M., 1981. The projection of Britain: British overseas publicity and 
propaganda 1919-1939. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Taylor, P. M., 1999. British propaganda in the twentieth century: selling democracy. 
Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.  
 
Tench, R. and Yeomans, L., 2009. Exploring public relations. 2nd ed. Harlow: 
Prentice Hall. 
 324 
 
 
Tomlinson, J., 2007. Globalization and cultural analysis. In: Held, D. and McGrew, 
A., eds. Globalization theory: approaches and controversies. Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 148-168. 
  
Traverse-Healy, T., 1988. The credibility factor and diplomacy: a public relations 
perspective on public affairs, Koeppler Memorial Lecture, Baylor University, 
Waco, TX, 15 November, unpublished lecture. 
 
Tuch,  H. N., 1990. Communicating with the world: U.S. public diplomacy overseas. 
New York: St. Martin's Press. 
 
Van Ham, P., 2001. The rise of the brand state: the postmodern politics of image and 
reputation. Foreign affairs, 80 (5), 2-5. 
 
Van Ham, P., 2002. Branding territory: inside the wonderful words of PR and IR 
theory. Millennium: journal of international studies, 31 (2), 249-269. 
 
Van Ham, P., 2003. War, lies, and videotape: public diplomacy and the USA’s war on 
terrorism. Security dialogue, 34 (4), 427-444. 
 
Van Ham, P., 2005. Branding European power. Place branding, 1 (2), 122-126. 
 
Van Ham, P., 2008. Place branding: the state of the art. The annals of American 
academy of political and social science, 616, 126-149. 
 
Von Eschen, P. M., 2005. Enduring public diplomacy. American quarterly, 57 (2), 
335-343. 
 
Vertzberger, Y. Y. I., 1989. The world in their minds: information processing, cognition 
and perception in foreign policy decision making. Stanford, California: Stanford 
University Press.  
 
Viosca, R. Ch., Bergiel, B. J. and Balsmeier, P., 2005. Country equity. Journal of 
promotion management, 12 (1), 85-95.  
 
Volcic, Z., 2008. Former Yugoslavia on the world wide web: commercialization and 
branding of nation-states. International communication gazette, 70 (5), 395-413.  
 
Wacquant, L. D., 1989. Towards a reflexive sociology: a workshop with Pierre 
Bourdieu. Sociological theory, 7 (1), 26-63.   
 
 325 
 
Walicki, A., 1996. Poland between East and West: the controversies over self-
definition and modernization in partitioned Poland. Harvard papers in Ukrainian 
studies. Harvard: Harvard University Press. 
 
Wallerstein, I., 1979. The capitalist world-economy. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Walt, S. M., 1998. International relations: one world, many theories. Foreign policy, 
110 (spring), 29-32+34-46. 
 
Wang, J., 2005. Consumer nationalism and corporate reputation in the global era. 
Corporate communications: an international journal, 10 (3), 223-239.  
 
Wang, J., 2006. Managing national reputation and international relations in the global: 
public diplomacy revisited. Public relations review, 32 (2), 91-96. 
 
Wang, J. and Chang, T. K., 2004. Strategic public diplomacy and local press: how a 
high-profile “head-of-state” visit was covert in American’s heartland. Public 
relations review, 30 (1), 11-24. 
 
Waquant, J. D., 1989. Towards a reflexive sociology: a workshop with Pierre 
Bourdieu. Sociological theory, 7 (1), 26-63.   
 
Weber, M., 1949. Objectivity in social science and social policy. In: Shils, E. A. and 
Finch, H. A., eds. The methodology of the social sciences. New York: Free Press, 
48-111. 
 
Weinwright, S. P., Williams C., and C., Turner, B. S., 2006. Varieties of habitus and 
the embodiment of ballet. Qualitative research, 6 (4), 535-558.  
  
Wendt, A., 1999. Social theory of international politics. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Wernick, A., 1991. Promotional culture. London: Sage Publications.  
 
Wilkie, W. and Moore, E., 2003. Scholarly research in marketing: exploring the ‘4 
Eras’ of thought development. Journal of public policy & marketing, 22 (2): 
116-146. 
 
Wilkiewicz, Z., 2003. Poland vs. European identity. The Polish foreign affairs digest, 
4 (9), 97-108. 
 
Williams, R., 1977. Marxism and literature. New York: Oxford University Press.  
 
 326 
 
Wilcox, D. L., Ault, P. H. and Agee, W. K., 1989. Public relations strategies and 
tactics. New York: Harper & Row.  
 
Wodak, R., de Cillia, R., Reisigl, M. and Liebhart, K., eds. 1999. The discursive 
construction of national identity. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.  
 
Yin, R. K., 2009. Case study research: design and methods. 4th ed. Beverly Hills, CA: 
Sage Publications.  
 
Yun, S. H., 2005. Towards theory building for comparative public diplomacy from 
perspective of public relations and international relations: a macro-comparative 
study of embassies in Washington D. C. Thesis (PhD). University of Maryland. 
 
Yun, S. H., 2006. Toward public relations theory-based study of public diplomacy: 
testing the applicability of the excellence study. Journal of public relations 
research, 18 (4), 287-312. 
 
Zarycki, T., 2004. Uses of Russia: the role of Russia in the modern Polish national 
identity. East European politics and society, 18 (4), 595-627. 
 
Zhang, J., 2005. Targeted foreign direct investment promotion strategy: attracting the 
“right” FDI for development. Paper presented at the first annual conference on 
development and change, Neernrana, India. Available from: 
http://www.policyinnovations.org/ideas/policy_library/data/01179/_res/id=sa_Fi
le1/ [Accessed 16 November 2011].  
 
Zhang, J., 2006. Public diplomacy as symbolic interactions: a case of Asian tsunami 
relief campaigns. Public relations review, 32 (1), 26-32. 
 
Zhang, J. and Swartz, B. Ch., 2008. Toward a model of NGO media diplomacy in the 
internet age: case study of Washington profile. Public relations review, 35 (1), 
47-55.  
 
Žižek, S., 1999. Carl Schmitt in the age of post-politics. In: Mouffe, Ch., ed. The 
Challenge of Carl Schmitt, London: Verso, 18-37. 
 
Znoykiewicz, P., 2008. Polska marka na arenie międzynarodowej. Stosunki 
międzynarodowe, 1/2 (37), 29-45. 
 
 
 
 
 
 327 
 
TABLE 1 LIST OF PILOT STUDY INTERVIEWEES (10 interviews; n=12) 
 
Name given Position Agent/Department No. Date 
Length 
(min.) 
1 Krzysztof Chair 
Institute of Polish 
Brand 
1 02/04/08 110 
2 Michael Chairman 
Saffron Brand 
Consultancy 
1 14/04/08 10 
3 Jim Brand consultant 
Saffron Brand 
Consultancy 
1 25/07/08 25 
4 Adam Managing director 
Brand Nature 
Access 
1 02/04/08 47 
4 Paweł Creative director 
Brand Nature 
Access 
1 02/04/08 - 
5 Marcin CEO 
Ciszewski Public 
Relations 
1 04/04/08 37 
6 Krystyna Editor 
Polish Ministry of 
Foreign 
Affairs/Department 
of Promotion 
1 
04/04/08 
30 
6 Małgorzata Editor 
Polish Ministry of 
Foreign 
Affairs/Department 
of Promotion 
1 04/04/08 
- 
7 Wojciech Press Officer 
Polish Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 
/London Embassy 
1 21/12/07 
22 
8 Ewa Press Officer PMFA/DE 1 01/04/08 24 
9 Dominika Manager PIIA/DNM 1 03/04/08 27 
10 Mariusz Consultant PTO/DMS 1 04/04/08 46 
Total: 378 
 
TABLE 2 MAIN FIELDWORK LIST OF INTERVIEWEES (48 interviews; n=43) 
 
Name given Position Agent/Department No. Date 
Length 
(min.) 
1 Michael Chairman Saffron Brand 
Consultancy 
1 20/04/10 45 
2 Maciej Deputy chairman 
Polish Chamber of 
Commerce 
1 03/09/09 51 
3 Krzysztof Chairperson Institute of Polish Brand 2 
17/08/09; 
09/09/09 
100 
4 Magdalena Consultant 
Polish Chamber of 
Commerce 
1 27/07/09 34 
5 Darek Project manager 
Polish Chamber of 
Commerce 
1 27/07/09 45 
6 Natalia CEO New Communication 2 
12/08/09; 
10/09/09 
98 
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7 Arkadiusz Managing director Ad Press 1 05/08/09 43 
8 Łukasz Managing director Stafiej and Partners 1 25/08/09 86 
9 Mirosław Director Ad Press 1 05/08/09 85 
10 Tymoteusz Managing director Corporate Profiles 1 13/04/10 57 
11 Igor Creative director Eskadra Group 1 31/08/09 65 
12 Piotr Creative director Grandeskochones 1 20/08/09 47 
13 Tomasz CEO 
Communication 
Unlimited 
1 09/09/09 57 
14 Teofil General manager 
Advertising Agencies 
Association 
1 19/08/09 30 
15 Franciszek Marketer/consultant 
Institute of Adam 
Mickiewicz 
1 11/08/09 40 
16 Gwidon 
Head of 
communication 
Institute of Adam 
Mickiewicz 
1 09/09/09 28 
17 Jerzy  Managing director Orbita New Media 1 19/08/09 26 
18 Beata Head analyst Institute of Public Affairs 1 12/08/09 15 
19 Barbara Director Ministry of Finance 1 10/09/09 20 
20 Władysław Ambassador 
Polish Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 
1 28/07/09 80 
21 Zofia Director 
Polish Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs/ 
Department of Public and 
Cultural Diplomacy 
2 
19/08/09; 
08/04/10 
72 
22 Grzegorz 
former Deputy 
chairman 
Polish Information and 
Foreign Investment 
Agency 
1 01/09/09 80 
23 Jacek Deputy Chairman 
Polish Information and 
Foreign Investment 
Agency 
1 02/09/09 45 
24 Edyta Director 
Polish Information and 
Foreign Investment 
Agency\ Department of 
Economic Promotion 
1 08/09/09 45 
25 Wioletta Director 
Polish Information and 
Foreign Investment 
Agency\ Department of 
Economic Intelligence 
1 06/08/09 45 
26 Wanda 
Head of public 
relations 
Polish Information and 
Foreign Investment 
Agency\ Press Office 
1 10/08/09 65 
27 Henryk Chief expert 
Polish Agency for 
Enterprise and 
1 29/08/10 50 
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Development\Expo 
Exhibition Office  
27 Justyna 
Head of public 
relations 
Polish Agency for 
Enterprise and 
Development\Expo 
Exhibition Office 
1 29/08/10 50 
28 Jarosław Managing director 
Institute of Adam 
Mickiewicz 
1 22/04/10 63 
29 Agnieszka Project coordinator 
Institute of Adam 
Mickiewicz 
1 03/08/10 42 
30 Bronisław Head of press office 
Institute of Adam 
Mickiewicz 
1 21/04/10 34 
31 Daniel Deputy chairman 
Polish Tourism 
Organization\Department 
of Marketing Strategy 
1 31/08/09 78 
32 Kinga Deputy director 
Polish Tourism 
Organization\Department 
of Marketing Strategy 
1 
20/08/09; 
21/04/10 
138 
33 Miłka Deputy director 
Polish Tourism 
Organization\Department 
of Marketing Instruments 
1 21/08/09 23 
34 Igor Advisor 
Polish Tourism 
Organization\Department 
of Marketing Strategy 
2 
11/08/09; 
16/04/10 
101 
35 Aleksandra Spokesperson 
Polish Tourism 
Organization/Press Office 
1 30/07/10 61 
36 Tadeusz Director 
Polish Ministry of 
Economics/Department 
of Support Instruments 
1 14/09/09 20 
37 Julia Deputy Director  
National Center of 
Culture 
1 24/07/10 60 
38 Wojciech 
National 
communication 
coordinator 
PL.2012/Department of 
Promotion 
2 
11/09/09; 
27/07/10 
60 
39 Teodor 
Public relations 
consultant 
Freelancer/unemployed 1 14/04/10 60 
40 Leon Deputy Chairman 
Young and Rubicam 
Poland 
2 
15/09/09; 
28/07/10 
76 
41 Marta Chairman Open Arts Project 1 20/04/10 64 
42 Agata Managing director  Citybell Consulting 1 28/07/10 54 
Total: 
2556 
min. 
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APPENDIX 1 GLOSSARY OF KEY BOURDIEUSIAN TERMS USED IN THIS THESIS  
 
CAPITALS (TYPES OF) Bourdieu is often thought of as a neo-capitalist as in his 
understanding of society he considers other than economic capital types of resources. 
They are socially scarce goods and values that co-construct social spaces. Apart from 
economic capital, he frequently speaks of ‘symbolic capital’; social capital’, ‘cultural 
capital’, but also ‘political capital’ and ‘intellectual capital’.   
 
CULTURAL INTERMEDIARIES It is a term that refers to groups of professionals, 
who, in their occupational positions produce symbolic goods and services. Their key 
features have been spoken of by Bourdieu as based on presentation and representation 
abilities. 
 
DOXA Originally a Greek word for ‘belief’ or ‘popular opinion’, but Pierre Bourdieu 
used it to explain truths taken for granted in any particular society. Bourdieu tends to 
speak of them those beliefs as ‘natural’ or as ‘self-evident’.  
 
FIELD Or ‘champ’ in French. Within the Bourdieu’s body of work, it signifies a 
social space in which various actors are engaged in specific practices. Fields are fairly 
homogeneous and structured by resources and subjective relationships.  
   
HABITUS It is an analytical concept used by Bourdieu to describe a set of identities 
characterising a specific group of actors. For Bourdieu habitus, primarily relates to 
cultural characteristics and dispositions developed by actors over time and it is a driver 
of their practices. The notion of habitus is frequently considered as a mechanism for 
understanding differences between classes of agents. On the one hand, it is a feature 
shaping their social agency and, on the other hand, manifesting collective identities.  
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HEXIS Originally, a Greek word for ‘having’ or ‘possession’. In Bourdieu’s body of 
work it is used as ‘bodily hexis’ and refers to peoples’ embodied practical sense of 
social orientation.  
 
HETERODOXA It refers the emergence of the new, competing beliefs on social 
phenomena which entail a move from practical action to discursive exchanges. It leads 
to the situation of social change, which is mediated by dominant, taken for granted 
social order.   
 
ORTHODOXA It refers to the situation where the arbitrariness of ‘what is taken for 
granted’ (doxa) is recognised, but accepted in practice by social actors in their fields.  
 
PRAXIS It refers to the whole body of human action, including the process of 
engaging, applying, exercising, reflecting and practicing.  
 
PRAXEOLOGY It is a study of action that Bourdieu describes as a type of universal 
anthropology. Praxeology, according to Bourdieu, takes under consideration historical 
conditions and highlights relativity of social structures, while recording the ways 
participants of social life form those historical structures.  
 
SYMBOLIC POWER It is a type of power that has the ability to shape a legitimate 
vision of the social world and its division; it tends to legitimize political and economic 
relations and contributes towards to the reproduction of social arrangements.  
 
SYMBOLIC VIOLENCE It is a form of violence that is exercised upon social agents 
with their complicity; exercising this type of violence takes place in the situation 
whereby agents know that they are subjected to it and they themselves exercise it too.  
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STRUCTURALIST CONSTRUCTIVISM It is Bourdieu’s ontological position that 
guides his sociological explanations of action. In this worldview, there is an interplay 
between actors and the structure whereby the social world is created by objective 
relations (determined by resources – types of capital) and symbolic relationships 
(determined by habitus) whereby the conditions construct action of the agents.  
 
STRUCTURED STRUCTURES In Bourdieu’s theory of symbolic power, it is a 
dimension of every symbolic system that is organised in a comprehensive way and 
includes objective structures, means of communication and the process of signification 
that is an output of the condition of communication.  
 
STURCTURING STRUCTURES In Bourdieu’s theory of symbolic power, it is a 
dimension of symbolic systems that explain the way of knowing the world; it consists 
of instruments of knowing and constructing the objective meaning whereby objectivity 
is understood as an agreement between subjects.  
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APPENDIX 5 SAMPLE OF INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPTS 
 
TRANSCRIPT 1  
 
Interviewee No 21; 19 August 2009; Warsaw; the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs; 
the office of the head of public and cultural diplomacy.   
 
 
Mogłaby Pani rozwinąć ten wątek, dlaczego słowo “marka” jest kłopotliwe? 
 
Dla mnie jako pewnego rodzaju praktyka, ale i urzędnika państwowego, marka 
kojarzy się pewnie z produktem i z towarem. Wiele rzeczy z brandingu i z marketingu 
mówią, że Polska jest towarem i trzeba go sprzedać. Ja nie wierze. To znaczy, dla 
mnie towar... hm...My w cale nie chcemy go sprzedawać, bo on i tak jest już 
sprzedany. To znaczy, my i tak istniejemy w obiegu. Teraz jest tylko kwestia tego jak 
to pokazać. Moim zdaniem...I dlatego dla mnie, być może jest cięka granica pomiędzy 
właśnie towarem, który należy sprzedać, ale ja uważam, że Polska jest już 
ugruntowaną jak gdyby jednostką w Europie czy w świecie. Teraz pytaniem nie jest 
jak ją sprzedać tylko jak ją dobrze pokazać, bo ona jest różnie pokazywana i różne są 
jak gdyby opinie. Ja mam, powiedzmy szczerze, kłopot ze słowem ‘marka’. Być może 
rozumiem to dość prymitywnie, ale jednak takie mam wrażenie. 
 
To bardzo interesujące. Czym jest zatem dla Pani branding narodowy? Bo to jest 
pytanie, które tak naprawde gdzieś krąży.  
 
To bardzo trudne musze powiedzieć.  
 
Ja wiem, że ono jest trudne. Ono jest proste, ale trudne.  
 
Bo ono jest wszytskim i niczym. Dla mnie nadal, eh...to znaczy jest to nadal sposób 
narracji o naszym kraju, o historii, o tradycji, ale i o współczesności. Dla mnie 
branding jest to umiejętność snucia opowieści o Polsce. To nie jest kwestia 
konkretnego produktu np. jakiegoś ‘Ćmielów’, który jest jednym z lepszych designów 
lat 60-tych czy 70-tych. Bardzo słynny. Dla mnie branding narodowy jest to mówienie 
o narodzie i o kraju w sposób spójny, spójny jeden komunikat. Pokazanie jak gdyby 
pewnych rzeczy. Nie wiem czy ja nie wprowadzam rewolucji w Pana myślenie....  
 
Nie, nie... 
 
Jeżeli nawet.... proszę to traktować tak jak moje przemyślenia po roku tutaj. Bo jestem 
dyrektorem tego departamentu tutaj, od roku i od roku zmieniłam nazwę tego 
departamentu na ten „public diplomacy”, żeby jednak pokazać, że pewne docieranie 
do interesariusza niżej niż wyżej; mnie nie interesuje klient rządowy, tylko interesuje 
mnie dziennikarz, artysta, kurator wystawy, archeolog danego kraju, i to tak działamy 
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przez instrumenty...być może do instrumentów później dojdziemy, to co chcemy 
pokazać. 
 
Czy ja mogę zapytać gdzie Pani po raz pierwszy usłyszała termin branding 
narodowy, i w jakich okolicznościach? 
 
Ja branding narodowy słyszę od lat. Powiem tak szczerzem, że to jest chyba kwestia 
jakiś siedmiu lat temu. To było...mój mąż jest dziennikarzem “Media & Marketing 
Polska”, czyli jednego z lepszych i poczytniejszych pism. Także, tak jakby z tego. Ja 
czytuje o wilekim branding wogóle, ale niekoniecznie narodowym, bo akurat tym sie 
gazeta nie zajmuje. Natomiast mam licznych znajomych pracujących w agencjach 
PRowskich, to też kiedyś jako tak słyszałam. Ponieważ od roku jestem tu, to się 
bardziej teraz nad nim koncentruje, czy doczytuje. 
  
Dlaczego jest takie istotne dla Polski, żeby obecnie posiadać markę? Pani podchodzi 
do tego tak naprawdę z jakimś dystansem? 
 
Tak, ale rozumię pytanie. Dlatego że jesteśmy niewyraziści moim zdaniem. To znaczy 
mówiąc “Polska” mam wrażenie, że z niewieloma rzeczami się kojarzymy. Kojarzymy 
sie z pewnymi ikonami typu Jan Paweł II i Wałęsa i koniec. I to jest problem. Z 
produktem – no wódkę zabrali nam Rosjanie niestety jako produkt, tak...Nokii nie 
mamy niestety. Nie mamy serów i win tak jak Francuzi – to znaczy mamy...ale dla 
mnie ważne jest to żeby zyskać kilka cech, albo pokazać kilka cech....przepraszam 
jeszcze raz pytanie, ponieważ odbiegłam w swoich myślach?  
 
Dlaczego tak istotne teraz jest dla Polski posiadanie marki? 
 
Dlatego żeby z czymś się kojarzyć. My mamy podobny problem jak Szwedzi na 
przykład, jak Finlandia. Nam się kojarzą oni ekologią, ale tak naprawdę z niczym 
innym. Czyli my musimy szukać wyrazistości w tym świecie, który jest dosyć 
zunifikowany. Moim zdaniem, bo ja patrzę bardziej od urzędniczego punktu widzenia, 
takiego bardziej nawet politycznego. Żebyśmy nie zniknęli z tą politycznością, którą 
mieliśmy do pewnego momentu, czyli jako kraj solidarny, kraj, w którym 
rzeczywiście udało się obalić komunizm itd. A później nic...20 lat nic nie zrobiliśmy... 
nagła pustka, z tym co moglibyśmy zrobić. 
 
W całej tej debacie fascynuje mnie pewna rzecz. Dlaczego Polska nie potrzebowała 
marki przed rokiem 1989 albo pomiędzy 1989 albo 2002, kiedy tak naprawdę do 
dyskursu albo debaty publicznej weszła idea brandingu narodowego? 
 
Ja nie wierze, że w takim systemie, jaki był, że było to możliwe. Byliśmy krajem, 
który był uważany za jakiegoś satelitę Związku Sowieckiego, także przedtem...hm.. 
Dla mnie jest to oczywiste, że z powodów takich bardziej historycznych i 
politycznych nie było to możliwe. Myślę, że jak się odzyskuje niepodległość, to inne 
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rzeczy są ważniejsze. Jam mam takie wrażenie. Skoncentrowano się w myśleniu nad 
takimi potrzebami pierwszej chwili. Coś, co będzie długofalowe, i dlatego wydaje mi 
się, że jak jest pewien oddech, to stabilizuje sytuacje, trochę polityczną danego kraju, 
to wtedy przychodzi czas na myślenie o rzeczach bardzo ważnych, nie mniej ważnych 
niż wtedy. Jest czas na pewien oddech – na myślenie „Odkuliśmy się, ale czym my 
jesteśmy w tej Europy?”. Jest to czas na rozejrzenie się. Bo najpierw jest czas takiej 
walki, znalezienia się gdzieś, wyprostowania systemu, wprowadzenie demokracji, 
myśmy tego nie mieli. A teraz jest nieźle, ale nie wcale niedobrze. Nikt nie wie, że 
mamy góry i Mazury, tylko ze gdzieś jesteśmy bliżej Moskwy, nadal. 
 
Pani wspomniała, że jest dyrektorem departamentu dyplomacji publicznej od roku. 
  
Tak. 
 
Ale jeśli miałaby Pani określić, jak wyglądał rozwój, albo koncepcja brandingu 
narodowego w MSZ-cie. Ponieważ ja czytam przemówienia Pana Sikorskiego do 
Sejmu i Pan Sikorki mówi, że Polska to jest marka, która powinna być, on definiuje 
tą markę w swój sposób, i mówi o wolności, o kraju kochającym wolność.  
 
Myśmy mu to napisali... 
 
Domyślałem się...W wywiadach dla BBC Pan Sikorki mówi nie o marce tylko o 
“trade-marku” i tak naprawdęe ten branding narodowy gdzieś tam sobie 
funkcjonuje. Czy mogłaby Pani wskazać jak ta cała koncepcja ewoluowała w 
Ministerstwie Spraw Zagranicznych. Pojawił się ten legendarny „Latawiec”. Jak to 
funkcjonuje w przestrzeni publicznej? 
 
Ja nie jestem w stanie powiedzieć o ewolucji. Ja jestem w stanie wypowiedzieć się o 
tych akcentach takich, które się dokonywały, a które pewnie się na te ewolucję 
składają. Natomiast mam wrażenie i tu przyznam się szczerze, nie można powiedzieć, 
że to jest process...na razie to było do tej pory i to od roku było troszeczkę lepiej, i jeśi 
rozmawiamy o tym, co ja tutaj robię, że były to takie strzały, które przychodziły 
komuś do głowy, że „Ojej, ale to jest ważne!” Kilka lat temu pierwsze takie kampanie 
kampanie wizerunkowe w CNN były robione. Nie wiem, kiedy to było... około 2004, 
ale to były drobiazgi. Placówki pracowały nad jakimiś rzeczami, ale to było raczej 
instynktownie...było robione jak rozumie to instyntkownie...niż wynikało ze 
zrozumienia albo jakiejś przyjętej strategii. Natomiast....powiem tak... Sikorki jest 
nowym typem ministra, w swoim myśleniu o Polsce, bo dotychczasowym 
ministrowie, choć nie można im nic zarzucić, natomiast on rozumie pewien fakt, z 
którym ja mam trochę problemu, ale to jest jak gdyby inna rzecz. On twierdzi, i 
słusznie, że nie ma się czego wstydzić, że precz z martyrologią, że jesteśmy silnym 
krajem i my to pokażemy. Ale to bardziej wynika z jego charakteru, wykształcenia i 
tego, że jeździ po świecie, niż naprawdę z takiej idei, która się tu rodzi. 
Niestety...natomiast.... 
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I to, co pani powiedziała jest bardzo interesujące. Z jednej strony precz z 
materologią, a z drugiej strony Państwo, proszę mnie poprawić jeśli sie mylę, 
jesteście zaangażowani w tą kampanie, która ma na celu przypomnienie Europie 
Zachodniej i tym samym Polakom, że Mur Berliński to nie był symbol upadku 
komunizmu tylko tak naprawdę to wszystko zaczęło się w Polsce. 
 
Ale to nie jest martyrologia... ja uważam, że martyrologią jest np. rocznica Drugiej 
Wojny Światowej. Bo myśmy ją przerżnęli...przegrali i nie ma się czym chwalić. 
Moim zdaniem 4 czerwca jest zwycięstwem. I to jest, to znaczy w naszej... 
zdecydowanie nawet jak rozmawiałam z Sikorskim to mówił, że trzeba”wygrać” 4 
czerwca, bo myśmy to wówczas wygrali. Tylko pokazywanie pewnie tego co nie 
istniało przez 10-20 lat....wracając do tamtego pytania... że myśmy...rozgadałam się 
troche... 
 
Nie, nie...ja nie chcę być niegrzeczny, po prostu kontroluje czas... 
 
 ...że myśmy nie zadbali przez te 10-20 lat o to...o swoje miejsce w Europie i dlatego 
teraz tak się dopraszamy do tego, że Mur Berliński był konsekwencją 4 czerwca i 
okrągłego stołu w lutym. I to nie jest martyrologia...to jest moim zdaniem kawał 
dobrej historii zwycięskiej. Martyrologia to jest to, co niestety moim zdaniem będzie 
się odbywało i odbywa się Druga Wojna Światowa. Prosze może nie 
cytować...Oczywiście czcić trzeba, natomiast nie róbmy z tego, że Polska na każdym 
lądzie ginęła... No ginęliśmy, i nic z tego nie było...jeszcze nas rozebrali pod koniec w 
Jałcie i Poczdamie, także...w ten sposób idę... 
 
Czy w Pani przekonaniu te działalności, które można określić jako zaczynające, 
umówmy się, branding narodowy w Polsce...Czy one skierowane są do publiczności 
międzynarodowych, czy do społeczeństwa Polskiego również? Czy może skierowane 
jest to w obu kierunkach? To znaczy czy była kampania, albo PRowska, którą 
ministerstwo zaczęło? Jak Państwo komunikujecie to co robicie społeczeństwu 
polskiemu? Wiadomo, że to były kampanie międzynarodowe, skierowane na 
publiczności międzynarodowe, tylko tak naprawdę, jaka jest rola społeczeństwa 
polskiego, i jak Państwo komunikujecie to społeczeństwu polskiemu? 
 
 
Myślę, że jest to problem. My tego nie robimy idealnie. Wręcz powiedziałabym, że w 
ogóle tego nie robimy. To znaczy, mam wrażenie dużej rozbieżności naszej 
działalności. Praca mojego departamentu to jest public diplomacy na zewnątrz... W 
ogóle nie robimy czegoś takiego jak PR do narodu. Jakoś częściowo jest to u 
rzecznika. Natomiast to jest kwestia niestety nadal, chociaż ja uważam, że jest to błąd, 
i nawet opowiem o pomyśle, który mi przyszedł do głowy razem z jedną z gazet, ale 
niestety rzecznik się nie zgodził. Rzecznik bardziej komunikuje działania Sikorsiego, 
czy MSZ-u wogóle, i mówi, że były to działania temu poświęcone, ale nie tłumaczy 
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społeczeństwu Polskiemu, że to jest nam potrzebne. To jest ważne, bo budujemy jakiś 
tam etos naszego kraju. Tego nie ma. Moim zdaniem to leży. Ja nie ukrywam, że z 
jedną z gazet, z która wymyśliłam....to jest pierwszy krok do tego żeby zrobić taką 
serię wkładek czy wkładkę, czy nawet główny program o tym, co MSZ robi. To 
znaczy chodzi o tłumaczenie działań naszemu społeczeństwu i przy okazji takie 
edukowanie, bo to, że tłumaczymy, że to i to jest ważne, ale takie troszeczkę takie 
pozyskiwanie do siebie. Ja mam wrażenie, że ludzie z zewnątrz myślą, że tu się nic nie 
dzieje, a my tu jednak coś robimy. To był pomysł, który nie może być sfinansowany 
przez ten departament, mimo że ma spore finanse... zdecydowanie moje paragrafy 
finansowe na to nie pozwalają, żeby działać w Polsce. Ja nie mam prerogatyw do tego 
żeby wydawać pieniądzy w Polsce i robić akcje, które są skierowane do Polaków.  
 
Czyli istnieje tak naprawdę jeszcze problem prawno finansowy? 
 
Ja tego nie postrzegam jako problem. Ja myślę, że to jest problem w MSZ-ecie. Nikt 
mi nie powiedział  - „OK, Pani departament ma sumę pieniędzy, którą ma i 
rzeczywiście dysponuje tak jak uważa...rozsyłam na placówki i na różne akcje i 
pomysły”. Natomiast ktoś powinien powiedzieć rzecznikowi, że dodaje mu 10 osób, 
albo 5 osób, daje jakiś tam budżet, większy czy mniejszy, i on robi PR MSZ-u w kraju 
i PR Polski w kraju. Tego nie ma niestety. Tu mamy lukę. To powiem szczerze, ja 
uważam, że moje działania absolutnie nie są skierowane na zewnątrz.  
 
A skąd dystans rzecznika prasowego, bo ja z nim chciałbym chwile porozmawiać. 
Czy to jest dystans czy to jest po prostu… 
 
On chyba...myśmy tego nigdy nie robili. Myślę, że to jest taka zmiana, która tutaj 
powoli już zachodzi w myśleniu, czyli w tym departamencie. Kiedy ja nastałam już 
ona zaszła. Uznałam, że my musimy przynajmniej wejść na ten taki trakt trochę, 
wizerunkowy i mówienia o Polsce się wspiąć...robić coś innego niż robiliśmy do tej 
pory. Natomiast chyba takiego myślenia jeszcze nie ma. Bardziej mentalnie niż 
osobościowo mam wrażenie. 
 
Jakie taktyki według Pani do tej pory były użyte w tym, co można określić w Polsce 
jako branding narodowy? Jakie konkretne narzędzia komunikacyjne? 
  
Ale MSZ-woskich...no ja mam kilka takich narzędzi...niewykorzystanych jest pewnie 
trochę więcej. Naszym narzędziem konkretnym np. są wizyty studyjne, czyli 
dziennikarzy i wszystkich innych środowisk. My mamy na to pieniądze żeby 
wyławiać dziennikarzy, którzy o danej tematyce... która nas interesuje, bo placówki 
ich po całym świecie szukają. Następnie zapraszamy tych dziennikarzy do Polski i 
organizujemy jakieś spotkania i “tour-y”, pokazując pewne rzeczy, o którzy np. źle 
pisali o Polsce. Wyłapujemy ekspertów, którzy twierdzą, że były “polskie obozy 
śmierci”. Zapraszamy do Auschwitz...i to jest jeden z instrumentów. Drugi to na 
pewno ta strona internetowa, zarówno nasza poland.gov.pl. My mamy dwie i MSZ-
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owska strona, którą to stronę przebudowywujemy. “Polanda” przebudowywujemy i 
już zmieniliśmy, bo była to strona bardzo nienowoczesna. Także to pewnie jest 
instrument informacji. Kolejne instrumenty... powiem tak, to wszystko to, co robimy. 
To znaczy pieniądze na kampanie, które możemy przeprowadzać. One przeróżnie tak 
naprawde wyglądają. Natomiast teraz akurat skoncentrowaliśmy się na CNN i dobrze 
nam się współpracuje, to jest oczywiste i to idzie w te rejony świata, które nas 
interesuje, przez Internet in na cały świat. Także tych instrumentów jest kilka. Są też 
kwestie togo, że jesteśmy w stanie zainspirować i poźniej odkupujemy np. prawa..do 
fajne filmy. I książki o Polsce. Coś co jest takim...ja siadam np. z kilkoma 
wydawnictwami i mówię, że na rynku brakuje tak naprawdę tego tego i tego, które 
pokaże Polska na swój sposób. To jest jakiś sposób, jakiś instrument, który ja mam i z 
którego mam pieniądze, Ja mam palcówki pod sobą. 150. I rozumiem, że w każdym 
momencie przez placówkę mogę też zadziałać. 
 
Jakie to są wydawnictwa, które Państwo do tej pory wykorzystujecie? Ja jestem 
świadom tego filmu „Katyń”, który został pokazany we współpracy z MSZ w Rosji.  
 
Tak, na całym świcie z porozumieniem z MSZ. Każdy film, prawie, że każdy twórca 
filmów, jak np. “Gry wojenne” czy jak np. „Katyń”... “Katyń” teraz mamy film o 
Księdzu Jerzym Popiełuszcze, przychodzą tutaj do mnie i pytają: “Pani Dyrektor czy 
nam Pani pomoże rozpropagować ten film i w jaki sposób?”. Wszystko ja to następnie 
dekretuje na placówki, które uważamy, że promocja taka tam być powinna, wysyłam 
więcej pieniędzy. Ambasador czy ktoś inny wynajmuje salę i wynajmuje PR agencję 
czasami do tego żeby to jakoś wyglądało. Tak jak teraz w Londynie mamy “Rok 
Polski” i zdecydowanie Instytut Adama Mickiewicza rzeczywiście działa we 
współpracy z naszym Instytutem Kultury Polskiej, z moim dyrektorem Hojnackim. On 
dostaje pakiet pieniędzy i za ten pakiet jest w stanie wynająć jakąś firmę PRowską, 
która mu tam wszystko zorganizuje. Ja chciałbym żeby Pan miał świadomość, czy 
pisząc czy zastanawiając się jak to u nas wygląda, że bardzo często jakaś idea 
wizerunku czy jakieś akcje wychodzą od placówek i oni realizują to na swoim terenie. 
Nie można zrobić jednej akcji na Azje, bo w Azji coś innego się sprzeda np. Chopin, a 
w Niemczech Chopin to nic takiego. Placówki bardzo często same z siebie mają swoje 
własne kampanie... I ja mówię “Tak, oczywiście, super róbcie to. ”, dlatego że 
prowadzimy sobie badania na ten temat, że właśnie w ten sposób w metrze w 
Madrycie puszczany ten i ten film będzie miał świetny odbiór. Ja tego nie musze 
narzucać z zewnątrz, musi Pan to zapamiętać i wiedzieć, tej, dwutorowości działań. 
Samodzielne placówki i my tutaj te kampanie czy akcje prowadzimy, ale istotnie nie 
do końca one muszą być spojone. Nie to, że nie są...źle powiedziałam...ale patrzymy, 
że co innego idzie na rynek Europy a co innego możemy w Ameryce Południowej 
zrobić, bo pewne rzeczy w Ameryce się w ogóle nie sprzedadzą, np. jak Mur czy 
Wojna Światowa. No kto będzie za murem... 
  
I tu się pojawia odwieczne pytanie czy jest to możliwe żeby w pluralistycznym 
społeczeństwie, wielopartyjnym, które jest tak naprawdę zunifikowane, ale różne 
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dokonać komunikacji  jednego narratywu Polski? Biorąc pod uwagę to, że w 
różnych państwach jesteśmy inaczej postrzegani. Z Polską różne państwa mają 
różne doświadczenia historyczne i tak samo różne rzeczy mogą być sprzedawane w 
humorystyczny sposób w różnych państwach. Ludzie po prostu w różnych krajach 
mają różne poczucie humoru. I tak naprawdę tu jest tyle czynników, które można by 
wziąć pod uwagę. I pytanie jest czy jest to możliwe żeby zunifikować jedną opowieść 
o Polsce? 
 
Trudne pytanie znowu. Ja mam takie wrażenie patrząc na doświadczenia hiszpańskie, 
że im to zajęło kilka ładnych lat, jak nie więcej, ale istotnie tam była ta zmiana 
historyczna, którą myśmy już stracili niestety... bo gdybyśmy ten branding zaczęli od 
1989 roku budować to my byśmy w ogóle tutaj już nie siedzieli, bo to by już było 
zrobione. Hiszpanie wykorzystali ten czas po Franko i takie zmiany... ale była wielka 
zgoda społeczeństwa, żeby Hiszpania wyszła z tego ubóstwa z tego zacofania 
potwornego, które mieli...i politycznego i gospodarczego...wszytskie siły, o których 
Pan mówi powiedziały “Tak, zróbmy to.” U nas jest to trudniej... nie zrobiliśmy tego 
po roku 1989, kiedy teoretycznie, chociaż ja twierdze, że właśnie tak się 
zafiksowaliśmy na pewnych innych rzeczach gospodarczo-społecznych, że się nie 
dało. Mi się wydaje, że da się. Bo ja myślę, że to jest tak jak piramida - czyli, że na 
górze jest taka jednolitość wizerunku i przekaz, a później rozchodzi się na niższe 
szczeble, które troszeczkę w Azji może być to inaczej pokazane. To znaczy, że tu jest 
zbiór pewnych wartości i rzeczy, tego, co to jest ta Polska, tego, co to jest ta marka 
Polska czy branding. Moim zdaniem da się zunifikować. Natomiast przekaz może być 
inny, bo ja tak to traktuje, że idea jest taka sama, a inaczej ją przekazujemy w Azji a 
inaczej w Ameryce. 
 
Gdybym ja chciał sobie opisać w swoim doktoracie kilka projektów, które MSZ 
zrealizowało, które według Pani noszą znamię branding narodowego? Które mam 
opisać? Prosze mi je wskazać, a ja je opisze tak ja je Pani rozumie... 
 
Niełatwo...to znaczy, ja myślę, że kampanie reklamowe, wizerunkowe te CNN-
owskie, z tych ostatnich dwóch lat. Dlatego że one miały większy wymiar, bo łączyły 
w kolei bardzo dużo samorządów i resortów. Czyli to dla mnie było takie coś, że 
nareszcie coś spróbowałam i nareszcie udało mi się zgromadzić wraz CNN-em przy 
tym stole 15 partnerów, którzy teoretycznie mogą się zwalczać nawzajem, ale tego nie 
zrobiliśmy. Bo uznaliśmy, że to jest wspólna sprawa, my dajemy pieniądze i robimy 
coś razem z CNN. To na pewno. Myślę, że fajnie by było, gdyby miał Pan czas żeby 
pojechać do Berlina, do Instytutu Polskiego. Mogłabym jakoś tam, jeśli bedzie miał 
Pan możliwość, jakoś zarekomendować dyrektorowi Dąbrowskiemu. Jego kampania i 
jego pomysły w Niemczech, bo to jest jak gdyby dla nas ważne nawet ze względów 
politycznych. Bo my jak gdyby cały czas, MSZ musi się cały czas obracać w tym, co 
się nazywa polityką zagraniczna naszego kraju. Czymś, co jest dla nas bardzo ważne. 
Czyli akurat Niemcy czy jako “Partnerstwo Wschodnie”, czyli Rosja. My musimy w 
tym myśleniu wiązać kampanie, nie tylko tak jak inne czy POT czy Ministerstwo 
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Kultury, z kampania historyczną, albo z kampanią turystyczną. Dla nas jest to 
szczerzej, my musimy patrzeć też jak nas widzą w innym kraju, ale także, na których 
nam jako partnerach zależy. 
 
W Polsce wiele instytucji mówi o branding narodowym. Jakby Pani określiła 
zależności pomiędzy tymi instutucjami? 
 
Zależności nie ma. Każda instytucja jest absolutnie niezależna i niepodległa. Istotnie 
prawdą jest, że to MSZ ma wpisane w ustawie zajmowanie się promocją Polski za 
granicą i tak to wygląda. I rzeczywiście w MSZ-ecie, i na czele tej Rady Promocji 
Polski, która istnieje, która na szczęście się od roku ożywiła...to MSZ stoi na czele tej 
Rady Promocji Polski. To jest ciało na razie opiniodawczo-doradcze każdego rządu. 
Rada jest skupiona, tam jest 12 resortów. Także każde działanie jest niezależne, 
natomiast ta Rada Promocji Polski pozwala na to, że 12 resortów, które gdzieś tam 
maja też wpisane rzeczy związane z promocją Polski za granicą i ta Rada to wszystko 
skupia. Nie ukrywam, że to jest bardzo ciężka praca żeby udało się narzucić, albo 
wymóc na partnerach pewne ruchy, które są dla wizerunku Polski korzystne. Ta Rada 
spotyka się 3 razy do roku. Mam nadzieje, że we wrześniu będzie następne spotkanie. 
Jedynym takim ciałem, które skupia kilka instytucji, i dla mnie jest takim zaczynem, 
że można mówić wspólnie i mieć wspólny własny przekaz jest Rada Promocji Polski. 
Tam nie działa jeszcze idealnie, ale chcemy zmienić jej prerogatywy.  
 
Jakby Pani dokonała refleksji na temat praktyki albo inicjatyw, które nosiły znamię, 
brandingu narodowego w Polsce, z dzisiejszej perspektywy? 
 
Cały czas mam wrażenie, że są to lub były to inicjatywy związane z czymś, czyli nie 
takie strategicznie przemyślane, tylko są to inicjatywy, które wynikają z czegoś. Teraz 
podam przykłady. To, że robimy jakąś kampanię, przeciw „polskim obozom śmierci” 
razem z „Rzeczpospolitą”, wynikało z tego, że w gazetach to się pojawia. To nie 
wynikało z naszego myślenia, tylko to była reaktywność. Cały czas... kampania CNN 
była reakcja na mur Berliński, który nam trochę zaszkodził. Czyli to bardziej jest 
reaktywne... 
 
Wiem o tym między innymi dzięki szefowi mojej szkoły, bo pracował wtedy jako 
dziennikarz i opowiadał, że relacjonował wówczas z Berlina, bo nie było telefonów 
komórkowych, było 100 dziennikarzy czekających do kolejki. 
  
Doskonale znam ta sytuację. Natomiast to jest kwestia jak ja to oceniam, nadal 
reaktywnie. My musimy mieć bardziej problem strategiczny i my „atakować”, znaczy 
wymyślać coś niż odpowiadać na to o się dzieje. Nie oceniam źle, ale zawsze może 
być lepiej i tu w ogóle nie ma, o czym mówić. Jest to kwestia pomysłu i jest to kwestia 
pieniędzy. Natomiast cały czas myślę, że to są takie prztyknięcia zamiast działania na 
podstawie poważnej strategii.  
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Jakie są według Pani największe wyzwania, jeśli chodzi o praktykę brandingu 
narodowego w Polsce? 
  
Jedno wielkie wyzwanie. To znaczy, nie wiem czy dobrze powiem po polsku, to 
znaczy...zjednoczenie ludzi i ich mózgów żeby zrozumieli, że pewne rzeczy są ważne. 
Pewne rzeczy trzeba ustalić wspólnie. Potem każdy może się rozejść i inaczej swoje 
rzeczy realizować. Dla mnie trudnością ogromną jest przekonane wszystkich, że to nie 
jest interes Pani Zofii, że robimy CNN, że to jest interes kraju. Ja bym powiedziała, że 
ta sfera jest bardziej społeczna jest ważna, czyli zrozumienie swoich partnerów żeby 
wyszedł jeden komunikat, nie żeby Polka Organizacja Turystyczna ze mną się kłóciła, 
że ich logo Polska to dla mnie nie jest logo, tylko obrazek. Oni mnie chcieli 
przekonać, że to jest świetne logo, dla mnie logo to nie jest obrazek. Chodzi mi o to że 
pewne zrozumienie partnerów, dla mnie to jest wyzwanie.  
 
Czy Pani pozycja dyrektora wydziału dyplomacji publicznej przyczynia się w Pani 
codziennych działaniach do budowania i konstruowania marki Polski? 
 
Bardzo mocne pytanie. Ja uważam, że tak. To znaczy...chyba w moich działaniach, 
jako w mojej osobiem czy w departamencie w ogóle, mam wrażenie, że nie ma 
działania, o które by teraz moi partnerzy nie pytali. Znaczy ja sobie tak ustawiłam, 
jeśli można to tak nazwać, czy ustaliłam kontakty właśnie z POT-em, czy PAIZ-em, z 
Ministerstwem Gospodarki najtrudniej, ja tam wszędzie jestem. To znaczy, nie ma 
możliwości zrobienia, znaczy rzadko, kiedy powiem delikatnie, to się zdarza... ta 
spółka 2012.PL, bardzo fajnie opracowali...zerknie Pan nawet, na tę prezentacje, 
bardzo fajna rzecz...Nie ma tak, że ktoś nie przyjdzie tutaj i nie zapyta, że nie, jeśli o 
pieniądze, o które mamy, a pieniądze dają w pewnym momencie władzę, tak nad tym, 
że można powiedzieć, macie pieniądze macie to zrobić tak i tak. Natomiast mam 
wrażenie, że sobie na tyle zapracowaliśmy tu całym departamentem, nie tylko jedną 
osobą... rzadko nas gdzieś nie ma, ktoś musi zdecydowanie nas nie chcieć mieć MSZ 
po swojej stronie żeby tutaj nie przyjść i nie porozmawiać. Myślę, że jest 
zdecydowana zmiana. Mówię też bardziej o takich resorowych rzeczach, bo może 
mam mniej kontaktów z innymi czy z agencjami czy z innymi środowiskami. 
Natomiast o takich resortowych rzeczach to zdecydowanie jestem na każdym 
spotkaniu, które mówi o jakimś budowaniu czy jakiejś kampanii. 
 
Czy ja mogę zapytać o kilka bardziej osobistych pytań, w sensie metryczki? 
 
Tak, oczywiście. 
 
Czy mogę zapytać o Pani wykształcenie? 
 
Wyższe. Uniwersytet Warszawki. Nauki polityczne. Stosunki Międzynarodowe. 
 
Ma Pani jakieś kwalifikacje marketingowe? 
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Nie.  
 
Czy ja mogę zapytać o poziom wykształcenia Pani rodziców? 
 
Wyższe i średnie.  
 
Czy ja mogę zapytać o krótkie nakreślenie ścieżki kariery? 
 
Po ukończeniu studiów zdałam egzaminy do Ministerstwa Spraw Zagranicznych. 
Pracowałam w Departamencie Polityki Bezpieczeństwa, zajmując się prawami 
człowieka. Następnie wyjechałam na placówkę na Nowego Yorku. Byłam 
przedstawicielem Polski w Radzie Bezpieczeństwa, kiedy Polska w latach 1996-1998 
była niestałym członkiem Rady Bezpieczeństwa. Zajmowałam się wtedy terytorium 
Europy i Ameryki Południowej. Po powrocie do Polski trafiłam z powrotem do 
polityki bezpieczeństwa i praw człowieka. Potem pracowałam dwa lata w biurze 
rzecznika MSZ, byłam zastępcą dyrektora, zastępcą rzecznika. To się nazywało wtedy 
Departament Systemu Informacji. Po tym dwuletnim doświadczeniu z mediami jestem 
tutaj od kwietnia 2008 roku. 
 
Czy ja mogę zapytać o Pani wyznania religijne? 
 
Katolicyzm. 
 
Czy obydwoje Pani rodziców są Polakami? 
 
Tak. 
 
Jak najlepiej określiłaby Pani kandydata, który mógłby pracować, albo miałby 
pracować w obszarze branding narodowego w Polsce? 
 
Kreatywny, otwarty, patriotyczny w sensie zrozumienia tego kraju.  
 
Kto według Pani jest największym autorytetem, jeśli chodzi o branding narodowy w 
Polsce? 
 
Nie ma takiej osoby. 
 
Którą z kampanii branding narodowego w Polsce uznałaby Pani za najbardziej 
efektowną? 
 
W CNN, rok temu. Była pierwsza, ale najlepsza.  
 
Pani Natalia [imie zmienione] powiedziała mi, że z tego wszystkiego mają być jakieś 
badania niedługo. 
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Tak i zdecydowanie ja się z tego bardzo cieszę. Tego nam brakowało. Bardzo często 
jak pan wie wszyscy są ekspertami od promocji. Ja chcę mieć czarno na białym czy to 
się opłaca czy nie. I zdecydowanie wiem o tym czy oni te badania robią, o tej 
kampanii zdaje się, bo poprzedniej nie zrobiono z różnych przyczyn, bo CNN w ogóle 
nie chce takich rzeczy robić. Ale po tej maja być, i ja z utęsknieniem czekam, bo 
patrzę czy to jest warte tego. 
 
Jaki według Pani jest wpływ branding narodowego na Polskie społeczeństwo? 
 
Trudne pytanie. Ja mam wrażenie o branding narodowym możemy mówić wśród 10% 
- 15% społeczeństwa i reszty to nie obchodzi i nie musi obchodzić powiem szczerze, 
bo to nie jej krytyka tylko ja uważam, że jeśli te 10% - 15% coś zrobi, to bardzo często 
to pozostała część ludzi przynamniej pozostałych przyjmie to załapie, pokaże to 
rzeczywiście... 
  
Czy ja mogę zapytać ile osób pracuje w wydziale dyplomacji publicznej i kulturalnej? 
 
33 osoby łącznie. 
 
Ja zwróciłem się pierwszy do Pani pisemnie przez Pana Mateusza Kryckiego o dane 
finansowe z 2008 roku / 2009 roku.  
 
Ostatnie dwa lata? 
 
Tak.  
 
To dostanie Pan to. 
  
Bo ja tutaj wszystkiego nie mogę opisać...bo tak naprawdę nie interesuje mnie to ile 
Państwo wydajecie pieniędzy, jak to zwykle interesuje dziennikarzy żeby robili z tego 
sensacje...  
 
Ja już mogę powiedzieć, że budżet mój w tym roku wyniósł 55 milionów złotych 
polskich...to jest tegoroczny wydatek 2009. I to jest 150 placówek i samych 
instytutów. Z tego w lutym, ponieważ placówki przygotowywują plan swojego 
działania w grudniu, w listopadzie ja dostaje pieniądze; a w styczniu od ministerstwa 
finansów, to już wiem, komu, na co rozdzielić. To idzie 20-30 milionów na placówkę 
a reszta zostaje tutaj w kraju, reszta to mam na myśli 30 milionów. Oznacza to że idzie 
na kampanie CNN i na inne konkursy.  
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TRANSCRIPT 2 
 
Interviewee No. 1; 20 April 2010; London; the office of Saffron Brand Consultants; 
conference room.   
 
Well, after listening to all those interviews and after reading your books, after 
reading many other books on nation branding, I started wondering if the idea of 
nation branding or, to be more specific, and kind of cohesion in communication is 
possible at all? And the reason I started thinking about it is simply first of all, all 
those...in any liberal democracy different institutions would have different priorities, 
different target publics, different market priorities....that’s one aspect of it...and the 
second aspect of my reflection is, say you take a country, Poland, for example, it is 
seen differently in different countries...   
 
Seen in many different countries? 
 
Yeah, so I simply started wondering how is it possible that we project one coherent 
nation identity if the country is seen differently in different places. 
 
Is that a question or you’re making… a rhetorical question? 
 
Rhetorical question.... 
 
Well carry on if it is a rhetorical question. 
 
So do you think cooperation among those institutions in Poland is actually feasible? 
 
You did the interviewing, I didn’t. There are several answers to the question. If the 
question is do I think the cooperation between those institutions in Poland is possible, 
the answer is: it is possible, but it is not very likely.  
 
OK. 
 
The more interesting question, which was the rhetorical question and that, was behind 
the question, which is not necessary about Poland specific here, but about any 
nation… The issue for nation is the reflect changes from what it was to what it is. It 
needs to have a feeling about itself, and that feeling needs to be communicated to the 
people hearing that, and people who deal with it. And when they deal with it, there 
rather deal with it as tourists, as an investment proposition, or some of them absorb the 
culture or have some other connections with it. Now, obviously to the very 
considerable extent, all happens when the nation projects an idea of itself, is that very 
different bodies project very different individual ideas to very different audiences.  
 
Sure. 
 355 
 
 
But, frequently a series of ideas emerge and what emerges can become coherent, it can 
be paradoxical, it may even be contradictory, but it is there. And the larger the nation 
is and the more it communicates in this despair and unconnected passion, you would 
think, that the more contradictory the impressions of the nations are... Frankly enough 
they are not.  
  
OK. 
 
There are not that different. The classic example is the Unites States. That is the 
classic example. It probably communicates more loudly and more incoherent than any 
other nation brought out here It is loud because it has a huge clutch and influence. And 
it is incoherent because it varies from Obama to Bush, or Bush right to Obama to 
Disney, to Apple to religious fundamentalists pro-life maniacs and so on and so forth.  
 
Sure. 
 
Nevertheless, having said all that, there is an idea. At the more manageable level, there 
is the idea of Spain. Spain is in many respects like Poland. It has 40 million people, 
give or take; it is on the edge of Europe, on the Western edge and the Eastern edge. 
Not exactly on the edge, but slightly peripheral not in the centre. Put it kindly, both 
countries had complicated history, putting it kindly.....  
 
Putting it kindly... 
 
Putting it kindly... Until fairly recently Spain was in very deep declined from 18th 
century onwards nobody almost heard of Spain, nobody saw Spain. It recently had an 
authoritarian… 
 
Regime? 
 
...deeply dislikeable dictatorship with rather a poverty-stricken backward country. And 
that was not that long ago, a couple of generations ago...until the 1970s. It has all 
changed, changed. Spanish companies are now among the most successful in the 
world. You don’t laugh at Santander if you are a British man. 
No? 
 
It is not funny. It is not peculiar. It just is. It is not particularly remarkable that [poor 
recording]...as far as I am concerned, as soon as they give Heathrow to Spain then 
better. Businesses are powerful, respectable, culturally it is in a top league, and seem 
to be...in sport, it is terrific...there has been a Renaissance in Spain, including 
architecture and everything. And how did that happen? It did not happen through an 
organised and controlled mechanism. It happen because people talked to each other. 
Spain is not that big, not bigger then Poland is...500 people, 1000 people, 1500 people 
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talked to each other, they knew each other. The politicians knew business people; 
business people knew the arts people; the arts people knew the sporting people and so 
on and on that the idea developed. And that is communicated through everything that 
the nation doesn’t what appears to be an individual fashion, but there is something 
there that you recognise. Let me give you an example. Seat, which is a German-owned 
Spanish motorcar company – how does it describe itself? ‘Auto-emotion’, a car with 
passion. You look at everything that Spanish do, you will see words like ‘passion’; 
‘emotion’; ‘vibrancy’ – you will see that. If you look at the petrol stations that we 
designed for Repsol they look Spanish... 
 
But, I am just trying to find a parallel to Poland... 
 
Now, the point is that it could happen in Poland, but it is not happening in Poland. It 
could because there is an idea around ‘Creative Tension’ that you could use to inform 
everything that you do. You could make it work. You don’t tell people what to do – 
you inspire them. They get the ideas and they start using them and each of those ideas 
relates to and has an impact on other ideas. So, collectively they become very 
powerful. A lady phoned me up the other day from some Polish newspaper. Every two 
or three weeks people phone me up....”What will the Chopin festival, what’s 
celebration of 200 anniversary of the birth of Chopin gonna do for Poland”, she asked? 
And I said, “Nothing, absolutely nothing”.   
 
Why is that?  
 
Because it is a one-off event. Because people don’t know that Chopin was Polish and 
if they do so what? What’s that to do with anything? You have to have a coherent, 
consistent idea, which is of course fragmented, in the sense that what you do is for 
you, but you related it something else! United States is an example of it. It is 
contradictory – one of the things about United States is that it is big, everything bit. 
And if you have that sense of what it is you represent, which I think we genuinely 
created in the idea then you can help people to do things collectively. Of course people 
in Paraguay are not very interested in Poland whereas people in Lithuania are very 
interested in Poland. And people in Russia have a different view of Poland...I 
understand that perfectly well...just like people in France...I know that...I know that... 
 
Sure.  
 
That is not an issues. The issue is that Poland has changed. I don’t need to tell you 
this. From being a grey, boring, communist country, associated with misery to the 
most dynamic country in Europe. Mind you, that’s not saying much, but nevertheless, 
it is the most dynamic country.  
 
But it is dull...I went there in February to do some skiing... 
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No wonder, in February....Zakopane or something?  
 
No, I went to Krynica.  
 
In Tatras somewhere... 
 
How did you come about investigating, researching, thinking and developing the 
idea of nation branding? Because as I understand, you are a mastermind of all this 
business...  
 
For Poland or in general?  
 
For Poland...  
 
We have been asked...I made a speech somewhere in Poland about branding or about 
national branding or something...and then we were approached by people by first of all 
Krzysztof [name anonymised], then by Maciej [name anonymised] and then we were 
given a contract. It was not very much money, but we were interested in that.  
 
And what happened next with this project?  
 
How much time do you have?  
 
How much time have you got?  
 
Basically, what happened is that we did all the investigation, we did all the research, 
we talked to everybody we could think of and eventually we produced this idea. And 
virtually everybody we have spoken about the idea and presented the idea to, think it 
was the right idea. I have not come across anybody who thinks that it doesn’t work, 
because it talks about individuality in Poland and by implication a lack of ability to co-
operate and this kind of stuff...It gives you an opportunity being very different, very 
powerful... 
 
But I would like to know where the resistance against this idea come from? Why is it 
that the project has not been implemented?  
The resistance came from those two political, identical twins and I hesitate to discuss 
the impact they had on me everything else.  
 
I also hesitate the impact they had on me... 
 
Anyway, they didn’t help. Half way through the project...[poor recording] Since we 
came back, since the new administration has been in charge nothing has happened. I 
wanted to make it happen, Maciej wanted to make it happen, but they don’t seem to be 
interested. And I had very clear idea of what should be done.  
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OK, so what should be done? 
 
Right, we should have a coordinating committee to examine the idea. We should 
develop a visual system so that when you see Poland you see things that relate to 
Poland...whether it is a colour or a symbol....I had very good idea for the symbol, 
actually. We should then talk to...you have to get the media on the side. It is very 
important to get the media on the side, because the most important audience of the 
Polish identity is the Polish people. So we have to have the media on the side. We 
should then deal with PAIZ, deal with tourism, deal with all of those people in a way 
that everything you are doing is, the way of speaking...you carry on doing what you 
doing, but you speak and look in a particular way so everything becomes mutually 
supportive. You don’t go away and do things, which look and sound completely 
different from everything else. Everything you do, if there is a Polish national week, if 
there is a Polish film festival, if there is a Polish-Ukrainian football thing, if a Polish 
company...there is a relationship between everything. Gradually, in the minds of 
people who are dealing with Poland from time to time an idea emerges just like 
gradually an idea emerged about Spain. That’s what you do. And you control it. And 
you manage it. You don’t spend fortune on advertising. If you have a budget for 
advertising that is fine, but don’t use it in a way that is completely different from 
something else.  
 
I understand... 
 
That’s what you do. You make it coherent. You don’t push people, you organise it. It 
is particularly difficult in Poland, because Poles don’t work together. They don’t work 
together very well. They argue with each other more than most people do.  
 
And here comes another question...I have been reading a lot of stuff about, well, I 
call it the field of national images management and maybe you share the same point 
of view...Because the idea of ‘Creative Tension’ seem to me is an on-going idea, 
something that should be managed for a number of years.  
 
Well, 10 years, 15 years. It is part of what Poland is... 
 
Yes, but the governments change. Once the government change, here comes another 
director of PAIZ or CEO of PAIZ, here comes another director of public 
diplomacy... 
 
Exactly, you are quite right. That’s one of the things that make it difficult. Let’s 
suppose, for the sake of the argument, that our friend is not the president of Poland. 
Let us pretend that somebody else is a president of Poland. For example, I got on well 
with the former minister of foreign affairs, Cimoszewicz, and I rather hoped he was 
going to be the next president of Poland. As we know, it is not going to happen, but 
 359 
 
let’s just pretend that is does happen. Another word, a non-political figure, a 
bureaucratic maybe...a non-political figure reporting to the president should be 
responsible for this. It is not a political issue. It is not to do with politics. It is to do 
with a long term interest of the country. Here is a reason why Spain is so interesting, 
because there isn’t anybody in charge. There is nobody in charge. If you asked who is 
responsible for image of Spain, nobody knows. But it works, because they kind of 
have a feeling for each other. So, if you make people feel it doesn’t matter...it doesn’t 
matter which political party, it doesn’t matter who is running PAIZ. This is what we 
are, this is what we do. Now, if you look at some countries, there is an understanding 
of what is Spain, there is an understanding of what is New Zealand. New Zealand has 
an idea about itself, which is really, really interesting. What is the worst thing that they 
can be – ‘remote’; what is the worst thing they can be – ‘pure’. So you turn this on its 
head, and it is ‘pure’ and it does not matter which political party is in charge. It makes 
sense. Poles argue with each other all the bloody time. Fine. So, what have we got? 
Creative tension. This huge individual sense of purpose. It allows in extremely 
difficult circumstance to produce something remarkable, which is actually true. Don’t 
ask if we have a good football team – we don’t do that. But we do skiing...another 
words, it is intrinsic to the country.  
 
OK. Can I just ask about nation branding as an idea, as a theoretical concept... 
When did you for the first time thought about a nation as a ‘brand’?  
 
I have read history at the university and I have always been very interested in history, 
always been very interested in aspects of history that you might describe as cultural or 
anthropological, or sociological or something. And it occurred to me very many years 
of ago that nations have a path of identity. And if you read about, say, the French 
revolution, or for that matter first or the second French revolution, you will continually 
see this dynamics of change. When I started using the phrase nation as a brand, I really 
don’t know. Probably around 1985 or something like that, something like that, I would 
think. But I was also amused by and impressed by a book that Hobsbowm....you know 
him, he is a Marxist historian....he edited the book...I cannot remember what it’s called 
now...I think it is called ‘Nations and nationalism’.... 
 
I think I know which one you are talking about.... 
 
And I found that...I was writing a book at that time and using the confederate states of 
America as my national brand...I was talking about branding...I wasn’t particularly 
thinking about nation as a brand, but I was thinking about the ‘brand’ and the USA 
and I wrote about it and Hobsbowm saw my book...anyway, he and I had a quite a 
long dialogue and that got me more interested. So I think my interest in history, and 
my interest in, what we then called identity got me into that world.  
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There is a particular reason behind this question. I looked at the literature, 
theoretical concepts and, historically speaking, nations have always projected their 
identities one way or the other. Now, they also attempted to manage it... 
 
Did they?  
 
...so...at first there was an idea of propaganda...or international propaganda...and 
later Americans developed the term ‘public diplomacy’. That was another term. 
Marketers coined the term ‘destination marketing’ and all of a sudden we have this 
idea of nation branding. What I am trying to establish is the relationship between 
them or if there is a point in wondering what is the relationships between them?  
 
These are terms that people use ahhh... in different situations. If I am talking to a very 
academic individual or to very academic institution or if I am talking to a charity, the 
word ‘brand’ is anathema, they don’t like, but they do like reputation. So, if I am 
talking to Amnesty International, let’s say, or Oxfam, I might talk about your 
reputation. If I am talking to the Oxford University, actually, Oxford University is all 
about brand now, because they know all about that. Well, destination branding, 
destination...it is all just words people use, they are semantics. What’s the different 
between internal engagement and employee brand?  
 
Semantics?  
 
I don’t see any difference between them. Fine, you talk about propaganda. The Nazis 
used propaganda, the communists used propaganda, but we use branding. Fine, OK. 
Of course if you are an authoritarian regime and you have a very strong point of view 
and you are able to control all media outlets that are available to you. Naturally, you 
can create as the Nazis did, as the Soviet Union did, or as Cuba has done very strong 
brands. Why? You don’t like brands in the context of Nazis? It was a corporate brand 
of the Nazis filthy ideology. The brand is immoral. The brand has not morality. That is 
why Naomi Klein’s book is so silly – ‘No logo’.  
 
Why is it so silly?  
 
Because she implies that the brand is immoral. Brand is not immoral. What she is 
saying is “I don’t like capitalist society. I do not like exploitative societies”. To pick 
on that little bit of capitalist society that you see, which are the symbols of 
capitalism... ‘No logo’...logos are nothing...they are neither good or bad. They have no 
morality. The Nazis symbol is horrible, but the Red Cross symbol is lovely. 
 
But it depends what kind of ideas they connote and where their reputations come 
form... 
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Exactly, that is why ‘No logo’...she is a very clever writer. She is a very attractive 
personality. She is a very powerful personality. But the book is not about branding, it 
is about capitalism. So don’t pretend it is about logos.....that is the bit she is fixing 
herself to.  
 
But even you in your work claim that nation branding as an idea serves capitalistic 
purposes....attraction of foreign investment....attraction of tourism  
 
Of course. Absolutely. So it is used by capitalist societies, but it can be also used by 
anybody...by Hitler...by Piłsudski...Anybody can use it. Belonging is a matter of a 
human condition and protecting an idea of belonging... [poor recording].  
 
 
Interesting...Do you know, I declared in my PhD is my own question to discover 
national identity... 
 
Go on... 
 
So I am trying to investigate changes to Polish national identity and I am looking at, 
how Poland is projecting the identity, how different projects represent narratives, 
storytelling on Poland. Whether it is coherent or not, I am not going to argue. My 
thesis is sociological, it is not sensu stricto marketing based, but I know theoretical 
changes. Basically, it is my question to understand my nation.  
 
Well, the Polish nation today is not what the Polish nation was in 1939. The Polish 
nation before the first partition of Poland...one of the problems in Poland is that there 
is a lot of discontinuity. There is, there are huge areas of discontinuity. There are huge 
populations issues, populations come, populations disappear. The Ukrainians come 
and disappear, the Germans come and disappear, the Jews come and disappear. So 
Poland is now a homogenous nation. It used to be heterogeneous...so that is a profound 
issue... 
 
Which also implies that is should be easy to co-operate, but... 
 
If you are busy fighting everybody, what makes it easy to co-operate. Look at your 
history. One of the reasons why Poland has a national inferiority complex...Why does 
Poland have a national inferiority  
complex? Because Poland has never been able, despite its enormous authority in many 
respects, to sustain a long term national pattern. Because it wielded itself into the 
catastrophe with the attacks from Russia, Austria and the only reason for that... it was 
so anarchic that it refused to be ruled.  
 
So there is a notable idea of national inferiority complex...have you come... 
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Among the younger people there is much less of it. I think, I know it is generalisation, 
but people under 35 even...there is a huge gap, attitudinal gap in under 35s. But over 
35s...there is a huge sense of grievance, of grudge, against German, against Russia, 
against the Jews, against Ukraine [noise].  There is a sense of grievance, sense of 
grudge, and a sense of inferiority... 
 
Was this idea of ‘Creative tension’ an attempt to reinvigorate this national identity?  
 
No, what ‘Creative tension’ does, is to say “Let us make the most of what we are, let 
us make the most of the strengths we have. And the strengths we have are the ability to 
bounce back, bounce back...here we are again...you crapped all over us and we are 
back again- very much Polish characteristic. A kind of, it is not exactly a sense of 
humour, but it is a sense of fun, a sense of joy...Poland as a country is not confident, 
but lots of individual Poles are confident.  
 
Maybe over-confident...so difficult to work with, they “know it all”... 
 
Perhaps...it is not that they know it all...they enjoy an argument with... 
 
For the sake of argument...? 
 
Yeah, do you agree with any of this?  
 
Of course. But I recognise all this stuff as I have a sense of perspective...I have been 
living in UK for seven years. If you were to say that to another person in Poland 
they would be seriously offended.  
 
I said that to them in Poland. I said to the people I was dealing with.  
 
You know what is one of the aspects of the Polish inferiority complex?  
 
What?   
 
Poles listen to foreigners and they seem to have a great respect for them. So, for 
example, Mr. Michael comes to Poland and says something about Poland and they 
shut up and listen to you. It is a culture of compliance and I think it is also 
generational. 
That could be true. I don’t know. That could be true.  
 
Last year you cooperated with a Polish institution on a “Polish Year” in United 
Kingdom. How would you assess the professionalism of this campaign?  
 
I think they were very professional. But somehow this campaign did not have an 
impact it should have. I think they were very good and very professional, very 
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thoughtful people. The campaign should have had bigger impact. Maybe there was a 
shortage of money, I don’t know.  
 
I was looking for the media coverage, here in UK... 
 
There wasn’t enough. There was something wrong, somewhere. I don’t know what it 
was. But people I dealt with were very professional, there were very competent and 
very nice.  
 
From your observations, how would you evaluate the relationships between all those 
institutions that are responsible for promotion of Poland?  
 
They don’t talk to each other. Look. You say to somebody, “I deal with foreign direct 
investment”.  So one the reasons I choose to invest in a country is the rational reasons, 
education of the labour force, taxes, and incentives. But there are also emotional 
factors e.g. education of my kids, do they speak English. Stuff like that. Another word, 
they are not rational, but emotional. I like it, I really like it so I am gonna but house 
here. Am I an investor or a tourist? Or if I come as a tourist, I like Gdańsk. I like the 
Baltic so much that I am gonna buy house here. Is that tourism or a direct foreign 
investment? So when you speak to people, there are areas here where there is an 
overlap. I have my budget, I have my responsibility to my investor, I have my 
audience, I have done  research...400.000 people came this year, 750.000 people came 
this year....thank you very much. Or you say to somebody interested in Poland, for 
example, in tourism...let’s look at maps, so we have Vienna, we have Prague, and 
Budapest, and Kraków...and we also have Baltic, we have Gdańsk. There is a huge 
amount to be seen, but a lot of it is not Polish, a lot of it is from everywhere. They find 
it very difficult to cooperate. I am not saying that this is unique to Poland as it isn’t. 
People have a better understanding of what is in Spain and then what is in Poland. So 
if you are trying to get a tourist to come to Poland, there is the whole issue of the 
relationships, or where it all comes from...so tourist go to Vienna, Budapest, Kraków 
and they find it complicated. But they don’t want it complicated, they only have five 
days. Where would you go on holiday? I went to Austria, I went to Czech Republic, 
and I went to Poland..it was all Habsburg. So, it is all complicated... 
 
Are you in a way trying to say that those organisations compete with one another?  
 
No, they don’t compete. They ignore each other. Because tourism looks at what it 
regards as tourism and it doesn’t think that it is anything to do with foreign direct 
investment. Foreign direct investment thinks it has nothing to do with tourism. They 
don’t see that there is coherence between them. They just ignore each other. They have 
nothing to say to each other.   
 
Fine. When did you start cooperating...or monitoring the market in Poland?  
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I mean, I get on well with Krzysztof and Maciej. I like them and I think they like me.  
 
Have you noted any changes in promotion of Poland since 2003?  
 
I have noticed a lot of changes in peoples’ attitudes towards Poland, but that hasn’t got 
to do with the ways Poles have emerged and how Poland has emerged within the 
European Union...the political changes and so on. But, I have noticed no changes 
about promotion of Poland. I have noticed changes in the way people write about 
Poland, but it is not because of promotion of Poland. It is because the way they 
perceive Poland. Another word, perceptions of Poland are actually beginning to 
change, despite the fact that nobody is doing anything about it. 
 
So what would you say is the biggest challenge when it comes to nation branding in 
Poland?  
 
The biggest challenge is getting people to do something in a coherent fashion, which 
doesn’t undermine or detract from individual initiatives. That is the biggest problem.  
 
Fine. I guess that is pretty much it. Can I ask few more personal questions? It is just 
for a biographical note.  
 
Of course you can.  
 
You said that read history at the university. Have you got any marketing 
qualifications?  
 
Sorry... 
 
Have you got any marketing qualifications?  
 
I don’t have anything like that... 
 
So when it comes to marketing you are a self-made man?  
 
I suppose you could say that. When you go up on the website it says who I am. By the 
way, have you read my book about nation branding?  
 
I have read a lot of stuff about nation branding, propaganda, particularly British 
propaganda and when it was institutionalised and the US overseas propaganda, 
particularly United States Information Agency.   
 
So you have read all this stuff, what’s your view of nation branding?  
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Can I send you my PhD? Sure. I would not like to say anything now as I don’t think 
it would be professional.   
 
You are too academic for me [noise]...  
 
You are a marketing person, you sell marketing ideas... 
 
I am not a marketing person. I am partly academic, partly creative, and partly strategic. 
I am a very unusual mixture. I am not an ordinary marketing person.  
 
I realised that...I am just a PhD student with policies behind him and the university 
does not allow me...they simply tell me to shut up for the time being... 
 
Is it a subject worth studying, nation branding?  
 
Well, I am trying...it is.... 
 
Most people don’t know anything about it.... 
 
There have been some PhDs written on this subject...there is a lot of publications 
about public diplomacy as well.  
 
Most of the stuff about nation branding is terrible. It is not good. Most of the articles, 
it is not thoughtful, it is not...Simon Anholt is a good thinker.  
 
I know his work. Financial details of your cooperation with Poland, is that 
confidential?  
 
[Nods]. It wasn’t much.  
 
Fine. I have read in interviews that you complaint about it. Are you working with 
anyone on nation branding at the moment...? 
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APPENDIX 6 SAMPLE OF PRESS RELEASES ON NATION BRANDING  
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APPENDIX 7 ‘EUROPE IS BIGGER’ CAMPAIGN: NATIONAL LOGOTYPE 
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NAZWA PISANA PO POLSKU 
NALEŻYMY DO EUROPY, 
UŻYWAMY ALFABETU 
ŁACIŃSKIEGO I JESTEŚMY 
SOBĄ 
NAJSILNIEJ 
ROZPOZNAWALNY W 
ŚWIECIE, WSPÓŁCZESNY 
SYMBOL ZWIĄZANY Z 
POLSKĄ 
LOT, PROCES 
UWOLNIENIA, RUCH, 
DYNAMIKA 
PIERWSZA KONSTRUKCJA 
DZIAŁAJĄCA (DZIECKO) 
MARZENIE, MŁODOŚĆ, 
ŚWIADOMOŚĆ 
PRZYSZŁYCH 
MOŻLIWOŚCI 
PRZEDMIOT PRAKTYCZNY I MAGICZNY 
ZARAZEM 
POLSKA 
SZACHOWNICA 
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APPENDIX 8 ‘AN ECONOMY UNDER ITS OWN FLAG’ CAMPAIGN 
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APPENDIX 9 ‘POLAND. DISCOVER AND SAVOUR’ CAMPAIGN  
 
   
 
 
 
 
